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PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY

BY

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MY

FATHER AND MOTHER

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PREFACE

As the central connecting thread of this book, I have aimed to present the idea that we all begin our lives as babies, that is, as the remotest of aliens, and develop into personalities by means of our social environment. Subsidiary to this is the sobering yet encouraging thought that all of our social structures are experiments in the arts of living, and therefore subject to continuous change and in need of rational control.

Further, I have aimed to describe and emphasize the scientific attitude, to open the eyes and minds of students to the order in our seemingly disorderly and changing social life, and to arouse an interest in further study in this rapidly expanding field of investigation. I do not find these matters sufficiently stressed in any one text and hence the preparation of this one.

It will be evident that I have drawn rather liberally from two main sources—the recent *Science of Society* by Sumner and Keller, and an *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* by Park and Burgess. These works seem to me to represent the ablest statements of the prevailing points of view in the subject at the present time, and I have endeavored to weave them together into something of a system. Obviously I do not find this in any other book. I am, of course, greatly indebted to these writers.

But I wish also to thank my loyal colleagues, Professors North, Miller and Spaeth, and Messers James, Timmons, and Ozer, for their unsparing services and continued encouragement.

FREDERICK E. LUMLEY.

COLUMBUS, O.
July, 1928.

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PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY

CHAPTER I

PREPARING OUR MINDS

Every course of study ought to be an agreeable combination of an exploration trip and an excursion; that is, it ought to be informing and interesting. But no journey of exploration or excursion, or both, can be satisfactorily entered upon and concluded without careful preparations beforehand. For a trip of exploration, one must assemble various and numerous items of equipment—maps, guides, tools—and have something more or less definite in mind as the object of search. For a delightful excursion, one must provide suitable dress, tasty lunch, agreeable companions, choose a fine day, and select a suitable spot. Since our journey at this time is to be one of mental traveling, we must make adequate mental preparations; we cannot go quite empty-headed; we cannot go along without personal initiative and expect to achieve anything.

Of prime importance, first of all, is some knowledge of that marvelous social movement in the modern world called *science;* we must learn something about science—its attitude, its methods, it aims, and its limitations. Then we ought to become decidedly awake to the special difficulties of this particular sort of science, the difficulties of applying science to ourselves. Then we ought to make a chart of our journey. Let us prepare ourselves by studying what these things mean.

1. Fundamental Attitudes

Perhaps there are four fundamental attitudes—an attitude being defined as a susceptibility to certain kinds of stimuli and a readiness to respond repeatedly in a given way—which are possible toward our world and the parts of it which impinge upon us.

1. We might remain as indifferent as possible. We might take the attitude of the Oriental official who replied to a Western enquirer as follows:

> My illustrious Friend and Joy of my Liver:
>
> The thing which you ask of me is both difficult and useless. Although I have passed all my days in this place I have never counted the houses nor inquired into the number of the inhabitants; and as to what one person loads on his mules and another stores away in the bottom of his ship, that is no business of mine. But above all, as to the previous history of this city, God

> only knows the amount of dirt and confusion that the infidels may have eaten before the coming of the sword of Islam . . . Listen, O my son! There is no wisdom equal to the belief in God. He created the world and shall we liken ourselves to him by seeking to penetrate into the mysteries of his creation? Shall we say, Behold this star spinneth round that star, and this other star with a tail goeth and cometh in so many years? Let it go! He from whose hand it came will guide and direct it . . . Thou art learned in the things I care not for, and as for that which thou hast seen, I spit upon it. Will much knowledge create thee a double belly, or wilt thou seek paradise with thine eyes . . . ?
>
> Thy meek in spirit,
> Imaum Ali Zadi.[1]

This is one attitude. But more and more in the Western world we would all like to *know* ever so many things—what the weather will be next week when our picnic comes off or the hay is to be cut, what grain will sell for next fall, what will cure our diseases, what preservatives were used in embalming by the ancient Egyptians, why Rome fell, how to get this lesson, what the neighbors are saying about our new hat, where to find a job, what gave the baby the colic, and so on. Most people are driven by curiosity or by the exigencies of their situations to be informed along some lines. Indeed, their happiness and often their very existence depends upon knowing; and pain and death come all too often from not knowing. Even the disdainful Oriental mentioned above was absorbed in gathering what he thought was the wisdom of God.

But how does anybody *know* anything? This appears to be a silly question at first, but it is a very old question and a very profound one. The most distinguished knowers the human race has ever entertained have given it prolonged and painstaking study and with none too satisfactory results; no scholar is yet certain that he knows how he knows what he knows. "Thus mathematics may be defined," says the great mathematician Bertrand Russell, "as the subject in which we never know what we are talking about nor whether what we say is true."[2]

It is not our purpose here to attempt an answer. What we wish to point out is how many learners have worked at the problem; and in doing this we shall distinguish three attitudes—the others of the four mentioned—which are possible for those who wish to know. We shall indicate briefly what these possibilities are and then take up one of them for careful consideration.

2. There is, first, the *practical* attitude, the attitude of those who are impatient of speculation and theorizing, who cannot abide dreamers, who regard visionary and studious people as a nuisance, who have no use for general principles and formulæ. Their motto is "Get something done" or, in the language of Bernard Shaw, "For Gawd's sake, do something." They want the roads repaired, the war carried through,

[1] Ross, "Principles of Sociology," p. 509.

[2] Parsons, "Black Science," *Harpers Magazine*, June, 1927.

the prisons cleaned, the bridge built, politics fumigated, at once and according to the dictates of common sense. These practical, hard-headed people are doers first, then knowers. They are knowers by doing, by crude and costly fumbling, by short-sighted experimentation in the world's affairs. All of this massive effort in the direction of profound and prolonged research is nonsense to them. A college education and book learning, with their calls for brooding, reflection, judging, analysis, inference, and detached, impersonal, intellectual grappling with problems which are not pressing on them, are mostly waste time, in their view.

3. In the next place, there is the *emotional* attitude, an attitude which is quite distinct from the one just characterized. One finds this dominant in artists of various kinds. The poet reveals it by exclaiming: "Oh, wondrous beautiful is God's earth, and good it is to be a man upon it." Thomas Hardy was moved to say:

> Whence comes solace? Not from seeing,
> What is doing, suffering, being;
> Not from noting Life's conditions,
> Not from heeding Time's monitions;
> But in cleaving to the Dream
> And in gazing at the Gleam
> Whereby gray things golden seem.
>
> —"On a Fine Morning."

"Is it so small a thing to have enjoyed the sun?" asked a sage of old, and of course we know what his answer was. Those who are dominated by the emotional attitude are the revelers in the world's beauties. They are the intuitionists, who receive truth directly and without long search. They know, or claim to know, by flashes, by illuminations, by immediate insights, or by inspiration. They do not *learn* by commonplace methods; they *feel* and *see* at once and thus know. If they feel that they know, that is all the evidence that they need.

4. Then there is the *scientific* attitude. The scientist, contrary to certain expressions of opinion, is not indifferent to reform, not necessarily blind to the beauties in the world, not necessarily unable to put on his coat or drive a nail. Thus, he is not always different from the people just described. But above all things, he is devoted to the task of knowing by means of a *slowly evolved and elaborate technique*—to be described a little later. "He thinks more of lucidity and formulæ than of loaves and fishes," as one writer puts it. He believes that human beings are very generally gullible and easily mistaken. He understands that many persons who will accept nothing but a certified check on a bank yet trust implicitly to what is printed on a bottle label or what is impetuously uttered at the club. He thinks that, as a rule, truth does not come by flashes, by illuminations, but rather by painstaking and laborious effort and constant verification.

Comparing these three attitudes, we may admit that they are all true ways of knowing; at least, we cannot prove that they are not. The discoveries of the practical man and the insights of the emotional people may be as true as the findings of a thousand scientists working together and checking on each other. But the essential difference is here, perhaps: When the practical and emotional people find out something, they rarely know how they came to find it out, and they can almost never prove it; they just know it, and other people can take it or leave it. On the other hand, when scientists find out something, they can usually show how they came to such conclusions, and they can show others how to reach them, so that, if others are doubtful—well, they can go ahead and prove it for themselves.

These three fundamental attitudes have been distinguished for purposes of exposition. As a matter of fact, they are found combined in most people to a greater or lesser degree, and all three are exhibited under different circumstances. The practical man does not cease to be foolish over his lovely wife; the emotional man is "hard as nails" on occasion; the scientist sometimes likes to see things done. But what we usually find, in any one of us or in outstanding personalities, is a marked tendency in one of these three directions, a high development of the one attitude and a comparative subordination of the others.

Professor J. Arthur Thomson, the distinguished biologist, says:

> These three moods correspond symbolically to hand, heart and head, and they are all equally necessary and worthy. "And the eye cannot say unto the hand, I have no need of thee; nor again the head to the feet, I have no need of you." They are all worthy, but most so when they respect one another as equally justifiable outlooks on nature, and when they are combined, in adjusted proportions, in a full human life. But that is so difficult of attainment, especially when great excellence in one direction has been inherited or acquired, that the disproportionate developments we have spoken of are apt to occur. They are often the more dangerous because of the very strength which the exaggeration gives to its possessor. This is part of the penalty of genius.[1]

But we have a road to travel, and we must narrow the question, How does anybody know anything? to this: How do *scientists* know anything? And yet the narrowing is not a severe limitation, for, as Sir Michael Foster has admitted:

> Men of science have no peculiar virtues, no special powers. They are ordinary men, their characters are common, even commonplace. Science, as Huxley said, is organized common-sense, and men of science are common men, drilled in the ways of common-sense.

Scientists may be common, even commonplace, men. But the significant point here is in the last sentence of the quotation—"drilled in the ways of common-sense;" and if one term in this quotation stands out above

[1] "An Introduction to Science," p. 14.

the rest it is the term "drilled." In concluding his autobiography, Darwin wrote:

> With such moderate abilities as I possess, it is truly surprising that I should have influenced to any considerable extent the belief of scientific men on some important points. My success as a man of science has been determined, as far as I can judge, by complex and diversified mental qualities and conditions. Of these, the most important have been the love of science, unbounded patience in long reflecting over any subject, industry in observing and collecting facts, a fair share of invention as well as of common sense.

2. The Scientific Attitude

Despite repeated assertions and assembled evidence to the effect that all great scientists have simply and honestly wished and worked to know as much as possible about themselves and their world, much has been said and is still being said against science and especially against certain kinds of science. Some hold that all science is a snare and a delusion. Others defend it in a wholesale fashion. But what *is* science? "If you would talk with me," said a great man, "define your terms."

Many thick volumes have been devoted to the answer to this question; hence, only a glimpse can be given here. A working definition was given above. Another is this: Science is a system of knowledge built up on the basis of a characteristic mood, by means of amply tested methods, and with a definite purpose. Three terms in this definition give us points of departure for what we have to say—the mood, the method, the purpose. And a very interesting and helpful way of considering these matters is to illustrate them from the life and work of the great Charles Darwin, who was born in England in 1809 and died in 1882.

1. The Scientific Mood.—Darwin grew up in a time when the usual explanation of the countless varieties of living things was in the terms of the popularly accepted tradition of special creation, and when it was blasphemous and dangerous to take any other view. Early in life he was curious, but he had no other explanation. As a young man, he was accustomed to take long and solitary walks and to be somewhat introspective. He was fond of music and read Shakespeare, Scott, and Byron with a keen relish. While at Cambridge University, he read a charming book of travel, Humboldt's "Personal Narrative," and also Sir John Herschel's "Introduction to the Study of Natural Philosophy." These books, he says, "stirred up in me a burning zeal to add even the most humble contribution to the noble structure of the Natural Science."

He also read Lyell's "Principles of Geology," a book which explained the various rock formations somewhat differently from the traditional explanation. In addition, he read the famous "Essay on Population" by the English clergyman, Thomas Malthus. He studied botany under Henslow and geology under Sedgwick and gradually became a "doubting

Thomas" with respect to the accepted creation theory. Here, then, was a problem shaping itself in the back of his mind—so many varieties of living things, and an inadequate account of how they came to be. What was he to do? He could not, as most of us do, dismiss the subject and rest content; his "burning zeal" would not allow him the pleasures of intellectual sluggishness.

Sir Michael Foster was not speaking particularly of Darwin, but might have been speaking of him, when he said that the nature of a scientist must vibrate in unison with that of which he is in search; that the seeker after truth must be himself truthful, truthful with the truthfulness of nature; that he must be alert of mind and ever ready to hear the whisperings and see the signs which nature is ever making; that while scientific inquiry is preeminently an intellectual effort, the scientist must have moral courage—the courage of steadfast endurance.[1]

Professor J. Arthur Thomson was not writing particularly about Darwin, but might have been, when he said that the chief features of the scientific mood are a "passion for facts," "cautiousness of statement," "clearness of vision," and "a sense of the inter-relatedness of things." The passion which Darwin had for facts has been commented upon over and over again; his cautiousness of statement is exhibited by his reluctance to publish his epoch-making book, "The Origin of Species," until 1859; his clearness of vision enabled him to see beneath the surface of things as the botanist is enabled to "see through his tree, see wood and bast, cambium and medullary rays, all in their proper place"; his sense of the interrelatedness of things is revealed by his famous picture, "Web of Life."[2]

We have now seen that Darwin grew doubtful of customary explanations; we have seen that he had a burning zeal to contribute something to knowledge; we have pointed out his passion for evidence, his clearness of vision, his courage, his truthfulness, and his caution. His description of his little daughter who died is of itself enough to show the extraordinarily fine quality of his affections, and his relations with his children were almost ideal in gentleness, kindness, and companionableness; he was also a good friend and acquaintance. He felt strongly upon the subject of human slavery. He came to see, during his long voyage round the world on the *Beagle* (1831 to 1836)— that the pleasures of observing and reasoning were of a much higher order than those of the sportsman— a pursuit to which he was much given in early life.[3]

These are the chief qualities of the scientific mood; and they help us to distinguish science, as a human movement, from most other human movements. They reveal the inner condition, the spiritual state, we

[1] THOMSON, "Introduction to Science," p. 15.

[2] *Cf.* THOMSON, *op. cit.*, p. 21 *ff.*

[3] *Cf.* WOODBERRY, "Literary Memoirs of the Nineteenth Century," p. 116.

might say, of the scientist as he carries on his work. But how does he work? How did Darwin work?

2. The Scientific Method.—The eminent biometrician (life measurer), Karl Pearson, says:

> Scientific method consists in the careful and often laborious classification of facts, in the comparison of their relationships and sequences, and, finally, in the discovery by aid of a disciplined imagination of a brief statement or *formula*, which in a few words resumes a wide range of facts.

Several points here are worthy of emphasis, and it will be useful to arrange them under two heads.

a. Technique.—By this term is meant the several types of skills employed by scientists. Darwin was, as has been said, an indefatigable collector of facts. As a youth, he was fond of making collections of coins, seals, minerals, and insects. Later on, he followed the Baconian principles and collected on a wholesale scale without any theory of his own. He became a slave to facts. Most of us, however, are more like Lloyd George. Premier Hughes of Australia was once asked: "What sort of man is this Lloyd George, anyway?" He replied: "Well, he is a very able fellow, but he is one of those men who will never stand any d—— nonsense from a fact."[1]

But what is a fact? This is a most difficult question to answer in words; but, briefly stated, we may say that a fact is an experience or an external reality which we cannot fashion to suit our wishes; it is something which cannot be forced or denied, and which is verifiable by other investigators; it is something which is *there,* is unchangeable, whether we will or no. As the Scotch have put it, "Facts are chiels which wi' na' ding"—facts are things which won't go as you want them to.

Collecting facts implies prior interest in given directions (scientific mood again) and calls for such qualities as observation, clear seeing, precision, discrimination, impartiality, and caution. Failures at one or all of these points are the common vices of the unscientific. We cannot take the space to illustrate all of these practices, but a word or two on *observation* must suffice.

Darwin says:

> Of reptiles, there are many kinds: one snake (a Trigonocephalus or Cophias), from the size of the poison channel in its fangs, must be very deadly. Cuvier, in opposition to some other naturalists, makes this a sub-genus of the rattlesnake, and intermediate between it and the viper. In confirmation of this opinion, I observed a fact, which appears to me very curious and instructive, as showing how every character, even though it may be in some degree independent of structure, has a tendency to vary by slow degrees. The extremity of the tail of this snake is terminated by a point, which is very slightly enlarged; and as the animal glides along, it constantly vibrates the last inch; and this part striking against

[1] Foreign Policy Association *Pamphlet* 44, p. 27.

the dry grass and brushwood, produces a rattling noise, which can be distinctly heard at the distance of six feet. As often as the animal was irritated or surprised, its tail was shaken; and the vibrations were extremely rapid. Even as long as the body retained its irritability, a tendency to this habitual movement was evident. This Trigonocephalus has, therefore, in some respects, the structure of a viper, with the habits of a rattlesnake; the noise, however, being produced by a simpler device. The expression of this snake's face was hideous and fierce; the pupil consisted of a vertical slit in a mottled and coppery iris; the jaws were broad at the base, and the nose terminated in a triangular projection . . . [1]

Let us notice carefully the numerous, precise, detailed observations exemplified in this one brief description. Nothing escapes his attention. And we could include, if they were needed, hundreds of such pictures showing the same thing. After Darwin returned from the voyage on the *Beagle*, he spent eight years upon barnacles! This was most laborious research. At Cambridge he was a mere collector; during the voyage around the world he was a collector and an observer; after this study of barnacles he was a trained naturalist.[2]

Another characteristic activity of science is *measurement*. Darwin did not have so much occasion to use this device as the inorganic scientists have; but he would have been the most thoroughgoing measurer had he been called upon to do so. Let us, therefore, interpolate the words of Lord Kelvin at this point:

> Accurate and minute measurement seems to the non-scientific imagination a less lofty and dignified work than looking for something new. But nearly all the grandest discoveries of science have been but the rewards of accurate measurement and patient, long-continued labor in the minute sifting of numerical results.

This is impressive testimony to the value of such well-known but not well-appreciated practices as weighing; computing lengths, breadths, heights; putting into containers; tabulating and recording. While, as we have said, Darwin did not make much use of these, it was, in fact, the overwhelming numbers of facts which finally convinced him of his evolutionary theory. When almost all of the vast numbers of bits of evidence pointed in one direction—what was he to do? *Numbers* do count in science.

Calculations about size and shape make a third procedure possible, namely, *arrangement* or *classification*. Darwin found that he could class certain insects, certain fish, certain birds, certain snakes together and then sum them all up, make them intellectually manageable, by reference to some common feature. His exhaustive work on barnacles shows that very clearly.

Experimentation is a very common and important procedure in the inorganic and lower organic sciences; indeed, it is what laboratories are

[1] "Journal of Researches," p. 109.

[2] *Cf.* OSBORN, "Impressions of Great Naturalists," p. 50 *ff.*

for. This means that certain materials are subjected to certain known conditions, and the results are carefully recorded; then one condition after another is changed, and the results are recorded. This process is carried on until the nature and the behavior of the subject stand revealed.

The biological scientist works in laboratories, but of course the technique varies with the materials in hand. The biological scientist cuts and lays open the insides of animals and plants; he injects certain chemicals and records the results; he withholds certain foods and notes the consequences; he breeds certain animals and observes the offspring.

Darwin was particularly fond of pigeons, and he had the following advantages in his breeding experiments; they were plentiful, they were not expensive, they bred freely, and nobody took offense at the consequences. So he carried on a series of experiments to see what they might reveal relative to his growing theory. He

> . . . soon perceived that selection was the keystone of man's success in making useful races of animals and plants. Breeders of pigeons and cattle, and horticulturists had long studied how to produce certain breeds, or to intensify certain characters which they valued; and their ends were gained by selecting and matching the most suitable parents and excluding all others, by giving particular foods, etc. Nature gave successive variations; man added them up in directions useful to him. Thus in many cases breeds were produced differing in colour, size, and other points, more widely than distinct species in a state of nature.[1]

And this discovery that selection is the keystone to man's success helped him to see that nature also selects. We all know more or less about his idea of *natural selection.*

Another very important activity of scientists is *verification.* By this is meant that a good scientist not only goes over his experiments and conclusions again and again until he is absolutely sure that nothing could have happened by accident and without his knowledge, but he also makes his methods and results available to others so that they can check on him and make the conclusions doubly sure. Scientists are, as a rule, the most merciless critics of each other.

Darwin verified by his pigeon breeding; he verified by collecting facts everywhere; he verified by taking note of every contrary case presented to him and then dealing with it. He was most remarkable in this that he was scrupulously careful to *make a record of all contrary evidence* so that he would not conveniently forget it in the interests of maintaining his theory. He was not interested in theories but in truth. In his autobiography, he says:

> I have steadily endeavored to keep my mind free so as to give up any hypothesis (however much beloved), and I cannot resist forming one on every subject, as soon as facts are shown to be opposed to it.

[1] "Journal of Researches," p. 8.

The story is told that the great Herbert Spencer was a member of a famous club in London. On one occasion, the subject under discussion was the drama and especially tragedy. A fellow member remarked caustically that Spencer's idea of a tragedy was a neat deduction (hypothesis) killed by a new fact. This weakness of Spencer only throws the strength of Darwin into stronger relief. Darwin always welcomed new facts and said, on one occasion, that if there was a single case which could not be explained by the evolutionary theory, that theory was unsound. No scientist has verified more carefully than Darwin.

b. Logic.—But while the scientist is behaving in ways which may be observed—collecting, examining minutely, measuring, experimenting, classifying, verifying, etc.—his head is busier than his hands. There is vastly more to scientific method than what has already been set down or than any one can observe. Science is, at bottom, a process of *logical thinking.* Let us see briefly how scientists think.

Sound thinking seems to start at a certain point and pass through four stages or have four phases. First, there is a *problem*, something which is not clear, a dark place or gap in knowledge, an uncertainty or an obstruction ahead, a mystery. And Darwin had a problem as soon as he began to doubt the prevailing and scriptural explanation of origins. It was this, as we have seen: How did all of the countless species and varieties of living things come into existence?

In the second place, there comes a *suggestion* or hint, from some source, of a possible explanation. In Darwin's case, this suggestion came from Lyell and especially from Malthus. The latter had said that human beings tend to multiply beyond the power of subsistance; then follow disease and famine to reduce them. Darwin seized on this. There are, perhaps, five links in his chain of solution: (1) the prodigality of nature, (2) the struggle for existence, (3) variation, (4) survival of the fittest, (5) heredity.[1] The prodigality of nature was an obvious fact; variation was an obvious fact; heredity was an obvious matter. The *suggestions* or hints were "the struggle for existence," and "the survival of the fittest." These were possibilities in accounting for the existence of so many species and varieties.

Next, and thirdly, our minds seize upon some of the suggestions or hints—and they usually come to fertile minds in numbers– as having more promise than others, and we *scrutinize* them very carefully and try to apply them. Darwin recognized that Malthus had made a most valuable suggestion when he said that population was cut down and held within bounds by disease and famine. His mind was like a detective on a trail. Here was a clue, a promising clue, and he followed it relentlessly.

After looking, in the fourth place, over the various suggestions and after scrutinizing them very carefully and trying them out, we are apt to

[1] *Cf.* Bristol, "Social Adaptation," p. 59, quoting Conn.

reach a tentative solution or, as we say, frame a *hypothesis*. Then research is continued, and this tentative solution is modified or abandoned as it fails to fit the new facts. Darwin faced the profusion of varieties in nature and framed the hypothesis called *natural selection*. To his problem, "Can nature, with long enough time, do what man in a short time is able to accomplish by use of reason and choice?" he answered, after years of study, that variation gives new beginnings, the struggle for existence selects them, the best adapted survive and reproduce, and thus new species and varieties come into existence.

Then he set at work with indefatigable persistence to verify this theory before publishing it to the world; and he would have hesitated longer had not Alfred Russell Wallace, after a tour in the South Seas, reached the same conclusion from independent investigations, and had not friends urged Darwin to take the credit by announcing what he had found out.[1]

While speaking of the logic of science, we should call attention to some important mental processes accompanying the foregoing and an integral part of them, but reserved for special mention. Facts and relations are not always what they seem to be. *Inference*, which is a process of intellectual bridge building, is therefore, always necessary. What are the modes of inference?

Analogical reasoning is the kind that we employ when we go, in our thinking, from one particular fact to another particular fact:

> When Darwin argued from the particular variations which he observed in his domesticated pigeons and cultivated plants to variations which might have occurred in unthinkably distant periods, he was trusting to analogical reasoning.

When we say, as we often do: This is *like* that, therefore, . . . we are using this method. "The childhood shows the man," said Milton, "as morning shows the day." Charles Dickens paid his respects to the terrible schoolmaster Squeers as follows:

> Mr. Squeers' appearance was not prepossessing. He had but one eye, and the popular prejudice runs in favor of two. The eye he had was unquestionably useful, but decidedly not ornamental; being of a greenish grey, and in shape resembling the fan-light of a street door.[2]

The point is that if we find an unfamiliar thing which is like a familiar thing, we think we know more about the former.

Inductive reasoning is the kind that we employ when we proceed from many particular facts to some universal truth. When we say, for instance: This apple falls to the ground; that apple falls to the ground;

[1] On the thought processes, see BODE, "Fundamentals of Education," Chaps. VI–VII. He goes back to Dewey.

[2] "Nicholas Nickleby."

the other apple falls; this plum falls; that pear falls; the stick falls—and so keep on accumulating instances up to great numbers—then we arrive at a generalization; we arrive at a universal conclusion; and we formulate the "law of gravitation," that is, we frame up a formula which includes all of these particular cases.

Darwin gathered thousands of facts or instances, bits of evidence, but even then he was some trillions short of the total; his acquaintance with the facts was vastly wider than that of most people, but it was relatively small in comparison with the total. From these cases, he made an inference; they all seemed to point in one direction; he reasoned that "natural selection" was universal—like gravitation. Darwin is a particularly good case of the use of this method.

The third mode of inference is *deduction.* This is a process of starting with some universal proposition or truth and then showing that any particular new fact is but one instance. We may briefly characterize it as going from universals to particulars. It might be compared (note the analogy) to the method of a magician who puts the rabbits in the hat first and then is always able to take them out before the audience. Take a syllogism as an example of this type of reasoning:

All men are mortal;
Socrates is a man:
Therefore Socrates is mortal.

In this case, the only real question is this: Is Socrates a man? Then, if he is, he is deftly included in the major premise with which the argument starts, namely, "All men are mortal." But if the question is raised: How are universal truths established? the answer is that they must be established by piling up particular cases (induction) or by *intuition.* As a matter of fact, induction and deduction are carried on by all of us all the time, and they are not distinguishable in the living work of thinking; we are hardly ever aware that we are employing now one and now the other.[1]

3. The Purpose of Science.—With some understanding of the mood and the method of science, we now inquire, in the third place: What is the aim of science? or, What are the aims of science? In trying to answer this question, let us ask another: Why do we ever investigate anything? If we examine our motives, we find that they are mainly of two sorts—experiencing the satisfactions of knowing, understanding, comprehending, and learning how to adjust ourselves to and, if possible, control our environment. The first means gaining knowledge for its own sake; it means the thrill of knowing. Darwin, as we have seen, found that the *pleasures* of observing and reasoning were of a higher order than those of sport; observing and reasoning were sport to him.

[1] *Cf.* THOMSON, "Introduction to Science," p. 58 *ff.*; LINDEMAN, "Social Discovery," p. 30 *ff.*; PEARSON, "The Grammar of Science," p. 32 *ff.*

There is not only this subjective aim of science but also an objective aim—adjustment and control. We want to keep ourselves alive and to live well; we want to ward off enemies and to make all sorts of conveniences to save ourselves effort; we want to be able to see how things—industrial, religious, governmental, and others—are going so that we can fit in or take direction. In short, we want to make our physical world tributary to our happiness and success.

But while this is the general aim of science, there is an important subsidiary aim of pure science, namely, the discovery and formulation of *laws*, the making of brief resumés of the infinitude of details so that they may become intellectually manageable. In other words, scientists aim to uncover the *uniformities* in all the world —uniformities which we can rely upon, uniformities upon which we can predict—so that we may know how to live.

More than this, science is also an organized effort to "discover new ways of searching," and, after all is said and done, this is probably the aim of pure science, as against applied science, which is an effort to work intelligently toward the solution of our practical problems. Science is functional; its purpose is to solve problems; it is the ally of an evolving and expanding life on earth. And judging by any and all of these criteria, Darwin was one of the greatest scientists human society has ever recognized.

4. The Limitations of Science.—As science has expanded, countless pet notions, superstitions, guesses—and activities based thereupon—have been shown to be untenable. This has occasioned many people extreme suffering. The coming of the theory and facts of evolution has robbed millions of their naive faith in a sudden and finished creation and the correlated conception of the Almighty; it has made them unhappy; it has made them angry. Of late, many have been seriously disturbed particularly over the threat of science to show that our world is pure mechanism—and then what would become of our "free wills?"[1]

But before we become too depressed over this prospect—although neither optimism nor pessimism has any place in science—let us ask: What are the limitations of science? How far can it go? Professor Thompson, already quoted, admits that science has many limitations; the greatest scientists are readiest to admit its shortcomings. Thompson points out that it always deals with abstracted parts of the world; it always arbitrarily limits its field; it always takes parts as typical of wholes; it always works with symbols or "counters" which are not self-explanatory; its causal explanations are only partial, since it rests content with finding secondary causes and never pretends to get back to the *first cause;* the sense organs of scientists are often defective; the reasonings of scientists often go astray; many distinguished men have

[1] *Cf.* Otto, "Things and Ideals," pp. 214, 220.

abandoned themselves to what have come to be known as "the follies of science"—squaring the circle, perpetual motion, the philosopher's stone, the elixir of life, and the rest.[1]

But science is self-correcting in a way in which superstition is not; it has turned away from many of these follies. Let us, therefore, not be afraid of it. Let us be afraid only of error, of unproved notions and positions. Scientists are not gods; they are only earnest men and women—searching for truth.[2]

3. The Difficulties of the Social Sciences

We asked earlier in this chapter: How does anybody know anything? Then we asked: How do scientists know anything? We have now to narrow the question still further and ask: How do social scientists know anything? Despite the limitations mentioned above, the natural sciences have made astonishing progress toward an understanding of our world and in helping us to live more successfully. The social sciences have lagged lamentably. If "the proper study of mankind is Man," as Pope long ago said, then not very many have found this out until lately. How may we account for this?

Social scientists approach their task with the limitations already noted and with some extra handicaps which must be considered. Social scientists are limited (1) by their inability to carry on systematic experimentation among human beings and (2) by human prejudices.

1. Limitations on Experimentation.—We are all familiar with the heaven-sent howls of the antivivisectionists who oppose the use of animals in laboratory experimentation. Those who would propose or attempt to experiment with human beings in the same manner would cause a revulsion to run through the populace, and they would be driven out. This opposition to such experimentation with human beings has been fixed in custom, law, and sentiment. Any sociologist who would propose, for example, to have a white man marry a colored woman in order to see how they would get along and what the offspring would be like, or who would urge that the churches all dissolve and go out of business to see if the Almighty would be angry, or who would advocate a dissolution of our capitalistic organization and a trial of the Russian plan—such a person would be mobbed. Thus, social scientists are shut away from the use of the most important parts of the natural-science technique.

But there is some mitigation of this serious handicap to be noted. First, experimentation is allowed more and more in emergencies. For instance, doctors are experimenting all the time upon sick people. When

[1] *Cf.* Ayers, "Science: The False Messiah," many passages; Sullivan, "Beethoven and the Modern World," *New Republic*, July 20, 1927.

[2] *Cf.* Thomson, "The Outline of Science," p. 172 *ff.*

we are ill we have to trust to what skill and knowledge are available, and these are not always of the best. It is sometimes said that doctors bury their failures. In social emergencies, many schemes are allowed which would evoke a storm of disapproval at other times. So, little by little, the scientists are pressing their case, and more experimentation is being allowed all the time.

In the second place, there is the evident fact that human beings experiment all the time and thus provide evidence for the investigator. They do marry across race lines; churches do go out of business; capitalistic organizations do dissolve; people commingle in innumerable ways; they engage in all sorts of adventures; they do every fool thing that a scientist could wish. But there is this difficulty still that these experiments are not "controlled" as the scientist understands control. And the only way in which this difficulty can be offset is greatly to widen the field of observation and to collect evidence far more extensively. Naturally, this slows up the work of assembling evidence and formulating laws.

2. Human Prejudices.—The inability to experiment and human prejudices are combined and supplement each other; they make a vicious circle. Social scientists cannot experiment in any systematic way, because they and their subjects are prejudiced against it; and they are prejudiced against it largely because they do not experiment. We can say, then, that the social sciences have been so slow in developing because of these prejudices or what Spencer called the "biases."[1] We have to do here with characteristic "mental sets" which are not easy to erradicate. But let us take an illustration.

A zoologist may study a bug as openly, as freely, and as fully as possible. He may reach any conclusions which the facts warrant about the bug; and the bug will not care a whit what conclusions he reaches or what he says about it; it has no pride in itself and no opinion of itself; it has no prestige to maintain; it will not be offended if the conclusions are depreciatory. But let the sociologist study his mother-in-law and her relations with the family. He does not approach his task, he cannot approach his task, in an entirely disinterested manner. He is biased to start with—either for or against her. Moreover, the conclusions which he reaches and announces will make a vast difference to her and to her relations with him and others. She has pride; she has an opinion of herself; she has prestige to maintain. Before he goes very far in his inquiry, he is apt to decide *not* to reach the warranted conclusions or at least not to announce them. There is the sorrowful story of a man who mistook a bumblebee for a blackberry and then became sore at the whole world.

A brief definition of a bias or prejudice is not easy to give. Satisfactory definitions in this field are few. There are more troubles here than

[1] "The Study of Sociology," several chapters.

in some other fields. Yet other fields have their difficulties. "What is ratio?" asked the teacher. "Ratio is proportion," answered the student. "What is proportion?" pressed the teacher. "Proportion is ratio," answered the wise one. "But what are ratio and proportion?" persisted the teacher. "Each other," answered the student. For our purposes, however, it is enough to say that a prejudice is a prejudgment; it is a position which is assumed before evidence and without evidence; or it is a position assumed with too little evidence—as in the case with the man stung by the bumblebee! "One swallow does not make a summer." Bernard says:

> A prejudice arises from the strong conditioning of certain psychic behavior or attitudes to certain corresponding stimuli and the dissociation of inhibiting tendencies, with the result that the inhibiting processes are not adequate to break the conditionings.[1]

We must now consider some examples.

a. The Political Prejudice.—A given man is a Republican and belongs to a group called "Republicans." He has the characteristic Republican way—if there is any such—of looking at political matters. He regularly votes the Republican ticket. He strongly approves of all Republican measures and abominates Democrats and Socialists. He has warm feelings toward Republicans and defends them against all attackers. This is the way he behaves. How does it all come about?

Well, his father is a Republican. His grandfather was a Republican. All his life he has mingled with Republican friends and neighbors. All his life he has been fed on Republican news by his newspaper and by the common talk. He has heard that the Republican party is the "Grand Old Party" and that it contains the brains, the money, and the patriotic devotion of the country. He has heard that it has saved the country many times, that the country's welfare is somehow bound up with this party. Contrarywise, he has all his life heard that all other political parties are ignorant, incapable, undependable, undesirable, tricky. No bad things ever came out of the Republican party; no good things ever came out of any other party. Now that he thinks of it, he recalls that he was once caught stealing peaches and was given a good drubbing—and his punisher was a Democrat! He grew up drenched with showers of commendation for Republicans and depreciation for all others.

"As the twig is bent, so is the tree inclined." All of this is what the psychologists now call "conditioning." This man was conditioned to be a Republican; he was conditioned not to be anything else. He was "weighted," "set," inclined—almost predestined—to be of that political persuasion, before he had taken any decisive steps of his own. Now, how

[1] "Introduction to Social Psychology," p. 315.

could he take up a study of his party as a geologist takes up a study of some rocks? He could not, except with the most heroic efforts and the bruising of many sentiments, examine his party without passion and partiality.

b. The Patriotic Prejudice.—Most people are born within a given community, and a community is usually within a given country or nation. They are born in it. Unless they travel, they grow up in it. They learn its history. They thrill over its victories and suffer humiliation in its defeats. They are proud of its heroes. They read its literature. Day by day, line upon line, a mental set frames itself, a set favorable to their "native land." Moreover, they have always heard that other countries are inferior. Certain characteristics of "foreigners" are pointed out contemptuously—"garlic-eating Italians," "hunkies," "greasers," "Wops," "Chinks," and the like—all epithets of opprobrium. They have heard their own land glorified to the skies and all other lands depreciated and condemned. "As the twig is bent, so is the tree inclined." And it is to be noted that while Americans, let us say, think their own country is the best and laud it to heaven, Englishmen, Germans, Chinese, and Zulus do the same. All of these assert with feeling that they belong to the best country. But we know, of course, that there cannot be several "best" countries.

c. The Class Prejudice.—A given man is brought up in a "rich" family and has heard all his life that the ownership of wealth is closely correlated with superiority. He has heard time and again that the workers are a lazy, avaricious lot, always struggling to resist benevolence, and carrying on strikes, spreading "bolshevism," and doing all sorts of things inimical to the welfare of the country—and the capitalists. Henry van Dyke describes the worker's bias pithily and wittily in one of his "Half Told Tales."

Simplex was an old Presbyterian plumber. Vortex was a plumber's helper. Vortex asserts that the capitalists made the World War just to get rich out of it. Simplex agrees, saying:

"Sure, that's when our pay went up. Selfish rascals. Let them be set in slippery places and cast down to destruction. But who is going to do it?"

"Us," cried Vortex, "the Perlitariat. Our toil and sufferin' is the cornerstone of *them* feller's yachts. A man ain't got no right to nothin' but what he makes with his hands. Ain't that so?"

"But say, old man," continued Vortex, "I wanna borra five hundred dollars. I gotta buy a Ford. You got money in the bank, aincher?"

"Sure," said Simplex complacently, "I've got about thirteen thousand in the bank. I'll loan you five hundred at seven per cent, with a mortgage on your house. Will that do?"[1]

[1] "Half Told Tales," p. 9. See many examples of labor prejudices, HOXIE, "Trade Unionism in the United States," p. 391 *ff.*

Here we see the laborers doing the same things that capitalists do and yet hating them and wishing to cast them down to destruction. The young are brought up with an inclination to one of those two opposite points of view. They hear everything good and nothing bad of their own class and everything bad and nothing good of the other class. What would their judgments of each other be worth?

d. The Theological Prejudice.—Most of us have been brought up as Methodists, Baptists, Presbyterians, Catholics, Theosophists, Mohammedans, Taoists, or what not. And we have absorbed the creed and the point of view as we have grown. As Methodists we have heard the Baptists condemned or ridiculed for using "too much water." Day by day, line upon line, we have been fixed in a theological way; and we have heard how thoroughly right the position we have taken is and how absurd and unscriptural all other positions are. "As the twig is bent, so is the tree inclined."

Van Dyke has put the theological prejudice in contrast with the scientific attitude in the debate between the "Obese Orator" and the "Lean Scientist." The Orator denies that he resembles an ape. The Scientist agrees—except as to his manners, which "are slightly simian." The former insists that nature is a mystery and that it is an affront to God to try to unveil her secrets. The Orator insists that he takes the "words" of God, while the scientist admits that he takes the "works" of God.

"You despise the oracles of God," cried the Orator—getting heated.

"You seem to ignore the works of God," answered the Scientist.

"Was your grandmother a monkey?" roared the Orator.

"Certainly not," said the Scientist, "the latest evidence shows that monkeys were our ancestral foes. But permit me to inquire whether your grandfather was a mud doll set up against the fence to dry?"

"You know nothing about it," shouted the Fat One.

"Very little," answered the Thin One, "but I am trying to learn, whereas you make a boast of your ignorance."[1]

But we must condense. There are many other prejudices from which we suffer—sex bias, race bias, professional bias, fraternity or sorority bias, philosophical bias, scientific bias; and they are all most difficult to escape; they are all vicious and subversive of the truth. Stephen Decatur outshone all of the patriots by declaring: "My Country, right or wrong, but my Country." He had a passion, but it was not a passion for the facts; he had a loyalty, but it was not loyalty to the truth; he had a theory, but it was not a tool for research. Imagine a man shouting: "My mathematics, right or wrong, but my mathematics." Imagine a farmer saying: "My plow, good or bad, but my plow." Would we regard such persons as quite sane? The Pharisee in the Bible thanked

[1] "Half Told Tales," p. 43.

God that he was not as other men; and the others probably thanked God that he—was not.

Social science is a brave attempt to recognize and escape these biases. It is an earnest endeavor to stand off and look at one's party, one's class, one's creed, etc., *as if one were not a member of it* at all. It is an attempt to approach such matters in as disinterested a manner as the geologist approaches his rocks. This calls for the throwing overboard of most that has been learned from the intimate social environment from hearsay, from tradition, and its reexamination in a critical fashion.[1]

4. Point of Departure in This Study

Working, then, as we do with such subtle handicaps as we have indicated, our science of society is most imperfect. It is hardly more than a series of guesses. But even these are probably somewhat nearer the truth and worthy of more respect than the spontaneous uncritical guesses of the average man. In "Martin Chuzzlewit," Dickens tells of the deaf cousin who felt perfectly competent to discuss the settlement of the estate by reason of not knowing anything about it. Her name is legion in society. The affirmations made and positions taken in this book are all too well recognized as but rough approximations. They are not at all to be "gulped down" by the student as finalities. They are merely "starting points" for further reflection and research.

Relative to the mode of procedure here, it might be said that by a heroic leap of the imagination we could try to begin our inquiry away back at the beginnings of human affairs and, after paying a good deal of attention to social origins, make a rough picture of early social life. Then we might try to follow the various lines of development, one by one or several of them interwoven into something of a pattern, down to the present time. This would be the historical or genetic way, and we would then see things in order in the time sequence. We would see the seed, then the sprout, then the blade, and finally the full corn in the ear. This would be the logical way to study.

But there is a pedagogical way as well, and, luckily, this is not necessarily illogical. We can begin *where we are*. We can look (*a*) out and around over society as it now is, and (*b*) we can look back toward beginnings. And we choose this method or plan rather than the other because we are all more interested in what is now around us and with which we have to live than we are in remote times. While the former plan has the advantage of necessary detachment and helps to rid people of their prejudices, it has the disadvantage of calling for too great a stretch of the imagination and usually working against listlessness. The present

[1] *Cf.* Bode, "Fundamentals of Education," p. 143; Bernard, "The Objective Viewpoint in Sociology," *Amer. J. Sociology*, November, 1919; Robinson, "The Mind in the Making," several chapters.

is vital, for it holds us in its clutches; it "makes or breaks" us; therefore, we have an invaluable asset in awakened interest. Accordingly, we shall move in our thinking from the more obvious to the less obvious, from the better known to the strange, from the familiar to the unfamiliar, from the evident to the inferable—as much as possible.

5. A Helpful Analogy

Our minds, if we have followed thoughtfully and carefully what has been presented thus far, may be somewhat better prepared for this study by the use of a striking analogy. Social life is so highly complicated and so vast, its relations with the physical world are so numerous and so obscure, its dependence upon our original natures is so intimate and so inscrutable, that the veteran investigator—to say nothing of the beginner—often becomes almost hopelessly mired down. But perhaps we can keep the broad outlines clear by a comparison.

Most of us have been to the theater. Now, what are the main features of the theater? We first note the building and its numerous parts and then the stage; the *stage* is the part that we are especially interested in. As the curtain goes up, some persons are disclosed or soon appear and begin to act; we call them *actors*. We do not see much sense in what they do at first, but after a while it appears that they are carrying on a *play;* they talk, they gesticulate, they move in and out with relation to each other, they become involved and ensnarled, and we soon detect what is called a *plot*. Here, then, are the three main parts of the theater—the stage, the actors, and the play.

We understand all the time, of course, that these actors are *playing*, that is, pretending. If we happen to meet these actors at dinner, they all look very different and act very differently. The young man is not, we find, in love with the young woman; he is married and has three children. The old gentleman is not married to the old lady at all and does not have much to say to her. The villain is not seeking the old lady's life and does not want her money, for she has no money. It is all pretense. The play is an appearance of reality. But if the play is a masterpiece, there is essential reality in the appearance.

Now, we may *liken* the stage to the earth on which we live, and we may say that the stage represents the *physical environment*. We may liken the actors to the people on this earth and say that they represent the *human population*. We may liken the play to society and say that the play represents the *social complication* of our everyday experience. Thus, we have three things in mind—the physical environment, the human population, and society.

But, in reality, this is no analogy. We have but used a *part* of a whole to represent the *whole*. The theater in question is but a tiny bit of a much larger whole; it is part of the world stage. The actors are

people, human beings, and so part of the total population. This play that they are performing is but one out of millions of plays which are being acted by these people; it is but a strand in the vast "web of life" in which we are all caught. Many persons have noted this identity, and some have commented upon it. The immortal Shakespeare concluded that:

> All the world's a stage,
> And all the men and women merely players,
> They have their exits and their entrances;
> And one man in his time plays many parts.

And this is literally true. Now, it is clear that the three parts of a theater are related in numerous ways. The stage affects the players, who, in turn, affect the play. The players remake the play and sometimes the stage. We might, if we wished, give sole attention to the stage, namely, the physical world in which we live, and find out all we could about it; but since hundreds of geographers, geologists, climatologists, chemists, physicists, astronomers, and others are working at this task, we shall pass it up except for a brief notice in one chapter. We might, if we wished, give sole attention to the actors, namely, the people on the earth; but since hundreds of anatomists, physiologists, neurologists, anthropologists, psychologists, and others are working at this task, we shall leave it aside—except for one chapter.

Our study is *the play*, the countless plays—society. "The play's the thing" for us. Our interest centers in this complicated, massive, unending social drama, which we help all unknowingly to make and which helps to make us. Our study is the immense web of relationships in which we are entangled as long as we live. This is our theme; and after two chapters we shall take it up.

Questions

1. Was Zadi really indifferent or the victim of prejudice?
2. Does the practical man learn as rapidly and as thoroughly as the scientist?
3. Are attitudes 2, 3 and 4 all true ways of knowing?
4. What other great men and women, besides Darwin, used these methods?
5. How is one to know when one has the facts in the case? Can you point to a fact?
6. How do you deal with a problem? Recall a case and trace out the steps.
7. What is wrong with the syllogism given below?

> Nothing is better than wisdom;
> Dry bread is better than nothing:
> Therefore dry bread is better than wisdom.

8. What is it that the scientist is most eager to uncover?
9. What experiments that are taboo would you like to carry out?
10. What theories about people and life that you hold would you dislike to see examined?
11. Try looking at some intimate friend in a detached and objective way.

12. Do you think social scientists can ever escape their prejudices? Why?

13. If all people were careful scientists, would all of the warmth and brightness go out of social life?

14. When we use the analogy of the theater, are we "reasoning by analogy?"

15. Do you regularly ask those who reason with you to present some evidence? What is your usual reaction?

16. Why do so many people take patent medicines instead of going to see accredited physicians? Why do they buy "gold bricks?"

17. Are you happier with the truth or with illusions? Give examples.

18. What is the relation between science and philosophy? Is a scientist ever a philosopher? Is a philosopher ever a scientist? Discuss these points.

19. What is the fundamental purpose of this first chapter? What effects has it had on you? Set them down carefully.

20. In what respects are you like Darwin? In what respects are you unlike him in attitude?

CHAPTER II

THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT

We are now on the stage—even if in the audience—and engaging in the play. "The play's the thing," as we have said; but let us first examine the stage and gain some understanding of the relations of the stage, the actors, and the play. Of course we are sure, from everyday experience, that there are relations, but we must be cautious about the use we make of such common assumptions.

1. The Stage Setting

We are in a building, let us say, as we read these lines. By stamping our foot on the floor or thumping the walls with our knuckles, we observe that these are hard and resistant; also, they surely rest on something else. Going out of doors, we find the sidewalk and a wonderful grass carpet. We notice amidst the grass many weeds—dandelions, docks, thistles, plantain, and numerous others. Lifting our eyes from the grass, we notice bushes and trees of countless shapes and sizes. Except in certain spots, the landscape is a profusion of vegetation—grass, flowers, vegetables, grains, bushes, and trees. Interspersed with all of these are many different kinds of fauna—birds, squirrels, mice, deer, dogs, horses, and the rest.

But what does all of this flora and fauna rest upon? Digging amidst the grass, we soon come upon material of a very different sort—the soil. What is soil? The work of answering this question has been going on for many years, and the answer is not complete yet. Our unaided eyes do not disclose what soil is; we need microscopes. Microscopes tell us that the soil is made up of such substances as quartz, limestone, sand, clay, and other ingredients of which decayed vegetable matter is no small part. Some kinds of ingredients predominate here, and some there—rich, black loam sprouting heavy vegetation here, and loose sterile sand or impregnable rock sprouting almost nothing there. The soil is a layer averaging about five inches thick and, in relation to the earth, may be compared to the very thin peel of an orange. It is one of the main sources of vegetation on this earth; we live from the skin of the earth.

What is beneath this skin? Our unaided powers of observation must be supplemented by the researches of geologists, metallurgists, mining engineers, and others, save as we can make correct inferences from the rocks which protrude through this earth skin at many points

and pile themselves up, at some places, in what we call mountains. What is at the core of the earth? Nobody knows, except by inference, for nobody has ever been there. Some scientists claim that the core is iron, others that it is a molten mass; but we need not concern ourselves with this controversy here. We may be content to know that under this earth skin we find rock for buildings, coal, gas, precious metals, and other materials which affect life on top.

Traveling about on the earth, we may soon come to bodies of water—small streams, rivers, lakes, and oceans. The water covers roughly two-thirds of the earth's surface. Delving into the water we may find more vegetation, and the deeps teem with all sorts of moving creatures—fish, crabs, turtles, and the like.

The weather is also a part of the stage setting. As we observe our surroundings, we cannot fail to be aware of sunshine, heat, cold, rain, winds, clouds. The day begins, opens widely, and then closes into the night. The seasons come and go, bringing their countless variations with them. The inimitable Mark Twain said:

> There is a sumptuous variety about New England weather, that compels the stranger's admiration—and regret. The weather is always doing something there; always attending strictly to business; always getting up new designs and trying them on people to see how they will go. But it gets through more business in spring than in any other season. In the spring I have counted one hundred and thirty-six different kinds of weather inside twenty-four hours . . .

So we might go on for days, months, years, centuries, milleniums observing, recording, classifying, measuring the properties of the world stage. And investigators have been doing this very thing for a long time. They have found, with Stevenson, that "the world is so full of a number of things," although they have not always been willing to admit that "I'm sure we should all be as happy as kings." The world is immense, dynamic, complicated.

Science aims at classification in order that the things classified may be better understood. Many classifications of the properties of the stage have been made; many of them have gone into very fine detail. We cannot go into much detail here in a short chapter but must rest content with a bird's-eye view. The following will give us one list of the properties, from which a few selections may be made for some further consideration:

1. The physico-geographic environment:
   - *a.* Contour and surface: (1) rivers, (2) seas, (3) mountains, (4) mountain passes, (5) deserts, (6) plains, (7) plateaus, (8) swamps, (9) forests, (10) distance
   - *b.* Altitudes
   - *c.* Light
   - *d.* Temperature

e. Humidity
f. Electrical conditions
g. Succession of the seasons
h. Inorganic resources: (1) iron and other metals, (2) coal and other fuel minerals, (3) water, (4) plant foods, especially nitrogen, potassium, and phosphorus

2. The organic environment—flora and fauna:
a. Animals for food
b. Animals for power
c. Plants for food and healing
d. Plants for clothing and shelter
e. Parasites
f. Germ life[1]

2. Conditions Necessary for Life

1. Basic Substances.—As far as investigation has gone, it seems clear that wherever conditions are favorable on the earth, there is life. The lowest forms are found in the water or where water is present. There is least life where the air is dryest. If the earth was once hotter than it is now, the water had to cool to below the boiling point or 212 degrees, before life appeared.

Pure air is composed of 79 parts of nitrogen, 21 of oxygen, and about 0.03 per cent of carbon dioxid with insignificant traces of argon, metargon, krypton, and neon. Pure water is composed, as we all recall, of 2 parts of hydrogen and 1 part of oxygen. Air is indispensable to life, and a very large percentage of all living bodies is water. It seems clear that one of the first needs of early life was a fairly fixed temperature. There are some bacteria which live and multiply in water at a temperature of 32 degrees; other bacteria prosper at 170 degrees. Of all known substances, water is the best fitted to maintain an even temperature.

Its specific heat is very high, being exceeded only by hydrogen and ammonia. If atomic weight is considered in addition, it stands at the top of the list. The freezing point of water is perhaps 100 degrees higher than that of the average substance. This means that the latent heat of water is very high, being surpassed only by ammonia. Thanks to the expansion that occurs when ice forms, the actual freezing of more than the surface of a body of water is practically impossible.[2]

Thus, the tender beginnings of forms of life in water could escape sudden changes in the temperature. In has also been observed that water evaporates readily, and it has been estimated that some six and a half feet of water are taken from the ocean at the equator yearly, and this spreads over the earth to cool the tropics and warm other regions. Water

[1] *Cf.* Bernard, "Environment as a Social Factor," publications of the American Sociological Society (hereafter *A. J. S.*) Vol. 16, p. 97; Mukerjee, R., "Regional Sociology," Chap. V.

[2] Kelsey, "The Physical Basis of Society," p. 8.

is also an excellent solvent and thus enables many substances to combine. Its surface tension is higher than that of any other substance save mercury, and this is a most significant fact with reference to its capillary action by which it penetrates the earth and living cells. Life could not get along without water.

Another element of the utmost importance to living things is carbon, although it forms but a very small part (0.03 per cent by volume) of the atmosphere and also a small part (0.01 per cent by weight) of water. Carbon is of such a character that it takes on a vast number of forms, and there are over 100,000 known now. Some of these are simple like carbonic acid (CO_2); but some are so complex that it would take more than a line of this page to write out the formula. These complex carbon molecules are quite stable and thus give a needed permanency to delicate living substances. It is a curious fact that living substances are composed—with other substances, of course—of six carbon atoms and multiples of these. Carbonic acid enters and leaves water freely and is always associated with it. It is thought to perform the function of regulating the reactions of protoplasm and of body tissues and fluids. On the other hand, the "unparalleled instability" of hydrogen and oxygen adds a feature. The combination of stable and unstable elements may give to living things those qualities of *permanency and change* which are so necessary in relation to environment.

The indispensable foods are the carbohydrates such as sugar and starch, the fats formed by the substitution of hydrogen for part of the oxygen in the carbohydrates, and the proteins which differ from carbohydrates and fats in that they contain nitrogen and sometimes phosphorus, sulphur, and iron. All of these materials are available in nature and ready for those combinations which we call *living things*. *How* these elements and others are changed into living structures we do not yet know; nobody has yet been able to make living cells out of these things. But that these substances are the physical basis of life is now well known. Did not these inorganic substances possess their peculiar properties, life could not be.

2. Gathering Up the Substances.—Having noted the basic elements of living things, it is now worth while to notice how they have been gathered up and made available—especially for the higher forms of life. This leads to the study of the *soils*. Soils have been produced by the disintegration of rocks and the decay of vegetation age after age. Some of the soils remain where they are formed, and some are moved about by rain, wind, and ice to other places. Hence, the two main classes of soils are (1) the sedentary, including residual gravels, clays, sands, peat, muck, and swamp soils; and (2) the transported soils which comprise alluvial, glacial, the wind blown, the dunes, and loess. All of these are different in many ways, the soil particles varying in size from clay so fine

that it can hardly be measured up to coarse gravel. Water plays an immense part in keeping soils useful; it forms a large part of plant substances and also discloses and combines certain chemical substances so as to make them available for plant foods.

In thirty-four soils analyzed by American chemists, the first eight inches of soil of an acre contained, on an average, potential plant food as follows: nitrogen, 3,217 pounds; phosphoric acid, 3,936 pounds; and potash, 17,597 pounds, a total of 24,750 pounds or more than twelve tons.

The varieties, regarded from the standpoint of the farmer, are numerous. Some of these are the alluvial soils which are so level that no natural drainage exists; other regions are so hilly that cultivation is difficult or impossible—we have heard of mountaineers having to plant their corn by "shooting" it into the hillsides; yet others are so stony that little can be done with them; yet others again are too wet, heavy, and cold to be workable; still others permit rapid evaporation and are light and warm.[1]

3. The Source of Energy.—The sun is the sole source of *energy* for this planet—with the exceptions of the tides and radioactive substances. The coal and oil which have become so important in recent decades are little more than stored-up sun rays. It is the source of light, by which organisms can see their way about and thus avoid many dangers; it is the source of heat, by which organisms are enabled to keep alive and flexible; it operates in the distribution of the rainfall over the earth; it has some influence on the winds and storms; it is the controller of the orbit of the earth. Of course, the rotation of the earth gives us the phenomena of day and night—with variations from twelve hours each at the tropics to six months each at the poles. It further is responsible for the succession of the seasons with all their various phenomena. And here is a starting point for the study of what we call *time*.

Light is necessary to the growth of many plants. The formation by the chlorophyll-holding plants of the substances which we call *proteids* takes place only in the light. The lower the temperature the greater the amount of light needed. Experiment has revealed that red and yellow light promote assimilation of carbon dioxide.

4. Temperature and the Distribution of Life.—In considering the importance of water, a page or two back, something was said of temperature. It is now known that temperature has a decisive vote in determining the character of the vegetation. A brief journey from the frigid zones to the tropics is enough to show this. Other things being equal, the nearer the pole the scantier and more dwarfed the vegetation. There is also a very decided difference in the animal life lizards and snakes disappear, as we go north, along with the almost hairless elephants and

[1] On the Influence of Soil, *cf.* J. Russell Smith, "North America," p. 277 *ff.*

hippopotamuses, and in their place are found the fur-bearing animals; gaudily colored birds are replaced by those with somber hues.

A very important aspect of temperature is its relation to reproduction. There is, as Merriam points out, a "law of temperature control," by which he means that the northward spread of tropical plants and animals is limited by the cold, and the southward spread of the regular inhabitants of the north is limited by the heat; temperature fixes the limits beyond which the various species cannot go. Many plants of warmer regions will grow in colder areas—but without producing seeds. And of course the relation of all of this to epidemics is most interesting and important. It was noted, long before the cause of the disease was discovered, that yellow fever ceased with the oncoming frosts in the fall. In 1882, a section of the Atlantic 170 miles in length by 25 miles in width was observed to be covered with dead "tilefish," the total number being estimated at 1,400,000,000. These creatures live at the edge of the Gulf Stream at a depth of about 600 feet. It appeared evident that in this year the Gulf Stream shifted its course with the results stated. In 1892, the old course was resumed, and since that time these fish have rapidly increased again.[1]

These points and many others which might be included are familiar facts of everyday life; most of them are ascertainable and provable within our own range of inquiry. They give a hint or two as to the conditions underlying and necessary to *life* on this earth. We must now say a word or two about the earth and its relations.

3. The Larger World

1. The Earth.—It is our present belief—for final proof is not easy to make—that the earth was once a molten mass and that its surface has gradually cooled. This process left in the air and at the surface the materials of which organic beings are composed and thus prepared the basis for life. This cooling was not steady and uninterrupted, by any means. Geologists are well convinced that the northern part of this continent experienced the sliding down from the colder zones of vast ice sheets, called *glaciers*, several times, possibly four times. Thus, these glaciers brought extreme cold down into Ohio, and when the climate grew warm again, they withdrew.

How long the earth has been in existence, that is, how old it is, nobody is able to calculate. That it has existed for many millions of years is certain. Geologists have worked on the structure of the earth, the way it is made up of layer after layer of rocks of various kinds, and have classified these rocks, giving many hard names to them, the oldest being the Pre-Cambrian which is followed by the Cambrian, Ordovician, Silurian, Devonian, Carboniferous, Triassic, Jurassic, Cretacious,

[1] *Cf.* Kelsey, *op. cit.*

Eocene, Oligocene, Miocene, Pliocene, Pleistocene, and the recent formations. Grouping these, and excepting the first, the first five belong to the Paleozoic era, the next three to the Mesozoic era, the next five to the Cenozoic era. Back of all of these were the Proterozoic and the Archezoic eras—500,000,000 to 1,000,000,000 years ago. At this early period, there was nothing but unicellular life. The first invertebrates came on the earth, say, about 500,000,000 years ago.[1]

The earth was a molten mass because it came from the sun. Chamberlain thinks it happened this way: The sun is so hot that it is continually exploding "sun stuff" or gas bolts which, traveling 300 miles a second, project as much as 300,000 miles away from the sun's surface and then fall back again. Along came a huge star, a sun, a body bigger and denser than our sun. Its pull was so great that some of the gas bolts then erupting were drawn off so far that they could not fall back but, drawn by various planets, kept on moving in orbits of their own and condensing. They were drawn so far away from the sun that they could not fall back, but yet the sun's pull was not wiped out, and hence the movement of our earth about the sun, for it is but a fragment of some larger body.[2]

2. The Multiverse.—But our earth, this good ship which sails about endlessly through uncharted regions, is only a minor speck in an immeasurable universe or multiverse. It is approximately 8,000 miles in diameter. The moon is 30 times this or 240,000 miles distant from it. The sun is almost four hundred times this or 93,000,000 miles distant. The nearest star is two hundred seventy-five thousand times the sun's distance or some 20 trillion miles away. Light travels at the rate of 186,000 miles per second. The distance which light can travel in a year at this rate is called a *light year*. Thus, the nearest star is three and one-half light years away. Orion is a group of stars some 500 or 600 light years distant. The Milky Way, so familiar to us all, is an immense constellation of stars—millions of them—having a disklike shape; and we see the edge of it. This disk is thicker in the center than at the edge and is said by astronomical calculators to be some 10,000 light years thick. The diameter may be 75,000 to 100,000 light years. Then there are countless other systems of worlds of which our heliocentric system is but a small part. In 1914, the Royal Observatory in Greenwich, England, calculated that the stars now known aggregate some 1,600,000,000, of which only a paltry 3,000 or 4,000 are visible to the naked eye; and new stars are being discovered constantly. Thus, this cosmos, if these countless and immense worlds are organized into a cosmos, is vast beyond conceiving.[3] We allow our

[1] DORSEY, "Why We Behave like Human Beings," p. 61, quoting Lull's "Organic Evolution," 1921.

[2] CHAMBERLAIN, "The Origin of the Earth." Chaps. I and VI.

[3] *Cf.* KELSEY, *op. cit.*, p. 1. DOUGLAS, "Two Sciences," *The Atlantic Monthly*, October, 1927, p. 489.

minds to play about this, and they reach out in imagination and by means of the telescope and spectrascope—out and out . . . and out . . . to no end. So far as we can know, *space* is boundless. And we have also seen that, so far as we can know finally, *time* is limitless. This earth is, comparatively speaking, the smallest of cosmic specks; and those of us upon it are much smaller still; and our span of life is short. But let us cease our cosmic roaming and "come down to earth" again.

4. Life and Man

When the earth was suitable for life, life came; "the *inorganic* elements reorganized into *organic* compounds. That was as radical a move in the earth's evolution as was its break from the sun." We have spoken of the conditions and elements of life. *One* element, of course, must remain an element; it takes two or more to make a compound. As the elements increase in number, the possible compounds increase in geometrical ratio. With carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, nitrogen, and a pinch of salts, every living thing is possible. We do not know why, we know only that it is so. The origin of life is not understood; its secret is locked up in the origin of matter and the nature of energy—whether these have been created by the Almighty or have come about as fortuitous collocations of atoms, two of the theories widely accepted. There is proof that electricity is material, and evidence, but not proof, that matter is electrical. But what is electricity? Nobody knows for sure. The line between life and death, between the organic and the inorganic, is vague and undefinable, as we know from hearing of sick persons "wavering between life and death"; it is about as undefinable as the line between day and night; it is so thin a line that it is crossed from time to time in laboratory experimentation. The chemical substance of life, that is, protoplasm, has been produced in the laboratory; it does everything but *live;* it does everything but *behave* in that manner which is peculiar to life.

Protoplasm is a wonderful substance. It has carbon in it. But remove the carbon and it is no longer protoplasm. Yet carbon is not living. Protoplasm is 72 per cent oxygen, 13.5 per cent carbon, 9.1 per cent hydrogen, 2.5 per cent nitrogen. The remaining 3 per cent consists of sulphur, phosphorus, chlorine, sodium, potassium, calcium, magnesium, iron, and silicon—these substances combined in certain proportions. But life is something more than these.

The earth had all of these substances within it when it cooled and became inhabitable. And so far as we can learn, these substances combined and recombined, disintegrated and recombined, and have given us almost innumerable forms of living things unicellular life at the start, then invertebrates, then vertebrates, then mammals, and man on the fauna line; thousands and thousands of species of flora de-

veloped. This work took a long time; but, as we have seen, there has been plenty of time. Nature seems not to be concerned about time as much as we are; she is more concerned with doing good work. And any one who studies this process of combination and organization will recognize that the work has been done expertly, although it has not been done without a vast amount of experimentation and the immense waste attendant thereupon.

Thus, the evidence seems to point to a "changing order, changing orderly"—which is what we mean by evolution. But there are innumerable mysteries in it all yet. We shall know *how* life evolved when we are able to evolve it. That day may come, but it is some distance off yet. The point is that we cannot yet get back to absolute beginnings; and it looks more and more as if there were no beginnings, just *prior stages.*[1]

It is now believed that *man* came along, as all other species did, by means of combination, recombination, refinement, reorganization of the substances available until he reached the form in which we think we know him. How long ago he came on the earth we do not know, but it must have been over a half million years ago. From what differentiated branch of living things he came is not known certainly; but that the human race is a differentiated branch is now widely believed. The earliest known creature belonging to this genus is represented to us by a skull cap, three teeth, and a left femur, found in Java, in 1891—known to anthropologists as *Pithecanthropus erectus*, the upright apelike man. He lived probably 500,000 years ago. We would not take him for much of a man if we met him on the street; but he is taken by scientists to be a member of a species akin to man.

Then came the Heidelberg man—known to us only by a lower jaw. Making a whole creature out of a single jawbone seems like an impossible task to us; but scientists have done it and have shown us what this creature probably looked like. He is supposed to have lived 400,000 years ago in what is now Germany.

In England a complete skull was found, although in fragments, which is the most of the earliest men yet discovered. It was found at Piltdown in Sussex and consequently is called the Dawn Man of Piltdown. Although this creature, when reconstructed, retains a good many apelike features, he would not be mistaken for an ape by any person. The posture was clearly more erect than in the previous cases. He lived from 200,000 to 300,000 years ago.

These creatures are the chief known representatives of their respective *races* of Homo, few companion representatives having been found as yet. But now we come to a real race—the Neanderthal. Perhaps the remains of two or three dozen of this type have been found in widely scattered

[1] *Cf.* DORSEY, *op. cit.*, Chap. II, for a popular and more detailed exposition of all of this and much more.

parts—the Neanderthal Valley in Germany; Spy in Belgium; and several places in France; at Gibraltar; in Palestine; and in Rhodesia. There are still many apelike features, and the neck is thick and strong. But there is an approach to modern man at many points.

We come much nearer to modern man, to Homo sapiens, with the finding of the so-called Brünn race discovered in what is now Czechoslovakia during 1871 and after. This is believed to have been some transitional type between the Neanderthal and the Cro-Magnon race, which was probably the ancestor of some modern European peoples. The Brünn race may have lived about 35,000 years ago, while the Cro-Magnons lived 25,000 years ago. The Cro-Magnons looked very much as we do today. All of these are known as *long-headed* or *dolichocephalic*. But back a long time ago, there began to appear in Europe, probably coming from some unknown point in Asia, a *broad-headed* or *brachycephalic* type, and these left descendants which are still with us.[1]

Of course, we must remember that bones are not easily preserved indefinitely, and it did not occur to these early people to make their remains imperishable in some way so that we today might trace out the complete story of man's coming on earth and his development. But fragments of bones and the works of early man are continually coming to light, and the whole story may be pieced together some day.

As eminent Biblical scholar for his day, Dr. John Lightfoot, vice-chancellor of Cambridge University in 1654, said that "Heaven and earth, centre and circumference were made in the same instance of time, and clouds full of water, and man was created by the Trinity on the 26th of October 4004 B.C. at 9 o'clock in the morning."[2] This is one view. But geologists, anthropologists, archaeologists, and other specialists are now generally agreed that all of these happenings occurred hundreds of thousands of years ago. We all have the privilege of taking our choice as to theory—so long as it is buttressed by the evidence.

5. The Physical Environment and Man

We raised the question, at the beginning of this chapter, as to the relation between the stage and the actors; and we now come to this problem because the chief justification for considering the physical environment in this connection is that it has had and continues to have so much to do with man and his social drama. Two views, however, may be contrasted here in passing. One view is that the physical environment has had *nothing* to do with man or his society since man is essentially and ultimately a spiritual being and is really and finally unaffected by anything material. The other view is that since man is an animal, on the one side at least, he is mightily affected by his physical

[1] *Cf.* Lull and others, "The Antiquity of Man," p. 13 *ff.*

[2] Lull and others, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

surroundings. Without assuming the truth of either of these views at the outset, let us look at some evidence. We cannot take up all of the features of the physicogeographical and organic environments noted above and show how they affect human beings. We shall have to be content here with some typical evidence, a few cases. In spite of much investigation, not much is yet surely known about the intimacy of man and his physical world. Certain things seem fairly clear, however. Our physical surroundings affect us in the following ways:

1. By Providing the Necessities of Life.—We may be spiritual beings essentially, and we may hitch our wagons to stars, but as far as the evidence goes, we live *on* the earth and *from* it. We cannot survive long without these earth- and sun-born necessities, as those who go on hunger strikes very soon find out.

Our common experience is that death is always being transformed into life and life into death.

> Chemical elements in the soil are taken up by plants, and are transformed into vegetable matter. The plant grows and matures and presently dies; then its elements return to the soil what has been taken from it. Or the transformation may be more extended. The animal eats the plant, and the original chemicals are transformed into animal tissue. Man eats the animal, and thus appropriates the chemical substances in his turn. But, in the end they are all returned to the inanimate world by the death of the man. He "returns to the dust."

This is the inevitable cycle of man, as well as animals, as to part of him.[1] If there is a non-material part of man in addition, the question is: Can this part remain so intimately associated with the physical part and not be affected by it?

2. By Stimulating to Activity or the Reverse.—These material necessities of which we have just spoken have to be *collected*. We are not equipped after birth with a pipe line running from us to butcher shops, bakeries, soda fountains, and clothing stores or to cattle in the field, growing grain, and other natural products. These things, properly prepared, are badly needed *inside* and on our bodies, but they are *outside* and often at some distance. The link between these things and ourselves is *activity*, either our own or that of others; no appropriative activities on the part of somebody, no income; this is the way the world is constructed. There is only one way in which any person can escape this necessity—and that is to be able to command the energies of others. Hence, we are not on the life stage very long before we become busy appropriating.

On the other side, the physical environment sometimes restrains us. It infects us with various germs and lays us low in sickness, whereupon we must die sooner or later without the help of others. In addition, it strikes down to death and thus causes us to cease action as well as to

[1] KELLER, "Starting Points in Social Science," p. 1.

discontinue wanting anything. But let us consider this stimulating effect somewhat more in detail.[1]

a. Growth.—We are all born small and must "grow up" to maintain ourselves and be of any use. The environment seems to have an appreciable effect upon our growing. Many experiments have established this beyond all question for creatures below men and for plants. While not much is certainly known about man in this respect, the experiments with plants and animals make what seems like a sound basis for inference with respect to man. We know that undernourishment retards the growth of children. It has been assumed that certain environments have hindered the growth of certain tribes of men—the Pygmies, for example. Boas cites the studies of Gould and Baxter, made during the War of the Rebellion, to show "that the representatives of European nationalities born in America have statures higher than the representatives of the same nationalities born in Europe."

Inasmuch as stature is often supposed to be an inherited trait, it may seem contradictory to attribute changes in it to the physical environment. But there is no fundamental inconsistency here. The individual inherits certain possibilities of, or limitations to, growth; but these do not remain unaffected by the medium in which they are realized. Heredity never operates in a vacuum.

b. Effect on the Blood.—Heat seems to have a decided effect upon the blood cells, so that adaptation to a different thermal zone is not easy. Blood is also affected by altitude, which seems to increase both the red and the white corpuscles. Some investigators have held that the increase in the red corpuscles is more apparent than real, the appearance being due to the concentration of blood from evaporation or to an unequal distribution of the red corpuscles so that more of them appear near the surface of the body. But from certain experiments conducted on Pike's Peak, the conclusion was reached that the number of red corpuscles was actually increased.[2] Now, if a change in the blood has anything to do with thinking, we may suppose that it has something to do with other types of action.

c. Effect on the Nervous System.—A dry atmosphere and possibly high altitudes seem to have a deleterious effect upon the nervous system. Doctor Moleen, however, maintains that nervous diseases are no more frequent in high altitudes than in low.[3] But Dexter seems to show that low humidity, especially if accompanied by wind, produces increased nervous tension, the results of which are manifest in mild insomnia and increased irritability.[4] The cause, however, is not supposed to be the

[1] *Cf.* THOMAS, "Source Book for Social Origins," p. 83.
[2] *Cf.* HENDERSON, *Yale Review*, new series, Vol. 3; 1914.
[3] *Cf. Literary Digest*, Sept. 16, 1916.
[4] *Cf.* "Weather Influences," p. 89.

dryness itself but the electrical condition of the atmosphere. During high winds in Denver, suicides, murders, and misdemeanors in the public schools, increased to six or seven times the normal. Dark days, as many of us know, seem to depress, while sunny days cheer and enliven. Nossiloff endeavored to analyze the effect of the polar night upon the inhabitants of the northlands and thought it caused an apathy of mind and a habit of drowsiness, results which were most noticeable in children. An excessive amount of sunlight, however, is thought to overstimulate the nerve cells and cause them to break prematurely.

d. Effect on Energy.—The temperate zone, with its diurnal and seasonal changes in temperature and rapid succession of storm areas, is usually thought to be stimulating to the inhabitants. Hard and continuous labor preparatory to winter is demanded. In moist, tropical regions, the climate is enervating, and not so much by way of preparation for the future is called for. The climate of hot, dry zones is less enervating than that of the moister regions. So much for generalities.

Huntington has studied climatic influences as they relate to intensity and continuity of labor and the health and vitality of man. He concludes that (1) seasonal variations in temperature, (2) changes in temperature from day to day, and (3) humidity are the most important influences from the standpoint of energy. He found that the maximum amount of physical labor was performed at an average temperature of sixty to sixty-five degrees Fahrenheit. Mental activity was greatest when the outside temperature averaged thirty-eight degrees.

The degree of humidity most favorable, he thinks, depends upon the temperature. In the spring and fall, when the temperature averages about fifty degrees, the most favorable condition of humidity is about 75 per cent. When the temperature rises to sixty or sixty-five degrees, the most work is accomplished with a humidity of about 60 per cent. He concludes that the most favorable combination of heat and moisture is a temperature of about sixty-four degrees and a humidity of 80 per cent.[1]

These statements show the direction of investigation. They also suggest very strongly, if they do not actually prove, that man is not unaffected by the physical world in which he lives. They give some hint as to how he is affected and to what extent. For lack of space, however, we cannot pursue this facinating subject further. Even if we, ourselves, are not convinced by these suggestions, they show that certain other people are convinced that man, as an organism, is intimately bound up with, is part and parcel of, his physical world.

6. The Physical Environment and Society

Can we now assume that what affects the actors also affects the play? Does it seem reasonable to suppose that if the physical environ-

[1] *Cf.* Civilization and Climate, 117, 123, etc.

ment modifies the human organism in the ways already suggested and in many more ways, it also shapes to some extent the ongoings of the social drama? This particular type of relationship might readily be assumed and passed by; but it seems desirable to discuss the matter a little that the fact of the relationship, and its nature, may be quite clear, for it is not always possible to say whether certain features of the social drama are due to the environment or to other forces; for instance, the physical environment apparently had little or nothing to do with the wearing of trousers by women and the wearing of skirts by men in Turkey for centuries, or with the reverse of this arrangement in France. Also, it is highly improbable that the physical environment caused the people of South America to gamble with cards and the people of China to gamble with *mah jong* cubes. Thus, many features of the social pattern, the human plot, are not readily, if at all, traceable to the physical environment.

1. Influence on Various Social Practices.—Yet the physical environment apparently has had a good deal to do with other features. It has had a good deal to do with the fondness of the Chinese for rice and the fondness of the English for beef and mutton. Further, rice eating and beef eating are consistent with, and productive of, certain other features of the social pattern. The beef eater needs a knife and a fork, while the rice eater does not. For the rice eater a bowl is more convenient than a plate. But a knife and fork call for metallurgy, while chopsticks do not. These are but illustrations to stimulate the imagination with respect to trains of social causes and results. But let us look at this problem in another way.

Let us suppose that the whole world is uninhabited except for four indentical groups of Chinese from the rice-eating parts of South China. Let the four groups be suddenly transported to four diverse environments and left to shift for themselves, the four environments being (1) the prairie of north central Illinois, (2) the center of the Arabian desert, (3) the heart of the Amazon basin, and (4) the coasts of Greenland. At the end of three or four generations, what would the social organization be like, and how far would it resemble the South China type? We may not be well informed as to the characteristics of these different physico-geographic regions, but we know that they are very different, and we are ready to admit that these people would develop very different social patterns.

We are all near enough to north central Illinois to know that rice cannot be grown there. Then what would these Chinese do? It is not usual for people so situated to sit down and starve. They usually set to work and experiment to find out what they can grow for their use. It does not require a very great stretch of the imagination to see that they would, if they persevered, arrive at the practices which are now employed in that region.

Again, what would these rice-growing Chinese do in Greenland or in the Arabian desert? The point we are driving at is that these different environments would purge these groups of former practices and induce them to invent others; that is, these environments would affect the social pattern decidedly. The human response to these four different environments would be very different, and the differences would not be decided alone by the inborn nature of these Chinese.[1] The only other inference possible is that these changes in social life would be forced by the physicogeographical environment. People of the same racial stock and background came to New England and Nova Scotia; and the cultures which these two areas exhibit today are very different. Why is this? The physical environment undoubtedly had something to do with it.[2]

Let us take one further detail of the social pattern in order to trace environmental influence. Let us take *dwellings*. Why are there bamboo houses in one part of the world, stone houses in other parts, houses of skins and cloth in others, and houses of ice and snow in still others? The answer is simply that, barring transportation, houses have to be constructed out of the materials available—no matter what people wish. The Eskimos might like a house in the Spanish style, but they have to use snow and ice. During the very hot weather, some of us would like a house of snow and ice, but we know that we cannot have it.

This close relationship between the social play and the physical environment would be more obvious at certain points were it not that the arts of *transportation* have entered to complicate and obscure. Most people in the world can now have what the local environment does not produce, and thus it is not always easy to trace the connection between certain features of their way of living and their environment; but we can rest assured that there are always connections.

The physical environment helps to shape the *industrial life* of people—as we have just seen. It also helps to shape their *religious* patterns. The practice of *sacrifice* is almost always present in religion wherever one goes. Barring transportation again, what is a tribe to offer up in case it feels impelled to make sacrifices?

> The sacrifices which the Incas (of Peru) offered to the sun consisted of many different things, such as domestic animals large and small. The principal and most esteemed sacrifice was that of lambs; next to which came that of sheep, then that of barren ewes. They also sacrificed rabbits, and all birds used for food, all the cereals, the herb *cuca*, and the finest cloths. They burnt these things as a thank-offering to the sun, for having created them for the support of man.[3]

An almost limitless number of illustrations of this sort might be introduced here. But their message is clear from a case or two. It is that

[1] *Cf.* Huntington in Davis and Barnes, "Introduction to Sociology," p. 194.
[2] *Cf.* Whitebeck, R. H., in Davis and Barnes, "Readings in Sociology," p. 296.
[3] Havemeyer, "Ethnography," p. 229 *ff.*

the physical environment mixes in with religion and contributes something to its contents—at least among primitive and backward peoples; it is not easy to see how *our* revised beliefs and practices are so influenced. We have all heard of *nature worship*.

Examples might be assembled in number to show that the physical environment has a directive influence on the *forms of the family*, upon the *kinds of recreation*, upon the *types of government*. But we must hasten on to deal with another matter; and this particular matter shows this relationship between man and his environment; it is what has been called the *man-land ratio*.

7. The Man-land Ratio

How much land there is to how many men is the fundamental consideration in the life of any society. The ratio between these two factors means the ratio of numbers to sustenance, or of mouths to food; for the fact that all food comes in the last analysis from the earth should not be let slip because it is obvious. This relation of numbers to sustenance affords a firm, unspeculative, unselected footing for a science of society. It is a matter of observation and of recorded experience. It is also determinative for organic life in general. Where Mother Earth has more children than she can nourish, they die or exist in misery; where beasts or men are fewer, they get more nourishment and may live on in comfort. This simple and objective relation furnishes, we say, a firm footing for a science of society; we start with an incontrovertible and, indeed, implacable fact of life, and not with any speculative considerations.

Adjustment between men and land involves a struggle between men. Numbers are always surging up against the limit of subsistence, and the mouths do not close upon the food without a preliminary contest which decides who is to have it. This is the familiar struggle for existence, or competition of life, with the powerful urge of self-preservation behind it, and its type is a reflection of the man-land ratio. If there are few men to much land, the struggle is lighter; if the reverse, it is searching and destructive. For the moment we are ignoring what men can do to alter the terms of the ratio . . . but the ratio is always there, at the base of things.[1]

Miss Semple has made the following descriptive estimates of how many people to how much land:

Industrial districts, 500 to 800 per square mile.
Agriculture with some industry, 250 to 300 per square mile.
Agriculture, as in southern Europe, 200 per square mile.
Agriculture, as in central Europe, 100 per square mile.
Agriculture, European methods in colonial lands, 25 per square mile.
Agriculture, wholly primitive methods, 5 to 15 per square mile.
Nomadism, as in Arabia, 2½ per square mile.[2]

[1] Sumner and Keller, "The Science of Society," Vol. I, p. 4.

[2] "Influences of the Geographic Environment," p. 65. *Cf.* Thomas, "Social Origins," pp. 45, 74.

Now, if numbers of men are always ultimately determined by land, the question arises: What have numbers to do with the social play? The answer is not so far off, and it is this: Numbers determine the complexity and efficiency of the play—the fewer the numbers the simpler and the less efficient the play, the greater the numbers the more complex and efficient the play. Robinson Crusoe, alone on his island, could not have much of a social play; he could not play baseball, tennis, football, organize a family, carry through a religious service, set up a government, run a factory. He had to be Jack of all trades and therefore was "master of none." When Friday came, things became more complex, and there came an opportunity to specialize. As numbers increase, then, more organization—which means also more specialization—becomes possible and inevitable. Thus, the social drama, just as the stage drama, is mightily affected by the numbers of persons engaging in it. Thus, the physical environment, by determining numbers, determines the social organization of man to some extent.

This series of relationships is greatly obscured, however, by the fact that man has progressively altered the man-land ratio. Plants and animals cannot alter the plant-land or the animal-land ratios; but man can alter the man-land ratio and has been at it from the earliest times. On the *land* side, man has "made two blades of grass grow where one grew before and has made two quarts of milk fly where one flew before." Intensive farming, reforestration, elimination of waste, conservation, and many other practices have substitutionally stretched the earth skin so that more people can now live from it than ever before. On the *man* side, man has practiced migration, infanticide, abortion, the killing of the old, human sacrifice, cannibalism, contraception and thus has limited numbers. But in spite of these efforts, numbers have steadily surged ahead through the ages, still piled up—as we shall see in the next chapter. Nevertheless, despite all of these attacks upon, and modifications of, the so-called *natural man-land ratio*, a ratio there always is and always will be until man becomes a disembodied spirit and a thousand angels can stand on the point of a needle. Man is a *body* requiring emplacement; he can never escape from a ratio.

8. Geographical Determinism

It has been held by many that man is utterly the creature, and mostly the victim, of his physical environment. Some examples of this view we have already noted. This theory is sometimes called *geographical determinism*. The view that man is "a piece of the earth" and nothing more is called *materialism*. The view that everything is heading straight for the pit is called *pessimism*. It now seems worth while to make a point or two further with special reference to geographical determinism, for it was that view that we stressed earlier in this chapter; and

we follow this matter not to deny the influence of the geographical environment upon man and upon his social organization but to balance things rather better and to remind ourselves of the sounder view; we should not become lopsided in our thinking—too soon. The following criticisms of the theory which says that man is utterly determined and all his works are determined singly and solely by his physicoenvironmental situation seem pertinent.

1. Early geographical determinists possessed little knowledge of primitive man and had, therefore, no basis for comparison. They were entirely unable to estimate how far man had come toward mastery, as a man in a boat cannot tell how rapidly he is traveling without reference to something outside the boat. These early theorists were, so to speak, in a boat and could not pass expert judgment on how far and how fast the human race had come in the control of its surroundings.[1]

2. These theorists, moreover, were disposed to overlook the evident fact that man is not, and has not for a long time been, a wholly passive agent. The evident fact is that man is nearly always an active factor in the situation. *Animals accept* the physicoenvironmental situation as they find it—or move out. Man also moves out—which is a non-acceptance of the situation—but he also stays and strives to find what he wants. In trying to find what he has wanted, he has built up through the centuries a thicker and thicker cultural mattress, which we name the *art of living*, between himself and the cruel onslaughts of nature; a heavy frost threatens, and we smudge the orchard and blanket the flowers; a rainy season menaces our crops, and we dig ditches and build levees; some infection sets into out system, and we cut the part away, stay in bed, take medicine, or move to another climate; we want the grapefruit of the south and the oranges of the west, and we build railroads and refrigerator cars; we are hindered by the dread yellow-fever mosquito, and we drain the swamps and banish the pest. Plants and animals, so far as we know, learn to want what they find; but man learns to find what he wants.

3. The geographical determinists have often overlooked the impulses which certain developments of culture have given to man's relations to nature. If there were no transmission of knowledge and skill from one generation to another and every baby had to begin life exactly where its parents began when they were babies, then these theorists might be regarded as sound. But whatever stage of culture or the arts man is born into becomes an active factor in determining what he shall do next and how he shall relate himself to his physical world. Illustrating this important point, Goldenweiser says:

[1] *Cf.* THOMAS, "The Environmental Basis of Society," and SOROKIN, "Contemporary Sociological Theories," for a review of the many theories of the relation between society and the physical environment.

The snow house of the Eskimo is thus said to be determined by the Eskimo's arctic *milieu*, the wood industries of the Northwest coast natives by the cedar forests of that area. Now while it will be admitted that snow is a *conditio sine qua non* of snow houses and that the elaborate wood-carvings of the Northwest coast would probably never have developed in the absence of the cedar forests, neither of these two factors may be regarded as a determinant. The refutation is right at hand: the Siberian Chukchee, whose environment is practically identical with that of the Eskimo, have no snow houses, while the natives of California, whose forests excel even those of the Northwest coast, have scarcely any wood industry and specialize in basketry. Moreover, even in primitive society the historical factor may not be neglected. Tribes often utilize materials not found in their own locality: thus the Toda of Southern India use pots imported from the Tamil, while the Australian Dieri travel some 300 miles to secure the pituri root cultivated by the natives of Central Queensland.[1]

Examples of this kind might be assembled at great length; and they would unite in showing that the arts of life have been diffused very widely and that people have migrated and carried some of their arts with them and that the young born into such social environments are often very little touched directly by the physicoenvironmental conditions.

4. Man, as we have already pointed out and as we shall see more fully later, has the habit of uniting with his fellows to meet the emergencies of life and to modify his physical situation. A bear which could easily capture one or two men could not stand up against twenty or thirty, and the twenty or thirty know how to unite and capture the bear. Bees sometimes sting men to death; but a single man often keeps millions of bees and systematically robs them of their honey.

What we have endeavored to say in these last paragraphs is that man lives amidst *two environments*—the physicogeographical and the social—and that he is powerfully influenced by both of them but probably more by the latter than the former *as civilization advances*. But let us gather from this chapter that the physical environment is real, is omnipresent, and is often menacing as well as hospitable. On the world stage of *land*, man plays his various parts. Climate pervades man's life; earthquakes and floods get in their little digs now and then; disease germs are never wholly absent from his body or what he eats; lightning strikes amidst his precious affairs; yet the call of open fields is for tillage, and of forests for the saw and axe.[2]

Questions

1. What does the term *environment* mean to you?
2. Can you improve on the list of features of the physical environment given? Anything lacking? Look the list over again more carefully.

[1] *Cf.* "Culture and Environment," *A. J. S.*, March, 1916. Lowie, "Primitive Society," p. 8 *ff.*

[2] *Cf.* Ellwood, "Cultural Evolution," p. 59 *ff.* Lebvre, "A Geographical Introduction to History," *passim*, is against geographical determinism. See, also, Wallis, "Geographical Environment and Culture," *Social Forces*, June, 1926.

3. What are the ultimate indispensables for keeping alive?

4. How far does temperature determine the distribution of life? Does what was said about animals apply to man, also? Why?

5. As we contemplate the immensity of the universe, we tend to feel very insignificant. What antidote for this feeling can you suggest?

6. Would it help us any if we could conceive of *the* beginning or *the* ending of all things? Are people who constantly talk of the beginning merely prejudiced?

7. What effects does the physical environment have on you; say, on your health; on your capacity for work; on what you wear; on your relations with your friends?

8. The case of the rice-eating Chinese transported to other parts of the earth is a very clear and convincing case of geographical determinism, is it not? Give reasons for your answer.

9. Can you think of any influences exerted by the physical environment on the family form; on government; on religion; on sports?

10. Why will not invention and the increase of capital sometime offset and nullify the man-land ratio?

11. What is the population per square mile where you live? How do you know?

12. What are the fundamental differences between the responses of animals and men to the physical environment? Give examples and try to take the scientific attitude.

13. Is Goldenweiser's argument about snow houses and wood carving sound? How could this be scientifically demonstrated?

14. Are there any prejudices at work in geographical determinism or in the arguments used to refute it? What sort of proof is called for?

15. In determining how many "actors" our "stage" can satisfactorily accommodate, how would a scientist proceed?

16. Why should the social scientist take any notice of the physical environment at all?

17. What evidence can be found that man is mastering his environment?

18. Does it appear to you that "man is Nature's rebellious son?"

19. What are the main parts of the theater?

CHAPTER III

THE PEOPLE

Having gained some notion of the stage on which, or amidst which, the stupendous and unending drama of social life is played, and having noticed its relation to the actors and its affects upon the play, we must now turn to a brief consideration of the actors themselves, or, in the usual language, the population. We have now to ask who and what are the *we* and the *they* of the preceding chapters, for it will be recalled that *we* observed this and *they* did that. We come, then, to the people; we come to ourselves.

1. They are Everywhere

1. Vast Numbers.—Creatures very similar to ourselves appear everywhere. We can see and touch them in the classroom. Out in the halls between classes they are more numerous. We go out on the street, and there they throng. We go down town and find them hustling to and fro along the streets, bustling in and out of stores, riding in street cars and autmobiles, working in offices and factories. If we go to another city, it is just the same. If we go to many cities, it is no different. Suppose we travel to other countries; well, there we find these creatures in as large or perhaps larger numbers.

Sometimes, it is true, we do not find many folk. Certain sections of our own country and certain parts of other lands are sparsely populated. There are not very many, so travelers tell us, in the mountain fastnesses or on the deserts. These are "outlandish" areas; and what does outlandish mean but that people are not there, never have been there, or have been there and have left? A remote region may be defined in terms of the absence of people.

How many persons are there, anyway, on this globe? None of us could ever, in several lifetimes, see, touch, and directly assure ourselves of the existence of all of the people now on earth; millions of them would be dead before we could get around. Authorities—and authorities are always to be watched—tell us that there are at the present time approximately 1,700,000,000[1]—almost 300 New Yorks. But no one can visualize

[1] Wolfe, "Readings in Social Problems," p. 195. Penk says that the earth can support 8,000,000,000. Davis, *Current History*, vol. XXVI, p. 773. *Cf.* Davies, Scientific Monthly, vol. XIX, p. 598.

so many; no one can conceive of so many. It is a very large "cast" that we have in this play; or we might say that there are many casts.

2. Distribution in Space.—How is this grand total distributed about over the earth? We cannot take the pages to estimate for the smaller units. The figures, moreover, are accurately computed only for certain areas. Rough approximations for the various continents for the year 1920 are as follows:

	Millions
Asia	990.8
Europe	452.1
Africa	132.5
North America	128.4
Central and South America	79.4
Australia and Oceana	8.0[1]

[1] Carpenter, "Relative Population Densities and the Immigration Policy of the United States," a pamphlet. *Cf.* Mailly, Ed., "Recent Estimate of the Population of the World," Smithsonian *Report* for 1873, p. 282 *ff.*

3. Distribution in Time.—So much for the present. How about the past? How many people were there in these and other areas last week? Last year? A century ago? A millenium ago? One hundred milleniums ago? Were there more people or less people than now?

Enrollments or enumerations were taken among civilized peoples as early as three or four thousand years ago for military and tax purposes; but these enumerations were for very small areas, and there were very few of them. We know nothing of the grand total five hundred or a thousand years ago, to say nothing of ten thousand years ago. We shall have to get an idea of the trend from recent computations. The following figures are suggestive:

Country	1872	1912	
Belgium	5,200,000	7,600,000	
France	36,100,000	39,600,000	
Germany	41,200,000	66,300,000	
Italy	27,000,000	34,700,000	
Norway	1,800,000	2,400,000	
Russia in Europe	74,100,000	141,300,000	
England and Wales	22,900,000	36,500,000	
Ireland	5,400,000	4,300,000	(decrease)
Scotland	3,400,000	4,700,000	

These are only a few cases, and they might give the wrong impression. But we can see that the population *increased* in every one of these areas save Ireland during this forty-year period; and the Irish increased—in the United States. If these figures may be taken as a fair sample, then the trend is quite clearly indicated—increase. Thus there were fewer people one hundred, five hundred, one thousand, ten thousand years ago granted something of uniformity in the trend. The figures for the United States show the same trend:

Year	Millions
1800	5.2
1820	9.6
1840	17.1
1860	31.4
1880	50.1
1900	75.7
1920	105.7[1]

This increase is due to immigration, you say? Well, what about the increase in the countries from which these immigrants came? No, there is good reason to believe that our own population would have increased about as rapidly without the immigrants.[2]

Upright creatures, bipeds, with one nose, one mouth, two eyes, two ears, free upper limbs, able to move about, versatile in adjustment, much like ourselves, are everywhere; and they have been on the earth for a long time, possibly 500,000 years—although not so numerously. But "we" have not been here 500,000 years, nor very long; the human span is "three score years and ten" according to the Scriptures, with many variations both ways. What we mean is that the *human family* has been here for a long, long time; and therefore the human drama has been going on for ages. What we mean is that there is something that abides, although individuals are coming in and going out all the time; they have "their exits and their entrances."

The next question that naturally presents itself—if we have not been sidetracked by some of the interesting problems suggested above—is this: Where do all these people come from, and where do they all go? Or, how do they come in and go out?

2. How People Come and Go

1. Natality.—The only door by which people can enter the world stage is the birth door. Some day we may discover a method of incubating babies, much as we do chickens, and succeed in augmenting or decreasing the population without assessing the present tax of pain, inconvenience, and loss usually associated with their coming. The total population of the globe at any moment is a product of the birth process.

The *rate* of the coming, that is fecundity, is of exceptional importance because of the cost and because of its bearing on the play—too few or too many actors both making very decisive changes in the character of it, as we all know from our own experiences with amateur theatricals. It is important, then, to take note of some birth rates. The following are selected merely for illustrative purposes. Death rates are inserted for

[1] Wright, "Population," p. 110. Wolfe, "Readings in Social Problems," p. 95.
[2] Fairchild, "Immigration," Chap. IX.

purposes of comparison. And the figures are for each 1,000 of the population.

Country	1881–1885			1901–1905		
	Average rate of			Average rate of		
	Births	Deaths	Increase	Births	Deaths	Increase
Hungary	44.6	33.1	11.5	37.2	26.2	11.0
Austria	38.2	30.1	8.1	35.6	24.2	11.4
Spain	46.4	32.6	13.8	35.0	25.8	9.2
Prussia	47.4	25.4	22.0	34.8	19.6	15.2
Italy	38.0	27.3	10.7	32.6	21.9	10.7
Scotland	33.3	19.6	13.7	28.9	16.9	12.0
England and Wales	33.5	19.4	14.1	28.2	16.1	12.1
Belgium	30.7	20.6	10.1	27.7	17.0	10.7
Ireland	23.9	18.0	5.9	23.2	17.6	5.6
France	24.7	22.2	2.5	21.2	19.6	1.6[1]

The first column for each of the above periods is the one we are interested in here, and we see that the birth rate is higher for some areas than for others. Other things being equal—which they never are—the areas with the highest rate would have larger numbers than areas with lower rates. It is worth while to note also that births are a continuous stream in any significant population. It is sometimes affirmed that a fool is born every minute, which means, of course, that babies are born oftener, for they do not all turn out to be fools. But there are never any distinct "generations," such as we sometimes assume.

Of extraordinary significance, in recent years, are the respective rates of birth within the different cultural levels of the population. The fact is well established and has been commented on many times that the rate is *lower* for the so-called *higher* classes and higher for the lower classes—Harvard and Vassar graduates not having enough children to keep their strains in existence. We are not just sure yet, however, what this means with respect to quality.[2]

2. Mortality.—As the only entrance—keeping in mind always the whole earth—is birth, so the only exit is death. Stories have come down to us from the past of how certain elect ones were taken directly to heaven and thus avoided the Grim Reaper's scythe; but these accounts are not well authenticated, and anyway these people were out of the population. All modern experience points inevitably to death—some time.

[1] NEWSHOLME, "The Declining Birthrate," p. 8.

[2] *Cf.* RICE and WILLEY, "College Men and the Birth Rate," *J. Heredity*, January, 1926. On the birth rate of southeast Asia, see WENZLER, "Geopolitik," Vol. VII, p. 614.

Two forms of death may be usefully distinguished in this connection—premature and natural. Among the backward peoples of the earth there is hardly such thing as natural death, death from wearing out, death from old age; almost all deaths are premature. And among ourselves, in civilized societies, there is far less natural death than most people suppose. Among primitives, the average length of life is from five to ten years, since infant mortality is so high. In the Philippines, the average is still under fifteen years. In India, the average is around twenty-two years. Among ourselves, the average is something over fifty years.[1] It is steadily being raised. Perhaps the longest life ever authentically recorded was around one hundred and thirty years, although again we have stories to the effect that certain ancients lived much longer—one Hebrew notable having reached nine hundred and sixty-nine.

The figures given above show the death rate to be *lower* in all cases than the birth rate. For the total population of the globe, the death rate has to be lower or we would not find the increase which we have noted. But for any given lesser area, any class, any time, the death rate may be higher. What this excess of births over deaths means for the future has been a cause for concern to many, since we do not have an elastic earth and since our natural resources are limited.[2] But the multiplication of numbers in the past undoubtedly has been a factor in causing human beings to work harder, be more efficient, save more, and thus push up the level of civilization. This is not to say, however, that such results would follow any increase which might occur.

3. Migration.—For any area *less* than the globe, say the United States or Ohio, migration complicates the ratio between births and deaths. The total population of Ohio might double or treble while the total population of the globe declined or remained stationary. For, we are so constituted that we can move about over the earth, and we count for one wherever we go—not always census-wise, but food-wise and place-wise. The migratory urge has been strong as far back as we can go—the ancient Hebrews illustrating it when they entered Canaan—and it is still strong with countless people. It seems to be clear that sedentary life has actually been forced on man by the increase in numbers, the open spaces dwindling in size.

Two phases of immigration have been given special attention, (1) the movement from the rural districts to the cities and (2) the movement from country to country. With respect to the first type, the following figures show what has been going on in the United States. The cities given[3] are those of 8,000 or more population.

[1] *Cf.* Woodruff, "Expansion of Races," p. 82.

[2] *Cf.* Ross, "Standing Room Only."

[3] Weber, "The Growth of Cities," Columbia University Studies in History, Economics and Public Law, Vol. XI, p. 22. Zimmerman, "The Migration to Towns and Cities," *A. J. S.*, November, 1926.

Date	Number of cities	Date	Number of cities
1790	6	1850	85
1800	6	1860	141
1810	11	1870	226
1820	13	1880	286
1830	26	1890	448
1840	44		

Now, of course, the excess of births over deaths did not—and would not, according to the ratios of births and deaths already given—give this remarkable growth. Migrants from foreign countries account for part of the increase. The remainder must have come from the rural districts; and we find also that during the same period, and especially later, the rural population has declined.

Of the movement from country to country a vast amount has been written. It is enough here to impress the fact of this change by assembling some figures of the foreign-born in the United States, probably the Mecca of the most extensive pilgrim movement the world has ever seen. The following figures[1] are estimates of the numbers here at the dates given from the countries named.

	1900	1910
Austria	276,702	1,174,973
England	843,491	877,719
Germany	2,669,164	2,501,333
Ireland	1,619,469	1,352,251
Italy	484,703	1,343,125
Russia	424,372	1,602,782

What we have then is this: The population of the earth is maintained or increased by an equality of births with deaths or an excess of births over deaths—sick people still counting; the population is diminished by a surplus of deaths over births; but for any lesser area than the globe, the population is the result of the interplay of the three factors—births, deaths, and migration. People come and go, then, in these ways, births and immigrants going together to increase the number, and deaths and emigrants going to decrease the number.[2]

3. The Characteristics of People

As we look at each other, deal with each other, study each other, we are impressed more and more with (1) our likenesses and (2) our differences. As I scrutinize my neighbor, I can see that he has two eyes, two ears, four limbs, a torso, a head, a structure, the same as I have. This holds true, also, of other neighbors. Moreover, careful examination—operations and autopsies—shows that all people have the same internal structure and organs. A surgeon trained in an American medical school

[1] Fairchild, "Immigration," p. 214.

[2] *Cf.* Pearl, "The Biology of Population Growth," several chapters.

and able to find an American's appendix can go to Africa, New Zealand, or Siberia and probe straight to the appendix of a native—without fail. He expects to find, and he usually does find, that a Zulu's heart is approximately in the same place in a Zulu's body as an American's heart in an American's body. A Patagonian's brains are in his head just as are an Englishman's brains. The world around, people are much the same; they are much the same physically, physiologically, neurologically, and mentally. The African feels shame; he suffers pain; he has wishes; he hopes; he fears; he thinks—just as all other people.

This universal similarity is the basis for including all people within what scientists call a *species*—which is simply a class. All things are put together into a class because of fundamental similarities—coins, rocks, trees, men. The consensus of opinion among anthropologists (students of man) is that the human race is one species. This conclusion has been reached after prolonged research. And it is supported by the further fact that human beings are everywhere interfertile; they can everywhere mate and produce offspring; all the laws that have prohibited or that now prohibit wide intermarriage are man-made; they are artificial and not natural. Thus, people are fundamentally similar the world around.

But they are also *different.* I am very much like my neighbor; but I am usually not mistaken for my neighbor. Others who have dealings with us both do not usually or ever mistake us for each other. And I certainly never confuse myself with my neighbor—whatever other people do. I have a nose, but not his nose; I have a head, but not his head; I have eyes, but I see things, as he often tells me, which he does not see. I have a pain in my toe, but he tells me that he does not feel it. He is only about five feet tall, whereas I am about six feet; his hair is black, whereas mine is brown; he breathes more rapidly than I do; he is nervous, whereas I am phlegmatic; he is quiet, whereas I talk all the time; he works at carpentry, whereas I teach—and so on to an inexhaustible list.

Here is a vast jungle of likenesses and differences. It is the business of science to enter jungles and impose some sort of intellectual order on them. Thousands of investigations have been carried on to this end—to classify the people of the earth—and many classifications have been worked out. But we do not have space here to do more than name some of the *principles* of classification which have been used.

1. Physical Characters.—We are all pieces of the earth, as has been said; we are, in part, identical with its compositional elements. Now, taking these physical characteristics and comparing, discriminating, and classifying, we soon find that the people of the earth begin to fall in subclasses, then subsubclasses, then subsubsubclasses, and so on, until we arrive at the individual who is, in the last analysis, unique; that is,

he has some features for which there is no class when the analysis is minute enough.

On this basis we can divide all people into *two sexes.* The two sexes are enough alike to belong to the species Homo; but there are very great differences—differences in physical frame, differences in sex organs, differences in metabolism or organic change within the system, differences in reproductive functions, differences in nervous reactions.[1]

On this basis, we might divide the people of the world into *races,* with the understanding that we are still using physical characters but not the same set employed in discussing sexes; the sexes cut across race lines. A study of color helps us somewhat; for there are masses of people with characteristic colors. Stature is another feature; and we speak of the Negroes as generally tall, the Whites as generally medium, and the Mongols as generally short. Some attention has been given to race odor; the Whites often complaining of what has been called the Negro odor; but all peoples have an odor, and the celebrated African missionary, Dan Crawford, reports that a black boy of his acquaintance could always tell when a member of his race had been in contact with a white man; the Peruvians have different names for the odors of Whites, Negros, and Indians. Odor seems to be a matter of skin activity. Then there is the head form; and very careful measurements have been made, and a cranial index—the ratio of the greatest breadth of the head to the greatest length taken as 100—has been worked out; the long-headed (dolichocephalic) have a cranial index of 75 and less, the medium heads (mesocephalic) have an index of 75 to 79.9, and the broad heads (brachycephalic) have an index of 80 and above; the Negroes belong to the first, the Caucasians to the second, and the Mongols to the third class. Then the lips, the nose, the eyes, the jaws, the ears, the brains, and many other features have been studied. From these evidences, some have concluded that there are three races, and some that there are thirty-three.[2]

Then there are the *ages,* with all that this term connotes. Human beings all about us, we can see for ourselves, range all the way from birth to death, from those just inspiring for the first time to those just expiring for the last time; and, of course, ages again cut across both sex and race lines. The broadest classes, from this angle, are, perhaps, the very young and undeveloped, youth which is in a transitional stage, middle age, which carries the work of the world and keeps the race going, and, finally, old age, which is a period of decline and surrender.[3] But age is a very complicated matter. Close study has shown that we all have six parallel and interrelated ages—a chronological age stated

[1] *Cf.* Hankins in Davis and Barnes, "Introduction to Sociology," p. 343.
[2] Keller, "Race-distinction," a pamphlet. Keane, "Ethnology," p. 162.
[3] *Cf.* North, "Social Differentiation," p. 57 *ff.*

in terms of years and months and days; physiological age denotive of the stages of physical growth; mental age denotive of the ripening of instincts and capacities; pedagogical age denotive of our school progress; social age denotive of how we make adjustments, involving altruism and cooperation, to other people; and, finally, a moral and religious age denotive of how our moral judgment has developed and what religious awakening we have had.[1] Probably the chronological age is best known and the least important. But we can see illimitable possibilities here for subdivisions of people.

Then there is the degree of physical *normality*—whether we have all of our limbs, whether they are all in the right (usual) place, whether they function in the usual way. We sometimes pick out athletes, such as the Greeks immortalized in stone, and "bathing beauties," such as we immortalize in pageants at Atlantic City, and we can take these as standards. Then those with too much or too little fat here or there or somewhere else are—different; those with small bones are different; those with defective teeth, poor eyes, crippled limbs, bowlegs, and what not are just—different; they are "outclassed" by the others. There is no end to the classifications which might be made in the light of some arbitrary standard of beauty, health, strength, size; or we might make many measurements and find an arithmetic mean which we could take as standard. But so much for the physical characters.

2. Mental Characters.—We could take up the same groups that we have defined on the basis of the countless physical characters and ascertain their mental characteristics. We would find that the two sexes are mentally alike in hundreds of ways; but they are also different in hundreds and thousands. The races are also mentally alike and mentally different in more ways than can be enumerated. So with the age classes, except the very extremes, and the normal and abnormal. Mental characteristics are bases for classification. If we *started* to assort people on the basis of mental characters, however, we would make very different classifications from those already given.

Roughly and inclusively speaking, however, there are the following types in the population. There are the *geniuses*, the persons who invent new things, who say original things, who seem to be especially endowed along some particular line, who are, as a matter of fact, indescribable because they are so different from what we ordinarily have about us. Then there are more people whom we might call the *talented*, who fall short of genius in many ways, but who rise so much higher than the mass that they are looked up to and copied. Then we come to the great mass of the *mediocre* where there is almost nothing of originality and very little of talent; these constitute the bulk of the people. Then below

[1] BALDWIN, B. T., quoted in *Literary Digest*, Jan. 17, 1920.

these are the *defectives*, the mentally sick, the mentally defective, who are almost as few or as numerous as the geniuses.

Within recent years, investigators have been at work trying to measure mental characteristics, that is, to work objectively and dispassionately at their classification and significance. As a result, it would seem that these 1,700,000,000—if the results for smaller areas and numbers like the United States hold good universally, which is doubtful—may be classified as follows: The A class, with "very superior intelligence," includes roughly 5 per cent; the B class, with "superior intelligence," includes about 20 per cent; the C class, with "average intelligence," takes in about 50 per cent; the D class, with "low average intelligence," takes in about 20 per cent; and the E class, with "very inferior intelligence," includes something less than 5 per cent.[1]

But in taking "intelligence" as a principle of classification, a somewhat narrow mental field is selected. The measurers are not exactly sure yet just what they are measuring. They aim to measure an original endowment, but it is increasingly doubtful if they do. Besides, there are such phenomena as temperament, emotions, instincts, which have hardly been quantitatively appraised as yet. But we can all recognize vast differences here, and we can see that subdivision might go on until the last man, in all of his uniqueness, stood out as unclassifiable.

3. Actional Characters.—It is rather easy to make a distinction between the physical and actional characters of people; but it is practically impossible to distinguish between the mental and actional. Indeed, we are driven to examine actions as a means of getting at mental characters; mental characters are revealed only in action. A man once told a boy: "Nobody will know you are a fool if you will only keep your mouth shut." Of course, he might have acted the fool in other ways, but there is a point in what the man advised. We know that a person is in a "bad humor" only by the way he "carries on" or remains silent—by his actions. We know that a student has done some thinking in the course only by the way he talks and writes. Activity is the clue to mentality. This means that we are already discussing the social play or drama of life and, therefore, ahead of schedule; therefore, we must desist. But what we are aiming to show is the absolutely countless number of *traits of folk;* we are trying to direct attention to the endless versatility of man—because this enters into and complicates the social play. Each individual, no matter what his permutations and combinations of characteristics may be, is *in* the social drama and playing a part; and no matter what way he moves—*if other people are around*—he affects the ongoings of the play.

[1] *Cf.* NORTH, "Social Differentiation," p. 176 *ff.*; SUMNER, "Folkways," p. 40. On individual differences, see HANKINS, *Social Forces*, December, 1925.

4. Sources of Likenesses and Differences

Having gone out amidst our fellows with our eyes, ears, and minds wide open, we have seen, heard, and inferred much. But a deeper matter now confronts us: What is the source of these characteristics?

1. Heredity.—One fertile source is, as we are all aware, *heredity*. We all derive, so competent authorities tell us, from the fusion of two cells, an egg or ovum and a sperm. Abundant experimentation has shown that the intermingling of the contents of these two cells gives very different results from the pouring together of the contents of some other two. And when the sperm cell enters the egg cell and the wall of the latter hardens so that no other sperms can enter, our original base is determined, there is something about us which is forever fixed; at least, if the results—babies have been born without limbs—are bad, there is no way to do it over again.

Our life history is divisible into three stages—the preconceptual, the prenatal, and the postnatal, respectively. The preconceptual means the development up to fertilization; the prenatal means the development from fertilization to birth; and the postnatal means the development thereafter. Whatever the organism receives from the contents of the two cells by way of mechanism and potentiality is what the organism *is* to start with, and nothing by way of fundamental physical contents can be added or subtracted thereafter.

Biologists who are also geneticists are of the opinion that these cells—egg and sperm—do not have little men or women or heads or brains or fingers or hearts in them when they fuse; they believe that these cells have *representatives* of these things of some sort in them, for some traits seem to go in and come out as *units;* that is, they do not mix and lose their identity—eye color or stature, for example. An Austrian monk, Gregor Mendel, found this out seventy years ago, and many investigators have more or less confirmed his findings. We cannot go into the details here.

The point we are making may be clarified by our own taking note of our family. We are the offspring of our parents, and we are *like* them in belonging to their species. Sometimes we are called a "rat" or something worse, but the language is metaphorical; we are always enough like our parents to be classed in their species. And so, with each case, it is obvious that species reproduce after their own kind; elephants produce only elephants; strawberries produce only strawberries; birds produce only birds; human beings produce only human beings. It would be a topsyturvy world if elephants sometimes produced strawberries and birds sometimes produced human beings. But these things do not happen. On one side, therefore, heredity is likeness-succession.

But on the other hand, heredity also means difference-succession. For while progeny are like their parents, they are also different at many

points. Children are like their parents but never exactly like The father has blue eyes, but the child has brown eyes; the mother has black eyes, but the child has blue eyes, and so on. These are familiar facts and need not be repeated. Heredity means sameness, but it also means difference. Out of our cell stage, then, come some of the likenesses and some of the differences which we have.[1]

2. Physical Environment.—Another fertile source of likenesses and differences is the *physical environment.* After the process of fertilization is complete, our mother's body is our environment for about nine months; this is our environment and it is subject to many fluctuations; to our secret cave many infections penetrate—syphilis for example, and more than one-half of the stillbirths are attributable to this disease; also many of the toxins or poisons generated by the mother's body reach this place and cause many changes.[2] Differences and likenesses are produced by this prenatal environment.

Our postnatal environment is a very different world, and it also has a vast amount to do with what we are. Some of us soon get the wrong food and waste away; others are kept healthy and normal. Some of us soon develop certain muscles, while others develop other muscles as the environment dictates. Some of us take on one language and some another and thus become very different; but sometimes we take on the same language and are thus alike. Some of us learn to worship the devil, while others learn to worship God; thus we are different; but sometimes we both learn to worship the devil, and thus we are alike. If we are strong for heredity and do not see much in the influence of the environment, what can we make of the following?

> The French botanist Bonnier divided a common dandelion, and grew half in the lowlands and the other half in the mountains. While the former grew into a small and slender plant, the half raised in the Alpine heights grew into a plant of a very different appearance, with longer roots, much shorter stems, smaller and more hairy leaves, larger and brighter flowers. Each variety produces its like in its own locality; but the seeds of the Alpine plant will produce only the lowland form if sown there, and vice versa, the seeds of the lowland form will grow into the Alpine form in the mountains. Moreover, if either form be transmitted into the other region, it will soon grow into the variety characteristic of its new habitat.[3]

How far does this apply to man? It is very hard to say, for man reacts differently; he reacts mentally and sometimes changes his environment rather than himself. While the physical environment, therefore, undoubtedly produces changes of the sort indicated above in plants, it produces mental and actional changes in the higher animals which are

[1] HANKINS in DAVIS and BARNES, *op. cit.*, p. 358.

[2] *Cf.* BERNARD, "Environment as a Social Factor," *A. J. S.*, Vol. XVI, p. 99.

[3] BERNARD, *loc. cit.*

substitutes for physical changes. Man has not changed noticeably since King Tut's day—on the physical side; if he has changed much, he has deteriorated, probably. But he has changed startlingly on the mental and actional sides. Thus, while great emphasis may and must be placed upon heredity as a source of physical and mental likenesses and differences, we may remind ourselves that the products of heredity do not enter a vacuum; each individual is a product, at any stage of his development, of the interactions of heredity *and* environment.

3. The Culture Pattern.—We have to remember, also, that man lives amidst two—indeed, as we shall see later, amidst three—environments; he lives amidst the physical world as we have described it in the previous chapter; but he also lives amidst a social environment which is unknown to any but the higher animals; but he lives amidst a culture environment which is unknown to any creature but himself. There is for man, that is to say, a psychosocial environment, and this has a profound influence in developing likenesses and differences. By heredity we have the apparatus to speak; but by culture we have the language spoken. By heredity we have the capacity to eat; but by culture we have the fat of lamb's tails as a delicacy in one part of the world, sea slugs in another, and Limburger in another. These uses can never be accounted for on the basis of physical heredity or on the basis of the physical environment. We have hands to convey our food to the mouth by physical heredity; but what food and the way in which it is conveyed, whether by a spoon, a fork, or chop sticks, is determined by the culture pattern prevailing where we happen to be born and grow up. But here, again, we are ahead of schedule. These points, however, enable us to see clearly that man is a very complex creature and the product of a multiplicity of interoperating factors. Let us now narrow the scope of the discussion and select an individual—any individual will do—for further examination.

5. Man: An Adaptive Organism

What am I, anyway? This is still a puzzler, for, although thousands of careful investigators are and have been at work trying to find the answer, the answer is far from complete yet. Two methods of investigation have been and are still used—introspection and observation. I may learn something about myself by introspection; but I cannot learn a thing about you in this way. In learning about you, I have to use observation; and you are in the same fix, I suppose. You can learn something about yourself by introspection, but you cannot learn anything about me, unless—and here we strike into the social play again—unless we *communicate* with each other and exchange views. But introspection is a somewhat unreliable method, and so many have turned to observation as the more reliable way. This, however, is not the place to discuss methods of investigation.

From these methods, some points seem fairly well attested. I am a distinct, though not utterly detached, material body. I am material in the sense that I occupy space, persist in time, resist external pressures, and dissolve into dust at death. I am a very complex compound of chemical substances, so I am told; and I know that I need to introduce chemical substances into my system all the time to keep alive. To keep alive?

Then I am also a living material body; that is, I am material in that condition which we call *living*. I cannot prove by introspection, nor can any one observe, that life is a thing in, of, and by itself. It is a condition, a state, just as death is; life and death are opposite conditions.

I am also an *organism*, a very complex organism. I am an organization of organisms. I am limbs, torso, head, brain, nervous system, eyes, heart, stomach, and the rest, all working together and forming a whole which functions in characteristic ways. These organs, like the heart, the stomach, the brain, are also organizations of organs which function in characteristic ways. That is what we mean by *organization*—a functioning instrument. And we might say that to live is to function. Certainly dead things do not function.

I am a *sensitive* organism. I am eyes which are stimulated by light waves; I am ears which are stimulated by sound waves; I can feel things and taste things. I am so constituted that outside influences play upon me, set up excitations in these receptors, carry through to the brain, circle about and produce certain responses in my internal and external organs which we call *activity*. I am an excitable material body. And there is great mystery in all of this. But as a result of my contact with external things, I am certain states of feeling or emotion within—pleasure, pain, sorrow, depression, exaltation, and the like—and observably active without.

I am a *recognizer*, a knower, an interpreter of these outside influences, an anticipator of them, a discriminator among them, a judger of them. I can feel the pin prick and let out a howl in response, or I can keep from howling. I can choose a soda instead of a piece of pie—when both are seen at the same time. I can go out at night or stay home. I can work a mathematical problem. I can read this book. I can help my fellows. I can love my country and hate other countries. I can work for my living or starve to death.

Being all of this, I am a good deal. But am I anything more? I have never, by my own internal scrutiny, been able to discover that I am more than this. But down through the ages has come the tradition that I am infinitely more than what has been indicated. Tradition has taught me that I am really *dual;* I am a living body and also a "living soul." How others found this out, when I cannot do it, and what this "living soul" really is—this is more than I can understand. The most

careful and persistent investigators of this present time have not been able to locate or describe this additional part of me. In consequence of this inability, many of them have been led to the conclusion that I am not a "living soul" in the meaning formerly assigned to this term; they have said that this is merely an illusion which has come down to us in tradition. But of course it does not necessarily follow that this part of me does not exist because scientists cannot find it. Scientists are all the while finding things which they did not know existed. The great philosopher Hegel once said: "There are seven planets; why look for more?" and a new planet was discovered while he was saying this. Hence, I cannot be sure that I am a living soul or that I am not—yet.

Whether it is merely habit or whether I have special insights, I do not know, but it seems natural for me to say: "*I* have a body," "*I* have a mind of my own," or "*I* have a soul," or "*I* have a pain," or "*I* have some clothes," and so on. But what is the *I* who or which possesses all of these accessories? When I say so confidently: "I have a body," is it the soul that possesses the body? Or when I say, "I have a soul," is it the body that possesses the soul? Is it just one part that talks about and lays claim to other parts, or is there something over and above all of these to which they are tributary? There is a vast amount of mystery about all of this yet.

In his able work entitled, "Man: An Adaptive Mechanism," Crile shows that "everywhere something is pursuing and something is escaping another creature." In other words, he calls a lively attention to "the struggle for existence" in which all creatures are inextricably involved—and which we shall consider in some detail in a later chapter. The result of this struggle is that structures and functions are wrought out which are saviors to the creatures to which they come; some of these are teeth, claws, skin, shell, color, fur, feathers, horns, and so forth.

Now, in all cases

> . . . the fate of each creature seems to have been staked upon one mechanism. The tiger by its teeth and claws, the elephant and the rhinoceros by their strength, the bird by its wings, the deer by its fleetness, the turtle by its carapace—all are enabled to counter the attacks of enemies and to procreate. Where there is a negative defense, such as a shell or quills, there is little need and no evidence of intelligence; where a rank odor, no need and no presence of claws or carapace; where a sting or venom, no need and no possession of odor, claws, shell, extraordinary strength, or sagacity. Where the struggle is most bitter, there exist the most complex and most numerous contrivances for living.

There appears to be a good deal of evidence that the victory in this struggle has usually gone to *brain as against brawn*. And it is possible to say that this is but a victory of lability as against stability.

> Everywhere the organism that exhibits the qualities of quick response, of extreme sensibility to stimuli, of capacity to change, is the individual that sur-

vives, "conquers," "advances." The quality most useful in nature, from the point of view of the domination of a wider environment, is the quality of *changeableness, plasticity, mobility, or versatility.*

Now, it would seem that man's especial and particular means of gaining ascendancy is this quality of versatility. By means of his highly organized nervous system, he is capable of a countless number of reactions to situations. And this is the feature above all others which strikes us as we watch him behave. When we know as much about animals as we do about ourselves, we can nearly always tell what any given animal will do in a given situation—not always, but nearly always. But we cannot tell very much about man; he can and does react to the same situation in so many different ways that it is very hard for us to calculate what he will do; and this is just our trouble all the time—when we insult him, when we make new laws, when we take away his mate, when we raise his wages. Man is most incalculable.

Because he has to live amidst all of these environments that we have mentioned, all of which are extremely complex and the last one the most complex of all because it is composed of these innumerable and incalculable reactions of his fellows, man has to be more variable; he has to react more frequently and more variously all the time because his fellows are under the same compulsion and present him with a more complicated environment to meet. Let us just remember what we all do during almost any day, especially if we live in a large city, and it will be clear to us that we are forced to meet an immense number of new situations and demands. Our ability to meet these situations successfully and, therefore, with originality is what we now call *intelligence;* the unintelligent cannot keep up with the pace.[1]

6. The Nature of Man

We can observe creatures like ourselves reacting quickly, cleverly, dexterously, energetically, precisely, readily, variously—anywhere—and they act as wholes, as complete units; they are "all there," as our slang has it. Their hereditary traits and their acquired traits are all interwoven to such an extent that they mutually support each other. From the biological and psychological points of view, we might stop right here and have nothing more to say about man save by way of the unlimited elaboration of the subjects already considered. But for our purposes in this connection, we must go somewhat further; we must analyze our specimen man in still another way. We have already spoken of his hereditary nature and his acquired nature; we have noticed that part of him which came from the fusion of two cells and also that part of him which came from his environment; we say he is a Chinaman by

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 17 *ff.*

heredity, but he eats rice by environment—or social heredity, if we like. We may now carry on with these points but with a slightly different emphasis.

1. Original Nature.—We originate from cells. This means that we do not start our lives as "human beings." We start as cells, and cells are not "human." If the cells of rats, apes, cattle, and men were going down the street together, none of us could tell which was which. This means that there is no reason why we should separate human germ cells off and place them on a special level *before they reach that level.* Thus, the adjective *human* is properly applied only after the acquisition of human nature—the meaning of which we shall see in a moment. *Human* is indicative of something not found at all in cells. We are originated from the cells of human beings; but we cannot properly apply the term *human* to the cells. At least, the biologists and psychologists can find nothing in these cells to warrant the application of the adjective *human*—whatever the mystics may find there.

The first meaning, the lowest meaning, of *human*, then, is that it is the name of an animal species; it is a class name for an assemblage of a large number of physical characters. "Man," therefore, is born "human" only in this limited sense; he is born an animal and *becomes* human by the acquistion of human traits.

What we mean by *original nature*, then is

> . . . roughly, what is common to all men minus [notice this word, *minus*] all adaptations to tools, houses, clothes, furniture, words, beliefs, religions, laws, science, the arts, and to whatever in other men's behavior is due to adaptations to them. From human nature as we find it, take away, first, all that is in the European but not in the Chinaman, all that is in the Fiji Islander but not in the Esquimaux, all that is local or temporary. Then take away also the effects of all products of human art. What is left of human intellect and character is largely original—not wholly, for all these elements of knowledge which we call ideas and judgments must be subtracted from his responses. Man originally possesses only capacities which, after a given amount of education, will produce ideas and judgments.[1]

Original nature seems to possess only capacities for reflex action. The simpler and commoner reflexes, according to James, are "crying, sneezing, snoring, coughing, sighing, gagging—extending and raising the arms at any sudden sensory stimulus, or the quick pulsation of the eyelid." But almost all of the higher animals do all of these; there is nothing human here.

Then there are certain more complex activities such as sucking, chewing, sitting up, wiggling about. Among the more general and

[1] PARK and BURGESS, "Introduction to the Science of Sociology," p. 80, quoting Thorndike.

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unlearned responses of children are fear, anger, pugnacity, envy, jealousy, curiosity, shyness, secretiveness, and so forth. But again, in this list, we have nothing that marks the man and sets him off from all other creatures. A good deal has been made of certain instincts—flight, pugnacity, repulsion, curiosity, self-abasement and self-assertion, parental, and others.[1] But there is nothing necessarily human about these except as they take on particular forms in special cases; and Bernard has shown that the larger part of these so-called *instincts* is habit; that is, learned reaction.[2] Original nature, then, is a species of animal nature capable, *under the proper environment*—this is very important—of becoming "human nature"; but we can never know this, in not a single case can we know it, until it has come to pass.[3]

2. Human Nature.—*Human nature* is one of the most familiar matters, one of the most frequent topics of conversation, and yet it is extremely obscure and difficult of definition. It is something which original nature of the right kind grows into; it is a superstructure; it is "an artificial product," as Hocking says;[4] it is the shape which original nature takes at the hands of society.

Surveying the literature on this subject, there are at least *four* meanings which this term has, and there are four views of human nature which prevail more or less widely.

1. A human being is one who is born of human beings; who has a longer infancy than the young of other species; who has learned to walk upright and thus has free hands; who has acquired certain skills such as language, a way of keeping alive, and some manners; who coordinates his activities to some extent with others of his kind; who is a mobile being and a maker and user of tools and symbols. This definition would not exclude the criminal and the parasite; it would not entirely exclude certain animals. Lack of moral discrimination characterizes this view.

2. There is the very common and popular view that human nature is that part of us which is stubborn or weak. It is often said of a man that he is "so human," by which is meant that he is weak and easily enticed. Or "human nature is like a bad clock; it might go right now and then, or be made to strike the hour, but its inward frame is to go wrong." Or "human nature is a rogue and a scoundrel, or why would it perpetually stand in need of laws and religion?" Or "human nature is hard to overcome." This view is well stated in the lines:

> It's human natur', p'raps,—if so,
> Oh, isn't human natur' low.

[1] *Cf.* McDougall, "Social Psychology," p. 29. *Cf.* Bernard, "Introduction to Social Psychology," p. 129 *ff.*

[2] "Instinct," p. 84.

[3] *Cf.* Ogburn, "Social Change," Chap. II.

[4] "Human Nature and Its Remaking," p. 2 *ff.*

And Arthur Guiterman, in his racing rhymes, has said:

When we try to curb the surges
Of unchanging human nature,
. . . . . .
We are every bit as crazy, as
I'll prove to any jury,
As those enterprising beavers
When they dammed the big Missouri.

—"Wildwood Fables."

This view does not make any distinction between human nature and original nature, indeed, it is the view that human nature is the same as original nature; these viewers would probably assign a certain baseness, an amount of moral depravity, to the original side. This is what unnumbered people have called *original sin*, in theological terms.

3. Again, human nature is sometimes thought of, to use the language of Cooley, as a complex of

. . . those sentiments and impulses that are human in being superior to those of the lower animals, and also in the sense that they belong to mankind at large, and not to any particular race or time. It means, particularly, sympathy and the innumerable sentiments into which sympathy enters, such as love, resentment, ambition, vanity, hero-worship, and the feeling of social right and wrong.[1]

Faris makes an excellent point when he says that to understand human nature it is necessary to "imagine imaginations." He says:

The ability to conceive of human nature thus always involves the ability to take the role of another in imagination and to discover in this manner qualities that we recognize in ourselves. We regard as inhuman or non-human all conduct which is so strange that we cannot readily imagine ourselves as engaging in it. We speak of inhuman cruelty when atrocities are so hard-heartedly cruel that we cannot conceive of ourselves as inflicting them . . . And conversely . . . to sympathize with the appealing eyes of a pet dog, or the dying look of a sick cat, or to view the last gasps of a slain deer [is to have the experience of attributing unreflectively human motives and feelings]. Human nature is, therefore, that quality which we attribute to others as a result of introspective behavior.[2]

4. Human nature is partly defined in terms of sympathy and imagination; but it is also defined in terms of intelligence. Sympathy and imagination distinguish man, but intelligence is a better criterion. This intelligence may be regarded as "the ability to exercise foresight, to adapt means to ends, to control behavior in the light of experience." More specifically, what distinguishes man is the amount and kind of his *thinking*, and thinking may be defined as "a process of finding and testing meanings"; and a "meaning" is simply a name for what stimuli

[1] "Social Organization," p. 28.

[2] "The Nature of Human Nature," *Proceedings, A. J. S.*, July, 1926, p. 18 *ff.*

signify to us. Thinking is an aggressive attitude toward the stimuli which assail us; it is "experimental, forward-looking, controlled by the future."[1]

Our point is, then, that some of this original nature is stuff which *can* be transmuted into human nature, is a shape or direction taken—when in the proper environment. But original nature is not predestined, willy-nilly, to be so transmuted or to take such shape or direction. And this is not guesswork but fact. There are many around us all the time who are human mainly in the first two senses of the term but who have rarely reached the levels indicated by the third and fourth. Of course, a farmer cannot grow a good crop from poor seed; let us admit the directing power of heredity. But neither can he grow a good crop with the best of seed and poor soil; let us admit, therefore, the directing power of environment. The "soil" of which we are now thinking is the Great Society—the unending social drama, to which we shall come shortly.

7. Man's Place in Nature

Differentiating between Man and Nature for the moment, let us ask: What is man's place in this vast complex by which he is surrounded? or, more particularly: Is man the darling of the gods? Is he the end for which all things were made in the beginning? Does nature *care* for man any more than for the worm? There have been many and varied answers to these questions, religion, as a rule, overvaluing him, possibly, and science remaining skeptical.

It is a fact that nature's "judgments" with respect to man and his affairs appear to be very different from man's judgments. Nature produces a man and then tuberculosis germs which kill him—or lightning, or earthquakes, or droughts. She produces families of idiots and of geniuses, of physical defectives and bathing beauties, of weaklings and stalwarts, with equal facility—and inscrutability. It would seem, therefore, that nature's standards of worth are very different from man's.

With such facts in mind, many thinkers have been very pessimistic about the whole business. Arthur Balfour thinks

> . . man will go down into the pit, and all his thoughts will perish . . . Nor will anything that *is* be better or worse for all that the labor, genius, devotion, and suffering of man have striven through countless ages to effect.

And Bertrand Russell, distinguished mathematician and philosopher once thought

> . . . that man is the product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were achieving; that his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and his

[1] Bode, "Fundamentals of Education," p. 216. Modern Educational Theories, pp. 200, 318.

beliefs are but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms . . . and all the labor of the ages, all the devotion, all the inspiration, all the noonday brightness of human genius, are destined to extinction in the vast death of the solar system when it finally occurs.[1]

And our own American Emerson has expressed himself as follows:

Nature is no sentimentalist,—does not cosset or pamper us. We must see that the world is rough and surly, and will not mind drowning a man or a woman, but swallows up your ship like a grain of dust . . . The diseases, the elements, fortune, gravity, lightning, respect no persons . . . Nature is the tyrannous circumstance, the thick skull, the sheathed snake, the ponderous, rock-like jaw.[2]

And man's pretensions that he is the special object of cosmic concern have been satirized by many. Montaigne, a French writer of the sixteenth century, asks:

Why may not a goose say thus: "All the parts of the universe I have an interest in; the earth serves me to walk upon, the sun to light me; the stars have their influence upon me; I have such an advantage by the winds and such by the waters; there is nothing that yon heavenly roof looks upon so favorably as me. I am the darling of nature. Is it not man that keeps and serves me?"

And Pope reiterated the same thought:

> While man exclaims, "See all things for my use,"
> "See man for mine," replies the pampered goose.

"The old religion," says Perry, "thought of him as 'a little lower than the angels'; the new materialism thinks of him as a little higher than the anthropoid apes."[3]

But here is a point which may be stressed in closing this chapter. Man may be ultimately going down into the pit—in several million years. But what about the wide-open Now? He is intimately bound up with the earth. But on the other hand, he does hitch his wagon to the stars. There may be a predestined place for him, but he is not content to stay in it. It appears that man is nature's only rebellious son. If man has foes in nature, as has been suggested, he also has friends—food, clothes, shelter, fresh air, delightful scenes, companions.

It is conceivable that geese, ants, worms, or something else *might* have been the lord of the earth; but they are not. Man is on the way to being lord; he is more a lord every year; and it is gratifying that few of the human race have ever become discouraged and have sat down in a corner and refused to go out to supper because the earth may go down into the pit in a million years or so. Man has gained control over fire, over domestic animals, over microbes, and knows more all the time about the manipulation of the forces amidst which he lives.

[1] *Cf.* Perry, "The Present Conflict of Ideals," p. 25 *ff.*

[2] "Conduct of Life," pp. 12, 20.

[3] Perry, "The Present Conflict of Ideals," p. 26.

And how has he achieved this mastery? First, by *thinking*, by science. Second, by banishing the hosts of imps, devils, ghosts, demons, which have kept him cowed and paralyzed through the centuries. And third, by cooperation. Nature may not care a straw for man; but men *care for each other*—that is the significant thing. A tremendous handicap in the past has been men's struggles against each other instead of against all extrahuman enemies. As they have struggled against each other, their control of all their natural enemies has been relaxed and the weeds have come back, the animals have run wild again, the microbes have spawned and decimated him. As he learns the arts of cooperation, he will more and more put all things under his feet.

What is man's place in nature? *He has no predetermined place.* His place is what he jointly chooses to make; and he is more free to experiment and thus to decide what he wants. He is a peculiar species on this earth and is adventuring. There are probably many limits to what he can do. But the conquest of natural forces, the victory over disease, birth control plans, the inauguration of eugenics, aggressiveness, more cooperation—these things seem to show that he has not found his utmost limitations yet.

The thought which we must carry forward with us, then, is that of 1,700,000,000 more or less human beings carrying on an inconceivably complicated and unending life drama. Having found the stage, and having assembled the actors—a motley multitude—let us now turn to an analysis of the play. From now on to the end of the book, "the play's the thing."

Questions

1. What, again, are the necessities of life?
2. How did we state the man-land ratio?
3. "Geographical determinism" means what?
4. Is man a passive or an active agent in the physical environment?
5. A few figures of birthrates and deathrates were given. Do these "prove" scientifically any trends in population? Criticise the figures.
6. Would it be better or worse for human beings if babies were incubated as chickens are—supposing a way could be found to do it?
7. Which is better, a condition of high birthrates and deathrates or the opposite? What factors are involved? Give reasons.
8. Make a list of the particulars in which (1) you are like your parents, (2) you are different.
9. How would a real scientist attack the problem of "race superiority?"
10. Are "boxers" and "bathing beauties" normal people?
11. What is meant by "mental normality?"
12. How do scientists explain resemblances and differences among people?
13. List the characteristics of yourself which you think are (1) hereditary, (2) due to environment.
14. How could man be an "adaptive organism" if he is solely predetermined by heredity? Is an organism the same as a mechanism?

15. Do you agree with Crile that man's most remarkable characteristic is versatility? What evidences can you find against this view? How versatile are you?

16. In what ways is "original nature" distinguishable from "human nature?"

17. Of the views of "human nature" presented, which is most sound, and why?

18. If all people followed your own principles of living, would the human race conquer in the struggle for existence or quickly perish?

19. What varieties of people can you think of? What principles of classification have you used? Is it possible to make "varieties" of anything without using some principles of classification?

20. Is there any danger of the stage becoming overcrowded? Give reasons for your answer. If so, who should be kept off? Be specific.

CHAPTER IV

GROUPS

People, then, are our theme—versatile, complicated people. More precisely and narrowly, people *in action.* More precisely and narrowly still, people fixed within their gigantic and intricate *web of interactional uniformities;* this is really our theme. In the previous chapter, we stopped individuals as it were, and fixed them in place for analysis; we saw them as so many separate and discrete units; we looked at society "in its distributive aspect," as Cooley has well phrased the matter.

But while we held these people before us for examination, docile subjects of scientific investigation, we knew all the while from our own experience and the observations of others that they were striving against our temporary intellectual leash; we knew all the while that they were not actually fixed in place and not docile subjects but were busy about many things; they were in action. We knew that they were in action because we know that they are versatile and mobile creatures and extensively on the go.[1] The higher animals, including man, are not attached and fixed in particular places on the earth, as plants are. They are capable of motion and must move about to secure the necessities of living. And man is the widest roamer of them all; he seems to be moving more quickly and farther all the time. Man really lives in motion and for motion; and this is a most important fact for us to keep in mind. Hence, from our point of view now, we must think of people "on the go," for it is "action" that makes the play.

Moreover, these individuals not only move about over the earth, but they also tend to *cluster;* they tend to aggregate and associate, and this clustering is absolutely fundamental to the social play—no clustering, no social drama. Plants and rocks are found in clusters, but they themselves have nothing to do about it. If a cabbage does not like its garden companions, it can do nothing about the situation; it is there, fixed with its neighbors until its head is taken off. With the higher animals, and especially with man, the situation is very different. They seem to have an option—to cluster or not to cluster; and they tend to cluster; they crowd together; sometimes they jam themselves together to the point of suffocation and immobility, as in the congested areas of our large cities. But they may withdraw and go to the country. Almost the only instance when they have to remain together, while not caring for each other, is when they are in jail. Even husbands and wives separate.

[1] *Cf.* SOROKIN, "Social Mobility," p. 133 *ff.*

Thus, these people are mobile and can associate; they are in action and do associate. And vast consequences for each one of them hang on this associating. For mere aggregation, mere proximity, is the cause of excitations in each of them, excitations to action which go out in innumerable ways. Aggregated people interstimulate each other in a variety of ways; they interrelate themselves; they become part and parcel of each other; they take on something new; they become different; they attain another level of existence. And this is the subject matter of our study—this clustering, its beginnings, its forms, and its consequences.

Not that any one of them cannot get away from clusters; he can. But once having been in a cluster, he is modified for life; he can never be the same again. This study, then, becomes intensely interesting to *you*, gentle reader, because of what clustering does to you. What transpires, roughly, is this that "original nature," is transmuted into "human nature" by means of clustering or grouping—and it cannot be brought about in any other way. We are all organically initiated within our mother's body and develop somewhat there. Then we are pushed *out* of her body but *into* the body of another mother—groups, society—this great mother completes us.

Small says:

> Man cannot be man without reacting with man. The presence of others is necessary in order that I may be myself . . . A person . . . cannot come into physical existence except through the cooperation of parent persons; he cannot become a self-sustaining animal unless protected for several years by other persons; and he cannot find out and exercise his capabilities unless stimulated by countless forms of action by contact with other persons.[1]

We have anticipated a play. But a play is not interesting without plot. We have been looking for a plot; and here it is: The plot is how all of the babies born to the human race are transmuted into human beings, into personalities—as far as this comes to pass. In other words, this is a "mystery play"; it is a "problem play." How a baby with such an equipment becomes a human being with such versatility!—that is the problem. Shakespeare created Hamlet; and then Hamlet has created dozens of actors who have taken his part. Groups find babies and force "parts" on them; or, babies find parts already created and assume them. Our great social play is not *all* worked out with respect to this particular problem; but this is the central plot to which all other plots are tributary. The play makes the man. We might name this plot The Great Initiation for the individual. But there is the same thing for the whole human race. How did it dig itself out of the muck and organize a culture? This is a unique achievement on this earth. We shall now begin the examination of a number of features of this play.

[1] "General Sociology," p. 476.

1. Some Definitions

There are three closely related ideas which we must understand and distinguish as we approach associated life—the group, the community, and society. These are often used interchangeably, but they do not necessarily mean the same thing. What do these notions mean and how are they distinguished?

1. The Group.—Small says:

> The term "group," serves as a convenient sociological designation for any number of people, larger or smaller, between whom such relations are discovered that they must be thought of together. The "group" is the most general and colorless term used in sociology for combinations of persons. A family, a mob, a picnic party, a trade union, a city precinct, a corporation, a state, a nation, the civilized or the uncivilized population of the world may be treated as a group. Thus a "group" for sociology is a number of persons whose relations to each other are sufficiently impressive to demand attention. The term is merely a commonplace tool. It contains no mystery. It is only a handle with which to grasp the innumerable varieties of arrangements into which people are drawn by their variations in interest. The universal condition of association may be expressed in the same commonplace way: people always live in groups, and the same persons are likely to be members of many groups . . .
>
> The college fraternity or the college class, for instance, would be only a name, and presently not even that, if each of the members should withdraw. It is the members themselves, and not something outside themselves. Yet to A, B, or C the fraternity or the class might well be a river or a mountain by the side of which he stands, and which he is helpless to remove. He may modify it somewhat. He is surely modified by it somewhat; and the same is true of all other groups in which A, B, or C belongs. To a very considerable extent the question, Why does A, B, or C do so and so? is equivalent to the question, What are the peculiarities of the group to which A, B, or C belongs? It would never occur to A, B, or C to skulk from shadow to shadow of a night, with paint-pot and brush in hand, and to smear Arabic numerals of bill-poster size on the sidewalk or buildings, if 'class spirit' did not add stimulus to individual bent. Neither A, B, or C would go out of his way to flatter and cajole a freshman, if membership in a fraternity did not make a student something different from an individual. These are merely familiar cases which follow a universal law.[1]

Another way to say this is that a "social group may be defined as a number of individuals whose psychic activities along a certain phase of life have a relation to one another in the way of cause and effect."[2] The phrase "along a certain way of life" refers both to the joint concern of the individuals involved, such as the interests in dancing, conversation, worship, making automobiles, and the like, and also to the uni-

[1] "General Sociology," p. 495.

[2] Good, "Sociology and Education," p. 48. *Cf.* Brown, "Social Groups," for a list of essential features.

formities which always develop in connection therewith. Also, the idea of "cause and effect" is made more explicit than in Small's definition.

We may say, then, that a group is any number of individuals who act, feel, and think in much the same ways, whose folkways and *mores* form a network of their own. The class of which we are now members is a unity of ways of acting, thinking, and feeling and is distinguished from every other class not by the individuals in it but by its characteristic ways.

2. The Community.—Community is the term which is applied to societies and social groups where they are considered from the point of view of the geographical distribution of the individuals and institutions of which they are composed. It follows that every community is a society, but not every society is a community. An individual may belong to many social groups but will not ordinarily belong to more than one community, except in so far as a smaller community of which he is a member is included in a larger community of which he is also a member. An individual is not, however, at least from the sociological point of view, a member of a community because he lives in it but rather because, and to the extent that, he participates in the common life of the community.[1]

It is well to take a firm grip on this concept, for practically all social groups are derived from, and have the background of, this community type of grouping. The mark of a community, according to Hobhouse, is "common rule habitually observed," and the community originated in "a circle of intermarrying families." Ellwood says it is "any group which carries on all phases of a common life."[2] We must note the *geographical phase* emphasized in the earlier statement and the *common-life* phase pointed out in the second; a group may have, but a community must have, a particular location; a community is one kind of grouping, the distinguishing marks being the carrying on of a common life in a given place. We might say that a community is a "natural" group, whereas most other groups are artificial. Individuals are usually born in communities. Any community that we might think of, any village, city, suburban area, tribe, farm community, can perpetuate itself; it carries on all of the activities necessary thereto. But there are many groups which are not able to do this; we can think of fraternities, sororities, factories, churches, and the like. These carry on activities "along a certain phase of life"; they are not complete, self-perpetuating units. We can think of communities starting as small hordes or farm communities and growing up to be more inclusive until it is possible to conceive of "the great society." "From the point of view of territorial distribu-

[1] Park and Burgess, *op. cit.*, p. 163.

[2] Hobhouse, "Social Development," Chap. II. Ellwood, "The Psychology of Human Society," p. 12. Cole speaks of "wholeness and universality," in "Social Theory," p. 25.

tion, the world community is composed of nations, colonies, spheres of influence, cities, towns, local communities, neighborhoods, and families."[1]

3. Society.—The term *society* is the most abstract and inclusive term and has a different emphasis. According to Park and Burgess, society is "the social heritage of habit and sentiment, folkways and mores, technique and culture, all of which are incident or necessary to collective human behavior." Individuals are not explicitly mentioned but of course are implied; it is only persons who have such a heritage. "Society viewed abstractly," they continue, "is an organization of individuals; considered concretely it is a complex of organized habits, sentiments, and social attitudes—in short, consensus."[2] This is one way of describing society.

Another view may be stated this way: Suppose a man in Mars—we always have to have a man in Mars to look at us and represent the objective and disinterested viewpoint—suppose this man were looking down at us through a powerful telescope,

> . . . he would lose the individual man in the masses of men, and could make out only clusters of various sizes. These would present themselves as discharging the usual functions of organic groups: the maintenance and the reproduction of life. A group of human beings living in a cooperative effort to win subsistence and to perpetuate the species: such is the conception here offered of a human society . . .
>
> Organization—specialization plus cooperation—is not sufficient alone to form a society; it must be organization for the discharge of the two characteristic societal functions. It is not admissible to regard large combinations, such as churches or conventions, as societies; for the term then has no real definition and the science employing it is doomed to barren wanderings over a vague domain. Unorganized groups of people, again, may perform societal functions without being societies. A chance concourse of persons—the audience at a theater, the worshippers in a church (if habitually the same persons), the passengers on a train or on a steamer—is not a society. Occasions arise when such a group wishes to perform societal functions; then organization becomes necessary. Any one of these groups could be sharply defined, but the cases serve to show that mere strictness of demarkation is no element in a definition of society.[3]

In this view, a society is always composed of both sexes, since it takes both sexes to perpetuate mankind. A fraternity or a sorority, therefore, is not a society; yet a fraternity or a sorority perpetuates itself by adopting new members and could maintain itself by work. What is the difference? It is here: A fraternity or a sorority can adopt new members only because there are families to produce them; a world composed of nothing but fraternities could not perpetuate itself. Then,

[1] Ellwood, *op. cit.*, p. 14. Gillette, "Community Concepts," *Social Forces*, June, 1926. Queen, "What Is a Community?" *J. Social Forces*, May, 1923.

[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 163.

[3] Sumner and Keller, "The Science of Society", Vol. I, p. 8.

again, it is not the main business of such organizations to take in new members and to carry on activities for self-maintenance.

To sum up: We may think of a number of individuals as causally related along any phase of life—and we are thinking of groups. We may think of a number of individuals as attached to a given territory and carrying on a common life together—and we are thinking of communities. We may think of individuals, not as located at any place, but simply as carrying on a common life together, as maintaining and reproducing themselves, as having a common heritage of habits and sentiments, folkways and *mores*, technique and culture—and we are thinking of a society. The Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Angels is not a "society" in the strict sense of the term; nor is it a community, for its members are widely scattered; it is a group. Every community, however, is a group or a network of groups.

These distinctions are important for further study, but we shall say no more of them here; nor is it necessary to maintain them in what follows. For the most part, the phenomena we have to consider characterize all three—groups, communities, and societies. But the stuff of our study is the throbbing, thrilling plot by which groups are made and maintained and out of which come persons.

2. Social Forces and Bonds

But what brought and brings individuals into group life and holds them there? For there has always been and there always is restraint and limitation of individual behavior in groups—very often quite maddening. We all know, moreover, from personal experience that many people repel us, and we would not remain in groups with them if we could help it. But why can't we help it often? Entrance into groups is not without its personal costs. In addition, we always find that group organizations, especially large ones, are inert and resistant to our efforts to change them. Why is this?

It is very difficult for most of us who live within a closely knit and mostly satisfying social life, and live convinced of the immense values of widening association, to realize that there was a time in human history when this sort of thing was almost lacking. One of the outstanding characteristics of early peoples is that they are *atomistic;* the individuals live in proximity to each other but live largely as individuals; they are in groups but only slightly of them. And sometimes we find such conditions as the following: Of a tribe—one form of group—in the Sahara, it is reported that

> . . . the competition of all for the possession of the wretched and meager resources of life makes each one ruthless, suspicious, and crafty. Each strives to hurt the other, if the other stands in his way; and all stand in one another's way in this land of need. Each one is eager to get an advantage over the other, not

in a comparatively legitimate way, but by shutting him out of all chance of competing for the prize or by robbing him of it. To this end the Teda steals, lies, and murders if need be.[1]

We may well ask: What holds these people together so that they form a tribe? Why do they not separate and each go his own way? While this may be regarded as an extreme case, perhaps—for many primitive peoples live in noticeable harmony—there is enough antipathy and repulsion among primitives and among us to make the "why" of associations, especially of large associations, a reasonable question. As we consider the answers which are usually given, we might make the matter quite personal and continually ask ourselves why *we* ever entered the groups we are in and why we remain within them.

Briefly stated, there are two sorts of influences always at work to produce the results we have indicated, to bring creatures together, force them into unity, and maintain them in the unity—oftentimes against their wishes—and we are thinking now of the group-making process from the very beginnings of social life to the present time. Ellwood speaks of these as *original* and *derived*.[2] The original factors are the physical environment and the original nature of the creature. The derived factors are those which have been compounded out of these original elements; they are the forces or bonds of human nature. We must examine these briefly.

1. Original Factors.—Included under this category are the physical environment in all of its variety, as we have already described it, and the original nature of man both on the physical and the psychic sides. Let us think, then, of three sets of influences here.

1. The physical environment, as we have already shown, has always presented all living creatures with a dilemma—Unite or perish. The same hard life that produced the stealing, the lying, and the murdering within the Sahara tribe already mentioned also forced association. These undoubted individualists were stronger in the struggle for existence in their tribal form than in their lonely living. The obvious but not fully explored fact is that, in the long run, those creatures which accidentally and unconsciously hit upon the association device or mutual aid survived as against the unyielding individualists. Association, with all of its costs, has proved to be a better expedient in the life struggle than non-association. It has always been the case, and is part of the very nature of things, that one hundred units—cells, ants, wolves, or men—working together have been able to survive as against the same one hundred units working separately.

From this point of view, we can readily see that group life came into existence long before man. It started when the first two cells

[1] Sumner and Keller, *op. cit*, Vol. I, p. 16.

[2] "The Psychology of Human Society," p. 113.

became attached—millions of years ago. It developed as three, four, five, a hundred, a million cells came into union and formed complex organisms. It developed further when complex organisms like the ants and the termites, like the wolves and the buffalo, came into organization. Its highest and most complex form is the thing amidst which we live all the time. Thus, the antisocial have had the worst of it in the struggle with the physical environment all through the milleniums. And long ago, human beings recognized this truth and coined an axiom to express and preserve it in human traditions—"in unity there is strength." Thus, we may say that the physical environment forced the play.

A part of the physical environment has always been other living things, as against the non-living, and especially other *men*. If men were forced into combination to fight the elements, they were forced into combination to fight other men. The liars, thieves, and murderers in this Sahara tribe doubtless ceased their antisocial practices to some extent when the tribe was attacked or when it engaged upon an exploiting expedition. Thus, what is going on in other parts of the great social play determines what goes on in any part; one part of the social drama shapes other parts. If some tribes and peoples play at war, then all tribes and peoples must be governed accordingly. If some tribes and peoples play at peace, then other tribes and peoples may make that sort of pattern their life way.

And we have to notice an exceedingly important additional point. Social life started long before man appeared on the earth, as we have said. Then a certain *direction of movement* was set up. Now we find that here, as in other parts of the multiverse, the direction taken and the momentum acquired become factors in keeping things going that way. A partial explanation of why things are going in given directions and speeds—say, toward war, toward peace, toward slavery, toward capitalism, toward monogamy, toward monotheism—is that *they are going* in these directions and at these speeds. We know that it requires more energy to stop and turn back a rolling log than it requires to start the log rolling. Similarly, it is often harder to change a social pattern, a folkway, than it is to establish one *de novo*. Thus, momentum is a force; condition is a force. These are pressures which individuals cannot escape. This force is usually what we have in mind when we try to change things and speak of being "up against a stiff proposition."

2. Certain of the organic influences have been implied in what has been said. But we must here take note of something additional. There is *heredity*, for example. If creatures could be born in some other way than from their parents, then they might have their freedom, both from the pressures of their parents after they are born and also from the direction given to them by their particular combination of genes or determiners. There is a solid and undeniable influence in our basic

and original structure—physical, tempermental, and intellectual. For example, we are born in one sex or the other, and that fact determines our group relations all along the line. Being born in one sex or the other, we are born incomplete so far as reproduction is concerned. Then, heredity has determined us to seek a mate; it has determined us by reason of the incomplete structure, and it has determined us also by reason of the sex urge.

Heredity predetermines us to be in a given race and, therefore, to group with those of our own physical kind. True, we may later repudiate this relationship and "indianize," but then we have to do with another factor; we are born as members of a given stock, race, and family; we are related *by blood* to these people and not to other people, whether we like it or not. Can the leopard change his spots? Can the Chinaman who dislikes a brachycephalic head put it back and take a dolichocephalic one? Can fig trees grow thistles? We belong to this family by birth. We may change our name, our habits, our place of living, everything about ourselves that we can change, but we never can change that basic fact.

But variation also plays its original part in predetermining us for groups. We might later wish that we were exactly like our mother or our father, but we never are; we are always different in some respects, and thereby we have at work a directive force which operates continually to place us in some groups rather than in others. But we need not elaborate these obvious matters further.

3. There are many original *psychic* factors at work placing us in some groups rather than in others and keeping us in groups rather than out of them. There are the original *impulses*. We have spoken of the sex urge; that is one type. Fear is another. A boy was once ordered to leave home because he had been learning to smoke and his parents detested tobacco. The boy hated his parents for forcing this alternative upon him. But he did not go; he quit smoking. Why? Here was a fine chance for his individualism to assert itself; but he dropped out of the "Back-alley Smoking Club" and stayed home; he feared his freedom and its responsibilities. The fear of parents makes a big difference in our groupings. Parents fear God or the law and stick together, often, rather than go off and make other alliances. The fear of the spirits—as we shall see later—has been a powerful factor in keeping religious people together. The fear of enemies keeps people all over the world from traveling. We may recall that, when Cain was banished, he cried out that his punishment was greater than he could bear; and it was; for all strangers were then the same as enemies, and they would surely take his life.

There is a native impulse to *imitate* which works continually to link us with some people and groups rather than with others. We wish to be

like fraternity men and wear a pin; we wish to imitate styles and so keep in the dress group; we grow up imitating our elders in speech and thus come into a language group; we grow up imitating our parents and others in creed and worship and thus come to be members of a sect. We imitate all the while unconsciously and consciously and thus establish social relations. Wherever there are people, there are copies; and wherever there are copies, imitation ties us to them. Not without a measure of discrimination, of course, for we do not imitate blackberries or trees; we do not take on everything everybody else does; we are incapable of doing so. But imitation is a powerful social bond.

There are also the emotions—the natural ones, of course. The baby feels attracted to the mother; the mother feels drawn to the child; this attraction aids in forming a group. The lover feels a pull toward the maiden "in the springtime," and the maiden feels a pull toward the lover sometimes. This attraction is a group-making factor. We are unconsciously "drawn" to this person and that and so make acquaintances and friends. Besides, we are repelled by some.

Our hereditary intellectual endowments, or the bases of these, operate all the time to put us in some groups and not with others. There is crude sensation, the ability to detect the presence of others and their attractiveness; there is crude perception by which we are soon able to discriminate among others about us and to associate pleasure with some and pain with others; memory and imagination also play their parts to attach us to some groups and not to others; thinking also does its part.

2. Derivative Factors.—These are forces or factors which are compounded out of the original elements; but it is practically impossible to determine where the original influences end and the derived begin; it is practically impossible to determine which ones are operative in given cases. The derived influences are very numerous, and they have never been listed or classified. They include the desires and wishes, the sentiments, the interests and values.

a. Desires and Wishes.—Sumner was of the opinion that there have been four *desires* operative through social life: (1) hunger, which has forced people together in the industrial organization; (2) love, which has produced the family; (3) vanity, which has been instrumental in developing all expressions of luxury such as recreational activities and adornment; (4) fear, which has brought people into the religious organization. These "are four great motives of human action which come into play when some number of human beings are in juxtaposition under the same life conditions."[1]

The *wishes* have been assigned a prominent group-making role by Thomas. The irreducible groups of wishes are: (1) the desire for new experience, (2) the desire for security, (3) the desire for recognition, and

[1] "Folkways," p. 18.

(4) the desire for response. He uses the term *desire* here, but he is thinking of something more elemental than desire; thus, we might have listed the wishes as original rather than derived factors. According to the famous psychoanalyst, Freud, the wish is the social atom. It is

> . . . a *course of action* which some mechanism of the body is *set* to carry out, whether it actually does so or not . . . The wish is any purpose or project for a *course of action*, whether it is being merely entertained by the mind or is being actually excuted—a distinction which is really of little importance.[1]

b. Sentiments.—The *sentiments* are organizations of the emotions about certain objects—the flag, the old home, the Bible, a person, a group, a belief, and so on. According to Shand, we have three kinds of sentiments classified according to the nature of their objects—the concrete particular, such as the attachment to a particular child or a jacknife or a fetish; the concrete general, such as love for children, pets, flowers, capitalists; and the abstract, such as love for virtue, honesty, justice, the good, success, and the like. The number of sentiments can be very great, of course, since there are many things in the world to which we become attached. But each person usually has a small number of sentiments—perhaps only one—which greatly surpass all others in strength.[2]

These forces have sometimes been described in terms of *attitudes.* And the sentiments are enduring attitudes. Park and Burgess say:

> An attitude is the tendency of the person to react positively or negatively to the total situation. Accordingly, attitudes may be defined as the mobilization of the will of the person. Attitudes are as many and as varied as the situations to which they are the response.[3]

They are built up mainly out of feelings and impulses.

c. Interests and Values.—These are compounds of feelings, impulses, and intellectual elements, and they play an immense role as group-making factors. Small speaks of (1) health interests and values, (2) wealth interests and values, (3) political and social interests and values, (4) intellectual and scientific interests and values, (5) esthetic interests and values, and (6) moral and religious interests and values. These have been summed up in six full words—health, wealth, sociability, knowledge, beauty, and rightness. And "interests are the simplest modes of motion which we can trace in the conduct of human beings."[4] Values are defined by Bouglé as permanent possibilities of satisfaction.[5]

A number of students of the subject insist that ideas are also to be considered as group-making factors, and Fouillée speaks of "idea-

[1] Park and Burgess, *op. cit.*, p. 488.

[2] Quoted in Park and Burgess, *op. cit.*, p. 464.

[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 438. *Cf.* Thurstane's definition, *A. J. S.*, January, 1928, p. 531.

[4] "General Sociology," p. 425 *ff.*

[5] Sellars, "Bouglé's Evolution of Values," p. 19.

forces."[1] Thus, a person goes into a certain group because he favors the ideas propagated therein. If two people have the same or similar ideas about religion, politics, science, marriage, and the like, they are apt to be drawn to each other on this basis. Organizations are formed all the time for the purpose of carrying certain ideas into effect—the Society for the Prevention of Crime, the League of Nations, the Rationalist Society, and many others. It is recognized by many that there is mutual advantage in forming such associations.

Giddings made an attempt to classify groups on the basis of the characteristic type of social bond. He speaks of the sympathetic, by which he means the homogeneous community of blood relatives; the congenial, by which he means any gathering of like spirits, say, the Mayflower band; the approbational, where there is a general approbation of qualities and conduct such as in a mining camp; the despotic, where all sorts of elements are held together by a dominant ruler; the authoritative, where people are welded together and live under the authority of a common tradition; the conspiritual, where "unscrupulous adventurers come forward and create relations of personal allegiance by means of bribery, patronage, and preferment," intrigue and conspiracy being the social bonds; the contractural, where people perceive the utility of association and deliberately get together as some Greeks did in the Achean League, the Indians did in the Six Nations confederacy, the states did in the United States, and the nations did in the League of Nations; the idealistic, wherein people get together to promote certain ideals of welfare.[2]

But in thinking of "forces" for group making, we must beware of postulating certain *originally causing* units of power and thus becoming metaphysicians. For a long time, physicists talked of "the force of gravitation," as if there existed an actual force which caused things to move toward the center of the earth; they postulated a force and called it *gravitation*. But they did not understand the nature of force. Now they talk of that particular *type of movement* and call *that* gravitation. Similarly, we may talk of a certain type of reaction and call that *love;* we may talk of another type and call that *interest;* we may talk of another type and call that *wishing*. All of these above-mentioned terms are simply names for characteristic ways in which human beings react to each other; they react the love way, the interest way, the approbational way, the conspiritual way, the sentimental way, and so on. "The only sense," says Ellwood, "in which the term 'force' can be used in the social sciences is in the sense of an active element or factor in social relations." Hayes thinks that the assumption of peculiar social forces is as metaphysical as the assumption of "vital forces" in biology.[3]

[1] Park and Burgess, *op. cit.*, p. 461.

[2] "Descriptive and Historical Sociology," p. 11 *ff*. See page 82 of text.

[3] *Cf.* House, "Social Forces in American Sociology," *A. J. S.*, May, 1926.

This is simply to emphasize the fact that, for the time being, we must confine ourselves to description, going, in explanation, from A to B, and from B to C, and from C to D, and from D to E, and so on back. This is the way we must work rather than assuming some mysterious "vitalistic," "mechanistic," "divine," or other "force," and then explaining some more familiar phenomenon by some less familiar phenomenon.

3. The Nature of Group Unity

What we have now said paves the way for, and, indeed, goes some distance toward, an understanding of group unity. Looked at from the outside and above, groups appear to be mere clusters of proximate individuals, mere aggregations of detached and independent units. But analysis soon shows that they are not detached and independent. Looked at from outside and above, an individual in Chicago, another in New York, another in London, another in Bombay, another in Pekin would not be thought of as a group at all. We are so accustomed to think of *proximity* in space as the essential and distinguishing mark of a group.

Now, proximity may, and often does, figure in group unity; but group unity is something quite different. The problem, then, is to see more clearly, and to frame in language, what this unity is. Here we can make only a brief and summary statement, but this matter will be in the fringe of our thought continually as we deal with the various features of society in the following pages.

Dawson says:

> Unity in the animal groups rests almost completely on . . . biological adaptations rendered active for the moment by communicable excitement in the herd, pack, flock, colony or hive. Each unity fulfils the function or the functions natural to its structure. In the colony or the hive the group seems much more an organism than a unity of individual organisms.

That is, each member of the colony or hive behaves with the same regularity in relation to all that any part of its own organism does with reference to the other parts; variability is limited; the arrangement is structurally rigid.

> Unity in the human group has an element in common with the animal group—the biological adaptations of the impulses of the individual organisms. But these impulses are much more plastic in the human being than in the animal and are at once overlaid by a social structure mediated by language symbols. Language makes possible the pooling of isolated experiences and gives them a symbolic embodiment. Practically it is as if human experience became superorganic, transmissible from generation to generation by mechanisms peculiar to itself. Group unity varies with typical human groups and within these groups.
>
> Group unity emerges in a process of interaction that integrates isolated experiences into a common excitement, mood, objective, a communicable tradition, a

collective judgment, or a basis of agreement. In this process psychical distances are overcome in varying degrees depending upon the nature of the differences in temperament, background of experience, and mobility in a given situation.[1]

Human unity, then, is a name for whatever amount and the kind of interstimulation that is going on, how well its significance is grasped, and then the further cooperative activities issuing therefrom. In its highest form it is the *joint comprehension of meanings.* In its lowest form it is just organic sympathy—which we have already noted. I am united with another to the degree to which I am stimulating him and he is stimulating me, to the degree in which we find significance in the exchange, and to the degree to which we cooperate as a result of these exchanges, with something of a fixation of attention and purpose. A threat of war fixes the attention of the citizens; defense becomes a common purpose; we stimulate each other, communicate with each other, to be clear as to the nature of the danger and as to the needs of the hour; we behave as one huge creature with numerous specialized parts. We have common emotions—fear, anger, desire to revenge. We have a common purpose—defense. But we know that we all feel the same way and have the same purpose *by communication.* Thus are we united.

An immensely important aspect of this unity is its persistence. You and I drop out at death; but group unity goes on by and through and over the generations.

Under ordinary circumstances the transmission of the social tradition is from the parents to the children. Children are born into the society and take over its customs, habits, and standards of life, naturally, and without conflict.[2]

How the parents feel is communicated to the young; what purposes they have are communicated; the technique of their cooperation is communicated. Thus, the children are unified with their parents and with all who are united with them at these points.

Unity is shown by, and inheres in, what Durkheim calls "collective representations." Examples are language, the flag, theories, constitutions, isms, slogans, emblems, in short, any symbol. If several of us know what the word *cat* means, what it stands for, we are unified that far. If we have the same emotions aroused by the flag, we are unified that far. If we believe in and behave according to some creed, we are united to that extent.

It is also shown by and manifest in what is called *esprit de corps*, or the living fire involving us all in the time of enthusiasm. Unity is shown

[1] Dawson, C. A., "The Unity of the Social Group," *J. Applied Sociology*, July-August, 1927.

[2] Park in Park and Burgess, *op. cit.*, p. 200.

by "morale," which is to groups what "condition" is to the body. Says Hocking:

> Morale is condition; good morale is good condition of the inner man; it is the state of will in which you can get the most from the machinery, deliver blows with the greatest effect, take blows with the least depression, and hold out for the longest time. It is both fighting-power and staying-power and strength to resist the mental infections which fear, discouragement, and fatigue bring with them, such as eagerness for any kind of peace[1] if only it gives momentary relief, or the irritability that sees large defects in one's own side until they seem more important than the need of defeating the enemy. And it is the perpetual ability to come back.
>
> From this it follows that good morale is not the same as good spirits or enthusiasm. It is anything but the cheerful optimism of early morning, or the tendency to be jubilant at every victory. It has nothing in common with the emotionalism dwelt upon by psychologists of the "crowd." It is hardly to be discovered in the early stages of the war. Its most searching test is found in the question, How does war-weariness affect you?[2]

Gardner points out that there are perhaps three distinguishable stages in the *development* of social unity. There is (*a*) a primary stage characterized by low fusion along with a high degree of self-consciousness; (*b*) higher fusion and lower self-consciousness; and (*c*) complete fusion and no individuality—the mob frame of mind.[3]

Before passing, we must touch on another matter connected with social unity. It is one of the most difficult and complicated problems imaginable. It may be presented in the form of a question: How is unity maintained in two or more groups with opposing emotions and purposes when the same persons compose the memberships? Or, stated from the individual point of view: How can an individual be loyal to two or more conflicting groups at the same time? This sort of thing seems to be occurring continually. Take a glaring example: The Christian creed defines a way of life which is utterly opposed to the way of life called for in most of our industry; yet there are countless persons who profess to be loyal to both at the same time; and this does not seem to weaken either institution.

We cannot pretend to propose a solution to this problem beyond saying that each individual has immense possibilities for being inconsistent; he *is* a great variety of selves which are able to hang more or less together the while they go out in opposite directions. The individual is the great shock absorber between groups, and therefore he has to be wonderfully plastic and full of compromise and rationalization. If individuals were all perfectly logical and clear headed and unsentimental and loyal in the scientific sense, this sort of thing would not be possible; they would not be members of conflicting groups at all. "The increasing

[1] This was written with reference to the World War.

[2] "Morale and Its Enemies," p. 3 *ff.*

[3] "Assemblies," *A. J. S.*, January, 1914.

number of Societies," says Bouglé "in which an individual participates frees him relatively from each of them."[1]

4. The Classification of Groups

This topic has already been introduced, but we must carry its discussion somewhat farther. As we look about us, we cannot help being struck by the numbers of groups within sight and knowledge. Here is the class, the department, the college, the university, the dramatic club, the church, the political party, the store, and so on without end. These are a veritable jungle. What can we do with it? Well, we can plunge in and try to make some roads through it, try to order its contents. Many have plunged in and have made some kind of order.

But first of all there is the question of *principles of classification;* we cannot go far without principles. But what ones can be found? In classifying various kinds of cloth, say, there are principles of color, weight, texture, use, and others. But what can we use in classsifying human groups? We might use size, location, rate of growth or decline, dominant interests, compactness of organization, function, and others. This is part of the trouble—so many principles of classification; almost as many principles as groups.

1. Le Bon, a French psychological sociologist, has classified what he calls the different types of *crowds* or aggregations as follows:

A. Heterogeneous crowds
   1. Anonymous (street crowds, for example)
   2. Not anonymous (parliamentary assemblies, for example)

B. Homogeneous crowds
   1. Sects (political, religious, etc.)
   2. Castes (military, sacerdotal, etc.)
   3. Classes (bourgeois, working man, etc.)

But as Sighele points out:

> . . it is inaccurate to give the name of crowd indiscriminately to every human group . . . ; it is difficult to understand why Le Bon terms a sect a *homogeneous* crowd, while he classifies assemblies as *heterogeneous* crowds. The members of a sect are usually far more different from one another in birth, education, profession, social status, than are generally the members of a political assembly.[2]

Also, it is not easy to see what the principle of classification is. Besides, the terms *heterogeneous* and *homogeneous* need some clarification before they can help us much.

2. Giddings says:

> There are types or kinds of societies. The broadest groupings correspond to the familiar demarcations made by natural history. There are Animal Societies

[1] "What is Sociology?" p. 17. *Cf.* Perry, "Is There a Social Mind?" *A. J. S.*, May, 1922; Bodin, "The Existence of Social Minds," *A. J. S.*, July, 1913.

[2] "The Crowd," p. 177 *ff.* Park and Burgess, *op. cit.* 203.

and Human Societies; and the human societies are further divided into the Ethnic—or communities of kindred, and the Civil—or communities composed of individuals that dwell together without regard to their blood relationships.

More significant for the sociologist, however, is a classification based on psychological characteristics. The fundamental division now is into Instinctive and Rational societies. The bands, swarms, flocks, and herds in which animals live and cooperate are held together by instinct and not by any rational comprehension of the utility of association. Their like-response to stimulus, their imitative acts, the frequent appearance among them of impression and submission, are all purely instinctive phenomena. Not so are the social relations of human beings. There is no human community in which instinctive like-response to stimulation is not complicated by some degree of rational comprehension of the utility of the association.

The combinations, however, of instinct and reason are of many gradations; and the particular combination found in any given community determines its modes of like-response to stimulus and its consciousness of kind—establishes for it a dominant mode of the relation of mind to mind, or, as Tarde would have phrased it, of intermental activity. This dominant mode of intermental activity—inclusive of like-response and consciousness of kind—is the chief social bond of the given community, and it affords the best distinguishing mark for a classification of any society on psychological grounds. So discriminated, the kinds of rational or human societies are eight as follows.[1]

And then follows the list which we have already given a few pages back.[2] There is certainly a selective principle used here; but it is a very broad and inclusive one.

3. Cooley has made a classification which has been widely quoted and approved. He puts all human groups into two classes—*primary* and *secondary*. The primary groups are those in which there is a face-to-face relationship between the members; that is, the members know each other rather intimately and communicate with each other directly. He says:

By primary groups I mean those characterized by face-to-face association and cooperation. They are primary in several senses, but chiefly in that they are fundamental in forming the social nature and ideals of the individual. The result of intimate association, psychologically, is a certain fusion of individualities in a common whole, so that one's very self, for many purposes at least, is the common life and purpose of the group. Perhaps the simplest way of describing this wholeness is by saying that it is a "we"; it involves the sort of sympathy and mutual identification for which "we" is the natural expression. One lives in the feeling of the whole and finds the chief aims of his will in that feeling.[3]

In another place he says:

I am accustomed to say that a primary group is simply an *intimate* group, the intimacy covering a considerable period and resulting in a habitual sympathy,

[1] "Descriptive and Historical Sociology," p. 4 *ff.* *Cf.* Bodenhafer, *A. J. S.*, January, 1921, p. 425 *ff.*

[2] See page 77.

[3] "Social Organization," Chap. III.

the mind of each being filled with a sense of the mind of others, so that the group as a whole is the chief sphere of the social self for each individual in it—of emulation, ambition, resentment, loyalty, etc.[1]

According to Cooley, there are three primary groups—the family, the play group of children, and the neighborhood or community group of elders. These are universal, and they are "the nursery of human nature."

Of course, the secondary groups are all others—the state, the religious sect, the political party, and so forth—and the basis of classification is that of indirect contacts and impersonal relations.

The local chapter of a sorority is a primary group, but the national organization is a secondary group; the local congregation of a religious denomination is a primary group, but the denomination is a secondary group. Thus, the distinction made by Cooley is very suggestive, but it is not decisive in all cases; there seem to be many groups with both primary and secondary relations.

This difficulty has been widely recognized, and Good[2] has attempted to improve the classification by proposing three classes of groups—the primary, the intermediate, and the secondary. The first class of groups is distinguished by primary relations. The second class is distinguished by both primary and secondary relations. The third class is characterized by secondary relations. Speaking from the standpoint of history, primary groups came first; then the intermediate groups; and then the secondary groups. It would now seem that secondary groups are increasing in numbers and playing an ever larger role in society.

The way Good makes the distinction among these three kinds is by reference to the time at which the intermental stimulation takes place. Primary groups are those in which the intermental stimulation is contemporaneous. An intermediate group is one in which some stimuli are exchanged at one time and some at another time. A secondary group is one in which the stimuli come later and come, therefore, from books, newspapers, phonographs, etc., that is, indirectly.

4. Miller has taken Cooley's classification of groups and has suggested a supplementation in another way. He proposes "horizontal and vertical groups." He thinks:

> . . . race, religion and nation are examples of vertical groups. The vertical group includes all classes in the society of which it is representative. A family is a good illustration, for it has unity among people of different ages, intelligence, authority, and economic power. The race obviously includes all classes within its limits . . .
>
> The class or caste grouping is easily understood as horizontal. In general, it is concerned more with the conditions of economic life, though not exclusively.

[1] *Cf.* Clow, "Cooley's Doctrine of Primary Groups," *A. J. S.*, November, 1919.

[2] "Sociology and Education," p. 73 *ff.*

There are many levels in this grouping, and many names to describe them. Upper and lower are terms in common use. Aristocracy and hoi polloi, capital and labor, or bourgeois and proletarian have been descriptive at different times. The peculiarity of these groupings is that they are not only found within the vertical groups, but that they tend to pass over the boundaries. There is much concern at the present time because the so-called labor group tends consciously to break down national barriers. The crossing on the upper level was made long ago. The well-to-do and the intellectuals have been quite at home in their own class in whatever nation or sect, but only recently has labor recognized its own class interest.[1]

We might continue to cite examples of classifications[2] of human groups; but what is the use? What is the value of classifications, anyway? There is the purely subjective value to the classifier; he has the many things that he tries to classify in better order; he sees things in arrangement. But there is also the practical value for the ordinary person who wishes to make his way about in the jungle. He needs to know and to make classifications; he needs to learn how to find principles; he needs to learn to discriminate and compare and thus put things in order for the pressing business of living.

Returning, therefore, to the point mentioned at the beginning of this section, we may repeat: What is the best principle for the classification of human groups? We have seen that *skin color* is practically useless, because colors shade into each other and because they really tell us so little about what is under them. The real need is for a classification that will enable ordinary people, the pure theorist aside, to adjust more perfectly, to live more effectively among people, to understand them better. We need, therefore, a classification that is based on fundamental and distinguishing features. It may be that we shall some day classify further in terms of the *communicational type of activity*, for this is absolutely fundamental to all group life. Indeed, we can go further and say, at least for the higher humans: *Groups exist wherever, and to the degree that, "meanings" are exchanged.* If few meanings pass at infrequent intervals, then the group is ephemeral and weak. On the other hand, if many meanings are exchanged among the members of a group, if these meanings are important, if there is urgency in the transmission, then the group is unified and powerful with its members. The cessation of communication *is*—not causes, but *is*—the dissolution of the group.

5. The Social Processes

If a thousand people existed in so many different parts of the earth and remained there, would it be possible for them to form a group? With the present means of communication, it would be possible to do so;

[1] Miller, H. A. "Races, Nations and Classes," p. 14 *ff.*

[2] *Cf.* Gardner, "Assemblies," *A. J. S.*, January, 1914, p. 531 *ff.*

physically separated persons are doing so all the time. But a thousand people *with space separation* would never develop the means for communication and thus form a group. Physical proximity, then, at the start of human development was necessary. But once aggregated, interstimulation would start immediately. Then interstimulation would force inventions for the exchange of meanings so that these people could separate again and still form a group. Aggregated people, proximate people, always interact; they just naturally make exchanges and start meanings in circulation; they *proceed* in such ways that they create society. Hence, we cannot think of groups without at the same time thinking of social proceedings or *social processes*, the spontaneous but inevitable interplay of human responses. We have conversation, and that is one form of interaction or intermental stimulation; we have marrying, and that is a complex form of interstimulation; we have fighting, and that is a form of human intermingling; we have competition, and that is a form of human exchange and interplay. The "goings-on" all around, the immense and complicated flux in which we are caught, the movement of individuals in relation to each other—all of these and numerous others are processes; and a social process is "any characteristic social change." As Small says:

> A process is a collection of occurrences, each of which has meaning for every other, the whole of which constitutes some sort of becoming . . . Human association is such a process . . . The social process is the incessant evolution of persons through the evolution of institutions, which evolve completer persons, who evoke completer institutions, and so on beyond any limit that we can fix.[1]

The totality of this *mutual modification*, inescapable and unending, is called *social interaction* by Park and Burgess, the idea being to link up human behavior with the processes of the stars and thus tie all things in the universe or universes into an unending series of mutual attractions and repulsions. But for our purposes, we must direct our thoughts back to the details of the mutual give-and-take which *is* our everyday experience and *is* our society. And, as we have already noted, the basis of this is communication. Dewey says:

> Society not only continues to exist *by* transmission, *by* communication, but it may fairly be said to exist *in* transmission, *in* communication. There is more than a verbal tie between the words common, community, and communication.[2]

But such a large, such a rich, such a variegated nebulosity as this world of communication must be analyzed; it must be torn apart and reassembled to be comprehended. We have made a beginning in this analysis in talking about individuals, human nature, groups. We must

[1] "General Sociology," pp. 513, 552. *Cf.* Hayes, "Some Social Relations Restated," *A. J. S.*, Vol. XXXI, No. 3, p. 343.

[2] "Democracy and Education," p. 5.

now go into the jungle of processes, of interaction, of communication and see if we can find some order in it. How many social processes are there? How many main types are there?

Park and Burgess, after considering isolation, contact, and interaction, have distinguished and analyzed *four*—competition, conflict, accommodation, and assimilation. They do not insist that these are all of the social processes, but they contend that they are the major ones.[1]

Hayes has argued that there are no less than *thirteen* major processes—social suggestion, sympathetic radiation, imitation, inducement, deterrence, accommodation, corroboration, competition, conflict, emulation, dominance, subordination, cooperation, and organization.[2]

Ross has attempted to point out and characterize some *twenty-five* social processes.[3] But we need not enter this controversy—at least until we try to become sociologists. We are not here concerned so much with a finished classification as we are with emphasizing, especially stressing, the *processual side* of our life and awakening some interest in it and making possible some more intelligent approach to it. Accordingly, we have selected several examples of social processes for illustrative purposes only. And we must keep our thoughts in order by remembering that we are elaborating upon the inner life of groups; we are carrying on the thoughts of this chapter into more detail; we are untangling some threads of the larger plots of the social drama.

Questions

1. Do animals cluster as well as people? What are the main differences between the clusterings of animals and people? What the main likenesses?
2. Is it correct to speak of a *cluster* of grapes and a *cluster* of people?
3. If association affects man as indicated, why does it not affect animals in the same way?
4. What are (1) the likenesses and (2) the differences between a group and a community? Between a community and a society?
5. What is the central and "deep" plot of our social play? Do you think that this is a very important matter? Give reasons.
6. List all of the *groups* you belong to; all of the *communities;* all of the *societies.*
7. What are the central features of organization? List the minimum essentials.
8. Give the influences responsible for your being in any two or three groups. Classify these influences into (1) original and (2) derived factors.
9. Are you in any groups contrary to your likes? If so, why do you stay?
10. Compare carefully the definition of *wishes* and *interests* given.
11. Examine Giddings' classification of groups and find the overlapping.
12. What caution is given about the use of the term *social forces?* Do you agree with this?
13. What is the essence of group unity? Illustrate from you own life.
14. Give some examples of "collective representations."

[1] See "Introduction to the Science of Sociology," chapters named.

[2] "Some Social Relations Restated," *A. J. S.*, Vol. XXXI, No. 3.

[3] "Principles of Sociology," p. 77 *ff.*

15. Give a case where you were influenced by the "morale" of the group. Show carefully how this influence operated.

16. A "principle of classification" is referred to. What is meant? By the way, what is a *principle?*

17. Put the groups with which you are familiar into Cooley's classification. Then put these same groups into Miller's classification. Which classification is more illuminating to you?

18. What did we say about "the essence of unity?" Trace out the lines of connection between yourself and those groups to which you belong.

19. If you ask some one to carry a message for you, is that a case of unity?

20. In what "social processes" are you involved?

21. What are the "minutes" of meetings?

22. To what extent is the newspaper a picture of the processual side of our life?

CHAPTER V

FOLKWAYS AND MORES

In the beginning of the last chapter, we called attention to the fact that "interactional uniformities" make up our theme. Human beings are usually in action; and these actions tend, to a large extent, to become uniform; a web of interactional uniformities is gradually formed as the activities are repeated. One of these tendencies, or a complicated system of tendencies, is the formation of groups—as we have seen. As soon as people aggregate, some of them tend to "fall in step."

Not that any one of them does not or cannot act in a novel and independent manner; we are not saying that. We are stressing the fact that when they assemble in the same area they drift into uniformities and regularities which become more or less fixed as time passes. Indeed, the very first meaning which we can give to the phrase "acting together" is acting uniformly, repetitiously. People are so constructed that they cannot associate without mutual modification *toward a common form.* Let any one of us try to sing while a number of comrades are singing some rollicking song; we can sing a different one only with the greatest difficulty. And this is the subject which we wish to elaborate in this chapter.

1. Reflexes and Instincts

Wonderfully plastic though a baby is, this uniformity of behavior is evident at birth. Not absolute uniformity, but a measure of uniformity. We call it *reflexes* and *instincts.* In discussing "original nature" in an earlier chapter, we called attention to *reflexes*, such, for example, as "crying, sneezing, snoring, coughing, sighing, gagging . . . extending and raising the arms at any sudden stimulus, or the quick pulsation of the eyelid." In addition, many investigators have noticed such activities as sucking, chewing, sitting up, wiggling about, swallowing, and many more. We are all familiar with the fact that a sharp jab just below the kneecap always produces a certain kind of response. We also know that a careless knocking of our funny bone is followed by very strange contortions of the features—uniformly. Here are some inborn activity patterns.

Much has been made of *instincts*, as, for example, pugnacity, curiosity, self-assertion, sex drives, and the rest. We know that we are often frightened by certain things—a spook in the dark, a weapon pressed

against our chest, great heights, and the like. We "fall" in love and behave in characteristic ways. There are some who are touchy and always ready to fight. This is all to say that we have many so-called inherited activity patterns. But such matters have been gone over and over again and need not detain us here. Our life *begins*, not without its variabilities to be sure, but also not without its uniformities, and these remain with us throughout life, to some extent, and enter into the social play.

2. Habits

We are not long in the external world before we drift into certain additional, substituted, or conflicting action patterns which we may call *habits*. Babies soon learn to suck their thumbs, to cry in a certain way for certain things, to say words meaningfully, to walk, to throw things about, to dress dolls, to roll hoops, and so on. And all through life, people keep on acquiring these behavior patterns. They learn to speak the language of their associates; they learn to dress as their sex does; they learn a trade; they sometimes smoke incessantly; they drum on the table with their forks; they chatter continuously—and so on without end.

What is more obvious about us all than that we do the usual thing at the usual time in the usual place and in the usual way? What is more apparent than that we are a veritable network of habits, just a series of endless repetitions, just lifelong routineers? We need not bother here to offer an explanation of how habits are acquired or to distinguish between good and bad habits. We know that we drift into these ways of acting, and we know that bad habits are just as uniform as good ones. There is variation, of course; but we are stressing the obvious invariability of the immense number of activities which characterize us all.

3. Folkways

Habits are acquired individual routines; they are linked series of individual activities; they would be acquired, drifted into, if any individual lived alone. Robinson Crusoe acquired many habits while he was alone on his isolated island. But they are also acquired by *borrowing*, and here is where social aggregation figures most prominently. Whenever people are physically together, they drift into each other's ways of acting; they thus unconsciously develop group ways; and when the group happens to be a folk or a tribe or a people, we have "folkways." Let us go back a little and cover some ground that we have already covered but from a little different angle, that we may see how these folkways come about.

1. Guides to Action.—Let us examine our baby.

> Its first act is a cry, not of wrath, as Kant said, nor a shout of joy, as Schwartz thought, but a snuffling, and then a thin, long, tearless a-a, with the timbre of a Scotch bagpipe, purely automatic, but of discomfort.

So asserts Miss Shinn in her illuminating book, "The Biography of a Baby";[1] and there are many confirmatory evidences. Thus babies begin their life on earth, not with thoughts but with acts.

If this is true for our babies, may we say that *man* began his life on earth in this way? Says Sumner:

> If we put together all that we have learned from anthropology and ethnology about primitive men and primitive society, we perceive that the first task of life is to live. Men begin with acts, not with thoughts. Every moment brings necessities which must be satisfied at once. Need was the first experience, and it was followed at once by a blundering effort to satisfy it.

This is a scientific observation and inference. It can be supported by the further inference that man was derived from some lower animal form; and it is a matter of observation that animals do almost no reasoning but act promptly and, of course, blunderingly, as need arises. If there is practically no thinking among animals, and if man began at their level, then he could not have inherited any ideas to guide him at the outset, for, of course, animals have no stored-up wisdom in traditions.

What, then, guided action at the outset? We have already called attention to reflexes and instincts. Sumner continues:

> It is generally taken for granted that men inherited some guiding instincts from their beast ancestry, and it may be true, although it has never been proved. If there were such inheritances, they controlled and aided the first efforts to satisfy needs. Analogy makes it easy to assume that the ways of beasts had produced channels of habit and predisposition along which dexterities and other psycho-physical activities would run easily. Experiments with newborn animals show that in the absence of any experience of the relation of means and ends, efforts to satisfy needs were clumsy and blundering. The method is that of trial and failure, which produces repeated pain, loss, and disappointment . . .
>
> The earliest efforts of men were of this kind. Need was the impelling force. Pleasure and pain, on the one side and on the other, were the rude constraints which defined the line on which efforts must proceed. The ability to distinguish between pleasure and pain is the only psychical power which is to be assumed. Thus, ways of doing things were selected, which were expedient. They answered the purpose better than other ways, or with less toil and pain.[2]

2. How the Folkways Arise.—Need has driven man along. Pleasure and pain have guided what he has done. Within these limitations, habits have been acquired. But what we have to see now is what the

[1] Page 20 *ff.*

[2] "Folkways," p. 2.

presence of others has always had to do with *what habits were acquired.* We might have singled out for special notice, when calling attention to instincts, the imitative tendency so characteristic of man. Man is an unconscious and a conscious imitator; and this is one of the most noticeable things about him. In the absence of knowledge of means and ends, primitive men did, and modern people do, imitate one another.

But what did they and do they imitate? The imitative tendency has usually taken hold on activities which were satisfactory; pain has kept people away from other practices. Here is a man who has acquired the habit of going down to a certain pool at a certain time and with certain equipment to fish, and who is usually successful with this particular activity pattern; he is pleased with his results. If he lives alone, this routine goes on day after day and remains unchanged until bad luck smites him. Then he goes through a period of suffering, blundering, experimentation, and correction.

This fishing routine would die out with the man *but for others;* others have need of fish; others wish to avoid failure and pain. Hence, others copy him, as the line of least resistance, as the shortest cut, to success. Says Sumner, speaking again of primitive men:

> The struggle for existence was carried on individually but in groups. Each profited by the other's experience; hence there was concurrence towards that which proved to be most expedient. All at last adopted the same way for the same purpose; hence the ways turned into customs and became mass phenomena. In this way folkways arise.[1]

Looked at from the standpoint of the individual—any individual in the group—this fishing routine would be appraised as nothing but a habit; it would appear to be no different from any habit, such as sucking the teeth, sleeping each afternoon after lunch, eating pie for breakfast, or anything else. Taking any such routine activity by itself and with its actor, it is nothing but a habit. But it is a custom looked at from the standpoint of the group. It is always true that each individual in the group has some habits which others do not have; therefore, there are always habits which are not folkways. But, on the other hand, those ways, which many in the group have, tend to be adopted by most or all of the members—especially if they are successful—and they tend to be adopted unconsciously, taken on, just as the air of the neighborhood is breathed. Thus, we may have a hint here of the beginnings of actional unity in groups. And what we have said of the fishing routine we can say for thousands of other routines—marrying in a certain way, worshiping in a certain way at a certain spot, eating certain kinds of food and rejecting others, believing in certain gods and other agencies, doing certain kinds of work, speaking certain languages. This mass uniformizing of the

[1] "Folkways," p. 2.

activities of each individual in a group is a process which started early in human history, has always being going on, and is now universal. We could not stop the making of folkways if we would. To do so, we would have to keep people entirely away from each other, or we would have to break up the imitative tendency in man.

3. The Strain toward Consistency.—These folkways, being group efforts to satisfy needs, succeed more or less well and, therefore, cause more or less pleasure or pain. If they bring pain or disappointment, then they are generally abandoned, and more successful and pleasurable ways are substituted as men learn better. Careful analysis discloses interrelations between these ways, which we may call the *strain toward consistency* or *harmony*. Consistency is an observable reality; it is not a hypothesis, or a wish; it is and has been as real as the folkways themselves.

The term "consistency" is from the Latin *constare*, meaning to stand together. The point which we are making, therefore, is that the folkways or usages of any group tend to stand together, tend mutually to support each other. We can show this negatively, first, by pointing out that persons who are unable to interlock and harmonize their life ways weaken themselves and perish; these ways are a means of protection, just as the shell to a turtle or the claws to a squirrel—when they fit together. If we are clear that a successful fishing routine or any other practice is an aid in the struggle for existence, we can see that, in general, what is good for one is good for many. As an individual's habits are often a source of strength when they mutually support and supplement each other, so are the habits of the group. The man who is trying to build an activity routine in study, in banking, or in lens grinding and at the same time is building a routine in sexual indulgence, in loafing, in doing careless work is not on the way to success but on the way to a heavy fall. Our personal, individual strength is much more largely than we suppose in our habit harmonies. And what is true of an individual is true of any group in this respect. The inconsistent tend to perish.

On the other hand, consistency in the usages of groups can be found and demonstrated. The patient examination of the usages of people all over the earth, and from the most backward to the most civilized, shows this. If we look into the way in which the Eskimo peoples make their living, for example, we find that their numerous work usages are well coordinated and quite harmonious. If we look into the folkways of the Indians of Arizona, we find the same thing. In these places, usage is linked and harmonized with usage, one after another, until the whole network gives the appearance of a well-worked-out pattern, a purposeful design, imposed at the beginning. And so well ordered, so smooth running, so neatly fitted together are the various units of these social patterns that they have always struck people, especially the young born in them,

as the work of supernatural agents; and the old guardians of these patterns, because comfortable in them, have usually taken pains to keep the young imbued with the idea that these usages actually were so originated so as the more easily to "break in" these colts. The *language* usage, for example, is a series of parts of speech, inflections, intonations, and other features, so skillfully fitted together and so effectual that, looked at afterward, it gives the appearance of having been designed by someone more intelligent than the daily users of it. Religious activity patterns have always been ascribed to the gods.

As each individual, however, acquires habits which weaken him in various ways without his knowing it, so groups do the same; and there is more excuse for groups than for individuals. Group ways become more numerous; groups lack the same degree of central control as individuals have; the relations between the parts of the group network become more attenuated as complexity increases; groups have to adjust themselves to more environments. Group ways are not wholly consistent. But in the large, fundamentally, they tend to harmonize and mutually correct each other so as to give the strength which is called for. Sumner points out that very large and highly composite peoples like those of India, China, England, Germany, Japan, and the United States have a harmony in their numerous usages so great that these peoples are individualized and differentiated from all others; they have a large number of well-coordinated and fundamental patterns which are their activity guides.[1]

Let us take one concrete example in closing: The Rechabites, an ancient Hebrew tribe, cherished the old religion—a series of consistent usages and beliefs—when they entered Palestine along with the other tribes; also, they retained the old pastoral form of industry in an agricultural country; they remained consistent. On the other hand, the other tribes felt drawn to the new type of industry which the "promised land" called for and changed their religion to correspond.[2]

4. The Strain toward Improvement.—We may find not only the strain toward consistency but also the strain toward improvement. And we may think here, without anticipating any theories of social progress, of improvement, as meaning the better adaptation of means to ends—whatever the ends. Let us recall our fishing routine. This routine is not examined or bothered with as long as it works successfully. But it is not uncommon for fishermen to find that their routines fail to bring them what they are after. Now, in such circumstances, the fisherman who lives by fishing cannot sit down on a log and refuse to fish any more; hunger soon spurs him on; and he is spurred on to improve his fishing routine or abandon it and work at something else. If he is

[1] "Folkways," p. 70 *ff.*

[2] Lumley, F. E. "The Hebrew Industrial Organization," p. 108, a thesis.

spurred on to remake his fishing routine, he proceeds in a purely experimental fashion—trying out a different hook, some select bait, another kind of pole, going at a different time, and so on—and he fumbles about until he captures Lady Luck again.

But his fumblings and final triumphs are witnessed and imitated by others, just as was his original pattern. His companions improve as he improves; and he improves as they find better ways to meet the situation. Hence, we can say for improvements all that we can say for the original pattern. There is this difference, however: It is easier to adopt a pattern the first time than it is to break one and take on another. Of course, refusal to improve methods in the arts of living proves suicidal very soon; man's ways are continually checked by the natural environment and checked convincingly. In the realm of religion, however, the subjective factor plays a large part, and there is no ruthless natural environment to check up foolishness immediately. Hence, as we get away from nature's checking on means in relation to ends, we find less checking; the checking has to be more in the nature of individual or group reflections; and then people can easily convince themselves that what they have is all right. But the changes of means enforced by the natural environment do, because of the law of consistency which we have just pointed out, effect changes all through the network of usages of any given group; the changes, however, are at a slower rate where the corrective force is man's reason rather than the onslaughts of nature.[1]

With these harmonizing and selective processes going on in all groups all the time, not as a result of collective reason, but as a result of the universal copying of successful individual tentatives, and with the gradual accumulation of usages, these ways tend to become "uniform, universal in the group, imperative, and invariable." They tend to become uniform because all tend to copy them if they are ways to satisfactions. They tend to become universal for the same reason. "Everybody's doing it," is our crude and slangy way of expressing this same fact. Everybody's doing it because it is the thing to do. These usages tend to become imperative, first, in the sense that what everybody is doing I can hardly resist doing because of mental contagion; and second, in the sense that the old impose these ways on the young and "condition" them this way and drive out or kill all adult variants, because these are the ways of the ancestors who are now spirits looking down on the doings of their progeny and ready to work endless damage upon impious conduct.

With these matters in mind, it is easy to understand the following statement about savages:

> It is difficult to exhaust the customs and small ceremonial usages of a savage people. Custom regulates the whole of a man's actions—his bathing, washing,

[1] *Cf.* SUMNER, "Folkways," p. 5. *Cf.* KELLER, "Societal Evolution," p. 128 *ff.*

cutting his hair, eating, drinking, and fasting. From his cradle to his grave he is the slave of ancient usage. In his life there is nothing free, nothing original, nothing spontaneous, no progress toward a higher and better life, and no attempt to improve his condition, mentally, morally, or spiritually.[1]

And how much better off are the majority of moderns? Does it not appear that we all behave according to the ancient uniformities with only a little wider margin for variation? Our informed impression is that we are amidst a vast network of ancient invariable, arbitrary, positive, and implacable usages calling for a large measure of resignation. Yet there is the same strain toward improvement of means to ends now as ever.

5. Folkways Due to False Inference.—We cannot pass on without calling attention to the fact that very many of these usages, just because they cannot be immediately checked up by the assaults of the physical environment and must be checked only by man's feeble reason, survive beyond the times of their usefulness. Hence, our network of ways is a veritable museum of vestiges. And since reason is the only test to which they can be applied, and man is so prejudiced, they remain untouched.

Here we raise the question of sound reasoning and especially of correct inference. Many folkways have *started* because of false inferences and have remained because of the inability to reason soundly, because of ghost fear, or because of sentiment. As the distance between means employed and ends to be attained increases, the reason of man declines in its critical and corrective significance. Let us take an example or two.

In the Nicobar Islands, some natives who had just started the pottery-making industry died. Here were two striking series of phenomena to the survivors—pottery making and death. What was the inference? Evidently, this was not a successful innovation; hence, the art was given up and never again undertaken.

Again, some white men gave to a Bushman in a *krall* a stick ornamented with buttons as a symbol of authority. The recipient soon died, leaving the stick to his son. The son soon died. Then the survivors brought the stick back to the white men—lest they all die.[2] Such cases might be multiplied indefinitely.

Some moderns see these as examples of the very general confusion between *association* of phenomena and true *causation;* they are cases of *post hoc.* Yet these primitives were not entirely unreasonable, granted their assumptions, namely, spirit agencies. Moderns, moreover, are not all or always entirely without the same weakness. While some have reached what they call a sounder position, the vast majority still think in the same fashion as the vast majority have always thought.

[1] SUMNER, "Folkways," p. 4.
[2] SUMNER, "Folkways," p. 24 *ff.*

It is no wonder, then, that our modern culture is well stocked with ancient usages and superstitions. When any one rises up and proposes a critical analysis of some cherished folkways, the majority are against him; and the more impossible it is to bring the case within the realm of scientific examination—that is, the more the phenomenon is steeped in sentiment—the more they are against him.

Not only are these apparently senseless usages in vast numbers still with us and supported by the unreasoning majority, but also we have a further weakness in that many cases cannot be dealt with critically. Take monogamy. It is a very old usage; it is our way. Suppose some of us do not like it; what can we do about it? This usage and its halo of sentiment cannot be tested. Besides not knowing how to get it, we do not know what kind of evidence we want about it. There are many subjective values involved; and when people believe thoroughly in something, that belief is, to most people, just one of the best of reasons why they should defend the thing; what people believe in has value for them. There is a vicious circle here out of which we all find it hard to leap. It is just as senseless, therefore, to vituperate and ridicule monogamy as it is blindly to defend it. That is to say, we moderns can and do make all too many false inferences and rest our cases on too many questionable assumptions to throw any stones at past generations. Had we been in their place, we would probably have done as they did.

6. The Economy of the Folkways.—It has often been remarked that the ability to form habits, and many habits themselves, have been an enormous labor saver. Let us suppose that we never could profit by past experience and thus reduce the things that we have to do over and over again to habits. In the morning, we manage to awaken. Then we have to spend some little time in reasoning as to how we shall get out of bed; this, of course, is a rather complicated procedure and, knowing not the first thing as to how we did it yesterday morning, we are some little time in figuring it all out. Then how does one bathe? Then how does one dress? Each garment has to be looked over very carefully and its outlines compared with the human frame to see where it belongs. Of course, we should be a long time dressing—even longer than some are now. Then how to walk down to breakfast? Then how to eat? Then what to do to get the work done? Thus, without efficient habits, the day would be gone before we were well started, and we should soon starve to death.

But, by hypothesis, many individual habits are identical with the ways of the group, are folkways. Thus, if habits are an economizer for the individual, they are also an economizer for the group. Let us take a fraternity. Suppose that we had no rules of procedure in the weekly meeting and therefore had to sit down and fight out every detail of every meeting before we could have it. Who would act as president?

Who would be scribe? Who would guard the door? What would be done first? The thing is maddening even to contemplate, to say nothing of actually experiencing. We are not yet able, even the keenest of us, to endure the strain that we should be called upon to bear if we had to think out carefully beforehand every detail of every new move we wished to make. But these "rules of order" which we use in fraternity meetings are just group ways, just ways which have been built up after the manner already sketched. And what we have said for a fraternity meeting we might say for the family, for the school, for the church, for the university, and for business. There is a vast saving of energy and time in being able to handle the many affairs of life in a routine fashion. A group without group ways would have no more outline or stability or usefulness than a body without a bony structure or organs. But, of course, the rigidity occasioned to the body by the skeleton is sometimes a serious handicap; and so it is with the group. Rigidity is an asset; and so is plasticity. But rigidity and plasticity are opposite and contradictory. Extremes of either are bad; strength, as a rule, comes with the proper balancing of each.

4. The Mores

The term *mores* was invented by Sumner and is the plural of the Latin, *mos*, meaning manner or custom. He used it to characterize folkways which have been lifted, in the process of evolution, "to another plane." He says: "The mores are the folkways, including the philosophical and ethical generalizations as to societal welfare which are suggested by them, and inherent in them, as they grow." Or, defined more exactly, as he says later:

> . . . they are the ways of doing things which are current in a society to satisfy human needs and desires, together with the faiths, notions, codes, and standards of well living which inhere in those ways, having a genetic connection with them.[1]

Let us now take these statements apart and attempt to make clear exactly what is meant.

1. The Transition to Mores.—Sumner and Keller say:

> After practicing certain folkways for a time, people acquire the conviction that they are indispensable to the welfare of society. They come to believe that their own ways are the only right ones, and that departure from them will involve calamity. It is with the addition of this welfare-element that folkways become mores. To illustrate: the removal of the hat when a civilian meets a woman on the street is in our folkways, while the practice of monogamy belongs to our mores. We do not regard neglect of the former usage as dangerous to society, though it is discreditable to the individual; but we are so convinced as to the expediency of

[1] "Folkways," pp. 30, 59. *Cf.* Sumner and Keller, "The Science of Society," Vol. I, p. 31.

the latter that we will promptly and severely repress the polygamist, and that in the interests of society.[1]

We must look a little at this "conviction" of the close relation between certain usages and *social welfare,* for here we have the basis of the distinction between these two types of societal bony structure.

The question hangs on human *reflection* and what starts it. Let us recall our fishing routine. We remember that the man went to the usual place, with the usual equipment, at the usual time; he did not think much about the matter; he certainly did the habitual thing. Now, suppose, as often happens—unless it is true that "once a fisherman always a liar"—that on one occasion he secured no fish; let us suppose, what often happens, that on several successive occasions he secured no fish. What would happen? Evidently, something was wrong somewhere. He would suffer from hunger, from pain. Would this start any reflection? What other reaction would this experience produce in him? This would be a problem requiring solution. He would fumble about a good deal to try to find the solution. Then he might change his equipment in some ways, offer more sacrifices to the spirits, or do various other things. If his luck returned, he would be apt to move along again in a somewhat semiconscious way until luck turned again. Then more fumbling, more changes, and the return of luck, and relapse to a semiconscious performance of this fishing routine.

Now this would be a *crisis,* this ill luck. Thomas says:

> Attention is the mental attitude which takes note of the outside world and manipulates it; it is the organ of accommodation. But attention does not operate alone; it is associated with habit on the one hand and with crisis on the other. When the habits are running smoothly the attention is relaxed; it is not at work. But when something happens to disturb the run of habit the attention is called into play and devises a new mode of behavior which will meet the crisis. That is, the attention establishes new and adequate habits, or it is its function to do so.
>
> Such conditions as the exhaustion of game, the intrusion of outsiders, defeat in battle, floods, drought, pestilence, and famine illustrate one class of crisis. The incidents of birth, death, adolescence, and marriage, while not unanticipated, are always foci of attention and occasions for control. They throw a strain on the attention, and affect the mental life of the group. Shadows, dreams, epilepsy, intoxication, swooning, sickness, engage the attention and result in various attempts at control. Other crises arise in the conflict of interest between individuals, and between the individual and the group. Theft, assault, sorcery, and all the crimes and misdemeanors are occasions for the exercise of attention and control. To say that language, reflection, discussion, logical analysis, abstraction, mechanical invention, magic, religion, and science are developed in the effort of the attention to meet difficult situations through a readjustment of habit, is simply to say that the mind itself is the product of crisis.[2]

[1] *Op. cit.,* p. 33.

[2] "Source Book for Social Origins," p. 17 *ff.*

Crises are oftentimes so serious as to destroy the people; then there is no longer a problem. Again, while some are destroyed, others are left, and those who are left have the problems. Again, all may suffer considerably or be threatened with calamity only, and thus all have the problem of what is called for in the crisis. Thus, we can see that the numerous crises of life have much to do with the development of our own individual capacity to think. They have had a good deal to do in developing that capacity in mankind.

This is the point we are making: Individuals—you and I—are compelled by crises to recognize our unconsciously acquired habits and to appraise them. We may smoke on day by day, unconcernedly and ever so gradually smoking a little bit more all the time, being preoccupied with study, business, or something else. We drift along with the smoking habit until some day we faint or have a bad case of indigestion or fail in a test because our nerves are "shot" or have some other awakening experience, when we suddenly become intensely *aware* of what we are doing. We haul this habit into court and judge it. We compare the fun we are having with it with the aim we have in life and ask about the relation of this habit to our general welfare. Then we stop smoking or cut it down or abandon ourselves the more to it, according as we place values in life.

What has been said, now, of an individual habit in an individual case may be said for a folkway and a group. Tipping the hat to the ladies has already been referred to. Apparently, such a practice has no special relation to any crisis that anybody could think of; but if it were ever thought of as having such a relation and then thereafter in the group regarded more highly and insisted upon as a necessary expedient in the arts of living, then it would become one of the mores. This is very evidently true of monogamy among us. There are many other marriage and family usages in the world; there is, therefore, disagreement. These different usages have confronted each other on many tribal and national borders. Such confrontations are always crises. The usage is just a folkway until attention becomes fixed upon it in relation to some critical situation. Then it is brought up to the top of public consciousness; it is discussed and reviewed; it is approved as being necessary to the welfare of the people; then it is made compulsory and backed up by sanctions. This is a very brief sketch of the evolution of folkways into mores.

2. The Mores are True.—When the element of "truth" is added to the folkways by reflection, they become mores. This is a matter requiring some elucidation. Let us take the case of monogamy again. It is a network of uniform practices—that is certain. But it is a network of practices *with a relation* to some life hypothesis, to some end or objective which the members of the group have. Universal individual

unanimity in wanting to live on makes group unanimity; the people desire to perpetuate themselves. This prevailing wish is father to various theories of objectives—increasing numbers, more strength to beat enemies, wealth accumulation, happiness, everlasting bliss in the other world, the view that the Almighty is guiding, and so on. For a long time, numerous men have been busy elaborating these theories, and some of them have become the main objectives of certain people or peoples.

When crises arise and the folkways are brought to judgment, who is the judge? Is it, can it be, any other than these theories, sound or unsound, of ends or objectives of life? Who can be the judge of monogamy when it is brought from the routine level of thoughtless use to the level of critical analysis and appraisal? Can it be anything other than the theories of well-being held by those who practice it? The question shapes itself: What is the relation of this monogamic *means* to the *end* which we have in view? Is it a necessary means? Can we reach our objectives without it? If the answer is that this is the only way, then the usage is one of the mores. Then the usage is true in the sense that it squares or harmonizes with the philosophical position which has been accepted.

Let us make this more clear by specifying a particular world philosophy, a particular theory of ends. Sumner says:

> With great unanimity all over the globe primitive men followed the same line of thought. The dead were believed to live on as ghosts in another world just like this one. The ghosts had just the same needs, tastes, passions, etc., as the living men had had. These transcendental notions were the beginning of the mental outfit of mankind. They are articles of faith, not rational convictions. The living had duties to the ghosts, and the ghosts had rights; they also had power to enforce their rights. It behooved the living, therefore, to learn how to deal with ghosts. Here we have a complete world philosophy and a life policy deduced from it. When pain, loss, and ill were experienced and the question was provoked, Who did this to us? the world philosophy furnished the answer. When the painful experience forced the question, Why are the ghosts angry and what must we do to appease them? the "right" answer was the one which fitted into the philosophy of ghost fear. All acts were, therefore, constrained and trained into the forms of the world philosophy by ghost fear, ancestral authority, taboos, and habit. The habits and customs created a practical philosophy of welfare, and they confirmed and developed the religious theories of goblinism.[1]

"True" has the meaning already indicated; but it has an additional significance. The various theories of ultimates—ghosts, heaven, the Almighty, spirituality, substance, ideals, and the rest—are the *subjective* side of the folkways and mores. That is to say, we always have the physical activities which men perform, and we always have the thoughts, speculations, theories which go along with the acting. Now, do these

[1] "Folkways," p. 29.

theories agree among themselves? Is there harmony among them? Are they logically consistent? Do they mutually support and supplement each other according to the most rigid and careful reasoning that man can carry through? Then any one of them is "true" if it is in harmony with the rest, does not contradict them. Or, there may be one of these theories—as, for example, the ghost theory above—which is regarded as more ultimate and fundamental than the others and with which all others must be consistent. Then any lesser theory or philosophy in the hierarchy has to be consistent with the fundamental one, and, if it is, it is "true."

Again, any theory is true—this is the way things have been, for the most part—if it is backed up by authorities. Our most familiar case, possibly, is that of Christianity. Christianity is a network of practices; but it is also a network of theories—about the nature of God, about Christ, about man, about salvation, about the next life. Pilate asked: "What is truth?" He could probably have answered his own question, and the Hebrew scribes would have answered, by saying that it is whatever is consistent with and supported by the Hebrew Scriptures, the Hebrew doctors holding that the Scriptures were the court of last resort. Later on, the Christian theologians maintained that the New Testament contained the ultimate truth about certain matters we have mentioned, and they always labored to "prove" their own theories by backing them up with a passage of Scripture. This, of course, as we now clearly see, was simply an appeal to tradition.

We still retain a vast amount of respect for authorities; that is, we still are living under the sway of the tradition that the more authorities we can array on our side of a proposition the more true it is. Modern science is steeped in this usage. When we publish anything on a scientific or philosophical subject, we always like to refer to authorities and to quote them—as the author is doing here and will do to the end. There is this sense, then, in which scientific truths are folklore and all science is in the mores. But there is the further sense, that we now hold that study and investigation are indispensable to our welfare in the future.[1]

3. The Mores are Right.—Many questions arise all the time as to what is "right" as well as to what is "true." We have already suggested the answer in the foregoing. *Right* is a term applying to the various usages of man. A usage is right when it harmonizes with the world philosophy. But there is another way of looking at the matter. A way of doing things is "right" when it *satisfies needs;* that we should all agree upon, and we can agree upon it when we mean a skillful or an efficient way. But because skill is never absolutely perfect, there is no absolutely right way.

[1] *Cf.* AYERS, "Science: The False Messiah," *passim.*

Then, again, a way is "right" if it is the ancient or usual way. The right way to meet a lady is to tip the hat to her; the right way to greet a person in certain parts of the world is to offer to rub noses; the right way to worship is the way worship is carried on; the right way to dress is to dress in style. In the two senses already indicated, there is

> . . . a right way to catch game, to win a wife, to make one's self appear, to cure disease, to honor ghosts, to treat comrades or strangers, to behave when a child is born, on the warpath, in council, and so on in all cases which can arise. The ways are defined on the negative side, that is, by taboos. The "right" way is the way which the ancestors used and which has been handed down. The tradition is its own warrant. It is not held subject to verification by experience. The notion of right is in the folkways. It is not outside them, of independent origin, and brought to them to test them. In the folkways, whatever is, is right. This is because they are traditional, and therefore contain in themselves the authority of the ancestral ghosts. When we come to the folkways we are at the end of our analysis.[1]

Arthur Guiterman has put this idea in clever poetical form:

> We shake each other's hands, and yet 'tis known
> That gentlemen in China shake their own.
> While Frenchmen kiss upon the public street,
> New Zealanders rub noses when they meet.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> Beside the right-hand curb we roll along;
> In London, driving on the right is wrong.
> Though forks bedeck the boards of Western inns,
> Are chopsticks barred at feasts of Mandarins?
>
> . . . . . .
>
> In every region, morning, noon and night
> Whatever Fashion sanctifies is right.
>
> "Wildwood Fables."

We have a distinctly different idea when we come to the term *rights*. We occasionally hear people speak of their *rights* and of *natural rights*. When people talk of their rights, they mean what we call their *dues;* they mean something like justice. But there are no "natural rights" of any sort. There are agreements among comrades and within certain groups as to modes of procedure, as to the mutual give-and-take to prevail in order that there may be peace and group strength. One's "rights" are always defined ultimately by these agreements or conventions and never in any other way. There are, therefore, no absolute "rights" of any sort.

It is further to be noted that *morality* is defined in terms of the mores of the time and the place. In the lower sense, the moral is the same as

[1] SUMNER, "Folkways," p. 28. When Sumner uses the term "folkways" in the above, he really means the *mores*.

the usual or traditional; the past and present folkways are the standards for judgment in individual cases. In the higher sense, the moral is that which is reflected upon and judged to be expedient in furthering welfare, individual and social. The *good* is that which, in the best judgment of the time, looks toward individual and social welfare. Or, the good and the moral may be regarded as the same as the *ideal*, which is a more or less clear picture of a more unified state of affairs, and a state of affairs cleansed from all that appears to be and actually is against welfare. Laws are enacted mores with prescribed penalties for infraction attached. But what we have to remember most of all is that there are no absolute standards to be found anywhere. All of the standards to which we regularly refer individual cases for appraisal are the product of use and wont, of blind experimentation in the past, of the struggles and conclusions of others plus what we have learned in our own case. There is no better sequence, it would seem, than act, think, act, think, act.

4. Each Group Has Its Own Mores.—It makes no difference what group we select—a fraternity, a family, a church, a factory, the proletariat, the wealthy, Republicans, ranks, professions, philosophical sects—each has its own distinctive network of usages and its correspondent theories of welfare. Indeed, these are the features by which it is characterized. There is no other way to distinguish Methodists from Catholics, Republicans from Democrats, capitalists from workers than by a study of their routine activities and the philosophies which accompany them. Capitalists practice the accumulation of private property, and they weave the most complicated theories to justify the practice. Socialists weave opposing theories and sometimes refuse to accumulate private property. Both groups justify both sets of practices and theories by reference to a higher standard in which they profess to believe—individual and social welfare. Both groups claim that they are "right" in their practices and "true" in their theories in relation to this higher standard. If we leave out physical characteristics, there is no way to distinguish between Americans and Chinese except on the basis of their respective usages and philosophies.

In any considerable group—the United States, for example—there are those who are in many groups. These persons are bonds of union between such groups; and they constitute areas of compromise and neutralization; they help to prevent misunderstanding; they carry on a work of mediation and modification. This is a most important work in the interests of goodwill and peace.

In any large group, there are always leaders and followers—a few of the first and many of the second. These leaders are either conservatives who encourage the masses to stand fast in faithfulness to the traditions and practices of the past, or they are the innovators who point the way to something different and strive to lead the people there. In any nation,

for example, the so-called *classes* have generally led the way in luxury, frivolity, vice, refinement, culture, and the arts of living. When they are believed in by the masses, they are imitated; otherwise, they are thrown out. The masses may be said, for the most part, to live on the level of routine, on an almost instinctive level. They are diabolically conservative. They are inert. They are the real center and bearer of the prevailing, dominating mores of the time and place. They move along cumbersomely, heavily, slowly, like a great body of water drifting toward the sea. Their mores undergo modification, but it is usually tediously slow and painful. They are dug deep in the channel of ancient usage, and their sentiments are linked to the past.

5. Ritual

Sumner says:

The process by which the mores are developed and established is ritual. Ritual is so foreign to our[1] mores that we do not recognize its power. In primitive society it is the prevailing method of activity, and primitive religion is entirely a matter of ritual. Ritual is the perfect form of drill and of the regulated habit which comes from drill. Acts which are ordained by authority and are repeated mechanically without intelligence run into ritual. If infants and children are subjected to ritual they never escape from its effects through life. Galton says that he was, in early youth, in contact with the Mohammedan ritual idea that the left hand is less worthy than the right, and that he never overcame it. We see the effect of ritual in breeding, courtesy, politeness, and all forms of prescribed behavior. Etiquette is social ritual. Ritual is not easy compliance with usage; it is strict compliance with detailed and punctilious rule. It admits of no exception or deviation. The stricter the discipline, the greater the power of ritual over action and character. In the training of animals and the education of children it is the perfection, inevitableness, invariableness, and relentlessness of routine which tells. They should never experience any exception or irregularity. Ritual is connected with words, gestures, symbols, and signs. Associations result, and, upon a repetition of the signal, the act is repeated, whether the will assents or not.

Ritual gains further strength when it is rythmical, and is connected with music, verse, or other rythmical arts. Acts are ritually repeated at the recurrence of the rythmical points . . . All ritual is ceremonious and solemn. It tends to become sacred, or to make sacred the subject-matter with which it is connected. Therefore, in primitive society, it is by ritual that sentiments of awe, deference to authority, submission to tradition, and disciplinary cooperation are inculcated. Ritual operates a constant suggestion, and the suggestion is at once put in operation in acts. Ritual, therefore, suggests sentiments, but it never inculcates doctrines. Ritual is strongest when it is most perfunctory and excites no thought.

No creed, no moral code, and no scientific demonstration can ever win the same hold upon men and women as habits of action, with associated sentiments

[1] He is speaking of America.

and states of mind, drilled in from childhood. Mohammedanism shows the power of ritual. Any occupation is interrupted for the prayers and prescribed genuflections. The Brahmins also observe an elaborate and daily ritual. They devote to it two hours in the morning, two in the evening, and one at midday.[1]

With this in mind let us think of a baby born in any group that has ancient usages and theories. What is the result? It is uncritical; it is helpless; it is plastic. What else can it do but grow up according to the mould? To what else can its sentiments attach but the treasured symbols of the group? If it possessed no original-nature directive forces, such as reflexes and instincts, it could not escape the uniformities imposed by its elders. As long as it imitates, its ways are approved. When it varies, it is punished and corrected. Thus are past ways—usages and beliefs—kept alive and perpetuated; thus is the child made, day by day, to feel that change is something dreadful and abhorrent. The old seize upon the young as they arrive and mould them into the local shape—in the United States, in the United States shape; in China, in the Chinese shape; in Mexico, in the Mexican shape; in Germany, in the German shape. They are moulded in language, in dress, in proper relations to the other sex, in political views, in religion, in philosophy—in everything.

Thus do the mores persist; they persist from generation to generation and from age to age. We have here a phenomenon which is a parallel to physical heredity—horses producing only horses, bees only bees, strawberries only strawberries. The individual drops out, but the species, that is, the *form*, the structural form, goes on. And so in society, the individual drops out, but these countless uniformities in theory and practice go on.

But we have to record the fact that these countless usages and beliefs, these sentiments and traditions, are *human*. Man is not born human but becomes human by taking shape according to some of these patterns. He becomes, that is to say, cultivated; and what *cultivated* means is a matter of the time and the place. There is a tendency for each group to suppose that only its own mores are cultivated. But that is superstition; all of these ways in any part of the world are acquired; they are the products of cultivation; they *are* civilization.

We may sum up this superficial analysis as follows:

Men in groups are under life conditions; they have needs which are similar under the state of the life conditions; the relations of the needs to the conditions are interests under the heads of hunger, love, vanity, and fear; the efforts of numbers at the same time to satisfy interests produce mass phenomena which are folkways by virtue of uniformity, repetition, and wide concurrence. The folkways are attended by pleasure or pain according as they are well fitted for the purpose. Pain forces reflection and observation of some relation between acts and welfare. At this point the prevailing world philosophy (beginning with

[1] "Folkways," p. 61.

goblinism) suggests explanations and inferences, which become entangled with judgments of expediency. However, the folkways take on a philosophy of right living and a life policy for welfare. Then they become mores, and they may be developed by inferences from the philosophy or the rules in the endeavor to satisfy need without pain. Hence they undergo improvement and are made consistent with each other.[1]

Then they are ritualized, the young are forced into them, and the whole massive network of usages and beliefs is perpetuated from generation to generation. The old, who are comfortable in these ways, insist on things remaining as they are. The young, who are plastic and full of spirits, accept in part and reject in part. So the course of human experience has gone for milleniums and is now going.

Questions

1. What is it that scientists seek out above all else?
2. Does the physical environment have anything to do with the formation (1) of animal groups, (2) of human groups? Can this be scientifically demonstrated?
3. What holds widely separated individuals together in groups?
4. What reflexes do you have which are similar to those of others? Do you have any reflexes which others do not have?
5. What habits do you have which are similar to those of others? Do you have any habits which others do not have?
6. What are (1) the similarities and (2) the differences between habits and folkways? Are there any folkways which were not first habits?
7. What are some of the folkways in which you participate?
8. Do you regularly act first and think afterward, or the reverse? What about a scientist, say, (1) at home and (2) in his laboratory?
9. How do folkways originate? Are they originating around us all the time, or were they originated at some past time once and for all?
10. What is meant by (1) the strain toward consistency, (2) the strain toward improvement? Can you give examples?
11. Give examples of folkways "due to false inference."
12. How do folkways and mores differ? How are they alike?
13. What part does "crisis" play in the making of mores?
14. Is "national prohibition" one of the folkways or one of the mores? Give reasons for your answer.
15. What is meant by saying (1) that the mores are true and (2) that they are right? How about head hunting among the people of Borneo?
16. Can you give examples of wrong mores? Can mores be wrong?
17. What is ritual? Is it possible to study it scientifically?
18. What organizations besides churches have ritual?
19. How is ritual affected by (1) the physical environment and (2) by a decrease in the population?
20. Can any group exist without ritual?

[1] "Folkways," p. 33.

CHAPTER VI

ISOLATION

In the third chapter, we took the merest glance at the vast number of individuals of our species in the world, and we made the merest beginnings of analysis. Our hurried survey revealed, among other things, that their natures—yours and mine—are divisible into two complicated parts; and these we found to be *original nature* and *human nature,* the first being inborn and having a physical base, and the second being acquired and having a social base. And we made the rather shocking affirmation that "man is not born human" but has to grow into his humanity.

Then, in the previous two chapters, we took note of man's tendency to form groups and to behave in uniform ways; interaction with others, we now see, is his way of growing into humanity. Now, the question emerges: What would happen if original nature—say, the new baby—were deprived of group life, of all contacts, and left with nothing but its original-nature assets? In other words, we suggest that it is possible to give some proof to the proposition that man is not born human by taking some actual cases. Before dealing with the "social processes," therefore, let us consider isolation and its effects.

Now, we might ask a mother to loan us her precious, newborn darling for an experiment, and, if she agreed, we might take it away from all human beings and leave it alone with Mother Nature to see what would happen. Of course, the baby would soon die, and we should be punished for murder; thus, the experiment would not turn out very successfully. Here, again, is this handicap on experimentation. But suppose we took a child of three or four years, a child able to rustle about for itself. Well, this experiment would also be abortive, because the child would already have been tinctured with humanity and would be greatly modified; it would have clothes, language, manners, tastes, games; it would already be decisively conditioned. But, of course, no decent mother would loan her child for such an undertaking. If she did, the authorities would soon learn of the wickedness and arrest all concerned.

Are we, then, shut away absolutely and finally from all information as to what would happen in such a case—the denial of social relations to any youngster? Not exactly. We have already said that human beings are not permitted to experiment upon others to their detriment, yet we have also said that human beings experiment for themselves; there is no fool thing and wicked thing that they do not undertake. And

we actually have many cases of youngsters wandering away or being lost on purpose from "nurture" and growing up in comparative isolation. What, therefore, we cannot do for ourselves as investigators, others have done for us. Unfortunately for us—but fortunately for themselves—they did not get lost early enough in life, or in sufficient numbers, to make the demonstration absolutely convincing. But the evidence, such as we have, may now be presented for what it is worth. If it is not entirely convincing, it is at least most suggestive.

1. Effects of Isolation

1. Retardation.—Organic growth does not take place without nourishment; muscles do not develop without exercise; minds do not become nimble and broad without suggestions in number and variety; where interstimulation is lacking—and that is what we mean by isolation—retardation inevitably follows.

Perhaps no character of this sort ever aroused more interest than *Caspar Hauser*. More than a thousand articles have been written about him, and his case is known to investigators all over the world. According to a letter which he bore when found at Nürnberg, Germany, one afternoon in 1828, he was born in 1812, left on the doorstep of a Hungarian peasant's hut, adopted by him, and reared in strict seclusion. When found, he could walk only with difficulty; he knew no German and understood little that was said to him; he paid no heed to what went on about him; he was ignorant of all customs.

When first found, he suffered much pain from light, and it was afterward found that he had been kept in a low, dark cell. He could see well at night and could distinguish fruit from leaves on a tree where others could see nothing. He called both men and women *Bua* and all animals *Rosz*. His memory span for names was marvelous. He burned his hand in the first flame he ever saw and, while not afraid of being struck, was convulsed by the sound of drums. He thought that pictures and statuary were alive and also everything that chanced to be in motion. He was delighted with trinkets but disliked the odor of paint, fabrics, and most flowers. His hearing was acute, but he seemed to be wanting in sex impulses and could see no sense in religious ceremonies. He never wearied of riding on horseback after he had learned. His autopsy revealed a small brain without abnormalities; it simply gave evidence of lack of development. He had never seen the face of his guardian who had brought him his food.

The *Hessian Boy* was found by hunters in 1341, running on all fours with wolves. Captured and turned over to the landgrave, he was always uneasy and could not adapt himself to civilized ways and died untamed. Whether or not he was normal, it is hard to say.

The *Irish Boy* had animal features, and his body was covered with hair. He lived with sheep and bleated like them. He did not notice people. He was fierce, untamable, and indocible; he was stolid and unconscious of self. His skin was thick, his sense of touch blunted so that attacks of thorns and stones were unnoticed. His age was about sixteen.

The *Lithuanian Boys* were three in number. The first was found with bears, in 1657. His face was not repulsive or beastlike; the hair was thick and white; the skin was dry and insensitive; the voice was a growl; he had great physical strength. Instruction was attempted, and he learned to obey his trainer to some degree but always retained certain bear habits. He ate raw vegetables and raw flesh and anything not containing oils; he had the habit of curling up in secluded places and taking long naps. The second, captured in 1669, is not so well described. The third was found in 1694. He learned to walk, but with great difficulty, and he was always leaping about in a restless manner. He learned to eat from a table but mastered only a few words, which were spoken in a harsh and inhuman voice. He showed great sagacity in wood life.

Clemens of Overdyke was found after the German struggle with Napoleon. He knew little and said little. After repeated attempts, it was learned that his parents were dead and that a peasant had adopted him and set him at work caring for pigs. Little food was given him, and he learned to suck a cow and eat grass with his porcine companions. He would get down on his hands and knees and pull up vegetables with his teeth. He was of low intelligence, subject to fits of passion, and fonder of pigs than of men. It is probable, therefore, that his case is of little use to us in this connection.

The *Savage of Aveyron* had a dermal sense duller than that of animals; his gaze was wont to wander; his language was deficient, and his ideas were very few; his food was raw potatoes, acorns, and fruit; he would eagerly tear open a bird and eat it raw. Being insolent and secretive, he would often hide in the garden until hunger drove him forth. When angry, he would gnaw clothing and hurl furniture about viciously. He met all efforts to tame him with apathy and learned but little of language. It is probable, also, that this is not a meaningful case for us.

The *Wolf Children of India,* two boys of about ten years of age, ate raw food all the time and refused cooked food. So far as is known, they never spoke, smiled, or laughed. They shunned human beings of both sexes but would permit a dog to eat with them. They pined in captivity and lived but a short time. Other cases from India have been recently discovered, but how authentic the accounts are it is hard to say.[1]

[1] See *Literary Digest,* Oct. 8, 1927, p. 54.

Peter of Hanover was found in the woods at Hanover. His food was buds, bark, roots, frogs, eggs, and anything else that we consider edible which he could lay his hands on out of doors. He had the habit of wandering away in the spring. He was unable to walk in shoes at first, and it was a long time before he would submit to the use of any head covering. He never learned to speak, although a teacher was provided. He became docile but remained stoical in manner. His sense of hearing was acute, as was also his sense of smell. He lived to be nearly seventy years old.

The *Girl of Songi* came out of the forest near Chalons in 1731 and was thought to be nine years old. She carried a club in her hand with which she quickly killed a dog that attempted to attack her. She climbed trees easily and made niches on walls and roofs, over which she ran like a squirrel. She caught fish and ate them raw. A cry served for speech. She displayed a tendency toward decorating herself with leaves and flowers. She found it difficult to adapt herself to civilized ways and suffered many fits of sickness. In 1747, while in a convent, she learned something of the French language, domestic ways, and embroidery; but she always clung to certain sounds which were not understood by any one else. She believed that the earth and the trees produced her and remembered her earliest shelter as holes in the ground. She said that she had started to reflect only after her formal education had begun.[1]

Were these children *normal* when born? That is a most pertinent question, and there is no sure way of answering it; mental testing was not known then, and the information is too scanty. There is reason to believe, however, that at least some of them had a normal original nature. But are there no *modern* cases? Is there no reliable evidence nearer home? There is a little, but, fortunately—on a humanitarian score—very little.

In 1925, five children were located on a mired houseboat in the Hudson River on the New Jersey shore near North Bergen—within sight of the high buildings and blare of Broadway. Their playground was the slimy margin of the river; and their abode, the ten-by-twelve-foot cabin of the rotting craft in which the family had taken refuge. These children had not learned to speak except in primitive grunts, although they ranged in years from one to ten. The father said: "What good's schoolin', anyhow?"[2]

Of canal-boat children in England, Hugh Gordon says:

> When the boats remain in a town for loading and unloading, the children do not appear to mix readily with other children . . . The majority were found

[1] These cases are taken from Park and Burgess, "Introduction to the Science of Sociology," p. 239 *ff*. See, also, extensive bibliography at the end of this chapter.

[2] *Columbus Citizen*, May 1, 1925.

anxious to talk, but it was often difficult to understand what they said owing to their indistinct articulation and their use of unrecognizable words . . . Their intellectual life is of the most meager description, owing to their lack of education and also owing to their social isolation.[1]

The same was found to hold good for gypsy children.

A news despatch from Illinois tells of the discovery of two boys, eight and ten, in the wooded hills of Pulaski County, who were unable to speak and "fought like little wildcats against being captured, scratching and biting members of the posse before their childish strength finally succumbed." When the boys first found the searchers on their trail, they fled into the woods, "one climbing a tree with the agility of a monkey, and each chattering to the other in monosyllables." They were in rags and subsisted on wild roots and forest animals which they caught and ate raw. This account may, however, be mere newspaper exaggeration—or worse.[2]

From India comes an account, apparently verified, of a Romulus and Remus in modern times. Two little girls there were adopted by a she wolf. When found at the age of two and eight years, they were running on all fours and barking. The younger died. The elder, now in an orphanage and gradually learning speech, prefers the company of dogs to children.[3]

The papers tell us of a recent discovery in Hungary, a veritable ape man. The creature was unable to speak a word and uttered only wierd cries. Its parents, normal Hungarian peasants, had kept their offspring locked up in the barn with the cattle for twenty-nine years.[4] Such cases as we have been giving are called *feral*, which means having become wild again from a state of domestication; yet the most of these appear never to have been domesticated.

It is entirely probable that the Russian "blowup" of 1917 sent into the lonely world scores, possibly hundreds, of children to grow up wild in the manner already indicated. The London *Times*[5] reports that an official census of the Soviet Commissars in the Ukraine showed the number of waifs and strays in that one region alone to be over one and one-half million. Some of these were being looked after, but "86 per cent of the children were left to their own devices." If this is not antibolshevik propaganda, it may indicate to us how the separations we have noted may have occurred.

Corroborative evidence comes from the studies of "the only child." Instead of outstripping other children because of continual association

[1] "Mental and Scholastic Tests among Retarded Children," pp. 34, 46.
[2] International News Service, Cairo, Ill., Oct. 27, 1924.
[3] *Columbus Despatch*, Oct. 22, 1926.
[4] *The Ohio State Journal*, May 23, 1927. *Columbus Despatch*, June 22, 1927.
[5] August 28, 1923.

with mature minds—as such children have been supposed to do—there is evidence that they fall behind. Not only do they, as a rule, enter school from one and a half to two years later, but also they are markedly inferior in school performance. Of some four hundred cases studied, one-fourth were noticeably selfish; the tendency toward morbid introspection was conspicuous; and 40 per cent were not interested in games, did not know how to get along with other people, and could not take a joke.[1]

2. Degeneration.—Let us suppose that the young grow up in a satisfactory social environment and reach normal adulthood. What would happen if these matured and well-set people were completely deprived of social contacts for good? What would have happened to Robinson Crusoe if Friday had not appeared? There is a little evidence that people so isolated *degenerate*, that is, tend to lose their human nature and slip back to the level of animals.

W. H. Hudson, who spent much time in Patagonia alone, thus records his experience:

> It was perhaps a mistake to say that I would sit down and rest, since I was never tired; and yet, without being tired, that noon-day pause, during which I sat for an hour without moving, was strangely grateful. All day there would be no sound, not even the rustle of a leaf. One day while *listening* to the silence, it occurred to my mind to wonder what the effect would be if I were to shout aloud. This seemed at the time a horrible suggestion, which almost made me shudder; but during those solitary days it was a rare thing for any thought to cross my mind. In the state of mind I was in, thought had become impossible. My state was one of *suspense* and *watchfulness;* yet I had no expectation of meeting with an adventure, and felt as free from apprehension as I feel now when sitting in a room in London. The state seemed familiar rather than strange, and accompanied by a strong feeling of elation; and I did not know that something had come between me and my intellect until I returned to my former self—to thinking, and the old insipid existence. I had undoubtedly *gone back;* and that state of intense watchfulness, or alertness rather, with suspension of the higher intellectual faculties, represented the mental stage of the pure savage. He thinks little, reasons little, having a surer guide in his instincts; he is in perfect harmony with nature, and is nearly on a level, mentally, with the wild animals he preys on, and which in their turn sometimes prey on him.[2]

What happens to persons in solitary confinement? In 1821, the authorities of New York State put eighty convicts in solitary cells in the Auburn prison. In five years, five were dead, one had committed suicide, another was mad, and the rest were melancholy. Since the more developed personalities suffer the most, it is not strange that

[1] Ross, quoting Bruce, "The Only Child," *The Century Magazine*, 1916, p. 310.

[2] Quoted in Park and Burgess, *op. cit.*, p. 247. *Cf.* Healy, "The Individual Delinquent," p. 376 *ff.*

of the Fenian leaders locked up at Mountjoy from 1865 to 1867 nearly one-half went mad before their release and many others died soon afterward. Says Ross:

Victims of long-enforced solitude generally become the prey of melancholia, delusions and hallucinations. They cease to have emotions, shrink from the sight of others, and perhaps return voluntarily to their cell as to a grateful shelter. Hermits, too, exhibit a variety of forms of mental disintegration. The biographies of the anchorite saints record strange noises and mysterious voices which the devout of their time deemed supernatural, but which were really sense hallucinations in no wise different from those which visit today the isolated lighthouse keeper, or the lonely shepherd of the Sierras.[1]

The results of keeping the Negro "in his place" are well pictured[2] by Kelly Miller, a full-blooded Black:

To expect the Negroes of Georgia to produce a great general like Napoleon when they are not even allowed to carry arms, or to deride them for not producing scholars like those of the Renaissance when a few years ago they were forbidden the use of letters, verges closely upon the outer rim of absurdity. Do you look for great Negro statesmen in states where black men are not allowed to vote? Above all, for southern white men to berate the Negro for failing to gain the highest rounds of distinction reaches the climax of cruel inconsistency. One is reminded of the barbarous Teutons in *Titus Andronicus*, who, after cutting out the tongue and hacking off the hands of the lovely Lavinia, ghoulishly chided her for not calling for sweet water with which to wash her delicate hands.[3]

3. Estrangement.—Another disastrous result of separation or isolation is estrangement. After some acquaintanceships, friendships, or close relationships have been set up, let us suppose that there is a break, and a consequent separation. There are two possibilities here—(1) wiping each other out of the book of remembrance or (2) remembering with "a root of bitterness." The latter possibility alone interests us here. People who have never heard of each other and who have no knowledge of each other's existence do not detest and hate each other. But where a relationship, once established, is broken off, then a whole series of activities and speculations is set up, and these are greatly aggravated by isolation.

Suppose intimates separate as a result of a quarrel. Then they refuse to speak to each other on accidental—and, of course, there are no prearranged—meetings; they will not telephone each other; they will not write; they will not have any "diplomatic relations." Now, what almost inevitably happens in consequence of these avoidances? In the first place, each has nothing but the *memory* of the other to go on. Not seeing each other, and not being familiar with the realities as they develop

[1] "Principles of Sociology," p. 96 *ff.*

[2] The negroes themselves have expressed gratitude for the picture.

[3] Park and Burgess, *op. cit.*, p. 251.

each day, each knows the other only up to the hour of separation; each is, therefore, "behind the times" in actual knowledge—some gossip excepted.

Relying on memory alone, or on memory supplemented by foul report, each builds a picture of the other, that is, keeps him alive. But imagination plays a large part and helps—lacking proper correctives—to distort the picture. This distortion goes on, aided by wishes, until there is very little resemblance between what one party actually *is* at the time and what the other *imagines* he is. For each always begins a process of justification; each always finds excuses for his own attitude, but none for that of the other party; old incidents are recalled as quite consistent with the picture developed; favorable characteristics, even if of greater numbers, are forgotten, disesteemed, or reinterpreted; each elaborates arguments to himself and to friends to show that he acted honorably and righteously and that the other party acted dishonorably.

Suspicions arise as well. Incidents that were scarcely noticed before now appear very important and meaningful; matters that were once taken as important now appear to be insignificant; these alienated people begin to detect dark designs in each other. Thus, the mythologizing process goes on in each; and it has to be mythology, because, being separated and out of communication with each other, these people are ignorant of the facts of the development from the time of such separation; no corrective information is available unless a mediator who knows both and knows what has happened in each case appears to provide it.

So lovers quarrel and separate; cabinet officers quarrel and separate; ecclesiastics disagree and separate; nations disagree and call their diplomats home; capitalists and laborers become involved in conflicts; husbands and wives refuse to speak. They become isolated and suspicious. They do the one absolutely worst thing—for beings who have abilities to understand each other. Park says:

> Orientals live more completely behind the mask than the rest of us. Naturally enough we misinterpret them, and attribute to disingenuousness and craft what is actually conformity to an ingrained convention. The American who is flattered at first by the politeness of his Japanese servant will later on, perhaps, cite as a reproach against the race the fact that "we never know what is going on in their heads."[1]

The sum of this is stated by Yarros as follows:

> Ignorance, profound prejudice, distrust, suspicion, misinterpretation of motives, perversion of purposes, incredible blindness to facts—these are the unavoidable effects of the high walls which separate class from class, set from set, group from group, school from school, in modern society.[2]

[1] *Survey,* May 1, 1926, p. 137. For many historical cases of estrangement, see Ross, "Principles of Sociology," p. 415 *ff.*

[2] "Isolation and Social Conflicts," *A. J. S.*, September, 1921, p. 213.

Hence, we may have a fanaticism bordering on insanity as one of the results of isolation.

4. Originality.—What has just been said must be qualified by what is now to be pointed out. Separation in anger is apt to result as we have indicated; separation because of high walls of prejudice is apt so to result. But separation has some relation to originality which is not fully understood but which cannot be neglected in this connection. If there is no original-nature disposition to originality, then isolation has the consequences noted—when prolonged.

But granted a certain degree of association; granted some copies; granted some degree of aspiration—then isolation is an invaluable aid to exceptional work, is an asset in mental integration and in the development of skill. As we think of the world's great persons, we recall, perhaps, that many of them were accustomed to some isolation.

> Buddha, Christ, St. Paul, Mohammed—these are names of men who changed the course of history. But do they suggest vast scholarship, or profound acquaintance with books in any sense whatever? They were great originators, even though they built on other men's foundations, but their originality was not inspired by libraries . . . With Buddha was it not 1 per cent papyrus roll and 99 per cent meditation? When St. Paul was struck down on the way to Damascus, he did not repair to the nearest Jewish seminary to read prophecy. He says: "I went to Arabia." The desert solitude was the only place in which to find the rationale of his new experience. And was it not in a similar life of solitude that Jesus—Essene-like—came to self-realization?
>
> But let us take other names with different associations—*e.g.*, Plato, Charlemagne, Caesar, Shakespeare, Napoleon, Bismarck. Can it be said of any one of these that he owed one-third of his distinction to what he learned from manuscripts or books? We do know, indeed, that Bismarck was a wide reader, but it was on the selective principle as a student of history and affairs . . . Of Shakespeare's reading we know less, but there is no evidence that he was a collector of books or that he was a student after the manner of the men of letters of his day . . . The impression he made on Ben Johnson, an all-around scholar, was not one of learning—quite otherwise . . . Shakespeare, when in the company of kindred spirits, showed precisely the kind of talk we should expect—not Latin and Greek or French and Italian quotations, not a commentary on books past or present, but a stream of conversation marked by brilliant fancy, startling comparison, unique contrast, and searching pathos, wherein life, not literature, was the chief subject.[1]

Ross points out that, in addition to other types and classifications of men, we must recognize the existence of the *sociable* man who wants to join any crowd he happens to come upon and the *individualist* who prefers the trackless woods, empty rooms, small congregations, wastes—in short, solitude. Such was the American backwoods type who, when he could hear the sound of a neighbor's axe, "reckoned" that "folks are

[1] KNOWLSON, "Originality," quoted in PARK and BURGESS, *op. cit.*, p. 237.

gettin' too crowded" and moved on. Such persons are always within our purview—the non-participant in conversation when things are rattling along finely, the non-participant in fun when everything is uproarious, the silent and lonely individual in proximity to brightness and company—there are always the non-comminglers, no matter what the program.[1] Most of these are not geniuses by a long way. Yet extremely intelligent people, gifted scientists, inventors, golden-mouthed orators, versatile writers often have little taste for society or for companionship. And there is a point with all of us, perhaps, beyond which "the taste for society cloys like our taste for salt."

Now here we have two conflicting views: Isolation seems to cause retardation and degeneracy; but it also seems to have something to do with originality. What is the solution of this contradiction? Does everything depend upon the original nature of the individual? We notice that in Knowlson's discussion of originality he said that these geniuses were not entirely familiar with *books and libraries.* He did not point out that there were many other sources of inspiration available, and that all of these men had had intimate contacts with many people prior to their periods of isolation.

The truth seems to be found in the fact that what produce the best results are (*a*) intimate early associations and (*b*) a continual alternation, all through life, between association and privacy. If we are left out of society during early life, we do not grow up; that is incontestable. In later life, if we go off into solitude and *stay there,* we degenerate; that also seems incontestable. But if we get a good cultural start, then we all need to work out a program of alternation between society and solitude—with each one having his own special problem. Lowell said: "Solitude is as needful to the imagination as society is wholesome for the character." Speaking of Napoleon, Charles Phillips said: "Grand, gloomy, and peculiar, he sat upon the throne a sceptred hermit, wrapped in the solitude of his own originality." From Thoreau we have the admission: "I never found the companion who was so companionable as solitude." But some of these might be regarded as illustrating some of the unfortunate results of solitude. At any rate, what we are saying is that we all need the stimulus of association but also the privacy to organize. No rules can be laid down; it is an individual matter for each person to work out for himself.

So much for the originality of individuals. What about *groups?* Isolation operates, in some cases, to sharpen the outline of any group's program and to drive the group to a full exploration of its meaning. We see this in religious sects wherein a certain theological position is taken and bolstered up with all the ingenuity available in its membership. And this is real gain—if the denomination regards itself as a research

[1] "Principles of Sociology," p. 100.

group for the time being and not as the sole savior of humanity, which is the usual position. Sectarian warfare has usually been precipitated not because sects have adumbrated some new phase of truth but because that "truth" was interpreted as entitling its discoverers to go out and battle royally with all of a different persuasion and convert the whole world to their point of view.

Similarly, we may speak of nations. No doubt isolation has played a large part in enabling certain peoples to be distinctive; no doubt it has enabled them to integrate their own life policies; no doubt "peoples" have become peculiar by cultural inbreeding. Then they have felt constrained to impose their policy on other so-called *benighted* peoples. Protected by the Monroe Doctrine, the people of the United States have had an opportunity to test out and improve their beliefs and programs with respect to democracy; yet, floods of immigrants have interfered with this attempt a good deal. But nationalism can be justified on the ground of opportunity to experiment in social matters without interference but not on the ground of a swashbuckling and truculent self-assertiveness.[1] Isolated tribes always seem peculiar, and peculiarity is closely related to originality.

What part isolation has played in the development of other nations—England, Italy, Greece, Egypt, Jewish Palestine, Babylonia, and others—is not well understood yet. A few investigators have played with this subject somewhat, and they are inclined to the view that there is a close connection between national greatness and freedom from outside interference. We might say that a great nation like England could live and thrive on its own culture for a long time and keep it developing, whereas an African tribe with very little culture would suffer and stagnate by such inbreeding. But, of course, a great people like the English always has cultural contacts from without and never does remain in complete isolation, whereas the African often does not have a single outside influence.

2. Some Forms of Isolation

The term *isolation* was first used by anthropogeographers, who study man in relation to his physical environment. The investigators in this field have long advanced the notion that the location of peoples over the earth, their peculiar race characters, the increase and decrease of population, and many other features of their lives have been due to, caused by, certain environmental barriers of which mountain ranges, bodies of water, and deserts are examples. The biologists have also used the term extensively in their attempts to account for so many organic species and varieties. Thomson thinks that isolation is the only evolution factor, besides selection, upon which all biologists are agreed. He speaks of it as a

[1] *Cf.* Potter, "The Myth of American Isolation," World Peace Foundation, December, 1921.

. . . general term for all the varied ways in which the radius of possible intercrossing is narrowed . . . As expounded by Wagner, Weismann, Romanes, Gulick, and others, isolation takes many forms—spatial, structural, habitudinal, and psychical—and it has various results.[1]

Since we are dealing with man in respect to *his social relations*, we have to pay some attention to the various forms, as we have already suggested some of the results. What forms of isolation are responsible for the retardation, degeneration, estrangement, and originality of which we have spoken? We must understand, however, that for man isolation is always relative, never absolute. No individual could be born without the momentary association of parents. No individual could be kept alive without the attentions of somebody. The absolute isolation of a person is unthinkable; it is a contradiction in terms. What we really have to consider, then, is degrees of isolation and the various forms it has taken. There are many more forms than we can enumerate here, but let us take the four suggested by Thomson.

1. Spatial.—By this we mean that human beings are distinct and separate organisms and, therefore, always a greater or a lesser distance apart in physical space. And we measure this distance in inches, feet, yards, rods, miles, and degrees of latitude and longitude and also in terms of the time taken in covering these distances. And here we face squarely one of our numerous residual physical limitations; that is, we are physical bodies and not disembodied spirits, and these bodies are subject to the laws of inertia and have a limited sense range. Consequently, bodily proximity is an indispensable condition of mental proximity until such time as space and time are overcome by the extension of the means of communication.

Being bodies and occupying space, no two of us can occupy the same space at the same time; we cannot telescope ourselves like picnic drinking cups and thus meet each other. This enforces *horizontal* separation until we learn how to build skyscrapers; but then we have vertical separation—which means the same thing. And there are limits both ways—horizontally, by the diameter of the earth, and vertically, by the growing rarity of the atmosphere. There are limits to our space separation.

Very important are the natural barriers of the earth—mountains, bodies of water, deserts, and the continents of snow. In mentioning these, we simply call attention to the fact that man's endurance is limited and also his ingenuity in overcoming these obstacles; we are calling attention to the fact that, on the whole, he takes the line of least resistance. When we picture the immensity of the Atlantic, we understand why there was practically no contact between the peoples of Europe and America for hundreds of thousands of years. When we

[1] "Heredity," p. 536 *ff.*

think of the Sahara Desert, we can understand why the peoples of North Africa and of Central Africa are so different. When we remember the heights and dangers of the Himalayas, we are not surprised that so few people passed back and forth from north to south and *vice versa*. It has been easy and natural for human beings, from the earliest times until now, to halt their movements at these barriers unless driven by extraordinary urgencies to surmount them.[1]

But we have to record the fact that extraordinary urgencies in many cases have existed, and therefore these barriers have been overcome to some extent; they have been steadily diminishing in importance as barriers to contacts as inventions have flowered out. The newspapers, as we write, record the fact that two men went around the globe in twenty-eight days, while, forty years ago, Jules Verne, in a highly imaginative tale, made it out as a marvelous feat to go around in eighty. As we write, also, telephonic communication between England and America is being made available. As we write, also, the papers announce the completion of the twentieth cable between America and Europe; a telegram can now be sent around the globe and back to the sender in two minutes. As we write, also—or rewrite, this time—the famous non-stop flight of Lindbergh from New York to Paris is an accomplished fact. The radio is doing its wonderful part in annihilating space and time. Space and time are shrinking. The railroads now go through the mountains, and fast ships cover the seas of the world.

2. Structural.—This type of barrier has played a significant role in separating and fixing animal species for countless milleniums. Dogs cannot mate with horses; cattle cannot mate with birds; mosquitoes cannot interbreed with elephants—because of structural differences; these species are permanently separated by these structural features. The bodies of any species or variety, after having taken certain forms or "sets" wherein great differences are fixed, are thereby prevented from changing through interbreeding. Human beings are not different in this respect from other creatures.[2]

Of more interest to us in this connection, however, are certain structural barriers *to communication*. Defects of the five senses belong in this category, and these are very numerous and widespread; they slow up, distort, and make communication of meanings impossible. A person who cannot hear is forever shut away from a vast deal about social life, shut away from all oral speech, all music, all noise. "My deafness," said Beethoven, "forces me to live in exile." That is it—exile. A person who cannot see is shut away from much that human beings do; there are no gestures to read; there is no facial expression to warn or amuse; there is no decoration or ornamentation to delight or sicken;

[1] *Cf.* SHALER, "Nature and Man in America," p. 151 *ff.*

[2] *Cf.* DARWIN, "Origin of Species," p. 96 *ff.*

there is no painting or sculpture to uplift or depress. Nakedness would not be shameful if all eyes were out.

Again, the person with a defective olfactory nerve is severed from much that means a great deal to ordinary folk; such defectives would have little difficulty with race odors; they would not gain much from perfumeries; bath salts would mean nothing to them; there would be a vast decline of industries devoted to pleasing us through the nose. And think of what contacts would immediately drop away, were we all to lose our sense of taste. We should have no use for costly confections of hundreds of kinds.

If we had no sense of feeling, there would be no soothing kiss from our mother, no encouraging pats on the back or arm or cheek, no massaging, no warm handshakes, no soft textures in cloth.

The wonderful story of Helen Keller is an illustration of what life means with these structural defects.

When people are ill, they are often isolated. When people are crippled, they are often shut away from joining in all sorts of human activity. The insane are shut away in the asylum and denied access to the usual associations of life. When people have heart disease, they have to deny themselves many connections in order not to cause a break. St. Vitus' dance removes its victims from all effective cooperation. Any structural or physiological defect may turn out to make an impassable barrier. It can hardly be doubted that the human race would be more solidly united, were all such defects to be wiped away.

3. Habitudinal.—By the use of this term, we have reference to habit and not to habitude. The latter would logically come under the first topic discussed, namely, space separation. But it is difficult to overestimate the separatist results of different habits which, of course, also means different customs. Take some examples: We are monogamists—literally, *one-marriers*—and we have no dealings with polygamists or many-marriers. We really could have dealings with them if we so decided; but we do not decide that way; each practice is so repulsive to supporters of the other that amicable relations are impossible. Catholics and Protestants carry out different ceremonial routines. Members of each group could learn the ways of the other. But what happens is that each group goes regularly to its own place, its own church, which means that it does not go—to the other church. And, hence, these people are kept apart in worship and attitudes. The clergyman carries out a certain daily routine, and the business man a different one. The latter could learn the ways of the former, but he does not, and, hence, the separation.

One set of obstacles to free international communication was found in the restrictive regulations in force at the end of the eighteenth century governing the rank and precedence of diplomatic representatives, the costume and ceremony

of diplomacy, and the use of an elaborate and artificial etiquette of procedure in international negotiations.[1]

The various languages of the world are excellent examples. Other languages can be learned, but they are not learned by the masses, and, therefore, the peoples are separated. It is often difficult enough to convey what one means to a person of the same language, let alone trying to convey it to a foreigner in another language. Again, we have such familiar matters as the man working at night and sleeping in the daytime. He is cut off from much association with the members of his family. The traveling man who goes away for a week, a month, or three months at a time is separated from his family, neighbors, and club. As men specialize in some profession, they become more or less queer to others.

Now, all of this customary routine is habit at bottom; it is simply the way things are done. There is no reason in the constitution of the universe why we should have several hundred different languages on earth and several thousand dialects. But having them and bringing the young up in them, these young are by that very means separated from their fellows. There is nothing in the constitution of the universe to enforce these differing ways, except that we cannot be in two places at once or two different things. If we sleep in the day, we cannot meet our friends at the ball game; if we are devoted to our neighbor in class, we cannot at the same time be listening to the teacher; living in Ohio, we cannot walk around the block and call at the home of a friend in California. These barriers are barriers of routine, of activity patterns, of our usual modes of believing, thinking, and feeling. They are habitudinal barriers in the sense that they are largely matters of where our habitat is—in America or Zululand, in China or Timbuktu.[2]

4. Psychic.—The barriers belonging to this category are as numerous as the ones just considered; indeed, under this head we are but concerned with the more subtle aspects of the same things; we do not *act* habitually in a given way without thinking and feeling in given ways. That we follow any given activity pattern is interpretable as evidence that we approve it—as a rule. Thus, we feel and think differently as we act differently. If we are separated by our activities, therefore, we are also separated by our feeling and thinking. We Americans "feel" all right about monogamy, and we think that we have justified it; but we loathe polygamists and others who depart from this usage, and therefore we are emotionally isolated. Each group cannot understand how the other feels.

"Nature" displays no antagonism to marriage between Whites and Negroes; but most Whites feel strongly about this and can assemble dozens of reasons why it should not be practiced. Those who have an antipathy on this matter cannot understand those who do not have it—

[1] POTTER, "The Myth of American Isolation," p. 435.

[2] *Cf.* WISSLER, "Ethnic Types and Isolation," *Science*, new series, vol. 23, p. 147.

which is separation and isolation; for the two groups are restrained at this point. Race feeling is a powerful separating, which means isolating, factor. It is very hard for members of different races, unless they are schooled to it, to sit down and talk over their differences dispassionately. Throughout history, each race has regarded itself as superior and has, therefore, detested other races—which means that commingling has been severely limited.

Religious denominations think that they are especially in possession of "the truth," and this means that other bodies are not in possession of it; therefore, the latter are wrong to the former; therefore, they are dangerous; therefore, they are to be avoided. Not many Protestant mothers care to have their children attend Catholic services, for fear of contamination. What, it is queried, can be gained by intermingling? Certainly nothing but damnation. It is very difficult for members of different sects to get together and talk over their differences in a dispassionate manner; and since such meetings are difficult, the various representatives stay away from each other.

In our daily associations with each other and with our friends, we have all had the experience of "being so near and yet so far"; of being near them physically and yet far from them psychically. We have sat on the same sofa with wife, husband, sweetheart, or friend in the twilight—or no light—and have been universes apart in our thoughts. We have all heard of not being in the same "universe of discourse," which means that we not only think and feel very differently about certain matters but also often cannot come, despite honest efforts, to an understanding; we do not think the same thoughts, and we cannot use terms in the same way.

Children and young people often complain that their parents or guardians "do not understand" them, and they probably do not; their routines are different; their views on life are different; their values are different. But do children and young people understand their parents or guardians any better? No better. Their outlook is radically different; their wants are different; their values are different. The same type of difficulty is found between bosses and workmen, between masters and slaves, between ministers and people, between teachers and pupils. Members of these various groups do not understand each other; often they do not want to—like petulant children or irritable parents; many times they cannot. It is probable that no two people in the world *fully* understand each other; they may understand each other at many points, but they do not ever really sound the utmost depths of each other. It has been said that "to know all is to forgive all"; and we might admit the desirability of both, but the first is impossible of realization. There is no one who does not baffle us in some respects.

Thus, the psychic barriers to association or, to turn the statement around, the psychic keepers of isolation, are numerous, very numerous, in

every level and phase of life. Einstein is of necessity a hermit to all but a few so far as his theory of relativity is concerned; ordinary people simply cannot follow him. The mystic is isolated; ordinary people simply cannot follow him. All people who "soar" are isolated because nobody can follow them to the end. The great creative minds have always been isolated, lonely, and misunderstood persons. Each individual has experiences which are *incommunicable*—incommunicable because of their nature, because of the inadequacies of language, because nobody wants to listen, and for other reasons.

Trollope wrote of one of his more doubtful characters:

> He isn't of our sort. He's too clever, too cosmopolitan—a sort of man white-washed of all prejudices, who wouldn't mind whether he ate horse-flesh or beef, and never had an association in his life.[1]

A recent anonymous writer has said:

> Anyone facing the step to marriage ought to go with his eyes wide open to the utter impossibility of penetrating the walls of another soul. Human life is a lonely lot and everyone must walk this path by himself alone. More than that, each one must respect the loneliness of another's personality, the dignity of that isolation, and must not seek to invade it. The more cultivated and refined, the more highly trained and educated the parties to a marriage contract, the more impossible is it for them to pierce behind the wall of personality, behind the reserve, the isolation which is their inevitable heritage. Simple souls may mingle, unaware of the deep loneliness which is so poignant to a more cultivated and refined human being.

This sounds rather hopeless, but in the main it is correct. Yet, it is one of the chief undertakings of humanity to come to an understanding.

So we start, as infants, in isolation. If we are defective at one or more points, we remain in isolation to that extent; if we remain separated in space and time, we remain more or less isolated. If normal, we grow and mingle with our fellows, take on some of their nature, become human beings. Then if we specialize and do something distinguished, we enter the lonely places again. Isolation is not the remarkable condition; it is the natural and normal condition. The *remarkable* thing is communication; the astonishing thing is understanding. And it is the purpose of the remainder of this book to give a few hints as to how we emerge from isolation.

3. The People Most Affected

We have already pointed out some of these people—infants, defectives, geniuses. But there are numerous others, individuals and groups. Thomas mentions especially that "the savage, the Negro, the peasant, the slum dwellers, and the white woman are notable sufferers by exclusion."

[1] *Cf. New Republic*, March 25, 1916; p. 206.

1. With reference to the *peasant*, he says:

The peasant (at the middle of the nineteenth century), limited in a cultural respect to his village life, thinks, feels, and acts solely in the bounds of his native village; his thought never goes beyond his farm and his neighbors; toward the political, economic, or national events taking place outside his village, be they of his own or of a foreign country, he is completely indifferent, and even if he has learned something of them, this is described by him in a fantastic, mythological way, and only in this adopted form is it added to the cultural condition and transmitted to his descendants. Every peasant farm produced almost exclusively for itself, only to the most limited extent for exchange; every village formed an economic unit, which stood in only a loose economic connection with the outer world. Outwardly complete isolation of the village settlements and their inhabitants from each other and from the rest of the country and other classes of society; inwardly complete homogeniety, one and the same economic, social, cultural equality of the peasant mass, no possibility of advance for the more gifted and capable individuals, everyone pressed down to a flat level. The peasant of one village holds himself, if not directly hostile, at least as a rule not cordial to the peasants of another village. The nobles living in the same village territory even wanted to force upon the peasants an entirely different origin, in that with the assistance of the Biblical legend they wished to trace him from the accursed Ham (from this the curse and insult *Ty chamie*, "Thou Ham"), but themselves from Japhet, of better repute in the Bible, while they attributed to the Jews, Shem as an ancestor.[1]

2. Of the *Negro*, it may be said that the White Man has developed a tradition of determination to keep him in isolation—"in his place." This phrase sums up the whole story. "In his place" means away from or in subjection to the Whites; it means out of primary contacts with the innermost refinements of white society. It is a fact that the most intelligent and progressive Negroes are of half or more white blood; but it is not yet known whether the advancement made by mixed bloods is due to the blood or to greater success in violating the White Man's taboo. The humblest White employee, says Thomas,

. . . knows that the better he does his work, the more chance there is for him to rise in the business. The black employee knows that the better he does his work, the longer he may do it; he cannot often hope for promotion . . . All these careers are at the very outset closed to the Negro on account of his color; what lawyer would give even a minor case to a Negro assistant? Thus the white man starts in life knowing that within some limits and barring accidents, talent and application will tell. The young Negro starts knowing that on all sides his advance is made doubly difficult, if not wholly shut off, by his color.[2]

Of course, with the development of the means of communication, the Negro has more reason for encouragement. He cannot teach in

[1] Quoted in PARK and BURGESS, *op. cit.*, p. 249.

[2] PARK and BURGESS, *op. cit.*, p. 250.

white schools, go to white theaters, enter exclusive white "sets"; but he can read white books and newspapers and magazines, he can use white victrolas and radio and thus obtain some notion of music, he can build schools of his own, he can appropriate so-called *white* religion, economics, and politics. Yet there is much suffering from isolation.

3. Much might be said with reference to the isolation of *savage* or preliterate peoples. They live in circumscribed regions; they know life only as they themselves live it; the only culture to which they have access is their own; they have no bases for imagining what any other culture is like. So there they stay—in the forest, behind the mountain, across the lake, hemmed in by natural barriers and repulsed by language differences—revolving on their own axis, generation after generation.[1]

4. The Concept of Social Distance

The subject of isolation cannot be left without some reference to attempts to *measure* it, that is, attempts to study it a little more scientifically. The question inevitably arises: Are we to leave this matter in the nebulous state in which we found it with our gain in understanding reducible only to a few glittering generalities, or, to say it in another way, is there no method of telling exactly how far people are apart? It is well to record the beginnings of measurement, and so we include another term—*social distance*. Of course, distance is a *space* term primarily; but it may be reinterpreted and enlarged to take in time and the kinds of isolation already mentioned.

A study by W. G. Bennewies deserves notice in this connection. If the statistical conclusions may be questioned, he has shown the way to greater objectivity in treatment of the subject. He says:

> In order to ascertain quantitatively the reaction of young women towards certain phases of their social environment, replies were secured from 458 young women, all of college rank, to the following questionnaire. These persons ranged in age from 18 to 35 years and came from different states, about 70 per cent, however, coming from Colorado. In the first place, they were asked to rate the following three occupational types of men in order of marriage preference—the business man, the professional man, the farmer.

	First place	Second	Third
Business man	166	147	39
Professional man	267	137	23
Farmer	19	46	339

[1] The cases of the white woman, the slum dweller, the pioneer, the ruralite, the sailor, the trapper, and others may be considered in classroom discussion. On rural isolation, *cf.* Hawthorn, "The Sociology of Rural Life," Chap. III. On the Jews, see Cohen, Israel, "The Sociological Review," Vol. III, p. 216 *ff.*, 1910.

They were asked, among other questions, to underscore only *one* of the following statements. The results are as follows:

1. I would prefer to marry a farmer	13
2. I would prefer to live on a farm	31
3. I would prefer to spend most of my time in the country	56
4. I would prefer to spend my vacation in the country	102
5. I would prefer to go to the country once in a while	225
6. I do not care for the country	29
Total	456

If the number of replies to each statement is multiplied by the weight for that statement and the sum of the whole is divided by the total number of replies we secure the quotient 4.276+, the arithmetic mean, which may be regarded as the rural social distance index for the group.

In an effort to find out whether those who *lived in the country* were more distant or less distant from it than others, the following answers were received:

	Have lived on farm	Have not lived on farm
1. Prefer to marry a farmer	10	3
2. Prefer to live on a farm	28	3
3. Prefer to spend most of my time in the country	46	10
4. Prefer to spend my vacations in the country	63	39
5. Prefer to go to the country once in a while	85	140
6. Do not care for the country	11	18
Totals	243	213

Applying the same method as above we get an index for column 1 of 3.89+, and for column 2 of 4.70+, which indicates that those who have lived on a farm have a less rural social distance than those who have not.

The following table gives the results for different population groups:

Preferences as above	Home on farm	2,500 or less	2,500 to 10,000	10,000 or more
1	6	5	0	2
2	23	3	2	3
3	29	10	8	9
4	28	23	15	36
5	27	66	43	89
6	6	7	4	12
Totals	119	114	72	151
Index	3.54	4.43	4.54	4.61

From this it will be noted that the distance increases as the size of the city increases.[1]

Bogardus, who also has made studies of a similar character, says:

In seeking measurements of social distances between groups, one may consult the records of the cooperation and conflict activities of the two given groups, and study the rise and decline in the "acting together" and "acting apart" processes. Increasing cooperative action over a period of time may be an index of diminishing social distance. Combat activities speak an even louder distance message.

A friend, living in a Middle Western town, states that twenty years ago there were no union services, no ministerial association, no joint undertakings. Under duress of the World War circumstances all Protestant and Catholic churches worked together on community enterprises; representatives of each served on the same committees; and at the close of the War a ministerial association of all the Protestant churches was established. This association held monthly meetings and its members worked officially together in behalf of a number of civic causes. Joint services were established. A year later two of the Protestant and non-Evangelical church communions withdrew, and for a time the ministerial association lapsed. Recently, the latter has been revived with regular meetings and with all the Protestant churches save one participating. An increasing number of union meetings are being held, and civic enterprises are being jointly supported.

Here are important indexes to social distance relationships. Apparently, the social distances once great were suddenly and for a short time measurably cut down, then they lengthened, and now, once again, but slowly this time, they are growing less (a graph of the cooperative activities of these churches during the past twenty years would visualize the possibilities of this method of measuring social distances).[2]

A vast field of social research has been opened up by the discovery of this tool of social investigation—measuring social distances—and we may confidently look forward to a time when we shall have more accurate information as to the social distances between all sorts of individuals and groups, that is, as to the degree of isolation which actually obtains. As a result of such studies, some quantitative and objective statements as to the distance between Whites and Negroes, between capitalists and laborers, between rich and poor, between one nation and another may become possible, whereas now we proceed merely by guessing from random impressions and unsupported expressions of opinion. The Negroes *are* isolated, are distant, from the Whites—but how much? Capitalists and laborers are estranged—but how much?

[1] *J. Applied Sociology*, January–February, 1926, p. 239. See, also, Poole, "Distance in Sociology," *A. J. S.*, July, 1927.

[2] *J. Applied Sociology*, May–June, 1926, p. 473. *Cf.* Bogardus, in *Proceedings of the American Sociological Society*, July, 1926, p. 40; and various articles in the *J. Applied Sociology*.

Such a movement will amount to a penetration of certain important "mysteries" of our common life; it will go behind the pretenses and false barricades of secret societies such as lodges and fraternities; it will pull the mask from such aggressive movements as the Ku Klux Klan and show us what it is all about and how much of propaganda and lying there is connected with it; it will reveal the actual situation in family quarrels and neighborhood brawls. It will have the effect of compelling individuals to be sound through and through and to cease pretending to be what they are not, now "warmest and dearest friends" and now "terrible enemies." It will puncture the superiority complexes and deflate the conceit of army officers and politicians, ministers and other leaders who maintain their positions by the "divinity" which "doth hedge a king."[1]

Another method of approaching this question of social distance is being followed vigorously. One of the most famous is the so-called "nut test" or mental testing. Such examinations are intended primarily to reveal native ability, to exhibit its degree of development, and thus furnish a basis for estimating how far apart people must remain by reason of their mental makeup; thus, a low I.Q. means that its possessor is at a certain level in intelligence potentiality and, being incapable, by and large, of understanding many things, is separated forever from certain members of society with a high I.Q. We may think of this rating as an attempt to distribute the population in various levels, the lower 5 per cent being at a greater distance from the upper 5 per cent than the lower 10 per cent is distant from the upper 10 per cent. The "quartiles" roughly represent these distances. Thus, besides saying that two men are twenty miles apart, we may also be able to say that they are 20 per cent apart, and the 20 per cent as well as the twenty miles will stand for certain difficulties which have to be overcome in order to reach an understanding and be really "together."

Studies of race, class, sex, and other differences are also attempts to make measurements of social distance, attempts to determine the degree of isolation obtaining, attempts to estimate the difficulties which have to be overcome before understanding and agreement are reached; we have already alluded to some of these. Some of these obstacles can be and are being overcome; others are probably insurmountable. And, therefore, it seems clear that, at certain points, some people can never escape a degree of isolation.

Returning, now, to the central teaching of this chapter, we may say that individuals do not develop into rounded, rich, capable, attractive personalities without social contacts, without association; we may say that, speaking in the language of industry, individuals are *manufactured* into persons; we may say that society is the great mother of us all, that in

[1] *Cf.* Park and Burgess, *op. cit.*, pp. 164, 230, 282, 440.

her, to adapt the language of Scripture, "we live and move and have our personal being." This is the thesis, as we have said; the rest of the book is an attempt to comprehend the nature of this "mother of men."[1]

Questions

1. What obstacles hinder scientific experiments with human beings?
2. How can we know that the effects of isolation in childhood are bad? Have you any first-hand evidence?
3. What are the two senses in which the term *human* is used? Are you sure that the differences between "original nature" and "human nature" are clear to you?
4. Do you agree with the assertion that "man is not born human?" In what sense is he born human—if any?
5. Do the cases given prove that isolation in childhood causes retardation? Were these individuals defective?
6. Have you suffered in any way from isolation? If so, how?
7. If you are left out of groups, do you tend to become suspicious? Are suspicious people readily received into groups?
8. How does isolation foster originality (1) of individuals, (2) of nations?
9. There are many subtle ways in which each one of us is isolated. Find out some of these ways as they apply to you.
10. Have you ever tried to communicate with (1) blind people, (2) deaf and dumb people? What were your experiences?
11. Could we have any group life at all if all people were deaf and dumb? Consider this carefully.
12. What are the most important senses for communication? Rank them in the order of their importance.
13. In what ways, and because of what, are rural people isolated? Who are more isolated, rural people or urban people? Give evidence.
14. Why is the "white woman" included in the list of those who have suffered most from isolation? What have been the differences between the woman's and the man's position?
15. Give illustrations of the exclusion of Negroes and foreigners in your community. In what ways and from what are they excluded?
16. What means are being developed for overcoming isolation? Make a list and see if you are not surprised at its length.
17. Do you thnk that "social distance" can be measured? Give reasons.
18. Does it seem clear to you that Benneweis' investigation was scientific? Can you criticise it at any points?
19. In what ways are the two sexes separated from each other?
20. Have you read the thrilling accounts of how Helen Keller and Helen Heckman overcame their isolation?

[1] Poole. "Social Distance and Personal Distance," *J. Applied Sociology*, November–December, 1926.

CHAPTER VII

CONTACT AND INTERACTION

The opposite of isolation is contact and interaction; the antithesis of separation is association. We have said that isolation is always relative, never absolute. An individual would have to be dead or deprived of all his sensory apparatus to be absolutely isolated. Even then we could not be sure; there are those who maintain that the separated living, and the living and the dead, communicate, although the sensory mechanism has disintegrated in the one case. But if a person had *ever* talked with any one else or had ever read a book, banishment for life to an uninhabited island would not mean absolute isolation.

If isolation can be only relative, then there can be less or more of it; there can be degrees of it. If there is less isolation, there is more contact. Whatever is severed from the one is added to the other—always, just as the miles of a journey add up behind and subtract in front. We can go only away from other people or toward them. Contact is the first stage in the movement toward them. Let us follow the line of human movement out of isolation, through contact, and into interaction and the resulting unity.

CONTACT

1. The Physical Bases

So far as we can learn, there is no contact without a physical basis. There are many—and some of them are exceedingly able—who speak of communicating with the dead or who assert that they have communicated with some person at a distance without the use of any physical means. This means that pure spirit—whatever that signifies—meets pure spirit directly and without the use of any discoverable or analyzable intervening physical media. A vast amount of investigation has been carried on to try to prove the truth or falsity of this position; but the verdict up to date is "Proved," for those who think that they have evidence and "Not proved" for many others. There are many all about us who believe in clairvoyancy, that is, *clear seeing*, in the soundness of premonitions, in the otherworldly significance of dreams and signs. But what is usually called *scientific* proof is yet wanting. We must, therefore, leave this hypothesis and pass on to something more demonstrable.

1. The Inorganic Bases.—The physical basis of contact is always all about us everywhere. Probably the most important features are the inorganic environment to which we have already devoted a chapter—the earth, the water, the air, light waves, and sound waves. Without these, we must assume here, we could have no connections of any sort. The earth provides the solid basis on which to stand, move about, and live; it provides materials out of which elaborate mechanisms of communication may be constructed; it serves as a connected medium through which impulses can be transmitted. The air also serves as a medium for the transmission of impulses. As individual organisms, with definable boundaries, we are separated; but we are always immersed in the air which is continuous and which presses down and in upon us unceasingly. The earth, the water, and the air are the carriers of all sound waves, and also the carriers of certain organic contagions. Light waves are also tremendously important. No light, no eyes; no eyes, no seeing; no seeing, no printing, no painting, no sculpture. But all of these matters are the commonplaces of our everyday living; they are what the chemists, physicists, geologists, and so forth study; they are taken for granted here.

2. The Organic Bases.—Living matter is sensitive, which means that it reacts to stimuli. In the higher organisms, there are certain places where the cells are organized for special services.

A sense organ may be defined as a group of sense cells of a special type of susceptibility plus all the other parts that serve to bring the environmental stimulus or its effect to the sense cells or to hold the sense cells in a particular position. These other parts, since they are aids to excitation, may be termed sensory apparatus.[1]

It was long supposed that man had only five senses—and sometimes a sixth, or "horse sense," if especially shrewd in some ways. It is now known that we have thirteen or possibly more. But the five traditional senses carry the chief burdens of human contact and are the most important for us here. Physiologists and psychologists study these senses—and the others—with great care. We must assume much that they have found out. But certain considerations cannot be neglected in this connection.

a. Touch.—It is common to hear commercial travelers and other agents speak of "getting in touch" with prospects, and we understand quite readily what they mean; they mean contact and interaction. But this use of the term *touch* is metaphorical, since they do not actually go out to put their finger tips or some other parts of their bodies upon the bodies of those whom they are seeking; they do not go out merely to shake hands with, slap on the back, stroke the arm, or otherwise physically touch these people, although these little ceremonies are usually no small a part of their "getting in touch."

[1] "Psychology for College Students," Part I, Ohio State University, 1926.

We must understand by "touch," an actual organic placing together of parts so that impulses pass from one to the other, a material juxtaposition so that certain kinds of sensations can be transmitted, a relationship of parts so that there is a circulation between organism and organism. In this form, touch is probably the oldest of all of the senses and the one from which the others were derived.

Touch is not any single and simple sense; it is complex. It is composed of the end organs of warmth which are excited by heat waves entering the body; of the end organs of touch which are excited by pressure on the skin; of the epidermis or pain-receptor organs which are excited by extreme heat, cold, pressure, or by tissue-destroying chemicals.

Common forms of touch which have great significance for social relations are handshaking, patting, smoothing, stroking, nose rubbing, tickling, hugging, kissing, sexual acts. Some of these are universally employed, as for example, patting, smoothing, sexual connections. Some of them are peculiar to certain areas, as, for example, handshaking and kissing among Occidentals, and nose rubbing, forehead bumping among certain primitives. Men do not kiss each other very much among us, but in France that is a usual form of greeting. The Chinese abominate kissing. We have extensions of several of these forms in massaging, osteopathy, and chiropractic.

The intimacy of touch contacts is very great. This contact really amounts to the surrender, for the time being, of parts of our bodies to others to stroke, to fondle, or otherwise to manipulate. Moreover, touch arouses the most intense emotions of affection or antipathy, as a rule; yet we shake hands or kiss certain people, now and then, who leave us quite unaroused. But the handshake of one person sets us on edge, while that of another gives us encouragement. And being such an excitant, touch has everywhere been the subject of tribal and state legislation from earliest times; there is no place where certain parts of the body, at certain times, are not taboo to others. All sorts of activity patterns have developed in connection with touch and have found approval or disapproval.

Crawley points out what he thinks is the truth when he says that the emotion of love always rests on a basis of physical contact.[1] He has given some attention to the relation between touch and various emotions such as tenderness, disgust, abomination, and also between touch and thought. These would be immensely interesting matters to follow, but our point is that sensitivity specialized in the ways indicated above plays a most important part in human relations.

b. Sight.—Next to touch, even above touch, in importance for human relations, is sight. The eye is the most complex of all of the sense organs, and the responses made to those stimuli which affect it are most

[1] "The Mystic Rose," p. 76 *ff.*

numerous and important. The eyes are excited by ether vibrations whose wave lengths are between 390 and 760 millionths of a millimeter. Here is a wide range; here is marvelous discrimination. The eyes enable us to adapt ourselves to space-occupying, solid, but noiseless objects.

Much of our efficiency in dealing with other people comes from sight, and blindness reduces it a good deal; through sight, we can sense what they are about to do as well as what they are doing and so adjust ourselves to them. A world full of blind people would be an indescribably backward world.

One of the advantages of sight over touch is that we can stimulate each other at greater distances; we can reach out and touch only those within arm's length. But we can see people, watch them perform, size them up, connect them, judge as to what we ought to do in the light of what they are doing—over some distance.

Sight means so much because human beings have such mobile and revealing faces. We are all literally "making faces" all the time in order to reenforce what we are saying or what the rest of our body is doing. These "faces" would be utterly wasted if there were no eyes to see them. And how the "sights" stir us—the sight of a long-absent loved one, of a lost diamond, of gay Broadway, of the old home, of a rare book, of cruelty, of heroic deeds! Rhapsodies, lyrics, and dramas have been written to extol the wonders and pleasures of seeing.

c. Hearing.—The ears are sense organs which are excited only by air vibrations whose frequencies range between 14,000 and 30,000 vibrations per second; ether waves apparently do not bother them. So with these organs developed we enter the world of sound, a world of harmonies and inharmonies. With sight we have access to human gestures, writing, pictures; with hearing we have access to human speech—a marvel of all marvels. Whereas the eye gives only to the eye and receives only therefrom, the ear is a receptor alone; it does nothing but record. From the human point of view, then, we shall have to consider as part of this sense the organs of speech and all other means we have for sound making. The ear gives out no stimuli, and the mouth receives none. For human relations, these two organs are mutually coordinated and supplementary. While sight gives us the movements of other bodies, the ear gives us only the sounds they make. Both together tell us immensely important stories about what is all around us.

Let us imagine what would disappear from our surroundings at once if all ears were sealed up or otherwise lost. We should lose all oral speech, all music,[1] all noise; the baby's cry would mean no more to us

[1] This sensitive and interesting letter has been forwarded to us by Dr. Carl Seashore, whose article on "The Musical Mind" appeared in the March *Atlantic*.

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

DEAR DR. SEASHORE:—

I have just finished reading your article. I have been deaf since about eight years of age, totally so, but have never lost my love for music and can enjoy a concert better than many who can hear, and it is

than the crashing of thunder, for both would mean nothing; we should live amidst an eternal and incomparable silence—the silence of death. No ears, then no talking, except in the sign language; no talking, then fewer intimacies; fewer intimacies, then more isolation; more isolation, then more death, more approximation to the insensitive material world.

d. Smell.—We have a large number of organs of touch, two mutually supplementary organs of sight and two of hearing; we have really two organs of smell, although they sometimes appear to be only one. This organ or compound organ, the olfactory, is excited by many chemicals whose molecules, being suspended in the air, enter the nasal tracts. And here is that mysterious duality again; our nose is a receptor only, and not a transmitter—like the eye. It is much less keen, that is, discriminating, in man than in some of the lower animals, probably; but it does not need to be so keen with the extensions of hearing and sight which have been made. Yet it serves well all the time and gives us very valuable clues as to what is going on about us.

We have already said something about various race odors. These would still exist, but they would not disturb us if we had no olfactory organs. In other words, race prejudice is largely a matter of offensive smells. In this connection, it is interesting to note that many things dangerous to man give off offensive odors—diseases of many sorts, decayed flesh and fruit, contaminated air, unsanitary sinks, filthy toilets—

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the only thing that thrills me so I fairly have goose flesh or the thrills run up and down my spine though I cannot hear a sound, and the pitch of my feeling largely depends on the piece played or the player.

The last time I heard music was some forty years ago and I do not remember a piano tone, but can often tell, possibly by instinct, if a piece is suitable for piano or organ. In my younger days I had friends who talked music to me as though I could hear and often took me with them when selecting music at the stores.

Time has dulled my feeling by touch, but I still enjoy touching a piano when one is playing; but alas, so few I know play the piano these days and I am unable to feel the vibrations of the radio to any extent.

I am always hearing music, if you can call it that. It is in the wind, the water, the rhythm of a train or steamer. To me the leaves still rustle, the limbs sough, the rivulet seems to make a tinkling sound. Josef Hofmann calls it Mental Music, which I suppose is the same as your Mental Imagery.

I have had music teachers laugh when I said I could enjoy music even though I could not hear it. I have my own, and was it not Keats who said, "Music that is heard is sweet, but music unheard is sweeter"?

When I get the music hunger I have my own concerts, and sometimes I play an imaginary violin or a piano or sing or lead an orchestra.

I often think I would like to plan a concert and show some people what a deaf person imagines music is—the only drawback being that the people who sang might not sing the way I would sing. Some are too mechanical. They look as expressive as a music box.

I used to be a typist and was often annoyed because there is no rhythm on a typewriter. I would write pages and not know what I copied, for one cannot dream and be practical too.

Many times I have tried to find a person who would tell me when a deaf person felt a jar and when a sound. It may not be connected with music, but I imagine some people hear music as I feel a jar. There is a vibration, but no sound.

My mother was always singing or whistling when I was a small girl. My grandmother sang old hymns in a quavering voice which I can still hear. Music must be born in us, as I have had friends who were deaf yet had heard music wonder how I got any pleasure out of it.

This is a very poor way of expressing myself, but possibly there are some who can understand how a person who is totally deaf can have a natural love for music—by which I mean MentalMusic and music conveyed by the eye and not the ear, since I can sit so far from the musician or singer I get no vibrations except mental ones.

Atlantic Mo., June, 1928, p. 861. LEONORA HOAR

and thus repulse him. In this way, he receives warnings of perils which he could not otherwise receive; things look all right sometimes when they smell bad. With respect to the race odor, it may be said that there is no danger in it except as the particular smell is a reminder that one is in the presence of another race and is thereby warned—since there has been so much race antagonism in the past.

This sense, moreover, furnishes the basis for the development of many human arts. As sight has played an enormous part in the development of human ornamentation, so smell has played an enormous part in the development of cleanliness and perfumery. We should, granted our modern discriminating sense of smell, be wellnigh intolerable to each other in modern congested city life, had we to lose these arts. Yet, it is true that this sense is rather easily dulled—as workers in meat-packing establishments find, and as we all find when working in a fetid atmosphere.

e. Taste.—Our tongue is our taster but only certain parts of it. The taste bulbs are excited alone by chemicals dissolved in the saliva or other fluids. This organ is stimulated, then, by things put in the mouth and cannot help us a bit until that connection is made. It seems that taste and smell are closely connected, and it is often difficult to ascertain which organ is really doing the work. Certain cooks tell us—though this may be propaganda to cover up their mistakes—that we should never know that the oatmeal or roast was burned if we held our noses as we ate. However that may be, the taste plays a conspicuous role in furthering or alienating human relations. Let us take an example:

We have an invitation out to dinner—sight or hearing. We arrive and delight in the pleasant but elusive odors of the home—flowers, incense, a delicious trace of the approaching meal. We sit down to an artistically arranged table and partake of the offerings one after another, with restrained and proper exclamations of delight interspersing the bites: "Delicious," "Exquisite," "Glorious," "Fit for the gods," and so on. Needless to say, we are attracted to our hosts and look forward to another invitation. Sights, sounds, odors, and taste all support each other in giving us a good time.

But now reverse the picture. Let us enter the house from the pure air outside and be immediately assailed by some repulsive odor; let us be offended by the sight of disorderly furniture and people in various stages of undress; let us—with this bad start—sit down to the table and find that this course is too salty, the next is burned, the next too oily, the next "messy." Do we seek another invitation? Would we not be "very ill" if it came? In the first case, we are attracted to the hosts; in this case, we are repelled. And our relations all along the line are very much determined by such experiences. Thus, on such an apparently slender thread as taste do many human relations hang.

It is important to note that the trend of taste has both greatly modified and been modified by the trend of the industrial organization. If our taste were wiped out, think what would be lost in the culinary arts, in candy making, in spice growing, in tobacco preparation, in sugar planting, in brewing, in wine making, and in everything that depends on these! And what scientific endeavor has been carried on, what amount of invention, what amount of human labor and sacrifice, what amount of struggle and bloodshed—with reference to taste! The man who invented the Eskimo pie was soon made wealthy!

An important point here is that taste relations between human beings are mediated and indirect, whereas all of the other sense relations may be immediate and direct. We can and do see, hear, smell, and touch others; but we cannot *taste* others—unless we are cannibals. Kissing is, perhaps, the nearest approach we make in this direction, but kissing is almost all within the touch area. We taste people, that is, we sense them, when we take their cooking, their wine, their candy and so forth.

These are our individual ways of taking hold of our world—including our fellows. We "come out," so to speak, by seeing, hearing, smelling, and touching others. They "enter us," so to speak, by these gates. But these senses, in their natural state, have a limited range; we cannot taste anything that is not on certain parts of the tongue; we cannot touch anything that is not within reach; we cannot hear people who are more than a few miles away; we cannot see people who are very far off. The crime of which Hamlet spoke smelled "to Heaven" but only with the powers of the gods; most of us cannot smell so far.

Hence, human ingenuity and heroic labor have been applied to the work of *extending the range* of our senses. By means of the countless mechanical devices now in operation, we can see and hear people anywhere on earth; we can now see and hear around the earth, up in the air and down in the ground. More than this, we can now see away back in time—since the invention of writing and painting. As *we* record human sounds more and more, and preserve the records, people in the incalculably distant future will be able to hear away back to our time and thus connect with us.

By the invention of means of transportation—automobiles, railroads, steamships, and airplanes—we are able to sense people all over the earth in the other ways mentioned; if we cannot reach out and touch the Sphinx, we can go to it, and on the way, we can sniff the mountain air of Switzerland and taste the luscious fruits of Italy. Thus, the whole world is being made accessible to us, by means of these marvelous extensions. The outlook for the enrichment of human contacts was never so bright as now. The physical bases are multiplying.[1]

[1] On the senses, *Cf.* HOWELL, W. H., "Textbook of Physiology," p. 273 *ff.*; WOODWORTH, R. S., "Psychology," p. 187 *ff.*

2. The Superorganic Bases

We have now called attention to the *physical* and *mechanical* bases of human contact. But these are only bases, as we are now about to point out. In other words, we are about to leave what the physiologists and psychologists study and take up what the sociologists study. We are coming to the "real stuff" of human contacts.

For example, we utter the word *cat*. At bottom, this phenomenon is sound waves, having pitch, intensity, tone, and other features which the physicist can and does study and measure. But the sound is incidental for our purposes here; as students of social relations, we care nothing at all about this sound, "cat," except as it is the carrier of an idea; we are concerned only with the fact that this sound is a stimulus which evokes a picture in another, that it evokes the same picture which we have. We could not do without the sound here, save as we used some other physical medium; but we are interested in it only because it is indispensable to this other service.

We have heard of people being "withered by a look." Now, the physical basis here is light waves; but light waves from eye to eye do not wither people in the sense that a brick heaved at one's head is withering. The look is light waves at bottom; but it is much more; it reveals something; it evokes or releases something. A wink is just a series of movements of the eyelids—to the physicist and the physiologist; but it is much more than that to the sociologist; we all know that it may be a signal to a lady or, perhaps, to a crook.

In the realm of touch, the same holds true. We all remember how we have been enheartened or depressed by a warm or a listless handshake. Any number of high points in life are connected with a friendly pat on the shoulder or a vigorous hug. But this physical touch is a very small part of the exchange. The pat *itself* and by itself did not lift us up; the pat was a physical means employed to evoke an attitude.

When we are struck by a particular odor from another, the odor as the transmission of physical particles is not of interest to us. We are interested in what it reveals to the receiver about the giver; we are concerned with the pictures it evokes, with the story it tells.

Now, what we have come to is this: These physical means of contact are burdened and thronged with *meanings*. Woodworth says:

> The child does not learn to see or hear, though he learns the meaning of what he sees or hears. He gets sensation as soon as his senses are stimulated, but recognition of objects and facts comes with experience.[1]

We are not sure, as we said in the beginning of this chapter, that there is any other way by which meanings can be circulated. But we are sure that they can be circulated by means of these sense organs. We are sure because this work is going on all the time. Thus, to return to our

[1] "Psychology," p. 187 *ff.*

sound, "cat," we have come in our development to this point: The *sound* "cat" has become, for those of us who know what it means, a substitute for the *thing* "cat." A mouse usually frightens girls; but we can frighten them by shouting: "There's a mouse!" that is, by using meaningful sounds in their presence. Most people are aroused by the *smell* of smoke; but we can arouse them by writing on a piece of paper: "There is smoke coming out of your upstairs window." Thus, experience associated with certain sights, sounds, smells, and tastes gives these purely physical things meanings. And meanings are simply systems of response, simply total responses. Or, to say it in another way, we know what things mean when we know how to adapt ourselves with respect to them, when we understand how to take the appropriate attitude of expectation or preparedness. Meanings are never fixed, therefore, but *grow.*[1]

Longfellow has given us a sonorous and thoughtful phrase—"the ancient Arrow maker"—although he probably had no thought of comprehending man's achievements in the realm of material culture. But one good phrase deserves another. Man is also the ancient *symbol maker;* and he is more distinguished by this art than by any other. He has reached his highest point of achievement so far in his making and use of symbols.

Now, this helps us to understand what we have just been saying. The *sound* "cat" is a *symbol;* the sound stands for the real thing. And this is the meaning of symbols; they are sounds, objects, movements, patterns or what not, which stand for, call to mind, serve in the place of other sounds, objects, movements, patterns; they are mediators; they are links. *These words are ink*—a chemical substance on paper. But they are ink *marks*—to those who can read them. These words in this book are *not* society; but they are somewhat meaningful symbols of society; they are meant to invoke pictures of society. We do not care much, in this particular connection, about the paper and the ink; the physicist can study these. We care about the meanings, what these material things stand for, what they re-present to us.

On the whole, it is quite true that a large part of our social life is made up of the use of these symbols. This "word" is a symbol composed of four symbols—w-o-r-d. This sentence is a symbol composed of several words. This chapter is a symbol composed of many sentences and paragraphs. This book is a symbol composed of many chapters. Our flag is a symbol. It is composed of some cloth and some dyes. But these things carry meanings; they stand for and direct attention to our country. A church spire is a symbol. It is really wood, tin, iron, and other material substances combined in various ways—to stand for something utterly different, to direct attention to, to suggest, something

[1] *Cf.* Bode, "Modern Educational Theories," p. 193 *ff.*

of aspiration. Our culture is rich in symbols; and there is nothing in it that cannot be used in a symbolic manner. It is a matter of usage and of learning. Nothing was symbolic when men could not grasp meanings.

It is by means of these physical things, into which are injected human experiences and out of which these experiences are taken again, that we make contacts. If we say "cat" to a man in Timbuktu, he looks blank; the sound has no meaning for him; it is not symbolic. These symbols are stimuli the same as the things which they stand for. And responses always follow the application of these stimuli—but in thinking of responses, we are already ahead of schedule. We are now in a better position to understand the meaning of contact in the sociological sense.

> It is only when minds meet, only when the meaning that is in one mind is communicated to another so that these minds mutually influence one another that social contact, properly speaking, may be said to exist.

So says Park.[1]

A less mystical way to say this would be, perhaps, that it is only when symbols have the same contents, when they evoke the same pictures, in two different persons, when the systems of response are the same or vitally connected, that we have contact. Social contact, then, is a name for a process which begins with some gesture or sound or other physical stimulus originating in one person's organism and ends with a more or less clear picture in another person's organism. The big thing is to grasp the significance of this process and then to gain some comprehension of the millions and billions of meanings or symbolic usages which human beings have developed in their interrelation.[2]

We might add that a "concept" is explained from this approach. We can take in, from the stimuli which assail us, enough so as to respond successfully when we have a wide range of experience—actual or symbolic on which to fall back. A concept is just a name for, an epitome of, this wide range of experience. "Automobile" is a concept. When one says to another: "Look out for the automobile," the other one immediately discerns what the situation is and knows how to behave—if he has associated automobiles with his own welfare in a serious way at any time or has heard from others what they do to unwary people.[3]

Another important point is that as we ourselves are incalculably modifiable as our experience widens and can adapt ourselves to new situations readily and efficiently, so these symbols are flexible and adaptable. From one point of view, this is a great advantage; but from another, it is a disadvantage. As symbols change their meanings, they fail to

[1] PARK and BURGESS, *op. cit.*, p. 506.

[2] *Cf.* SPYKMAN, "The Social Theory of Georg Simmel," p. 167.

[3] *Cf.* BODE, *op. cit.*, p. 193 *ff.* On the concepts of sociology, *cf.* EUBANK, "The Concepts of Sociology," *Social Forces*, March, 1927.

symbolize, and therefore the use of them does not help but rather perplexes us. This difficulty is especially serious in connection with words. It is especially serious in the newer sciences where the terminology ought to be more precise but cannot be because of the complexity and inscrutability of the experiences to be represented. We recall how puzzled many were when President Coolidge said: "I do not choose to run in 1928."

3. Primary and Secondary Contacts

We have already said enough to make this distinction—the distinction between primary and secondary contacts—fairly clear; but some further sharpening seems necessary. We are all familiar with the experience of having easier access to some people than to others; we can adapt ourselves more readily to some than to others; the details of their behavior are better known or more calculable. We have easier access to and can adapt ourselves better to the members of our own families, to the members of our play groups, and to most of the people in our neighborhoods; we have intimate, face-to-face associations with these persons; we speak to, look at, touch, and otherwise connect with these without hesitation or trepidation.

We recognize at once, moreover, that we have more numerous contacts with these people than we do with the rest of humanity. In addition, we have more affection for many of these than we have for utter strangers. Thus, speaking familiarly to Mr. Jones, calling across the back yard to Mrs. Smith, joking with the grocer's boy, winking at little Jennie—all of these familiar and unrestricted contacts are part of the day's living. These are the real substance of primary groups; without them primary groups would fall to pieces or become secondary groups.

But with countless others our connections are limited in numbers and by a great many sacred formalities. Secondary contacts are thus those of externality and greater distance; they are the contacts we have with slight acquaintances and with strangers; they are the contacts we have with only one or two sides of the lives of others. For example, we know our intimates in many phases of their characters, but we know the big banker, the politician, the bishop, the prize fighter, the diplomat, the show girl in only one phase, and that the public phase, the phase which is reported in the papers. Most of us know Babe Ruth only as a baseball star; we know little else about him; we are certainly not intimate with him.

It is important to note, also, that the trend in modern society is toward the enlargement of secondary contacts. This has come about largely through the extension of the means of communication already mentioned. The village is the place for primary contacts; but modern city life is the place for secondary contacts. In the village, control is

rigid and immediate in its application; in the city, the individual is freer and less important, and, hence, control operates more slowly.[1]

INTERACTION

1. The Idea of Interaction

Let us record the simple fact that A winks at B, and then raise some questions as to consequences. A wink is an *attempted* contact. It is a *completed* contact if B receives the stimulus and *interprets* it correctly or is in any way affected by it. Now, if B winks back, kicks the dog, insults a neighbor, chucks a job, goes to the country, does better work, snaps at a parent, or does any other of a million possible things *as a result of this wink*—that is what we mean by interaction. If B winks back at once—that is a circular form of the narrowest possible range. If B goes out to the country and then writes to A—that is a circular form of a wider range. If A tells her father and he asks the policeman to look after A—that is a circular pattern of a still wider type. There are literally infinite extensions and attenuations possible. And most interactions move in such obscure ways that they cannot be followed with our present knowledge and technique. We can think of series in which A sends a bouquet to B who is moved to go off and break her engagement with C who is so "broken up" over this that he insults D who is made angry "clear through" and goes off to revile E who repeats the story to F who carries it to G who relays it to H, I, J, K . . . and so on without end. We live in a world of increasing progression and circulation of influences.

Interaction, in contrast with contact, is not a notion of common sense. Ormond says:

> The notion of interaction is not simple, but very complex. The notion involves not simply the idea of bare collision and rebound, but something much more profound, namely, the internal modifiability of the colliding agents. Take an example, the simplest possible case, that of one billiard ball striking against another. We say that the impact of one ball against another communicates motion, so that the stricken ball passes from a state of rest to one of motion, while the striking ball has experienced a change of an opposite character. But nothing is explained by this account, for if nothing happens but the communication of motion, why does it not pass through the stricken ball and leave its state unchanged? The phenomenon cannot be of this simple character, but there must be a point somewhere at which the recipient of the impulse gathers itself up, so to speak, into a knot and becomes the subject of the impulse which is thus translated into movement. We have thus movement, impact, impulse, which is translated again into activity, and outwardly the billiard ball changing from a state of rest to one of motion; or in the case of the impelling ball, from a state of

[1] On the importance of contacts, see Yarros, "Isolation and Social Conflicts," *A. J. S.*, September, 1921.

motion to one of rest.[1] The situation is not understandable at all unless we assume the internal modifiability of the participants in such a phenomenon.

These ideas are applicable equally to things and persons. Persons move as well as billiard balls and communicate impulses to other persons. These "stricken" persons are internally modifiable and gather into activities as a result of the communicated impulses or contacts. Thus, interaction is action and reaction between people; it is reciprocal modification; it is a stimulus-response relation; sometimes we call it *influence*. An action of a solitary person causes no reactions—in others; but any action in the presence of others who are sensibly alive always evokes or releases actions, responses, movements. Any action is one stage in a series, and it is a link between what precedes and what follows. We are all and always involved in hundreds of series of interactions—series without beginning and without end, so far as we can discover. Those high points which seem like beginnings and endings are simply definable stages in a continuous movement. Our involvement is startling to contemplate.

A very important matter, about which very little is yet known, is the proportional relations between stimulus and response. In the physical sciences, the relations between cause and effect (*stimulus* and *response*, in our terminology) are fairly well understood, so that results from given causes are predictable. In human relations, much remains to be described; we cannot predict very much yet. If A speaks to B, there is no way of being absolutely sure what B will do by way of response; she may wink back, she may say "darn," she may stamp her foot, she may slam the door, she may take to her bed—any one, any two, any three, or all of these and more.

An outstanding difficulty arises here from the fact that responses are often *delayed*. Some kinds of responses appear at once, but others which are connected with this particular stimulus often do not appear until later and thus are not easily, if at all, connected with their cause. Thus, B may not respond in the ways sugested above until the next day or the next week or the next year. And in the meantime, other showers of stimuli have fallen upon her and have complicated the matter by modifying or obliterating the memory of the stimulus. Thus, what causes what, or what is linked with what, can rarely be satisfactorily or finally ascertained and stated; little causes have big results and *vice versa*.

2. Social Unity

We now have something additional to fill out the sketch of unity already presented when discussing groups. It is only by assuming internal modifiability that we can complete this picture. An organic

[1] "Foundations of Knowledge," Chap. VII, especially p. 198 *ff*.

body is a unity when its parts are related in a more intimate exchange of energies among themselves than with anything outside. Any social group is a group by virtue of the reciprocal influences which involve members among themselves more than those outside and in ways in which outsiders are not touched. Dismemberment and division are simply names for the interruption of the flow of this stimulus-response stream or a change in its content. An individual is *in* a group when its activities affect him in certain ways and inwardly modify what he thinks and feels. When these results do not follow, he is not a member no matter what he does.

What we have to keep in mind, therefore, is the fact that impulses are awakened by contacts, are released in one form or another, and flow very far afield, and never stop—in fact. This flow is in two main directions—out and far through contemporaneous society, and from the beginnings of history on down to the present. In the first case, we have, as a result, contemporary social unity; in the second place, we have historical continuity. Let us examine these for a little.

1. Contemporary Unity.—What we are *now* doing affects our immediate circles—the members of our family, our friends, our fellow members in various organizations, and these affect others, and these, others yet, in countless and obscure ways. The impulses communicated by us pass through others in ever-widening circles. What *others* are now doing reacts in complex and inscrutable ways upon us. There is action and reaction—to the *n*th degree among us. The lectures, the papers, the magazines, the books, the spectacles, keep more and more people informed as to what is going on everywhere and, by so much, keep all united. We hear of a brutal murder in Australia and instantly react in a certain way—which affects those around us, who affect others. The wheat crop fails in Argentina, and very soon the price of wheat goes up in England and other places. A banker fails in Iowa, and people in New York and other places suffer.

Some years ago, the Russians, who are white, were defeated by the Japanese, who are yellow—and, at that time, supposedly inferior. During the following months, the news of this remarkable achievement penetrated the uttermost ends of the earth and quickened the hopes of the so-called *inferior* races. What the Prince of Wales decides to wear as shirts for the coming season is spread abroad and helps to determine the dressing practices of the men in all civilized countries. Illustrations of this sort might be assembled in legions. What we are pointing out is that stimulus-response cycles, involving us all, are incalculably numerous, immeasurably powerful, and ever widening in spread in contemporary society.

2. Historical Continuity.—But there is a past connection as well as a present connection. The only direction in which *we* can send out

waves of influence is to our contemporaries and successors; we cannot turn time backward and do much with Plato and Moses. But Moses and Plato were the transmitters of stimuli, in the form of laws and other ideas, which have stricken countless successors, generation after generation, until they have reached us. A small stream of impulses started in the prehistoric past and has grown, as people have increased in numbers and as they have had more experience, until now it is a vast, and sometimes a raging, torrent. History is the record of this social continuity.

Simmel has shown that this continuity has been made possible by, and is evident in, a number of ways of interacting, such as living in the same locality for a long time, maintaining the traditions of blood relationship, making all kinds of symbols, erecting ideals and standards of honor, and the development of specialized organs and functions. This is how "every man of us," as Viscount Morley has well said, "has all the centuries in him."[1]

3. Levels of Interaction

Interaction, like contact, exists and may be studied on the levels already noted—inorganic, organic, and superorganic. We are interested only in the third—the superorganic. To us the incessant circulation of meanings is the important matter. But this exchange seems to take place on at least three levels; yet these are not easily distinguishable in practice.

1. Sense Interaction.—This type may be illustrated by visual interaction. Says Simmel:

> Of the special sense-organs, the eye has a unique sociological function. The union and interaction of individuals is based upon mutual glances. This is perhaps the most direct and purest reciprocity which exists anywhere. This highest psychic reaction, however, in which the glances of eye to eye unite men, crystallizes into no objective structure; the unity which momentarily arises between two persons is present in the occasion and is dissolved in the function. So tenacious and subtle is this union that it can only be maintained by the shortest and straightest line between the eyes, and the smallest deviation from it, the slightest glance aside, completely destroys the unique character of this union. No objective trace of this relationship is left behind, as is universally found, directly or indirectly, in all other types of associations between men, as, for example, in the interchange of words. The interaction of eye and eye dies in the moment in which the directness of the function is lost. But the totality of social relations of human beings, their self-assertion and self-abnegation, their intimacies and estrangements, would be changed in unpredictable ways if there occurred no glance of eye to eye. This mutual glance between persons, in distinction from the simple sight or observation of the other, signifies a wholly new and unique union between them.[2]

[1] *Cf.* Park and Burgess, *op. cit.*, p. 348 *ff.*

[2] Quoted in Park and Burgess, *op. cit.*, p. 358.

Simmel points out that the searching look which seeks out the other is itself expressive; by glancing at another, one discloses oneself; in the very act of looking, one surrenders, to some degree, to the understanding of another; there is no taking without at the same time giving. This is evident not only in the look itself wherein other people read what they wish to know, but also it is further evidenced in the act of avoiding a searching look. When we are overcome by shame, we look away or down. We do this not only to be spared the visible evidence of how others are regarding us but also to avoid further disclosure, to prevent the other from reading us more fully.

Besides this pure and direct reciprocity, there is the larger comprehension—and resulting union—which comes from eye surveys of what other people are in appearance and what they do; appearance, as to facial expression, as to dress, and as to posture; what they do, as to running, walking, fighting, stamping about, and the like; and knowledge of such matters is surely fundamental to union with them. For the blind, the other person actually exists only when he is talking or making sounds of some sort; thus, he comes and goes, comes in and fades out as does radio unless he talks all the time. Thus, the expressions of anxiety and unrest, the facial traces of unpleasant experiences, escape the blind, and this may be a reason for their calm and peaceful dispositions.

Simmel also points out that the increasing tendencies toward city life multiply occasions for seeing rather than hearing people, and we can always see more people, in any given space of time and in any given area, than we can hear; but as a result of so much seeing there is more for hearing; some observers have noticed that primitive and rural people sit together for long periods without talking, the main reason being that they have seen nothing new and, therefore, have nothing to talk about. And it is noticeable, also, that the person who sees but cannot hear is anything but calm and peaceful and reveals a certain radical anxiety in facial expression, movement, and voice.[1]

Life's associations in pageantry and display would all disintegrate, were all seeing to be blotted out. The blind do engage in games and dramatics, but they always have to be taught by a seeing person; left alone, they would never develop such things, and therefore much association and interaction would never come into existence. Without seeing, actional coordination would be immeasurably slowed up—if it would not fail utterly. Interaction, then, depends to a very great extent upon visual exchange.

The interactions and social unions dependent upon and growing out of *other* senses might be considered in the same way. We might show in detail the nature of the exchanges and what would disappear from our culture were they to suffer any irreparable damage. But we must pass

[1] *Loc. cit.*

to another phase of interaction. The senses are tremendously important in interaction but only when they lead to and support more fundamental types. Sense interactions without emotional contagion and the exchange of ideas would be worth nothing.

2. Emotional Interaction.—And we do not mean *feelings;* we are above that level. The terms *emotion* and *feeling* are often used interchangeably, but they are not synonymous. There are actually only two forms of feeling—pleasantness and unpleasantness—but there are many forms of emotion—anger, love, hate, fear, joy, shame, sympathy. Feeling wells up through emotion; that is, fear is unpleasant, joy is pleasant, but they differ in that feeling is wrapped up with its own importance within the organism and concerns itself not at all with what is outside, whereas emotions always localize or pick out the outside stimulus with which they are connected; thus, one is not just angry but angry *at* something or about something; thus, one does not just fear but fears something which is more or less defined and located.[1] Thus, perception plays a much larger part in emotion than in feeling.

Our interest in these emotions is that they are almost always translated into action; they reveal themselves in characteristic ways; and translating and revealing themselves, they affect other people and evoke emotions in them. We have all heard that "laughter is contagious" and that "sorrow is shared," and we mean by this that, in some unknown way, emotions seem to expand from a central point and radiate through groups until all are united, more or less closely. We say that "love calls forth love" and "hate evokes hate." We hear that the whole country was "overjoyed at the news of victory" or that "a wave of anger swept across the land when the flag was insulted" or that "the citizens were panic-stricken when they learned of the brutal murder." "Emotional union!" Nothing is more common; nothing is harder to explain in any entirely satisfactory manner. Roughly stated, the explanation is that the same stimuli, under the same conditions, evoke or release the same responses—since we are all so much alike. But let us take some historical cases:

In 1787, in a factory in England, a girl put a mouse into the bosom of another girl who had a dread of mice. The girl was immediately thrown into a fit which lasted, with violent convulsions, for twenty-four hours. On the following day, three more girls were seized in the same manner; a few days later, six more were seized; the next day, three more were taken, and on the next, eleven more—making twenty-four in all. One of the victims was a man who had been much fatigued with holding the girls. The factory was shut down, and apprehension spread far and wide. Three of this number lived about two miles from the factory where the disorder first broke out, and three of the victims worked at a factory about five miles distant, and these were affected entirely from report,

[1] BERNARD, "Introduction to Social Psychology," p. 159 *ff.*

since they had not seen the other sufferers. The symptoms were anxiety, strangulation, and very strong convulsions. A doctor used an electrical machine and by shocks universally relieved the patients. This brought back assurance, and the epidemic died out.[1]

Hillsboro, Ohio, in 1873, was suffering, like most other civilized towns in the world, from the scourge of intemperance. Reform movements had arisen before this time, but they had proved abortive. A lecturer came to Hillsboro, however, and suggested that the cleansing of the nation was *woman's* work and that women might accomplish a great deal by going to saloon keepers and persuading them, for the sake of humanity and for their own salvation, to quit the hateful business. The speaker was full of enthusiasm, and the women hearers were filled with hope. After prayers, private and public, and a "wonderful message from God," the women went to saloon after saloon, weeping and pleading, some keepers yielding. This awakened immense enthusiasm. The movement spread to other towns, particularly Ocean Grove and Washington C.H., was successful, and came into prominence at the latter place. The women, in increasing numbers, and fortified by prayer and mutual encouragement, went to the saloons and pled with the keepers. If they were locked out, they held prayer meetings out in front. They also called on druggists and pledged some of them. They held mass meetings and reported their gains, and then went out again to visit the saloons. On one day in Washington C.H., a liquor dealer surrendered and poured his stock into the gutter amidst a throng of nearly a thousand persons, with the bells ringing, the people shouting and singing, and all leaders praising God who had given them the victory. A day later, people thronged in from the outlying districts to witness public surrender after surrender, until finally all sellers were rid of their stocks and pledged to have nothing more to do with the nefarious traffic. This was the beginning of the Woman's Temperance Crusade, and we cannot fail to be struck by the large part played by emotionalism and by the union effected thereby.[2]

An example is given of where some 5,000 primitives, in the large district of Sarawak, had been brought together by the resident authority for the purpose of encouraging friendly relations and pacifying the various groups. All went well as the respective chiefs gathered their followers in a large timbered hall to make public protestations of goodwill. Suddenly a small piece of wood fell from the roof and wounded one of the chiefs on the head. Only the immediate neighbors of the victim observed the accident; nevertheless, in a few seconds, a wave of angry emotion swept through the whole assembly, and a general and bloody fight would have commenced had not the Resident taken previous precautions and required all persons to leave their weapons at the river

[1] Quoted from VERNON LEE in PARK and BURGESS, *op. cit.*, p. 878.

[2] PARK and BURGESS, *op. cit.*, p. 898.

some 200 yards away. The great majority rushed away to secure their weapons, while the few who remained on the ground danced in a fury or raced to and fro making wild gesticulations. The Resident was able, by persuasion and threats, to prevent a reassembling of the people and a bloody fray.[1]

We might illustrate this emotional spread further from the Crusades, from numerous political revolutions—the French, for example—from scores of religious revivals—the Kentucky revival of 1800, for example—from persecutions, from panics, from mobs, from manias, and from fashion.[2] We could also illustrate it from the common exchanges of everyday life, where laughter becomes infectious, and where all members of a group suffer in the embarrassment of one. We might also illustrate from cases of social unrest and "milling" about; and many examples have been cited from the behavior of animals. But these are enough to show that social union is affected on the basis of emotions of various kinds.

We should not go far astray if we were to sum up this process under the head of *sympathy*—literally, "suffering with" but enlarged to mean the prevalent entering into and sharing of emotions of whatsoever sort, so characteristic of man. There are various phases of this, and they are illustrated in the spontaneous "getting in step" as we walk, in the swaying of our bodies as we watch tight-rope walkers, in the clapping of our hands if the performance pleases us, in dancing together or rowing and marching, and on up through gradations to those agreements which are founded on unity of representation and which are more intellectual than emotional in character.

Also, this close psychic union on the emotional level is sometimes called *rapport*, and we frequently speak of being *en rapport* with some one. The condition has its extreme form, perhaps, in hypnosis, where the relation between experimentor and subject is so close that the latter responds automatically to the suggestions of the former and is indifferent to all else; the subject appears to be just an extension of the hypnotist's body. In the case of a crowd sharing the same emotion, a similar kind of automatism, focusing, and isolation is affected just as rapidly as some objective defines itself among the members—before which stage there is restlessness and milling; the individual abandons himself or becomes lost in the prevalent contagion.

3. Intellectual Interaction.—Without attempting to go far into the obscurities or mysteries of this subject, we may say that an idea is a mental picture, an image, a sketch, a shape, an outline which we have of anything; we have, as we are this very minute trying to have, ideas about ideas. We sometimes speak of them as conceptions, and con-

[1] McDougall, "The Group Mind," p. 37 *ff.*

[2] *Cf.* Brown, "A Fortune in Oil," *Atlantic Monthly*, January, 1928.

ceptions are mental syntheses or integrations of perceptions; conceptions are generalities of which perceptions are the particulars; "room" is a conception built up of perceptions of walls, floor, ceiling, desk, blackboard, and other features. Usually ideas, if they are clear-cut, pertain to the essential and differentiating nature of the object.

Frequent expressions among us are "I have an idea," "I see the point," "I have a plan," "The idea is clear to me," by which we mean that the object—thing or notion—is now clearly bounded and differentiated from its surroundings and made to stand up as an individuality on its own account. We use the term *see* in a metaphorical sense, saying that we "see" the word-picture as painted, the notion as elaborated, the plan as described.

Of course, ideas are rarely utterly destitute of emotional elements, just as emotions are rarely devoid of conceptual elements; there are all degrees of combination. But some ideas stand out in their own right as luminous points, and they connect people, not primarily or at all because of their emotional infusions but because of their intrinsic worth as ideas and the services which they render in social living. "Patriotism," for example, is a little nucleus of an idea embedded in a vast mass of emotion. On the other hand, the "theory of electrons" is a big idea with little emotional content. But it must be admitted that most ideas about human beings and their relationships are highly charged with emotion.

As to examples of interaction on the level of ideas, we may say that they are not far from us. The very section that we are now reading is an attempted communication, a bid for interaction, on this level; whether or not the interaction is actually established will depend upon the kinds of replies made in class discussion, on examinations, and in other ways. A better case, perhaps, would be a mathematical discussion. "Two and two make four," it is asserted—a contact. Then the hearer agrees and replies that "Two and two make four." There may be some feeling in the reply; but the feeling will have nothing to do with the truth or falsity of the proposition. What we are discussing appeals to *understanding* and *intelligent* responses—whether in words, gestures, or other activities. We might call this process *social thinking*.

By the shuttling back and forth of meanings, we gradually build up what has been appropriately called *a universe of discourse*, by which is meant a realm or an area of ideas which two or more people share in common. Two or a hundred physicians are in the same universe of discourse; but the patient who goes to see them is more or less shut out. Two or a hundred ditch diggers who are expert at their job are in the same universe of discourse; but the loafers who watch them dig are more or less excluded. When psychologists gather and talk about axons, neurons, synapses, and effectors, they are interacting on the level of ideas; but the non-collegiate layman is an outsider—unless he has taken a correspondence course in the subject!

There are innumerable forms of interaction on this level. We have spoken of "talk" and "discussion" above. In addition, we might mention debates, lectures, conferences, criticisms, the writing and printing of books, magazines, and papers, the writing, printing, and circulation of unbiased historical and ethnographical monographs. The modern newspaper is full of emotion—scandal and the like—but it spreads an enormous amount of factual information, facts about household arts, facts about sports, facts about what is for sale in the stores; it rains ideas.

> Each number of a great journal which appears today . . . is an instrument of intellectual and economic intercourse, in which the potencies of all other instruments of commerce—the railway, the post, the telegraph, and the telephone —are united in a focus.[1]

And of course we must not omit mention of the radio—the broadcaster.

What we call education is a combination of these various features to which the young in modern societies are forcibly introduced. If the above instrumentalities and the ideas which they convey may be thought of as informal education, then the educational system—with its school buildings, its set curriculum, its especially prepared teachers, its books, charts, pictures, and the rest—may be thought of as a highly articulated system for the formal promulgation of ideas; and from the initiation ceremony of savages to the efficient and prolonged schooling of the civilized, this applies. And the school is not for the purpose merely of spreading ideas; its end function is training in dispassionate thinking. Perhaps there is no place in modern society where what we may call cooperative thinking proceeds on a higher level or in a more disinterested and systematic way.

It has been said—although extravagantly—that "ideas rule the world." By this is meant that clear mental pictures of what is and what ought to appear in the minds of leaders—politicians, philosophers, scientists, and others—are acted out. This behavior distributes these ideas to others who accept them and are similarly directed. This behavior distributes these ideas to others and yet others who send them on until a social movement is made which is, so to speak, the actual body and instrument of the idea. Thus, there is contact of ideas and continuous internal and external modification going on always and without end. Take the idea or the system of ideas called *relativity* advanced by Einstein; there has been an enormous amount of human modification as a result. Take the idea or system of ideas called *behaviorism* advanced by Watson, Weiss, and others; there has been an enormous amount of activity quickened and modification effected. Take the idea or system of ideas called *evolution* and advanced by Darwin and

[1] Quoted in Park and Burgess, *op. cit.*, p. 389.

many investigators before and after him; there has been an incalculable amount of internal and external modification as a result. Or, we might think of Buddha, Confucius, Plato, Jesus, Luther, Nietzsche, and hosts of others who have released among men certain notions about life's duties and rights, relationships and separations, nature and end.

Interaction on the level of ideas is man's greatest achievement. Cooperative thinking—and research may be included here—is the finest flower of man's civilization. Man excels in this direction. An individual chimpanzee can be taught by patient trainers to do many manlike things—drink out of a cup, ride a bicycle, smoke a pipe. But if the creature is then returned to the jungle and the company of his fellows, he cannot interest them in such accomplishments; moreover, he would speedily lose them himself. Man, however, exchanges and pulls himself up, by his own boot straps; he is an autodidact—a self-teacher; he is an intelligent interactor and is everlastingly devising ways and means for more satisfactory interactions.

Say Park and Burgess:

> Society stated in mechanistic terms reduces to interaction. A person is a member of society so long as he responds to social forces; when interaction ends, he is isolated and detached; he ceases to be a person and becomes a "lost soul." This is the reason that the limits of society are coterminous with the limits of interaction; that is, of the participation of persons in the life of society. One way of measuring the wholesome or the normal life of a person is by the sheer external fact of his membership in the social groups of the community in which his lot is cast.[1]

4. Forms of Interaction

We have said that *contact* is the first step in an endless series of interactions. Strictly speaking, there is never any *first* step; there is just another step; we know only stages or points in the process. And it is clear, also, that we can move, with respect to other persons, only *away* from them or *toward* them—speaking in terms of interaction. By *away* from them we mean isolation, and we have already discussed that. By *toward* them we mean a variety of things which we have merely suggested by the terms *contact* and *interaction*. We have done with isolation and now propose to follow the process of interaction into some of its more prominent forms, follow people "into society" and see what happens. We are all familiar with such obvious facts as that out of contacts come opportunities for jobs, positions in church and state, preferment, friendships—and engagements. We would never have been a teacher in this school, a janitor in this building, a politician in this office, a student in this university, a minister in this church, a patient in this hospital, a patron of this art, an officer in this lodge, a

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 341.

criminal in this penitentiary, and many other things—but for contacts and interactions, often chance ones.

But we are speaking of processes or *characteristic series* of ongoings rather than of the details of the same; and the numbers of processes flowing out from contacts and interactions are more than we can count and more various than can be put in language. Let us look at some of the possibilities in the next few chapters.

Questions

1. What is the relation between group unity and social contact?
2. What are the chief differences between animal and human contacts?
3. Are the methods of contact among human beings folkways? Illustrate.
4. Show clearly the differences between physical and social contact.
5. Could there be any social contacts if people had no senses? Are "mediums" and "clairvoyants" dependable?
6. What senses are most used and what are least used in social contacts in your own case? Ask your friends about this matter.
7. What is meant by *superorganic?* Is this the same as *spiritual?*
8. Make a list of symbols which you use continually in connecting with others. Try to classify them.
9. What are the chief differences between primary and secondary contacts?
10. Why is "social unity" referred to again in this connection?
11. Professor Weiss says that social unity is built up from the practice of two or more persons using each other's receptor and effector systems. Thus, "I *see* for you; you hear for me," and so on. ("A Theoretical Basis of Human Behavior," pp. 279, 301.) Is this an adequate statement of social unity?
12. Give examples from your own relations with others of the different levels of interaction.
13. Have you ever "gone wild" in a crowd? Describe what happened and try to account for it.
14. Give an example showing how ideas spread.
15. What is the meaning of *meaning?*
16. Do we mean the same thing by *forms of interaction* and *social processes?*
17. Give examples to show how physical heredity affects social interaction (1) favorably and (2) unfavorably.
18. Would an increase in population have any effects on social interaction? Why? What?
19. If we had no material world, could there be any social interactions? Reason about this.
20. Do you think a scientist can study social interactions successfully?
21. What is meant by *social contagion?*

CHAPTER VIII

COMPETITION AND CONFLICT

We have now before us certain solid and fundamental realities: the physical environment, with its resources for living and its subtle influences on man; vast numbers of highly complex and mobile people who do not care to live alone; the development by these people of a vast complex of usages and beliefs; and contact and interaction as the living substance of this group life. We have now to point out that these contacts and interactions combine, interrelate themselves, take on certain patterns or forms which have units, some individuality, and can therefore be differentiated and partially described. We have to single out some of these combinations as, for example, competition, conflict, accommodation, imitation, cooperation, and others. These are names for characteristic ways of interacting; these are names of *social processes*. We now take up competition and conflict and deal with them in the same chapter because they are so intimately connected, and because the latter is really the logical outcome of the former under some circumstances.

COMPETITION

Doubtless most of us have been at "bargain sales" where, in our eagerness not to be outdone, we have purchased, along with what we did want, some things we did not actually want or need. A university professor was telling only recently of triumphantly carrying away from a crowded bargain counter a shirt that was several sizes too small for him, but which a number of other hunters seemed to want badly. It was many times the author's painful duty, when a boy, to engage in the seemingly endless task of pulling mustard from the fields of wheat and oats which, he understood vaguely, suffered in some way by the presence of this weed; the grain was valuable, whereas this weed was a nuisance and a hindrance. Here are two familiar illustrations of *struggle* interaction. We came across this notion in speaking of Darwin in the first chapter, and in considering man's relations to nature in the second. It is now necessary to elaborate this idea and bring it out into the light. Let us get this notion of struggle firmly fixed in mind.

1. The Struggle for Existence

Nothing, perhaps, is more obvious about our world than struggle; nothing is, perhaps, harder to explain. The newspapers are telling us just

now that profits are decreasing and that competition is becoming keener. We are all familiar with the maxim that "Competition is the life of trade," and we know from experience or hearsay that wherever success attends the efforts of man, the methods are imitated, and competition is brought to pass. Economic competition is a familiar matter.

But this is only one phase of a very deep plot. Says Thomson:

> The formula, "struggle for existence," familiar in human affairs, was used by Darwin in his interpretation of organic life, and he showed that we gain clearness in our outlook on animate nature if we recognize there, a continual process, a struggle for existence not merely analagous to, but fundamentally the same as, that which goes on in human life. He projected on organic life a sociological idea, and showed that it fitted. But while he thus vindicated the relevancy and utility of the sociological idea within the biological realm, he declared explicitly that the phrase "struggle for existence" was meant to be a shorthand formula, summing up a vast variety of strife and endeavor, of thrust and parry, of action and reaction.[1]

This is simply to say that all living, and living well, seems to involve the aggression of some organisms upon others and often their hindrance and doom. If all organisms could live, like the plants, directly from the inorganic world, then struggle would be less inevitable, perhaps, and certainly not so obvious. But they cannot do this, as we have already seen. And since no mobile organism delights in being eaten, it resists. Hence the struggle. The dictum of the natural world seems to be: Eat or be eaten. Crile says:

> To the superficial observer, nature in all her parts seems imbued with the spirit of profound peace and harmony; to the scientist, it is obvious that every infinitesimal particle of the immense concourse is in a state of desperate and ceaseless struggle to obtain such share of the available supply of matter and energy as will suffice to maintain its present ephemeral form in a state of equilibrium with its surroundings.

The atoms of the inanimate world are in a ceaseless process of transmutation, disintegration, reintegration, and collision. They seem to take the struggle pattern.

The same is true in the animate world.

> Everywhere something is pursuing and something is escaping another creature. It is a constant drama of getting food and of seeking to escape being made food, evolving in the conflict structures fitted to accomplish both reactions. Everywhere the strong prey upon the weak, the swift upon the slow, the clever upon the stupid; and the weak, the slow, the stupid retaliate by evolving mechanisms of defense, which more or less adequately repel or render futile the oppressor's attack. For each must live, and those already living have proved their right to existence by a more or less complete adaptation to their environment. The

[1] "Darwinism and Human Life," p. 72 *ff.*

result of this twofold conflict between living beings is to evolve the manifold structures and functions—teeth, claws, skin, color, fur, feathers, horns, tusks, wily instincts, strength, stealth, deceit, humility—which make up character in the animal world.[1]

2. Causes of the Struggle

In considering the causes of this struggle we have to note two very important points which have been hinted at before but were not stressed. We have to note that the available resources for life are limited, but numbers tend to increase as if there were no limitations.

1. Limitations on resources are evident first in the fact that the land surface is limited. If we had an elastic earth, one that could and would expand according to need, there would probably be far less struggle. But there are only some fifty-one million square miles of land surface—and no more. Actually, however, men do enlarge this area by many methods; they occupy new regions; they live in greater congestion by building skyscrapers; they learn scientific farming whereby more is raised from the same area; they practice conservation; they eliminate waste; they build out over the water and take food therefrom; they also reduce the number of competitors, such as clearing away weeds, draining swamps, practicing infanticide, and so on. Yet there are always limits.

2. But, on the other hand, living things tend to increase as if there were no limitations of any kind. Twenty thousand bacteria injected into a rabbit have been found to multiply into twelve thousand million in one day. One bacterium actually has been found to rear a family of eighty thousand within a period of twenty-four hours. The Cholera bacillus can duplicate every twenty minutes, and might thus in one day, if unhindered, multiply to 5,000,000,000,000,000,000,000, weighing, according to Cohn, 7,366 tons; in a few days this mass would equal the moon in size.[2]

Many years ago, Frau Buckland estimated that the cod lays seven million eggs at once; if all of these grew up and bred just once the resulting fish would fill the English Channel—solid. A specimen of the giant puffball, given to the University of Birmingham, was estimated to contain 7,000,000,000,000 spores. A common fly lays four times each season, and 80 eggs at a batch, therefore 320 eggs. One-half of these, on the average, produce females. One-half of these, or 80 flies, lay before fall and produce some 12,800 progeny. The total descendents of a single female in one season, if all survived, would be 2,080,000 flies. Multiply these by 80 and we have a staggering total. It is not surprising that "swatting" is so ineffectual; but on the other hand one effectual swat does an immense amount of actual and potential killing.

[1] Crile, "Man: An Adaptive Mechanism," p. 17 *ff.*

[2] *Cf.* Saleeby, "Parenthood and Race Culture," p. 183.

The Welsh naturalist, Thomas Pennant, kept a record of one female rabbit for twelve months; her offspring numbered fifty-eight. Lyddecker estimated that the offspring of a single pair would number 13,718,000 in three years. The female white butterfly lays forty eggs at a time and two batches each season. In three years there would be a total of one thousand million butterflies, and they would cast the city of London, England, in deep gloom if concentrated over it. If just one oyster were let alone until it had had its great-great-grandchildren, there would be, if all survived, just 66,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 of them. Their shells would make a pile eight times the size of the earth![1]

These are examples taken at random from the organic world below man. What happens with man? We have already seen his tendency, when comparing the birth rates and death rates in earlier chapters; we saw then that man's tendency is to increase, although not at the same rate as in other beings. But before the giving of Scripture and since, man has obeyed its injunction to "multiply and replenish the earth" as if the earth had no limits. We may say, then, that *all* living things on the earth *tend* to increase as if there were unlimited possibilities as to space and supply.

Now what *has* to happen when there are limited supplies on the one hand and rapid increase in numbers on the other? The answer is plain—a heavy death rate. This point was made so clear in a lecture by Huxley many years ago that what he says is worth repeating.

> I will suppose, therefore, that all the inhabitable parts of this globe—the dry land—amount 51,000,000 square miles,—I will suppose that the whole of the dry land has the same climate, and that it is composed of the same kind of rock or soil, so that there will be the same station everywhere; we thus get rid of the peculiar influence of different climates and stations. I will then imagine that there shall be one organic being in the world, and that shall be a plant. In this we start fair. Its food is to be carbonic acid, water and ammonia, and the saline waters of the soil, which are, by supposition, everywhere alike. We take one single plant, with no opponents, no helpers, and no rivals; it is to be "a fair field and no favor." Now, I will ask you to imagine further that it shall be a plant which shall produce every year fifty seeds, which is a very moderate number for a plant to produce; and that, by the action of the winds and currents, these seeds shall be equally and gradually distributed over the whole surface of the land. I want you now to trace out what will occur, and you will observe that I am not talking fallaciously any more than a mathematician does when he expounds his problem . . . What will be the result, then? I will suppose that every plant requires one square foot of ground to live upon; and the result will be that, in the course of nine years, the plant will have occupied every single available spot in the whole globe. I have chalked upon the blackboard the figures by which I arrive at the result:

[1] Dorsey, "Why We Behave Like Human Beings," p. 98, quoting Lull.

Plants	Plants
1 × 50 in first year.....	50
50 × 50 in second year....	2,500
2,500 × 50 in third year.....	125,000
125,000 × 50 in fourth year.....	6,250,000
6,250,000 × 50 in fifth year.....	312,500,000
312,500,000 × 50 in sixth year.....	15,625,000,000
15,625,000,000 × 50 in seventh year...	781,250,000,000
781,250,000,000 × 50 in eighth year.....	39,062,500,000,000
39,062,500,000,000 × 50 in ninth year.....	1,953,125,000,000,000

Now take this last total—1,953,125,000,000,000 plants. Fifty-one million square miles make 1,421,798,400,000,000 square feet. If we subtract the latter we have 531,326,600,000,000 plants *having no soil* in which to strike root and grow. This many plants with no place to grow! And in the short space of nine years! Thus, this sum would represent the unavoidable deaths in the tenth year. How many deaths would there be in fifty years? How many in a thousand?[1]

Now let us reintroduce the variables neglected by Huxley—other plants, other plant-eating creatures, changes in climate, barren soil. Any one of these would vastly increase the death rate. All of them would increase it incalculably. Thus we get hold of the idea that living, for any given organism, either individual or species, is a struggle; and all others are competitors. This is a universal dilemma from which there is absolutely no escape.

It has been said that the "fit" or the "fitter" or the "fittest" survive the struggle. Nobody knows what these terms mean except in terms of survival. Those which survive are the same as the "fit." The terms "survival" and "fitter" are synonymous.

3. Man's Competitors

1. What we have already pointed out shows that man is involved in an unending struggle with all lower forms of life—the microbes, the insects, the wild animals, the grass, the weeds, the birds. Any one of these species would, if unhindered, fill the whole earth and take possession of it to the exclusion of everything else; that is the unexplained but sure trend of all living things. None of these species, and no member of any species, has any native regard for man; any one of them would destroy him very quickly if it could. A pleasantry sometimes practiced by certain African tribes is to tie an undesirable person fast over an ant hill; these voracious creatures soon take care of him.

Arthur Guiterman has vividly and humorously expressed this involvement of man and the natural antagonism to him in the "Mosquito War Song," part of which is:

[1] "Man's Place in Nature," p. 237.

On reckless youth and age I dart
My thirsty bayonet;
Like wise Uylsses, I am part
Of all that I have met.

. . . .

In every age, in every zone,
Unbounded sway, we knew;
That braggart upstart Man alone
Denies our rightful due.

—"Wildwood Fables."

2. But men struggle with each other as well; they struggle with each other in the same ways as they struggle against the lower forms of life and in additional ways. We can see them bidding against each other at a sale. The farmer in Manitoba raises and ships as much wheat as he can and cares not a whit what becomes of the Argentine farmer who is doing the same thing. The maker of one kind of automobiles works indefatigably to take possession of the market and crowd out the other makers. The orange growers of California try to crowd out the growers in Florida; and the former care nothing as to what becomes of the latter—their families, their relatives and their friends.

This sort of thing is called economic competition; but it is the same old struggle. At its worst and in its most ungoverned form, it is conflict, and we shall examine that soon. At its worst *within the law*, it is "cut-throat competition." This is frequently illustrated by two gasoline companies cutting prices against each other until one is put out of business or both suffer enough. From conditions characterized by absolute freedom to enter the field of selling groceries, making automobile tires, building railroads, and the like, and to take chances and consequences, we pass over to those conditions where we find complete monopoly, say, of raw materials, of machine processes, of patent rights. This, of course, eliminates competition in the narrow sense, but increases it in the larger sense, since prices are raised to what "the traffic will bear" and other needs of man go unsatisfied because of the cost of satisfying the one supplied by the monopoly.

3. Man also struggles with what Thomson calls "fate." He says:

Our sweep widens still further, and we pass beyond the idea of competition altogether to cases where the struggle for existence is between the living organism and the inanimate conditions of life—for instance between birds and the winter's cold, between acquatic animals and changes in the water, between plants and drought, between plants and frost—in a wide sense, between life and Fate.

That is, man may make warm clothes, build comfortable houses, and otherwise protect himself from the elements; but the very doing of these things is evidence that the old struggle is there. We have already

called attention to the fact that man's needs are difficult to satisfy, and to the fact that Nature, in the sense of the impersonal and mechanical world, seems not to care for man any more than for bugs.

Looking somewhat further we may say with Thomson that:

> We cannot here pursue the suggestive idea that, besides struggle between individuals, there is struggle between groups of individuals—the latter most noticeably developed in mankind. Similarly, working in the other direction, there is struggle between parts or tissues in the body, between equivalent germ cells and perhaps, as Weismann pictures, between the various multiplicate items that make up our inheritance.[1]

Thus we conclude that competition is an interactional relationship or series of such relationships between every living thing, and between the living and the non-living. These relationships are often clear and easy to trace out; but for the most part they are indistinct, attenuated, indirect, delayed in their results, and so are difficult to follow and portray. That they exist, however, and that all things are tied together, is better attested as investigation proceeds.

4. Methods of Competition

With our minds refreshed upon these matters, we may come more nearly to the subject of competitive interactions, that is, the competitive social process, by considering certain methods of competition. Ross has made some illuminating suggestions as to how *institutions*—and of course institutions interact only by means of members—behave towards each other.

1. Methods of Old Institutions When Threatened by the New.—There are numerous examples throughout history and at the present of the old and well-established institutions being menaced by new movements. What is done under such circumstances?

1. When a serious competitor of an old and established institution appears, the first impulse is to destroy it. The "trust" regularly cuts prices and thus drys up the nourishing stream upon which offenders expect to live. The highest social class hobbles the class which tries to come abreast of it, by passing sumptuary legislation. The supporters of monogamic marriage try to ridicule out of existence or otherwise throttle every form of "free love" arrangement or "companionate marriage." Entrenched governments send out agents to arrest and imprison all insurrectionists. The whole history of organized religion is replete with efforts to secure a monopoly on "the way of salvation" by a ruthless destruction of the exponents of new religious notions.

2. In cases where rivals cannot be destroyed, the plan of strategic withdrawal is sometimes adopted. An army which cannot conquer its

[1] "Darwinism and Human Life," p. 72 *ff.*

enemies occasionally withdraws to a safe place behind fortifications and allows the enemy to wear itself out in attack. Japan, in the seventeenth century, finding that the Jesuit missions were undermining the old social forms, slew the native Christians, expelled all foreigners save the Dutch traders, made it a capital offense for any Japanese to leave the country, destroyed all vessels capable of long voyages, attacked European ships entering Japanese ports, and thus withdrew from the outside world.

The American-Chinese Exclusion Act was a movement of the same sort. The more rigid exclusion and inspection of all immigrants to this country may be interpreted as an expression of fear lest these foreigners undermine our standards and otherwise corrupt us; it is a withdrawal. Asceticism in the early church was a withdrawal, the old not being able, apparently, to compete out in the open with the new. In the economic world, sometimes, by means of the "factors' agreement" dealers are bound to handle only the goods of a certain firm.

3. A third method is what Ross calls "constrained adaptation." The government-advocated "modernization" movement in Japan was as much, perhaps, to forestall absorption by Western culture as it was a conversion to the Western point of view. Wherever the missionaries of Christianity have gone the world over, the old religions have been prodded into activity and into modification, sometimes by incorporating certain features of the new and sometimes by the elimination of certain features of the old and by reinterpretation. Churches, in the modern world, have found themselves increasingly without young people, and have been forced to adopt certain recreational features, modify the creed and the ritual, and in other ways make themselves attractive. The "amusement" clause of the "Methodist Book of Discipline" has, in many cases, become a dead letter; and the dead have been left in peace. The Ceylonese Buddhists speak of the "incarnation" and the "immaculate conception" of Buddha, thus borrowing Christian terminology, and they comfort the dying by assuring them that the Lord Buddha will presently receive them in his arms, thus borrowing Christian theory. The vast growth of athletics and other extracurricular activities in modern institutions of learning has constrained the authorities in many ways. In other words, it often becomes a case of imitate or die.

4. Specialization is another method adopted to meet competition. For example, a business firm will change its product to meet special demands; after the people use it and become accustomed to it a new firm has difficulty in gaining a foothold.. This is a suggestive line of thought. But specialization, when carried far enough, is really a way of rising above competition; it moves towards monopoly; competitors fall behind as specialization advances; Kipling and Edison have not suffered much from competition.

2. The Methods of New Institutions.—The methods of new institutions and groups, when struggling to gain a foothold against the strategies of the old, are numerous, versatile, and ingenious; they are quite different in many ways from those methods just noted; they have to be different because new movements do not have the material or psychic assets of the old—nor the experience in trickery.

1. One of the methods often adopted is that of making extravagant claims and promises. People already know what older institutions can do; their history is an open book. The new are simply new, and untried; they have no history or prestige; the secret conclaves which gave them birth cannot, usually, be scrutinized by the outsiders. To offset these serious weaknesses, therefore, the most wonderful claims are made; the talk is always in superlative terms—"most magnificent spectacle," "no equal," "greatest invention ever," "superior fuel economy," and the rest. Any one who examines modern advertising understands this; every automobile or breakfast-food manufacturer claims that his product "has no equal." Whether the new thing be a single tax, a high tariff, a new ear drum, a new medicine, a new faith, a new hairpin—it is always much superior to anything else in existence.

2. Of course this easily passes into sensationalism. The public is usually fairly absorbed in its usual routine, is somewhat dull and undiscriminating, is more or less unconscious; yet there is always a demand for some new thing if an arousal can be brought about. Hence attention is gained by the spectacular, by the bizarre, by the extravagant, by the risque. For example, the *noveaux riches*, in order to take away the prestige of the old-established families, will "lay it on thick," no extravagance being regarded as too costly if it will gain the desired end. The new religion has to announce its arrival with blare of trumpets, with seances, with "wonderful cures," and other questionable methods to gain a following. The poet, Vachel Lindsay, has been interested in restoring poetry to the common people. His recitals, or performances, are always interesting—and exciting. He does the unusual, the sensational, thing. The writer heard him declare that in order to accomplish his purpose he had to "beat the electric sign."

Of course the new movement has to promise more than it can fulfil. The new political party has to force the belief that it will govern more economically, give more freedom, put paragons in office, and do many impossible other things to get any attention. The new religious movement has to promise to save further and faster than the religions now in existence. The new medicine—well, very clever persons are employed to say what it will do and they often do not have much knowledge of materia medica.

3. The new, of course, is devised to make an appeal to the unsatisfied demands of people; and since there are always unsatisfied demands,

there are always new movements. One of these ever-present demands is that for freedom; therefore there are always new movements promising the "new freedom"—early Christianity, the Crusades, the French Revolution, the Protestant Reformation, the American Revolution.

Similarly, other desired goods are offered—a more beautiful and satisfying ritual, secrecy, exclusiveness, opportunity, and what not. And there is always a chance, in the light of historical precedents, that such goods may come by way of the new. "Who knows," certain people say, if they reason at all, "but that this is the promised Messiah?" And who does know? Nobody can always be sure that it is not; and there are always people ready to have the excitement of taking a chance.[1]

As to methods, we may say further that new expedients are being evolved all the time for the purpose of winning in this struggle. Human beings and the groups which they form are working harder, they are working longer hours, they are thinking more closely and connectedly, they are becoming more skillful and efficient, they are working more rapidly and introducing more machinery and means of communication to help them, they are eliminating waste, they are using more foresight and predicting more accurately. The times steadily demand more of each of us if we would reach the top; they are likewise sending the slow, the stupid, the lazy, and the sick to the bottom with greater dispatch.

CONFLICT

1. Interest in Conflict

No activity of man, apparently, has been of greater interest to him or has evoked more enthusiasm, excitement, abandon, devotion—than conflict. Let us recall how much of our histories has been devoted to wars, heroes, conquests, warlords, army leaders. Let us take note of the present-day absorption in sports of the conflict type. Although in the past men have been the fighters and the women the spectators, the interest seems to be equally active in both sexes.

1. Organic Basis.—An *organic* basis for this interest has been suggested. Keith says:

> When we are about to make a severe bodily effort, it is necessary to flood our muscles with blood, so that they may have at their disposal the materials necessary for work—oxygen and blood-sugar, the fuel of muscular engines. At the beginning of muscular effort the suprarenal glands are set going by messages passing to them from the central nervous system; they throw a hormone—adrenalin—into the circulating blood, which has a double effect; adrenalin acts on the flood-gates of the circulation, so that the major supply of blood passes to the muscles; at the same time it so acts on the liver that the blood circulating through that great organ becomes laden with blood-sugar . . . Nothing is better known

[1] "Institutional Competition," *A. J. S.*, September, 1919.

to us than that our bodies respond to the burden they are made to bear. Our muscles increase in size and strength the more we use them; increase in the size of our muscles would be useless unless our bones were also strengthened to a corresponding degree. A greater blood supply is required to feed them, hence, the power of the heart has to be augmented; more oxygen is needed for their consumption, hence, the lung capacity has to be increased; more fuel is required, hence the whole digestive and assimilative systems have to undergo a hypertrophy, including the apparatus of mastication.[1]

The very sight of a struggle sets all of this going.

2. Psychic Basis.—There is a *psychic* basis for this interest. The millenium-long struggle for mastery, mastery over the lower orders and over other men, has indelibly stamped the struggle pattern on man's feeling and thinking; it has aroused the strongest emotions; the most precious goods have clustered about it. What has man always prized most by way of idealism? Has he not prized courage, sacrifice, heroism, devotion? And wherein have these excellencies been called forth to a greater extent than in various forms of struggle? So, in the dim remote past men were excited by the menacing activities of others; the glands did their part; the game was on; folkways and mores were developed; and *we* moderns are the inheritors of these ages of struggle and the psychic uniformities developed therein.

2. Types of Conflict

Out of the ages of struggle, and in accordance with the preoccupation with it, have come a great profusion of types. Nothing new can be thought of any more except some minor changes in details. The following are some of the more common types:

1. The Fist Fight.—As animals have always fought and defended themselves with the equipment which nature gave them, so man has always fought with his original weapons. Before he had tools he fought with his fists, his finger nails, his teeth, his feet. And he has never ceased to use these, although many more effective instruments have been invented. The excitation has come—a slap in the face, a wicked look, an insulting word; this is communicated to the glands; the glands pour the hormones into the blood; the muscles leap for action, and the struggle is on—more quickly than we can explain it. Often, there is no time for the use of instruments even when available.

The fist-fight type has varieties running all the way from the crude, blind, erratic punching, clawing, pummeling mix-up so frequent among boys and rough men, through various grades of modification and refinement, up to the fine, poised, carefully calculated and directed parry and thrust of the prize fighter. Indeed, there are so many varieties of this

[1] Quoted in Case, "Outlines of Introductory Sociology," p. 211.

type of interaction that they never have been discriminated and classified, nor have names been invented for them.

As a rule, only two persons are involved, and they may be of any size, shape, color, nationality, or class. Very often, the bystanders, who always gather eagerly about and become excited as well, become drawn into a general mix-up, which we call a *melee*, an impromptu engagement in which the participants are mingled in a confused, struggling, mauling, biting, scratching, kicking mass. Such an engagement may be of three or ten or any number. It tends to degenerate into the purest of animal fights without rules, without care.

2. The Duel.—The term "duel" is a shortened form for *Bellum inter duo*, or *duorum bellum*, meaning a prearranged fight between two people with prescribed weapons, according to strict conventional rules, and for the purpose of deciding a personal quarrel or a point of honor. It is almost always supervised by "seconds" who act as personal and public representatives or referees.

A distinction must be made between the duel proper and the judicial combat. The form of the combat is not essentially different, but the interpretation of the result is very different. The duel appeals to no outside arbiter; the participants fight within the rules and when one goes down, the thing is settled. The judicial combat, on the other hand, appeals to an outside arbiter; it appeals from the justice of man—conventional justice—to the justice of God. The outcome is taken as an omen. In other words, the judicial combat is one form of the ordeal. The downed participant is thereby proven to be guilty whether he is or not; might is right.

We must also notice that the famous so-called duels between David and Goliath, Hector and Achilles, Aeneus and Turnus, were not duels in the strict sense. They were incidents in the tribal or national wars of the time, two champions being chosen to represent their respective armies, the victory going to the army of the winner. They were duels in the sense that they were engagements of two according to the rules; but they were judicial combats in the sense that the omen feature was conspicuous; the combatants need not have known each other or have had any private quarrel to settle.

Now strip the judicial combat of its legality and divest the war combat of its essentially public character, and what is left is the duel in the strict sense. The joust was similar in purpose, but the combatants were usually mounted. The tournament was a mock duel for the special benefit of the onlookers, the combatants having no more animus towards each other than the bullfighter has towards the bull.

The duel is supposed to have originated in Feudal times, as a special phase of Chivalry. France was the country where it blossomed most luxuriously. The so-called "protective spirit" of Chivalry was highly

developed there; a very keen sense of honor was characteristic of the people; they were rather peppery and pugnacious in disposition; and there was the supporting custom of wearing swords as a necessary feature of formal dress. Duels grew out of small matters—just as fist fights; a hasty word, a misconstrued gesture, a question about the color of a ribbon—anything; the favor of women was a highly important feature. The occasion arose—trifling or otherwise; the challenge was given; seconds were appointed—for, of course, the participants could no longer communicate with each other directly; a day was set, a place, an exact time, and the type of weapon; and the affair was carried out according to schedule. The most frequently employed weapons were pistols, rapiers, sabers, and swords.

This practice was legally abolished in France, in 1547, but has persisted in spite of legal enactments, although diminishing somewhat. One of the causes of the decline, in addition to the legal prohibition, was the banding together of nobles of undoubted courage and skill in an agreement not to settle their difficulties in the old way; thus an ideal was set up for the masses to imitate. The duel was popular in England at one time, but was legally prohibited in 1879. In Germany, as well as in France, this type of combat has survived as a feature of army life, and is still resorted to in some measure. Students' duels, about which so much has been heard, are serious enough for them, but are really a form of play from the spectator's point of view.

The old-world traditions of dueling spread to the United States along with many other notions and usages. Some very famous duels have been fought here. Two men, McClung and Menefee, met near Vicksburg a short time before the Mexican War and fought with Mississippi rifles at a distance of sixty yards. Two noted Americans, John Thurston, of a famous Virginia family, and John Harrison, of the distinguished line which gave a president to the United States, as proud Kentucky squires, fought a duel *a la mode*—over twelve and one-half cents. We may recall also the cases of Andrew Jackson, of Gen. Sam Houston, of Alexander Hamilton, of Abraham Lincoln and others.[1]

3. The Feud.—The above examples of conflict display for us the consciousness of unendurable and irreconciliable personal differences working themselves out in conventional or other pattern. In the feud we find something different. We find hatred, but it is not the hatred of a person so much as it is the *hatred of a group*, and of a particular person as its representative. We also find here that the danger persists as long as the hated group survives or any member of it.[2]

A feud is a group difficulty—generally a family—settled or kept unsettled by a succession of individual combats, the duty to fight and

[1] *"Cf.* TRUMAN, "The Field of Honor," *passim.*

[2] *Cf.* SIMMEL, quoted in PARK and BURGESS, *op. cit.*, p. 588 *ff.*

to punish being a solemn obligation transmitted from generation to generation. This is what is meant by "blood revenge." Hatred of the opponent and all his relatives is cultivated, nourished, brewed; the story is told and retold; a tradition is established; a sacred duty is entailed to go out looking for "the son of the man who had shot the father of whom you are the son," as one writer puts it.

As with other fights so with duels—a small matter has often started them. The South's biggest and most disastrous feud, the Hatfield-McCoy affair which raged between West Virginia and Kentucky families for about thirty years, cost the lives of twenty-six persons besides occasioning many "mysterious disappearances," and bringing these two states to the verge of war, was started by a dispute over two *razorback hogs*.

Quite similar in character is the Corsican vendetta. The term is from the Latin meaning "to defend oneself and take revenge." In Corsica, the solemn duty has for a long time been placed upon the nearest kinsman of a murdered man to take up the quarrel and avenge the death. This duty gradually spread until it involved all relatives, so that many families, because of their ramifying connections, were involved in bitter and interminable quarrels. In addition, this simple pattern was complicated by the *vendetta transversalle*, wherein each of two branches of a family had to murder to take revenge on representatives of the other.

The Chinese have had, and still have to some extent, their feuds. The "Tong Wars" about which we have heard so much in the United States are not feuds in the strict sense. Tongs are secret societies which are a cross between the fraternity and the chamber of commerce. Thus the nature of the group involved is different, but the methods of carrying out revenge are the same.[1]

4. War.—We have just seen—remember David and Goliath—that two tribes or nations may fight out their differences by means of champions. We have just seen that feuds always involve a string of relatives. Wherein is war different from these various ways that we have noticed?

a. Definition.—The difference is not wholly in the methods for "everything goes" in war, including the breaking of agreements. It is not in the aim, for both sides, in all cases, desire to exterminate opponents. It is not in the feelings of hostility aroused, for hatred accompanies the forms of conflict already noted. War is a form of conflict wherein large numbers of trained fighters, using the latest implements of destruction and ordered out by political officials and backed up by the civilian population, are pitted against others of the same type; war is conflict

[1] *Cf. Literary Digest*, Mar. 12, 1921; *Everybody's*, Vol. 68, p. 427; on the Black-hand, see PARK and MILLER, "Old World Traits," p. 241.

between political organizations, such as tribes and nations, by means of trained and anointed representatives in large numbers. Combining several definitions, we may say that:

> . . . war is a means of attempting to settle international or civil disputes, by armed military forces, through organized destruction of life and property, in which each side seeks to impose its will upon the other by force.[1]

Several points in this definition call for emphasis. First of all war is a *means*, not an end; and the end may be good while the means is bad. Second, war is a conflict waged by *armed military forces*, which are police, judge, jury, executioner, and law—four in one. In the third place, war is a method of *irresponsible sovereignties*. No private citizen is allowed any more to settle his disputes this way; he is responsible to some one higher up. But nations are not responsible to anything higher. In the fourth place, war *always destroys* the lives and property of its victims. Nothing culturally constructive comes out of it, except as invention is aided. In the fifth place, war is the way of *force*, whereas reason is coming more and more to be recognized as the most economical method of settling disputes.

b. Causes.—Relative to the causes of war, much has been said and is being said; but much more remains to be said; the problem is a very complicated one. Speaking broadly at first, we may say that these causes lie much deeper than the fumbling, not to say vicious, diplomacy of the period in which the wars occur. The following are some of the phases of the matter which have been studied.

(1) Biological.—We go down here to what naturalists like to think is bedrock. We have already talked about the inevitable dilemma of living things, man included—the limitation of space and supplies and the rapid increase of numbers. When this pressure is felt by nations and tribes, these groups think first of themselves; and for long ages the struggle pattern has been the easiest one to follow. Yet man is not, by original nature, a fighter—at least woman is not.[2]

(2) Psychological.—We have already mentioned the folkways of fighting; these are important. Then we have the rise of national states and the belief that migrants should retain citizenship in the country of origin and not be seduced by foreigners. Then there is the age-old standard that fighting is "honorable," that it is "glorious," that defeat is "shameful," that a "pacifist is reprehensible." The young are brought up with these notions and, therefore, "conditioned" to fight when high officials say "sick 'em." Again, there is the philosophy that war is simply the analogue of the struggle for existence, is indeed a

[1] EDDY and PAGE, "The Abolition of War," p. 13.
[2] *Cf* SUMNER, "War and Other Essays," Essay on War.

continuance of it, and is necessary to purge a tribe or a nation of all weakness. This is called "Social Darwinism."

Further, there is a cult of war, a religion, which is cultivated and extended like any other cult and having the same seductive but fallacious features; as the church has its apologists and evangelists, so does the army. As evangelists save the individual souls of men, so does the army save the national soul from black-hearted cowardice, from supine submission, from pitiful groveling. Sometimes it seems as if we would never be patriotic without the army; but, of course, patriotism has only one form of expression according to its standards, namely, fighting and destroying. Then, in addition, there is the incomparably mischevious influence called propaganda.

(3) Economic.—In the modern world the rapid rise of industry of the organized, aggressive and competitive type has called steadily for more markets and for more sources of raw materials. This gigantic growth has led to what is known as "imperialism," namely, the grabbing of territory from backward peoples and the investment of large amounts of capital which requires armed protection. The World War grew out of the struggle for raw materials and new markets as much as from anything else—except the unpicturable stupidity and cupidity of the diplomats.

As industrial expansion has taken place, highly conscious and designed when looked at in individual cases but semiconscious and after the manner of the folkways when regarded from the standpoint of the whole, these modern nations have found themselves confronted on the frontiers by each other. As a means of protection, they have erected barriers called tariffs around their respective borders to try and hinder the growth of industry in opposing states. These tariffs are one expression of "nationalism," which means a growing consciousness of likeness, importance, and superior worth. Economic warfare is consistent with political peace; but when people are threatened or worsted economically they appeal to political authorities, and money talks here as elsewhere.

(4) Political.—When the national state system was evolved a curious mixture was brewed, a mixture of nationalism, patriotism, and the military cult. Nationalists said: "We are independent." Patriots said: "We must be loyal to our own which is independent." The militarists said: "We must defend our own at all costs and by force."

Early in the development of these states they became the harborers of ideas of autonomy and absolute sovereignty. But while "nationality" has usually been thought of as a political reality, it is really more a matter of language, manners, attitudes, namely a cultural reality.

While professing absolute independence and sovereignty and boasting about them, every state is actually a limited creature; it is limited by every treaty and agreement, by every trade tie and arrangement, if its pledged word amounts to anything; and all nations are endlessly involved

in these agreements. Thus, there is no such thing as absolute independence or sovereignty any more than there is absolute individual independence and sovereignty—except in the mouthings of the superpatriots.

Secret diplomacy has played its nefarious part in causing war. The various representatives have, for a long time, been in the habit of bargaining away rights, organizing rings, engaging in secret agreements, provoking rivals, and doing many other things. Because such things can never be kept entirely secret, they provoke counter-plots, agreements, and plans which become known and stir up others and so a vicious circle is created with war as the prevailing way to break it.

(5) Social.—These causes of which we have spoken are social for the most part. But under this head we would include those broad and deep movements within and among populations which are not particularly political or economic; we would include broad sweeps of the mores of respective groups which make ultimately for grand differences in main structural pattern and in world philosophy. For example, there is group pride, pride of position, pride of wealth, pride of theory; contrast Germany and the United States or England and China. Or there is group aggressiveness as in England and the United States as contrasted with India and China. Or there are standards of honor, of glory, of valour, of shame, of "face," and the like.

Most of all, there is the drift of a group in a direction of its own, sensed by nobody in particular, or howled down if sensed and announced, by everybody in general. We are all "charmed," obsessed, by our own set of mores. And we are all very sensitive as to what other people think of them.[1]

In a recent work, Winston Churchill, an English statesman, shows the imbecility of modern warfare, and shows that this imbecility is not an accidental quality of the particular players, but is inherent in its spirit and rules. That is to say, the only leaders who can stand the terrific strain of modern warfare are those who are by nature essentially wooden, essentially insensitive, rather dogged, who can sleep well and eat well while the carnage is going on, and not at all those who are sensitive, detached, reflective, idealistic; and thus the only ones who can stand the strain of modern war are the very ones who have not the capacity to organize it. Churchill goes on to show in some detail that what he says is borne out by the World War.[2]

Earl Grey, sometime Foreign Secretary of Great Britain, has summed up the causes of war in these words:

> If there are armaments on one side, there must be armaments on the other sides . . . The increase of the armaments, that is intended in each nation to

[1] *Cf.* BARNES, "Genesis of the World War," Chap. I: Page, "War: Its Causes and Cure." *Passim.*

[2] *Cf.* "The World Crisis," 1916–1918.

produce the consciousness of strength and a sense of security, does not produce these effects. On the contrary, it produces a consciousness of the strength of other nations and a sense of fear.

Fear begets suspicion and mistrust and evil imaginings of all sorts, till each government feels it would be criminal and a betrayal of its country not to take every precaution, while every government regards every precaution of every other government as evidence of hostile intent . . . The enormous growth of armaments in Europe, the sense of insecurity and fear caused by them—it was these that made war inevitable . . . This seems to me to be the truest reading of history, and the lesson that the present should be learning from the past in the interest of further peace.[1]

5. Litigation.—Two methods, speaking broadly, are available for the settlement of disputes or, better, for debellating people—the animal and the human. We have now examined several animal methods with a dash of the human element in the form of weapons and ceremony. We now come to litigation, a distinctly human procedure.

Let us suppose an injury of some sort. Then the injured party, in addition to being excited in the manner already indicated, *suffers a sense of wrong* and experiences a desire to "get even." The attempt to get even under excitement always, as history has shown and as our own personal experience helps us to understand, leads to excesses, leads to more than evenness. As a result, the original aggressor suffers a sense of wrong and desires to get even, but goes to excess—unevenness again. And so it goes, for no person under excitement can ever correctly appraise the injuries done and mete out an exactly equal portion in return; no "hot" person can keep exactly to the Scriptural standard, "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth." The ultimate logic of trying to settle things under excitement is a vicious circle which is broken only by the extinction of one of the parties—and probably serious injury to the other. But this has been a much-used way.

Another way to settle such a case is this: Suppose, again, an injury and the accompanying sense of wrong. Then the injured party, instead of immediately striking back under his excitement, may appeal to an impartial, disinterested, unemotional, trusted expert for an investigation and appraisal. The expert will then call in all parties and try to get all of the facts, try to get "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth." Thus, everything is aired before the impartial tribunal. Finally, an appraisal is made, and the injury is compared with the *law* in the case which is, we must assume, the wish of both parties originally. The responsibility and guilt are focused, and the penalty assessed. Thus, the case is settled; things are "evened up" again; the sense of wrong is wiped out. This is what we mean by litigation.

It is clear at first glance that this method of settlement lifts the process from the level of brute struggle with its inevitable excesses to the level

[1] "Twenty-five Years," *cf. Federal Council Bulletin,* July–August, 1926.

of a scientific inquiry; it is preeminently a human procedure. In actual practice, of course, emotion is not utterly excluded nor is reason always enthroned; for judges, juries, lawyers, and witnesses are emotional people and not always reasonable. But bad as trials are, they are infinitely better than the brute struggles which are their alternatives—unless people are so poised and reasonable that they can settle their own disputes out of court.

This litigatory method is workable only if the parties involved agree to go to court or can be forced to do so. Thus, a prior agreement to settle disputes this way is assumed. But suppose the injured party says: "I never agreed to take differences to court. I had nothing to do with introducing courts. I do not believe in them and prefer to settle matters in my own way." Then what? The answer is simply this that he agrees to the method of litigation by remaining, and as long as he remains, in a society where that is the prescribed method. He can leave the country if he wants to. Simmel says:

> The common subordination to the law, the reciprocal recognition that the decision can be made only according to the objective weight of the evidence, the observance of forms which are held to be inviolate by both parties, the consciousness throughout the whole procedure of being encompassed by a social power and order which are the means of giving to the procedure its significance and security —all this makes the legal controversy rest upon a broad basis of community and consensus between opponents.[1]

6. The Conflict of Impersonal Ideals.—In fist fights, feuds, and war, the *bodies* of the respective combatants, and their extensions in the form of weapons, are always hurled against each other and dangerously mixed up; whence the struggle often resolves itself into the pressure of so much avoirdupois. But in litigation, the bodies of opponents are kept out of it as much as possible. Litigation is a battle of *wits*. It is a battle, however, with many tricks, many sinuosities, many strange ways, much interested and fallacious reasoning.

Can we think of a yet higher level? There is the struggle for the discovery and statement of truth. Scientists and philosophers battle with each other all the time, and, being somewhat emotional, they often become partisan and reason fallaciously. But there are those among them who desire to clear up the mysteries of life and see things as they are. They try to assemble evidence. They rejoice, instead of getting "sore," when weaknesses in their positions are pointed out. They criticize each other mercilessly, not with the slightest personal animus, but for the purpose of having all see more clearly.

"Democracy" and "autocracy" are conflicting ideals in the political realm. Many bloody fights have been carried on to prove the soundness

[1] PARK and BURGESS, *op. cit.*, p. 591.

of one or the other. But these fights have never done one thing towards really settling the matter. Bodily weight is not the instrument for harmonizing these networks of notions any more than a cider press would be. Their nature calls for utterly different treatment. The method of this type of conflict is debate, argument, assembling of facts, criticism, logic, investigation, inference, and mutual respect. Other examples of conflicting ideals are "materialism" and "spiritualism," "creationism," and "evolutionism," "realism" and "idealism," etc.

Now it is conceivable that we could condition our young so that, when they received a personal injury, they would not "heat up" suddenly and "let fly" in return and thus make two injuries where there was but one before. It is conceivable that they might be trained to remain calm and try to find out what happened and why. Then if they could not repair the damage by persuasion, they would have to defer to courts. This is to say, that, conceivably, we might make investigators of our young in the same way that we now make foolish patriots, bigoted religionists, impossible political partisans, and the rest. It would appear that we could have some mores of higher personal worth, of devotion to truth, of mutual tolerance, of concern for the welfare of others, if we worked patiently at making them.

3. Competition and Conflict

We have now tried to present some pictures of these two types of social processes and make some inferences about them. But the reader will be asking: "What are the differences between these two forms? Are they really not simply variations of one form?" In answer, it may be admitted that they are both forms of the universal struggle pattern. But they are rather distinctive types and we shall take a page or two to contrast them a little more sharply. Park and Burgess take the stand that competition and conflict are both forms of interaction,

> . . . but competition is the struggle between individuals, or groups of individuals, who are not necessarily in contact and communication; while conflict is a contest in which contact is an indispensable condition. Competition, unqualified and uncontrolled as with plants, and in the great impersonal life struggle of man with his kind and with all animate nature, is unconscious. Conflict is always conscious, indeed, it evokes the deepest emotions and strongest passions and enlists the greatest concentration of attention and of effort. Most competition and conflict are forms of struggle. Competition, however, is continuous and impersonal, conflict is intermittent and personal.
>
> Competition is the struggle for position in an economic order. The distribution of populations in the world economy, the industrial organization in the national economy, and the vocation of the individual in the division of labor –all these are determined, in the long run, by competition. The status of the individual, or a group of individuals, in the social order, on the other hand, is deter-

mined by rivalry, by war, or by subtler forms of conflict . . . In general, we may say that competition determines the position of the individual in the community; conflict fixes his place in society.[1]

These points, and others made by Park and Burgess, may be summarized by saying that the differences between competition and conflict hinge on non-contact *versus* contact, the impersonal *versus* the personal, the unemotional *versus* the emotional, the unconscious *versus* the conscious, the continuous *versus* the intermittent, slow social movement *versus* rapid movement.

Hayes thinks these distinctions are important but not fully distinguishing. He argues that competition is where one activity "limits or prevents the success of the other activity," and conflict is where one activity "impedes or destroys the other activity." He says:

> Competition is the relation between activities which exists when the success of one activity *limits* or *prevents* the success of the other activity. Conflict is a relation between activities which exists when one activity *impedes* or *destroys* the other activity. If one racer trips another they come in conflict. If the race is run without interference neither racer "impedes" the other. On the contrary, each is likely to run faster in competition than if running alone. But, none the less, the success of the one prevents the success of the other. There is competition and though there is excited social contact there is no conflict.
>
> It is true and important that competition oftener than conflict is impersonal, unemotional, and even unconscious. The farmer in North Dakota and the farmer in Argentina, both of whom raise wheat that goes to market in Liverpool, are in competition although they may be unaware of each other's existence. There is a truth which underlies and explains the fact that competition may exist without social contact, namely, that competition is the relation between two activities which is mediated by the result of one of them. To take an example from the non-social world, when a stronger plant absorbs nitrogen from the soil and leaves the weaker plant to dwindle, one plant affects the other not directly but indirectly by first affecting the environment on which the second plant depends. In competition it is the result—the success—of one activity which affects the other. In competition the direct aim is the success of the actor; indirectly it may result in the failure of the competitor, but in conflict the direct result of the action of one person is to impede, prevent, or destroy the act of another. However, conflict may be unconscious and the action of one may impede, prevent, or destroy the action of another without intention or emotion. Thus, one of the parties to a two-party telephone line often unconsciously conflicts with the action of the other. It is equally untrue to say that competition is always and essentially unemotional and without social contact. The racers in the quarter mile on the Olympic track were in competition, and not in conflict, although in highly emotional social contact.
>
> The difference between conflict and competition does not lie in the presence or absence of social contact, for social contact may be present in a high degree in either case. Neither is it an ethical difference. Conflict does not necessarily imply hostility. A tug of war is a conflict. A football game is a conflict. And a

[1] *Op. cit.*, 574.

fundamental principle of good sportsmanship in such games is to enter the conflict without hostility. Competition and conflict are purely, solely, and definitely types of relationship between activities. War differs from sport in that it is accompanied by emotions of hostility and so is likely to become the "sum of all villanies."[1]

It may be said, however, that Hayes has not entirely clarified the difference. The use of the terms "limits" and "impedes" is suggestive but hardly dissolves the issue. To "impede" a runner is clearly to limit him; and if an activity is destroyed it is certainly prevented from being successful. To place the emphasis upon "the success of the actor" is not to differentiate but to confuse the two processes. About as far as we can go at present is to say that the relations between competitors are, *for the most part*, indirect, impersonal, and unemotional, while between those in conflict they are direct, personal, and emotional.

Questions

1. How did we define a *social process?*
2. What is the difference between folkways and mores?
3. To what extent are you engaged in the "struggle for existence?" With what do you struggle?
4. Give evidence for Crile's statement that "everywhere something is pursuing and something is escaping another creature." Does this apply to you?
5. List the causes of the struggle for existence. What is a "cause?"
6. Do human beings have more or less competition now than formerly? Give reasons for your answer.
7. What is the point, for our purposes, in Guiterman's poem? Is it scientific to use poetry in this way?
8. What does Thompson mean by *Fate?* Do you have anything to do with Fate? What?
9. Does specialization increase competition or help to avoid it? Explain. Consider the relation between specialization and isolation.
10. "Interest in conflict." By the way, what was the definition of *interest* given earlier? Are you interested in conflict?
11. Describe a fight that you have been in, giving causes, methods, and results.
12. What were the causes of the World War?
13. Who won the World War? Give evidence.
14. Do you agree with Earl Grey's statement about war? Criticise it.
15. How does litigation differ from other forms of conflict?
16. Are any forms of conflict beneficial to the human race? If so, what ones, and in what ways? Is not this mere prejudice?
17. What are the essential differences between competition and conflict? In what ways are they alike?
18. Do you think that competition and conflict are forms of interaction? Give evidence.
19. What does conflict do to social unity? Cite examples.
20. What social forces are at work in social conflict? By the way, what was said about social forces earlier?
21. Would you say that "rivalry" is a form of competition or of conflict, or something else still?

[1] "Some Social Relations Restated," *A. J. S.*, November, 1925.

CHAPTER IX

DIFFERENTIATION

The processes of competition, rivalry, and conflict, in which we are all involved all the time, work out some further processes and results which we must notice. We have talked of "the struggle for existence" and of "the survival of the fittest" and have thereby admitted that certain results follow.

Or, let us turn the matter around. It is common knowledge that there is such a thing as "position" in a social drama; there are "higher" and "lower" places; some people are in "leading" roles, and some are in "insignificant" roles—mere nonentities. Our recognition of this is all the while admitted when we use the expressions *upper and lower classes, social promotion,* "Mrs. So-and-so is a *climber,*" "He is an *outcast,*" *right and left party, middle classes,* and numerous others. But when we use such expressions what do we mean? What are we trying to say? We are trying to say that people have locations relative to each other and are graded. But what do these things mean?

There is such a thing as *geometrical* space. The earth is divided off into areas which are located by reference to each other. The earth is located by reference to other siderial bodies. When we say: "The stump is down by the brook," that does not help us unless we know what brook we are talking about and where it may be found. That is to say, geometrical space is a kind of universe in which physical phenomena are situated; and by taking some fixed point of reference we may locate other things.

In the same way, says Sorokin, "social space is a kind of universe composed of the human population of the earth." If there are no people on earth, there is no social space; if there is only one man on the earth, there is no social space, because such a person can have no relation with others. If there are two persons or more, there is social space; and to find the position of any one of them in social space, his relations to others, as "points of reference" have to be traced.[1]

What these points of reference are depends, as is true in geometrical space, upon *what we fix upon.* It is possible to take one point, two points, three points, or a large number. When we say that Bill is a Republican, we have taken a step toward locating him in social space.

[1] "Social Mobility," p. 3 *ff.*

If we further say that he is a Presbyterian, we have run another survey line to bound him. If we say that he is a blacksmith, we have run another line. In these cases, the fixed points of reference are Republicans, Presbyterians, and blacksmiths. To indicate one man's relations to another individual gives us very little help in locating him, because men are so variable and there are so many of them—unless we have first carefully located the other man. But it is far more helpful to have *groups* as fixed points of reference and then to know the relations of these groups to others. But it is more important still to know the folkways and mores of these groups, their standards and values. Note how common usage emphasizes what has just been said. We go to hear a lecture by a stranger. He is introduced as follows: "The speaker of the evening is Mr. A. (family group location) who is professor (occupational group location) in the Northern Baptist Theological Seminary (religious affiliations), a prominent Democrat (political location), formerly ambassador to Mexico, a scholar and writer of note," and so on. All of these allusions help us locate him in social space. All of these relationships compose a system of social coordinates by means of which we can define the social position of any person.[1]

While the universe which the natural scientists study is a three-dimensional affair, the social universe is a many-dimensional affair because there are many groups and relationships used in defining a person's position; the more differentiated is the population the more numerous are the dimensions. But, broadly speaking, the social world is a two-dimensional world; we may speak of these, borrowing terms from physics and astronomy, as *vertical* and *horizontal*. We can and do say of several persons that "they are all Rotarians, or that they are all Catholics, or all Orangemen." We are now thinking horizontally. But there may be decided differences among the members of these groups when thought of vertically. For example, within the Rotarian group, one finds the president, who is at the head, the vice president, the second vice president, the secretary, various committees, the ordinary members, and those who are just hanging by a thread. Within the Catholic group, one may be an archbishop, another a bishop, another merely a layman. Any group that one cares to select will reveal members in these two-dimensional sets of relationships. In the light of these terms, we understand better what we mean by saying that a person is "out of" or "in" a certain group and, if he is in, that he is "up" or "down," "high" or "low" in the group.

Examples of horizontal groups, according to Miller, are the class or caste—large areas of population where people are approximately on the same level. On the other hand, the family, the religious sect, and the nation are usually thought of as vertical groups, because they are thought

[1] Sorokin, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

of as groups which include members of all levels.[1] But since "out" and "in" in most cases mean the same as "down" and "up," we shall think mainly in this chapter of the vertical position or "level" and think of differentiation in this way.

1. The Criteria of Differentiation

Before determining where people are in the social universe and how they get there, we must agree upon some "fixed points" of reference and some standards of measurement. For locating a ship at sea, we start at Greenwich and look east or west, and we start at the equator and look north or south. Greenwich and the equator are fixed points; but they are arbitrarily chosen points; any other points on earth would do as well, provided there was an agreement in advance to use them and measure from them.

In determining social position, we must proceed in the same way. There are no absolute fixed points from which to start. We must make a choice. This choice is arbitrary in the sense that others than the ones chosen would do just as well—if agreed upon. As with the cases of Greenwich and the equator, however, there is a vast amount of usage accumulated, so in the cases of the points we are about to mention, there is a vast amount of accumulated usage. These points represent an amount of consensus; they are the criteria which have been used for a long time; they are in the folkways and mores and are the products of evolution.

Sorokin thinks that, without going into too much detail, there are three sides of a person's life that we must know something about in order to locate him in the social drama. These three are his economic position, his political affiliations, and his occupation. By our knowing these, he thinks that we could locate a man as easily as, knowing Greenwich and the equator, we could locate a ship. North thinks that there are four criteria which we must use—occupation, rank, culture, and interest.[2] But these are not important, because these men have seized upon them. They are important because they are and have been for centuries the chief determiners in the differentiation processes; and that is why these men have selected them. We shall arbitrarily select North's classification as being somewhat more complete. When others are well informed as to our occupation, as to our rank, as to our culture, and as to our interests, they have, as we say, "our number." Many other facts would have to be known in order to be thoroughly informed about us *as individuals*, as separate, discrete beings. We are not, however, thinking of individuals but of *persons;* we are thinking of human nature as already defined; we are thinking of performers in the social drama.

[1] "Races, Nations and Classes," p. 14 *ff.*

[2] Sorokin, "Social Mobility," p. 12. North, "Social Differentiation," p. 5 *ff.*

1. Function.—The chief needs of any individual or group are self-maintenance, self-perpetuation, the maintenance of order, and the so-called *higher* aesthetic satisfactions. These are the main needs, whether we think of a modern person or group or of a prehistoric person or group. They are universal needs; and people everywhere are striving for them. Individuals are not very long in this world, whether we think of the child born or the group organized this year or of the first child ever born or the first group ever organized, before they begin to act and begin to act in certain ways.

One acts as a hunter and spends his time trying to learn the ways of wild animals and how to catch them. Another spends his time as a magician, learning the ways of spirits and how to deal with them. A third spends his life as a policeman and learns the ways of crooks and how to trap them. There is the job of cook for a fourth, the job of window dressing for a fifth, the work of machinest for a sixth, the profession of teaching for a seventh, and so on up to a great many.

The name which we commonly apply to all of this occupational differentiation of people is *the division of labor* or *specialization.* And one of the outstanding phases of cultural evolution has been this increasingly minute specialization. The primitive man engaged in a number of occupations, but the modern man is lucky if he is a specialist in one. The modern factory shows us what this development has come to—one man doing nothing but turn the nut on a bolt, another giving himself to the sharpening of a tool, a third pointing pins, a fourth feeding material into a machine. We are now in the midst of an inconceivably vast complex of ramified and interlocked specialisms—which means differentiation.

Now we have to notice especially that some of these functions are more highly regarded than others—and this is another kind of occupational differentiation. Most of us think that the occupation of bank president is more desirable than the work of ditch digging; we regard the work of a physician as above that of a coal heaver; we had all rather be generals in the army than privates; we covet the position of chief of police more than the position of patrolman. In saying these things, we are not theorizing but describing actualities; we all aspire to the occupations of the so-called *higher levels.* How is this?

In times of war, who is more valuable to the country, the soldier or the banker? Who is more necessary in times of peace, the ditch digger or the stock broker? Who serves more valuably at any time, the prize fighter or the mother who bears and rears a wholesome family? But how is it that the ditch digger is paid three dollars a day while the stockbroker is paid fifty or a hundred? How is it that the private in the army is paid a dollar a day and his keep while the banker is paid many times as much? How is it that the prize fighter earns "big money" while the mother manages only to gain her keep?

The answers to these questions are found in the mores of the groups where these various estimates obtain; they are found in those half-conscious usages and standards which have developed through the centuries. But part of the answer is immediately found by considering the different *ranks* to which people belong in part because of their occupations. We have, then, in conclusion, many occupations appraised in various ways—as is shown by our wish to be in some rather than others and by our rewarding some more highly than others.

2. Rank.—One man in the army is a private, another is a sergeant, another is a captain, another is a major, another is a general. The differences indicated by these terms are partly a matter of function, but they are more a matter of popular esteem and some other goods which we can soon point out. What is meant by *rank?*

What attaches to the general's office that does not attach to the position of the private? Why would everybody rather be a general than a private? North says:

> By the rank or status which a member of a group occupies, we understand the rights and privileges he enjoys or the degree of appreciation or honor in which he is held by other members of the group. No form of social differentiation is more fundamental than that by which a group is separated into subdivisions on this basis.[1]

In this definition, we have the beginnings of an answer to the above question; there are rights and privileges and honor attaching to the office of general which are not attached to the office of private. And rights, privileges, and honor are the central values of life for *human* beings. Animals call for food, comfort, shelter, and sex experiences; but human beings call for rights, for position, for esteem, for opportunity. We have no reason to suppose that the leader of a pack of wolves recognizes or appraises his position and is all "set up" over it as a man would be. Man is peculiar. It is not the exhausting labor of ditch digging that makes men dislike it and shun it so much as it is the insignificance of it in popular estimation as evidenced by the low pay and the uncomplimentary names attached. Football players probably work more strenuously than ditch diggers; many teachers work harder than machine workers; bankers often work harder than coal heavers. It is not the exhausting labor which causes people to shun certain occupations but rather the grade of the occupation in the social hierarchy. The slave often has an easy life, his food, clothes, shelter, and amusements being found for him, his work often not being very exhausting or exacting; but he is a social nonentity; he does not count as one in the universe of persons. That is what hurts.

But what do we mean by *rights and privileges?* And what rights and privileges are attached to masters, railroad presidents, generals, the rich,

[1] "Social Differentiation," p. 17

high political officials, professors, that are not attached to slaves, track men, privates, the poor, henchmen, pupils? They are very numerous and of many kinds. North notes the following especially: "Personal and civil, political, economic, religious, and honorific." A comment or two on some of these may help.

1. The simple right to vote is, perhaps, the lowest rung in the political ladder of rights and privileges. In a society with widely distributed franchise, this right or privilege is the beginning of political climbing. Without this right, a person is hardly a person, hardly has any political status, is hardly more than an animal. And for milleniums, women have been denied this elemental right and so have occupied a despised position. The same has been true for minors. These persons have belonged in society but not in the body politic. They have been governed by reason of being in society; but they have been denied a voice in how they would be governed. The same has been true for many grown men—the peasants. And because these people have all lived beside those who had this right, have seen others admitted to the privilege, and have suffered unspeakable ignominy and indescribable exploitation, this unpolitical position has been disliked and the vote has been coveted.

On the other hand, certain persons have found themselves with this right and privilege and have made regulations for others to follow—an exceptionally coveted privilege. They have been able, moreover, to control patronage and thus to build up political machines for political advantage. They have been able to extort taxes, to exploit natural resources, to compel all sorts of obeisances and otherwise advantage and gratify themselves. Government of any kind means that power is located somewhere. Those who have ready and easy access to political power are, by that very fact, in the higher ranks. They wield a two-edged sword—they can control the power themselves, and they can prevent others from having access to it and what goes with it.

2. Economic rights and privileges have usually been closely associated with the political. But economic rights and privileges have been strenuously sought on their own account. The possession of wealth, whether inherited or acquired in some other way, has meant relief from degrading occupations, on the one hand, and the satisfaction of many demands, on the other. There is not only a reservoir of political power which all people would like to tap, but there is a reservoir of wealth as well. As an *animal*, man has sought a certain amount of this wealth—food, shelter, clothes. But as a *human being*, he has sought, in addition, what is not easily defined but what has been called a *standard of living*, and an ever higher standard. This has included more and better food, more and better clothes, more and better shelter, and all that we call *luxuries*. He has sought money as the medium of exchange and the representative of these things. And people are endlessly differentiated at this point.

Graded in terms of wealth, they range all the way from the pauper at the bottom to the billionaire at the top.

Besides, wealth power and political power have always tended to coalesce and mutually support each other, so that the wealthy man is rarely at the bottom politically nor is the poor man very often at the top politically; moreover, the politically powerful are hardly ever poor—although we cannot say that the politically weak are hardly ever rich. But to grasp the significance of the impression which wealth makes and to understand the prestige which goes with it, let us just imagine the treatment accorded a very wealthy ignoramus and an impecunious scholar—at a hotel.

3. There are endless ramifications on the honorific side. Indeed, honor and prestige are, perhaps, the ultimate goods back of wealth and political power—provided the necessities of life are satisfied. Man's physical needs are limited, but there is no limit to his thirst for public approval and acclaim. And this striving after honor is what we call *vanity*.

There are honors in titles. Any number of persons have striven most earnestly to be called Sir, or Doctor, or Lord, or Kleagle, or something else as a means of distinction. Think of the glorifying epithets applied to the King of Siam—Mighty and August Lord! Divine Mercy! The Divine Order! The Master of Life! Sovereign of the Earth! or those addressed to the Sultan—The Shadow of God! Glory of the Universe! or those applied to the Chinese Emperor—The Sun of Heaven! The Lord of Ten Thousand Years! All over the world and from the most backward peoples to the most modern, these elevating titles have been used.

As people have been elevated and thereby differentiated by means of honorific titles, so they have been degraded and differentiated by the use of humilific titles. Familiar examples are servants, slaves, outcasts, blasphemers, heretics, rubes, foreigners, crooks, and the like through a very long repertoire. Persons are classified and put in their "place" by these labels, and this place is one of low esteem. And just here it may be pointed out that any kind of naming is a means of differentiation.[1]

Besides honorific titles, there are honorific gestures which are called for and distinguishing—kissing the hand, the low bow, the bending of the knee, kneeling, prostration, crawling. Of course, the lower down toward the ground some people are the higher others are. Hence, on the other hand, elevated platforms, thrones, carriages, and the rest, by which some are set on high and thus distinguished. That a private in the army is required to salute his superior officer is, of course, a sign of inferiority.

Besides titles and gestures which confer honor, there are costumes and badges which work toward the same end. When we are given a

[1] *Cf.* LUMLEY, "Means of Social Control," Chap. XII.

Phi Beta Kappa key, we are set up several notches, and apart. The Croix de Guerre, the Victoria Cross, and all the rest are distinguishing. Describing a Russian dinner party, Wagner says: "I found that on the breasts of thirty-five military guests, there glittered more than two hundred stars and crosses; many of the coats of generals had more orders than buttons." During wars in the Sandwich Islands, different ranks of chiefs are distinguished by the sizes and colors of their feather cloaks. Ministers have their robes; professors, their gowns. The *toga picta* and the *toga palmata*, worn by victorious commanders at their triumphs, by consuls entering on their office, by the prætors at the *pompa circensis*, and by tribunes of the people at the Augustalia in ancient Rome, marked these persons in the public eye and set them off from the rest. And we might speak of forms of dress, of pins, of caps, of ribbons, of colors, some of which make for elevated distinction, and some of which—the crown of thorns, the sackcloth and ashes, the shaven head, the notched ear—make for degraded distinction. There are endless ramifications here.[1]

3. Culture.—Another very important differentiating feature is culture. As defined by Wissler;[2] "Culture is a vast social complex of human inventions." Ellwood[3] says: "The essence of culture is invention or achievement." As defined by Tylor, culture is "that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society."[4] The last phrase, "as a member of society" is very important. A man in isolation might acquire some knowledge, some beliefs, be artistic, be moral, be governed by rules and habits; but acquisitions in isolation are not for our consideration. What we are thinking of is what is acquired by members of society. As a member of society, the individual tends to take on the patterns of the group, to know what is prevailingly known, to believe what is prevailingly believed, to be artistic according to form, to be moral according to the social standard. He tends to be an American, a German, or a Zulu, or whatever it is if he is in America, Germany, or Zululand. Whatever acquisitions along these lines the group has, that is culture.

The fact that your boy plays "button, button who has the button" is just as much an element of culture as the fact that a room is lighted by electricity. So is the baseball enthusiasm of our grown-up population, so are the moving picture shows, *thés dansants*, Thanksgiving Day masquerades, bar-rooms, Ziegfield Mid-

[1] *Cf.* SPENCER, "The Principles of Sociology," Vol. II, Chaps. IV–X, where these matters are treated with ample illustrations.

[2] "Recent Developments in Social Sciences," p. 87.

[3] "Cultural Evolution," pp. 5, 6, *ff.* 46, 73, 76.

[4] "Primitive Culture," Vol. I, p. 1.

night follies, evening schools, the Hearst papers, woman's suffrage clubs, the single-tax movement, Riker drug stores, touring sedans and Tammany Hall . . . [1]

Culture, then, is the complex whole of the folkways and mores of the time and place; and a cultured person or group is one who is conversant with and at home in this complex. The pupil makes the point in the following dialogue:

TEACHER: Now children, what did the Romans do for the Britons?

PUPIL: They civilized 'em, miss.

TEACHER: And how did they do that?

PUPIL: Please miss, they taught 'em how to fight.

But there is another sense in which we speak of the cultured person. A cultured man is one who discriminates among these folkways and mores and acquires what we sometimes call "the best" of them. We would not think of an ignorant or illiterate person as cultured in this sense. A teacher in the public schools of Chicago came in possession of the following letter written to a friend in Mississippi by a Negro boy who had reached the city two months before:

> Dear leon I write to you—to let you hear from me—Boy you dont know the time we have with Sled. it Snow up here Regular. We Play foot ball. But Now we have So much Snow we dont Play foot Ball any More. We Ride on Sled. Boy I have a Sled call The king of The hill and She king to. tell Mrs. Sara that Coln Roscoe Conklin Simon Spoke at St Mark the church we Belong to.
>
> Gus I havnt got chance to Beat But to Boy. Sack we show Runs them Mickeys (A hostile Irish group on Wentworth Avenue.). Boy them scoundle is bad on Wentworth Avenue.
>
> Add 3123a Breton St Chi Ill.

We do not think of this boy as cultured in the second sense but as the reverse. Yet he was cultured in the first sense in that he was quite at home in his new environment and was participating in the accepted ways.[2]

We can say briefly that a cultured person in the second sense is one who has exceptional knowledge, taste, and skill along some approved line. With reference to *knowledge*, it may be said that he is not a "know all" but a "know well." And first of all he knows well what is most approved in the ordinary intercourse of life—speech, gesture, dress, and the like. With reference to *taste*, it may be said that he chooses words, books, companions, clothes, amusements, color combinations, which are suitable and harmonious. With respect to *skill*, it may be said that he has exceptional deftness, efficiency, artistry in the use of knife and fork at table, in meeting people, in dealing with situations, and ranks high in some occupation. And yet no development along one of these lines makes him cultured. He is cultured if he has made an *admirable* and a

[1] LOWIE quoted in CASE, "Outlines of Introductory Sociology," p. 144.

[2] PARK and BURGESS, *op. cit.*, p. 666.

useful combination of these three characteristic features of life. Our excellent term *refinement* means re-fined, dross-purged, like precious metals. Of course, we instantly understand that there are many possibilities for differentiation along cultural lines.

4. Interest.—Another very important line of differentiation among human beings and groups is with respect to interests. Small has defined an interest as "the simplest mode of motion which we can trace in the conduct of human beings."[1] But when he speaks of "human beings," we are not sure whether he is speaking of original nature or of human nature. If the former, then interests would be inherited and of little concern for us here. If he is thinking of the latter, then interests are more nearly habits—that is, acquired ways or reacting and, therefore, the subject matter of our study.

North, who had lectures with Small and professes to speak from his point of view, says:

> And when we get beyond these elementary animal wants into the region of intellectual, sociable, moral, aesthetic wants, we find almost an unlimited variety of things that man is seeking after. These subjective wants and the objective things that will satisfy them have been termed "interests." A man's interest is nothing more nor less than his attitude toward those things which will satisfy his wants, and anything is "to my interest" which will aid in satisfying one or more of these wants.[2]

In other words, only human beings have "interests."

Small thought that there are six dominant interests—health, wealth, sociability, knowledge, beauty, and rightness; he thought that all we strive after can be classed in these ways. But if these may be regarded as the major categories, the evidence of our own experience and of all investigation shows that there are hundreds of minor categories and an unlimited number of individual combinations. Thus do interests ramify and differentiate, and thus are people differentiated.

And what we say of any person we may also say of any group. This group is interested in eliminating tobacco from the world; another group is interested in spreading its use. Here is a group trying to abolish war; and here is another trying to promote it. One group wants higher tariff; another wants lower tariff. Hence, there are as many interests as there are individual interests plus group interests plus combinations of individual and group interests. The ramification and differentiation along the lines of interests surpass imagination.

In sum, then, we can say that we are all located in society by running these four lines—function, rank, culture, and interest—and the running of these lines marks out a vast number of levels. These are the criteria

[1] "General Sociology," p. 425 *ff.*

[2] "Social Differentiation," p. 47.

which are most useful in determining the amount and kind of differentiation which may be found. Now let us look at some cases of differentiation in the light of these criteria.

2. Social Stratification

Under King Hammurabi, old Babylonia

. . . was a group of city-provinces in process of unification through the influence of a nationalized religion, a powerful centralized government, a closely interdependent commerce, and a well-recognized legal system which protected property rights and stimulated agriculture and industry. The state was personified in the priest-king, in whom were joined personal prestige and divine authority. Crown lands were held under a feudal tenure by a class of priests, devotees, nobles, military and civil officials, in whose interests the laws were in certain respects carefully framed. To presumably the same social status belonged a class of land owners, bankers and merchants. Next in the social scale came the tradesmen and artisans, followed by the tenant farmers who held their lands under the metayer system; while last came a great body of house and other slaves, upon whose labor the entire economic structure was largely based . . . Babylonian society was pyramidal. The King was the apex, and the broad base rested upon a foundation of slaves. Social control was mediated from class to class. Caste and status are imbedded in the code. In precise tariffs human values are set forth.[1]

The tendency of the latter [Roman] Empire was to stereotype society by compelling men to follow the occupation of their fathers, and preventing a free circulation among different callings and grades of life. The man who brought the grain of Africa to the public stores of Ostia, the baker who made it into loaves for distribution, the butchers who brought pigs from Samnium, Lucania or Bruttium, the purveryors of wine and oil, the men who fed the furnaces of the public baths, were bound to their callings from one generation to the other. It was the principle of rural serfdom applied to social functions. Every avenue of escape was closed. A man was bound to his calling not only by his father's but by his mother's condition. Men were not permitted to marry out of their guild. If the daughter of one of the baker caste married a man not belonging to it, her husband was bound to her father's calling. Not even a dispensation obtained by some means from the imperial chancery, not even the power of the Church could avail to break the bond of servitude.[2]

Ross says:

In the fourth century A. D., Roman society formed a pyramid. At the base were the *plebs*, comprising the corporations of artisans and merchants. In the middle came the smaller proprietors, distinguished into simple *curiales* and *principales*. The top story comprised those who had the title of Roman senator. These classes were strictly separated . . . All classes paid taxes, but not the same taxes.[3]

[1] Vincent, "The Laws of Hammurabi," *A. J. S.*, Vol. IX, pp. 741, 753.
[2] Dill quoted by Ross, "Principles of Sociology," p. 322.
[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 322.

Japan of a half-century ago had a social organization embracing, first, the throne and the court nobles; second, the military class; third, the common people. In Russia, until half a century ago, the law recognized four social orders, namely, nobles, merchants, townsmen, and peasants. The Code contained no less than 1,600 articles relating to "classes, orders, or conditions." The right of holding serfs was reserved to the nobility. The higher orders were exempt from the obligation to render military service and to pay a poll tax. A generation ago, the inhabitants of each Roumanian village were divided into three classes, namely, the distinguished villagers, the middlemen, the hind men. Each man, according to his family, personal gifts, reputation, and fortune, was ranged into one or other of these three classes, which had each their separate customs, rights, and privileges.[1]

The orthodox Hindu holds that the caste-system is of divine appointment and that it has existed for all time. But the sacred books themselves, when they are studied historically, supply evidence both of its origin and growth. The poets of the Rigveda know nothing of caste in the later and stricter sense of the word; but they recognize that there are divers orders of men—the priests (Brāhma or Brāhmana), the nobles (Rājanya or Kshatyra), the tillers of the soil (Viç or Vaiçya), and the servile classes (Çūdra). Between the first three and the fourth there is a great gulf fixed. The former are conquering Aryans; the latter are subject Dasyus . . .

The caste system is the outcome of a long process of social differentiation to which the initial impulse was given by the introduction of a higher civilization into regions occupied by peoples in a lower stage of culture. The Aryan settlers, as represented by the sacrificial hymns of the Rigveda, were both intellectually and materially advanced. Their language, their religion and their social institutions were of the Indo-European type like those of the ancient Persians of the Avesta and the Greeks of the Homeric poems; and they were skilled in the arts and in the working of metals.[2]

But every one of the above-mentioned castes is minutely subdivided.

Thus ten great sects are reckoned of the Brahmins: five on the north, and five on the south, of the Vindhya range. And these are split up into a vast variety of divisions, the members of which cannot intermarry or eat together. Among the Mahrattas alone there are over two hundred castes.

The principal rules of caste observed by Hindus at the present time are, according to Mr. Dutt, as follows: (1) that individuals who do not belong to the same caste cannot marry; (2) that a man may not sit down to eat with a person of a different caste; (3) that his meals must not be cooked except either by a person of his own caste or by a Brahmin; (4) that no man of an inferior caste is to touch his cooked rations or even to enter his cook room; (5) that no water or other liquor, contaminated by

[1] Ross, *op. cit.*, p. 324.

[2] Rapson, Ed. "Cambridge History of India," Vol. I, p. 53 *ff.*

the touch of a man of inferior caste, can be made use of—rivers, tanks and other large sheets of water being, however, held to be incapable of defilement—(6) that articles of dry food, such as rice, wheat, grains, and so forth, do not become impure by passing through the hands of a man of inferior caste, so long as they remain dry but cannot be taken if they get wet or greased; (7) that certain prohibited articles, such as cow's flesh, pork, fowls, and so forth, are not to be taken; and (8) that the ocean is not to be crossed or any of the boundaries of India passed over.[1]

In these few examples—and any number of others might be given—we have pictures of people fixed at various social levels, differentiated vertically; we have people able to move about horizontally within their stratum but unable to move up to any other level; we have people severely circumscribed with respect to function, with respect to rank, with respect to culture, and in interest range. We can see them *stopped*, so to speak, on the social stairway, widely differentiated and separated but stationary. Such types of societies or groups are "closed, rigid, impenetrable, immobile," but not absolutely, as we now come to see.

3. Social Mobility

By *social mobility* we mean the amount and rate of movement of people from one stratum to another. The change of a man from the Catholic to the Protestant group would be a horizontal change. The change from the position of layman to that of bishop or from bishop to acolyte would be a vertical change. Freedom to change horizontally is, of course, important—a much coveted privilege sometimes. But men's eyes are fixed, for the most part, on vertical changes *to the upper levels*, and we shall think mainly of that sort. One of the most conspicuous characteristics of the so-called *democratic societies* is a greater amount of vertical mobility. Indeed, *democracy* might be defined as that social arrangement—political first and then universal—wherein mobility is freest. According to the amount of free circulation in any group, and between groups in society, it is possible to discriminate between the immobile and the mobile social types.

Sorokin proposes five propositions which may be stated and illustrated, and which are rough indices of the amount of mobility found in any group or society.

1. No Absolutely Closed Groups.—There has never been any group of society which has been absolutely closed. Any group remaining absolutely closed has suffered death. The first point to note here is that the young have been born into groups composed of the two sexes; birth has kept such groups from being closed. The second point to notice is that room has usually been made for adoptions—babies, new members. The third point to notice is that death is inevitable and opens

[1] Quoted in Case, "Outlines of Introductory Sociology," p. 225.

the circle by taking out members. There can be no absolutely closed horizontal groups, therefore, so long as people are born and die. Even the most rigid and unchanging form of society—the caste system in India—is not immune from the mobility caused in these ways. And there is always the possibility of being "outcast."

2. No Absolutely Open Groups.—This is simply a corollary to the first proposition and states that every society or group has some amount of stratification. The nearest we find to absolutely open groups are those mass movements, like the crusades and political revolutions, where anybody may join who cares to; such freedom is a characteristic of disorganized society. But for the rest, there are always conditions of membership of some sort, very severe conditions in the upper levels in certain parts of society—"the four hundred," for example—and less severe as we come down the ladder. The boys' gang on the river front and the girls' sewing club are, after all, rather select groups.

3. There is Wide Variation in Mobility from Group to Group.—This point may be illustrated in many ways. In an aristocratic society, the way in and up, usually, is *birth;* and there are very few upstarts, as a rule. We have already seen that the caste system of India is largely dependent upon hereditary stability; the majority of the occupational population take on and keep throughout their lives the work status of their fathers. In a democratic society, there is some of this entailment of various kinds; but there is much more freedom. In the United States, 58.5 per cent of the policy holders of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company changed their occupation between the time when the policy was issued and the time of death.[1]

With reference to political mobility, it may be said that the percentages of upstarts among monarchs and presidents in various countries and at various times are as follows, and these figures might be said to indicate the amount of mobility: western Roman Empire, 45.6; eastern Roman Empire, 27.7; Russia, 5.5; France, 3.9; England, 5.0; United States, 48.8. Here we see a very wide range of difference.[2]

4. The Mobility is Different in the Same Society at Different Times. There is abundant evidence to show this. Take the case of Russia as a handy one. During the decade, 1910 to 1920, there were two or three revolutions, and during this period a good many people who were "out" of politics at the beginning came "in" and came in at the highest levels; people who before the period were "nothing" during the decade became "everything." Never in its history, perhaps, has Russia been so mobile in all directions as now.

Wars as well as revolutions have changed the mobility of countries. The ancient Aryans conquered the native population of India, subjected

[1] DUBLIN, "Shifting Occupations," *Monthly Labor Rev.*, April, 1924.
[2] SOROKIN, "Social Mobility," p. 143.

it, and laid the foundations for the caste system. The Dorians conquered the ancient population of Greece; the Spartans, the population of Messenia; the Spaniards, the early Americans. The Revolutionary War made vast changes in the mobility possibilities in the United States.

Migrations have also increased the mobility. The continual waves of migrants reaching the shores of America have made radical changes here. Our classes were largely open, it is true, from the beginning, although the aristocratic feeling was not unknown here, and there have always been the "first families." The coming of the immigrants probably saved the country from hardening in certain ways. The movement of the Barbarians upon Rome made many changes there.

It would seem, indeed, as if mobility were increasing in almost all of the countries at the present time—China, Japan, India, and even some of the less important nations. We sometimes speak of this as the onsweep of "democracy." At the present time, there is a backwash in Italy and in other European countries.

5. No Certain Trend Yet Shown for Any Country of Mankind.—On the surface, as we have just said, there appears to be a trend toward greater social mobility in many parts of the world; the caste system in India seems to be giving way; in Russia, there are more possibilities of circulation up and down than formerly; in China, we see a movement toward republicanism. But no country shows any consistency of trend. We must keep in mind that historic time is such a small part of all time. If we proved, therefore, that the trend of old peoples like the Chinese had been consistently toward mobility, we could show it only for historic time and not for the whole life of the people. There is some evidence to show that primitive societies are rather more mobile than those which have taken up more space in the historic record; that is, peoples emerging from the primitive state have hardened, and mobility has decreased. Moreover, what does the future hold? There is no way of knowing that such a "free people" as these United States will not set up something as immobile as the Hindu caste system in the future.

In the United States, we have a record of less than 300 years. That is but a small segment of the possible sweep. Besides, while political obstacles to free circulation were largely swept away, other obstacles have crept in. President Wilson once said in an address that he liked to think of this as a country where the street urchin might become president. But to *wish* to have it so and to *have* it so are two different things. Since wealth is playing an ever larger part in politics in this country, there are more obstacles to advancement. The chances of 99.9 per cent of the citizens of this country to be president are not much better than the chances of 99.9 per cent of the subjects in a monarchy to be monarch. There are many students who are fearful of a movement

toward stratification. There is more said about, and more denial of, free speech now than some decades back. We have raised the bars against immigrants higher so as to control our own heredity. The power of business in government has probably grown greater. Similar phenomena are evident in other lands.

If we try to think of mankind as a whole, we are on more precarious ground. From the biological analogy, it might be plausibly argued that nations and mankind would harden and "cake" as they grow older rather than become more plastic. But if we leave the analogy aside, we have no evidence that there are more mobile nations on earth now than at some former period. There is no evidence that there were more or less mobile nations at the year 1000 A. D. than at the year 1. It takes preponderance to make a trend, but we cannot show preponderance. If we cannot show it for the past, we certainly cannot show it for the future. About all we can see is "trendless change."[1] There is no telling, however, what man's increasing control over nature and his organization of intelligence may do in the future.

4. Determiners of Social Position

With these matters in mind, we are now ready to ask: Why are people where they are in these strata? Or, if we dislike the use of the term *why*, we can ask the question this way: What people are in these various social strata? What one is a master, and what one a slave? What one is wealthy, and what one is poor? What one is politically important, and what one is politically insignificant? A full answer is not yet known. We can make only a few suggestions here. We must say that the explanation is found in heredity, environment, and struggle, all mixed up together.

1. Heredity.—That heredity—physical and mental—has played and continues to play a large part in social climbing and descent has long been assumed; it has seemed that this was obvious. But it is only within the last few decades that sound scientific studies have been made in this area, and now we have something much better than guesswork to rely upon. We have space here to do little more than name certain hereditary qualities which have figured in distributing people into the various strata.

1. Let us look at certain *mental qualities* first. As we look about us and examine the occupants of the different strata of our own groups, it is clear that the various mental defectives, the hereditary idiots and imbeciles, are at the bottom—gauged from the standpoint of function, rank, culture, and interests. They almost never perform any useful functions. Training sometimes supplements such deficiency; but these

[1] *Cf.* Sorokin, "Social Mobility," Chap. VII.

individuals rarely reach the level of what we call *skill*. They cannot usually acquire the prevalent mores and thus participate in the common culture, to say nothing of reaching a cultural level of importance. They usually have no interests beyond the satisfaction of animal wants; and in a less charitable environment they would drop out entirely. As to rank, we may say this: They are more and more privileged in the sense that they are more and more the objects of a protective philanthropy; but aside from these attentions, they are not privileged. Thus, we may say, without laboring so obvious a matter, that hereditary mental defect aids in social differentiation and distribution.

On the other hand, it is just as clear that those with exceptional native endowments climb toward the top. We have already pointed out that the fit survive and that the survivors are the fit; and in like manner, we might reason that the endowed are at the top and those at the top are the endowed; we might think of these two terms as synonymous. But we now have another way of reasoning; the judgment with respect to mental endowment is still made on the basis of achievement, that is, after the fact, but it is now also made before achievement. Mental testing has been developed to such an extent, and the correlation between test results and performance results has been carried far enough so that we are able to say something about the future beforehand; we can now locate those superior mental endowments very early in life and say that, as a rule, those who possess them will climb. On the other hand, we can say that, as a rule, those with inferior mental equipment will not climb. To take educational performance as a specific case, those with I. Q. ratings which place them in Class I will, as a rule, complete their course of study with distinction from the standpoint of a judgment made by compiling the opinions of instructors. On the other hand, those whose I. Q. rating places them in Class V will, as a rule, drop out of school—especially university—early in the course or perform poorly if they continue. There is increasing evidence that what is now established for educational performance holds true also for other types of occupation. Thus, we are getting evidence that what we call *native intelligence* is an important factor in distributing the population into the various social strata.

But there are other native mental qualities as well. Analysis has not yet gone far enough completely to isolate some of these, and they are all so soon overlaid, supplemented, or otherwise modified by training that it is not possible to be sure at this point. But our common experience is that persons of determination, originality, imagination, perseverence reach the upper levels in greater numbers than those who lack these qualities. Allow that very much of these qualities is acquired, yet there is a core of them all which seems to be inborn. Sorokin sums this matter up as follows:

Except during the period of decay, the upper strata are composed of persons possessed of strong ambitions, bold and adventurous characters, with inventive minds, with harsh and non-sentimental natures, with a sort of cynicism and, finally, with a will for domination and power.

These are the facts. Here is achievement; after the fact we recognize ambition, adventuresomeness, will to domination, and the rest. Some day we may have tests which will determine the existence of these endowments—if they are not acquired—early in life and thus be able to forecast life's direction in a larger and more accurate way.[1]

2. On the side of the native *physical characters* there is also much to be said. We can give only a few suggestive points. It is common enough to hear people predict that "that boy has energy; he will succeed." What is meant is that certain persons seem to be endowed with inexhaustible sources of energy; they never seem to get tired, or if they become weary they recuperate easily; they can overwork, go without sleep, and otherwise abuse themselves, and still be "going strong." How much of this is native is not known; but that there is something here which is not acquired is widely believed. And this quality of unwasting energy is a large factor in distributing people.

Closely associated is the matter of health. We are familiar with the social precipitation caused by ill health; all around us are persons who would be at the top but for their health. Of course, much of our good or bad health is a matter of acquired habits. But some are born with a good constitution, as we say, a native equipment which resists disease and which figures extensively in their ability to climb.[2]

In addition, there are other hereditary characters which seem to play a part in social distribution but whose part is not so obvious. There is some evidence to show that those in the upper strata are *taller* than those in the lower. Measurements have been made in Switzerland, Scotland, England, Italy, Russia, France, and elsewhere, and they all agree in locating the taller persons in the upper classes, whether the measurements are from the standpoint of wealth, intelligence, or occupation.

What has been said of stature is also true of weight; on the average, the weight of the members of the upper classes is greater than the weight of the members of the lower classes. This has been shown so often that we may take it as fairly well established. How much of weight is due to heredity, however, remains an open question.

Much has been done about the size of the head, the cranial capacity, and the weight of the brain. Excluding the purely pathological cases, there seems to be a close correlation between larger heads, cranial capacity, and weight of the brain and the upper social levels. Just what the

[1] *Cf.* SOROKIN, *op. cit.*, Chap. XII, where there is a good deal of statistical evidence for the points made.

[2] *Cf.* SOROKIN, *op. cit.*, Chap. XI.

exact connections here are we do not yet know; the interconnections have not yet been worked out, but there is a fairly close parallelism.

There is a good deal of evidence, of one kind and another, to show that the shape of the face, beauty, and bodily proportions have something to do with reaching the upper levels. We can see this negatively in the constant "turning down" of actors and actresses who are not "good-lookers" by the movie and legitimate-drama captains. It is also clear that, other things being equal, of two candidates for almost any position that we can think of, the handsomer will have the better chance. Again, what can be the meaning of such terms as *aristocratic face, aristocratic fingers, noble brow, well shaped,* and so on? Do they not indicate that the persons who have these qualities belong to the upper levels by virtue of having them and in these particulars? It is not easy to see what else they can mean.[1]

Other hereditary characters which play a role here are sex, age, and race; but these must be dismissed in a few sentences. We are born into one sex group or the other, and we take on the status of that sex in the larger group or society, whether that status be high or low. Sex has distributed people to various kinds of occupations, has entitled them to certain kinds of privileges, has enforced the development of certain kinds of culture, and has determined to some extent the range and kinds of interests.

We have already said something of the groups into which we fall by reason of age. We cannot avoid being helpless and the objects of all sorts of kindly attention, indifference, or abuse while in the helpless condition. We grow helpless again when up in years and tend to drop out of the stress of life, thereby going down the social ladder—although we may be apotheosized after death if we have been conspicuous while living. Youth has certain occupations open to it, certain privileges, a rather definite culture in one sense—or lack of it in the other sense—and there is a rather definite accompanying range of interests. The "middle ages" are the times of complete nonentity, mediocrity, or success. Our age is a notable factor in distributing us through the population.

We are born in one race rather than in another; and this decides very largely—since races are so different—what we shall do by way of function, what privileges we shall or shall not have, what type of culture we shall take on, and, of course, the accompanying interests. If we are of one race, certain occupations, rights and privileges, cultural achievements, and the like of other races are closed to us. Race relationship, therefore, is a distributing factor for the total population.[2]

2. Environment.—Turning to the environmental factors responsible for our being where we are, we have a vast profusion of complexities to

[1] *Cf.* SOROKIN, *op. cit.*, Chap. X, for much statistical evidence.

[2] *Cf.* NORTH, "Social Differentiation," Chap. VI *ff.*

deal with. We can take the space to mention only two—opportunity and social inheritance.

a. Opportunity.—In spite of all of our endowments, there is a limit to our achievements if opportunity, if an open way, is denied. Let us admit that ability makes opportunity; let us admit whatever the geneticist cares to demand at this point. It is still true that opportunity is a large factor in the flowering of ability. Ability does not manifest itself in a vacuum. There might be mining-engineering ability, but how should we know it without mines? There might be sculptural ability, but how should we know it without clay, wood, or stone in which to work? It is conceivable that rare intelligence would manifest itself without informal or formal education, but it is hardly conceivable that such intelligence would fail to profit immensely by large resources in informal and formal education. We probably should never have heard of Lindbergh if the airplane culture had not been in existence; this was his opportunity. We should probably never have heard of Edison if he had been born 300 years ago; the available scientific lore in certain fields was his opportunity.

This is simply to say that endowment is a one-sided, a partial, an incomplete, and, therefore, a sterile thing without nourishment. Hereditary endowment is no better than the best seed which a farmer can buy—it is useless for reproductive purposes without soil, and the better the soil the better the crop. There are opportunities in the material resources available. There are opportunities in the cultural resources. There are opportunities in the type of social organization into which these endowments are thrust by birth. There are opportunities in the "spirit of the times," that is, in those points of view, theories, and prevailing inclinations which encourage or discourage the native abilities in question. It would take an immense time for persons consumed by an ambition for wealth to become wealthy in the Sahara desert. Opportunity, then, is an active factor in distributing the population into the various strata.

b. Social Heredity.—The richness of human experience and natural resources operates as we have said. But a rich human experience helps not at all without tradition, without preservation and transmission to oncoming generations. If each one of us had to start at the very bottom, we should line up far differently than we do now; we should be very differently distributed. Each one born starts with a native equipment; that is true. But each one starts with a given family, community, and national accumulation of wisdom for living; that is also true—and immeasurably important. If we are born among primitives, we have a bad start—no matter what our endowments. If we are born in a wealthy home, we inevitably have a better start—at least from the standpoint of wealth.

This last point may be taken as illustrative of the numerous values in social heredity; we refer to the inheritance of *wealth*. From time immemorial, social leaders have been deeply concerned with the problem of organizing society so as to make it possible for those who have accumulated wealth unfailingly to transmit it; and there is a large body of tradition, of belief, of opinion, of expectation registered in the law to this end. The young have been more and more sure that they could receive and retain title to the accumulations of parents. Now, what has this meant by way of social distribution? It has meant, for one thing, that those born among the wealthy were born into the wealthy classes—and not at the bottom of the social scale; they were born amidst certain surroundings, material and cultural, which have made a vast difference in occupations chosen, in privileges available, in cultural acquisitions, and in interest range; they have been born with a halo. This is a special case, because there is nothing else which is accumulated that has been safeguarded in transmission with such care as has property.

If we put these two factors—opportunity and inherited wealth—together we can see that they are, separately or in combination, very powerful agents in the distribution of the population. And we can see that they are closely related, mutually supplement each other, and are transmutable into each other; inherited wealth creates opportunity, and opportunity makes wealth possible.

c. Struggle.—But back of and in addition to these two factors there is struggle, the struggle for existence, the competition and conflict of life; and it is this struggle that combines all of the excellencies and defects of life, rolls them up, twists them around, tests them, refines, and distributes the population. Each baby is born into a world of struggle. It offers first its native endowments—physical and mental. Thrown into the hopper alone, these would be handled and tested and give a certain kind of rating—a kind of which we have no knowledge because there is no arrangement on earth among men where people have no other assets. But the minute the child is born, it supplements these native endowments with wealth or poverty or mediocrity, with family culture or the lack of it, with family position or the lack of it, with family prestige or the lack of it, with community pride or the lack of it, with rich cultural and occupational opportunities or the lack of them, with large natural resources or the lack of them, and so on.

All of which means that the struggle for existence does not begin at "scratch" for all, like a foot race, but *begins* at different levels and carries on from there; and since nature, as we have seen, cares not a fig as to the outcome in any individual case, the struggle is a bitter and fierce one with her; the only mitigator is the amount of human wisdom accumulated and accessible, is the amount of human concern for the welfare of the individual, is the amount of organized justice and goodwill; in other

words, the only help available is in human solidarity. Nature is concerned—if we may use such a term—only with the species. But men have become concerned with the individual because the individual is the ultimately valuable item in the whole process. Some attitudes which are vicious—charity, for example—from nature's point of view seem to be virtuous from the human point of view, because they focus on the individual first but help the species indirectly.

Because we do not start at scratch, our democratic philosophy about all men being born equal is much awry; and if we add equality to inequality, we still have inequality. We shall have to know much more about genetics than we do now before we can seriously propose a program of eugenics; all we can do now, perhaps, is to locate some of the obviously unfit strains and bring them to an end. Also, we shall have to know a great deal about how to enlighten public opinion so that social organization may be revamped to this end.

It is all very fine, we think, that the Western world is blessed with open classes, that it is *possible* for the young or old to kick over the traces and climb; we like to see people going steadily from the bottom to the top, just as we like to watch steeplejacks climb. But we must remember that any system, any social arrangement, which permits of "going up" also permits of "going down." We do not see yet any way of constructing a social organization which will permit of "one-way traffic only." We may construct a social organization which will facilitate the upward climb—and we think we are doing that. But how to keep everybody up who goes up—that is much too hard for us yet. So our widely differentiated and differentiating processes will go on. The best we can hope for, perhaps, is to take unnecessary obstacles out of the way of those who would go up if they had, as we sometimes say, "half a chance."[1]

Questions

1. What are the main features of the scientific attitude?
2. What are the differences between a community and a society?
3. Several "forms of isolation" were given. What were they?
4. What are the chief causes of war? Can social scientists uncover true causes?
5. What is meant by *social space?*
6. When you introduce people, how far do you usually go in locating them in social space? Think about how you do it.
7. What was said about "differentiation" in the chapter on The People?
8. List the ways in which you differ *functionally* from several other persons.
9. What different *ranks* are represented in your home town?
10. What honorary titles have you heard used? What ones have you read about? What ones would you like to have applied to you?
11. When you call another person a *pig*, a *cat*, an *old hen*, a *crook*, and the like, what are you trying to do to them?

[1] *Cf.* Cooley, "Personal Competition," *Economic Studies*, Vol. IV, No. 2, p. 78 *ff.*

12. What does the story ending "Please miss, they taught 'em how to fight" illustrate?

13. What is the relation between differentiation and isolation?

14. Are people stratified in the United States? Give reasons for your answer.

15. Give some examples of social mobility in American life?

16. Do you know of any absolutely closed groups? Show why there cannot be any such thing.

17. What forces have determined your present social position?

18. What is meant by *social heredity?* Can you distinguish clearly between physical heredity and social heredity?

19. Among your acquaintances, some have, as we say, "gone up in the world," and some have "gone down." Count them and find out which group is the larger. Would this be a scientific fact?

20. What has the physical environment to do with social position?

CHAPTER X

ACCOMMODATION

Competition and conflict go on—the first interminably, the second intermittently. The process of differentiation never ceases. As a result of the everlasting reshuffling which we have tried to describe briefly, there is that "stratification" which was pointed out in the last chapter. The people of the earth *are* on different levels, and they live along on those levels. Now the question arises: What is the character of the relations or interactions among people at different levels? To put the matter more concretely: When two men engage in a fist fight, the outcome may be unsatisfactory to one of them. Then what?

Suppose a man decides to take a walk in the country. He almost invariably finds physical obstacles—trees, rocks, streams, and so forth—in his way, and *he* usually *changes* his course accordingly; that is, he modifies his behavior. Suppose we mix in some people with the trees and other physical things; then he changes his direction, also, but finds the situation much more complicated; people can move about and get in his way more readily than immobile physical objects. But suppose we add some ghosts or goblins; then he has more difficulties still, because the ways of spirits are more undecipherable than the ways of men. If a *group* decides to take a walk, the situation is infinitely complicated. This is about what each of us finds in life. What is called for in such a situation? We shall try to describe it in this chapter.

1. The Meaning of Accommodation

In view of modern biological theory and discussion, two modes of adaptation might be distinguished—adaptation by hereditary changes and adaptation through acquired modifications. J. Mark Baldwin has suggested the term *accommodation* for the latter type. This is a term "applied to any acquired alteration of function resulting in better adjustment to environment and to the functional changes which are thus effected."[1]

It is clear from the above that *two* modes or methods of meeting life's situations are possible—one by hereditary organic modifications and the other by alterations in activities which are acquired; that is, if the bear grows a thicker coat and the young inherit this modification to meet cold weather, that is adaptation; but if a man makes a thicker coat

[1] Quoted in Park and Burgess, *op. cit.*, p. 663.

and shows his son how to make one, that is accommodation. Broadly speaking, there are no other possibilities.

But what does *environment* mean? We have spoken of rocks, trees, streams, and other physical features being in the man's way as he walked; we have also spoken of people being in his way; and we have spoken of spirits being in his way. These illustrations suggest *three* types of environment. Broadly speaking, we are all amidst a world composed of three kinds of objects—the physical, the cultural, and the spiritual. In an early chapter, we discussed the first; in the chapters on Folkways and Mores and Contact and Interaction we gave some attention to the second; in a later chapter, we shall take note of the third. But the point is that adjustment has to be made by any person or group of persons to all three; these three are our environment, our surroundings. And while man undergoes organic and hereditary modifications to adjust to his environment, his chief method of adjustment is of the second type mentioned above; it is mainly by "alterations in activities which are acquired" and transmitted in tradition. In other words, man's chief method of adaptation is what we now call *accommodation.*

Park says:

> The term *accommodation*, while it has a limited field of application in biology, has a wide and varied use in sociology. All the social heritages, traditions, sentiments, culture, technique, are accommodations—that is acquired adjustments that are socially and not biologically transmitted. They are not a part of the racial inheritance of the individual, but are acquired by the person in social experience. The two conceptions are further distinguished in this, that adaptation is an effect of competition, while accommodation, or more properly social accommodation, is the result of conflict . . .
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> The distinction between accommodation and adaptation is illustrated in the difference between domestication and taming. Through domestication and breeding man has modified the original inheritable traits of plants and animals. He has changed the character of the species. Through taming, individuals of the species naturally in conflict with man have become accommodated to him. Eugenics may be regarded as a program of biological adaptation of the human race in conscious realization of social ideals. Education, on the other hand, represents a program of accommodation or an organization, modification, and culture of original traits . . . [1]

Then, almost anything that any individual does for himself or any group does for itself to meet life's situations is an accommodation. If this device is transmitted to his son by communication and is carried on down, it forms a part of the acquired racial inheritance and becomes, to that extent, a part of the group's method of adjustment to the three environments already mentioned. We can see, then, that accommodation is a *modus vivendi* involving (*a*) the surrender of some life patterns -thought.

[1] Park and Burgess, *op. cit.*, pp. 664–665.

feeling, and action—and (*b*) the adoption of some others as a means of survival. Because the three environments change, man must change. If the change in people is unfavorable to life and progress, we call it *maladaptation;* if it is favorable to life, we speak of it as a *genuine adjustment.*

2. Relations between Competition, Conflict, and Accommodation

The relations between the social processes which we have called *competition, conflict,* and *accommodation* are very close, as has already been hinted; but some further comment seems necessary.

1. Competition and Accommodation.—To struggle or not to struggle, that is the question. But prolonged inactivity means death. There is, therefore, a very important sense in which competition is a part or form of accommodation; for competition is a form of struggle, and struggle is one method of meeting life's situations. Struggle with nature, moreover, is never without some form; it is never without some bodily and mental phenomena which are adjustments or accommodations; it is never without a variety of techniques which are transmitted by communication. That is to say, the totality of man's social heritage, the totality of his culture, is nothing other than a vast complex of accommodations; to acquire and develop the arts of life is one way of meeting the struggle for existence. Let us illustrate:

Where nature provides oases and palm trees, man develops and transmits a certain kind of culture system; that system is his mode of meeting nature in that form. He does not, unless he is a very civilized and modern man, come upon the oases and palm trees with a number of preconceived notions and a prearranged social organization which he imposes on physical nature; but he takes hints from nature and adjusts himself by means of the special type of culture which he developes. Hence, we find very different culture complexes or social heritages in different regions—agriculture here, mining there, fishing in another place, and herding in another. If the physical environment presented exactly the same aspect, the same phenomena, everywhere on earth, it would not be easy to account for the wide diversity of social heritages. Thus, every tool, every skill, and *group life itself,* is an accommodation.

But there is another sense in which the term *accommodation* may be used, namely, with reference to certain adjustments of man to man and group to group; that is, there is adjustment to nature by means of the social heritage, and there is adjustment *within* the social heritage itself, of individual to individual, of technique to technique, of one part of the social heritage to others. In this sense, accommodation is continuous with but distinguishable from competition; it is a subsidiary social process, and it tends to take the form of subordination and superordination, that is, where one individual or group and one technique or part of the social heritage is subordinate to another. And it is *in this sense*

that we shall use the term in this chapter, plenty of illustrations following soon.

2. Conflict and Accommodation.—Park and Burgess say:

> Accommodation is the natural issue of conflicts. In accommodation the antagonism of the hostile elements is, for the time being, regulated, and the conflict disappears as overt action, although it remains latent as a potential force. With a change in the situation, the adjustment that had hitherto successfully held in control the antagonistic forces fails. There is confusion and unrest which may issue in open conflict. Conflict, whether a war or a strike or a mere exchange of polite innuendoes, invariably issues in a new accommodation or social order, which in general involves a changed status in the relations among the participants. It is only in assimilation that this antagonism, latent in the organization of individuals and groups, is likely to be wholly dissolved.[1]

The meaning of this may be clarified as follows: A fist fight, a duel, a feud, or a war can have one of three possible terminations for any given party to it—victory, a draw, or defeat. But looking at the conflict process itself, and not at the parties to it, we can see that there are only two possible terminations—a victory-defeat condition and a draw condition. And all cases call for readjustment, *are* readjustments. The only satisfied party is the victor; if the conflict issues in a draw, then nobody is satisfied. Hence, the antagonism mentioned above.

But in the cases of a draw and a defeat, what is to be done? The conflict is over—in overt form—but feelings of suffering and humiliation remain. Yet there is nothing to do but accept the situation and wait; there is nothing to do but adjust, accommodate, make the best of it. But here we have clear cases of subordination and superordination; the victor is the superordinate when the conflict ends; both parties are subordinate to the situation in a draw; the vanquished is in a subordinate position in a defeat. And the parties to a draw do not love each other any more than before engaging in the conflict, nor does the victim love the victor better after he is defeated.

In discussing the transition from war to peace, Simmel points out that a simple *longing for peace* is a prime motive and that this desire may spring up both directly and indirectly. The return to power of the peaceful element in the party would be a case of the first as would also the domination of the peaceful self over the warlike self. The second or indirect desire sometimes arises from the exhaustion of resources, from a growing interest in some other object, from a certain ascetic tendency, from a recognition that nothing further can be gained by continuing the struggle, or from a desire to withhold the full satisfaction of victory to the conquerer by confessing defeat before it is actually accomplished. "Victory is a mere watershed between war and peace."[2]

[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 664–665.

[2] Quoted in Park and Burgess; *op. cit.*, p. 704.

3. Reciprocal Character of Subordination and Superordination

It is clear, from all that has been said so far, that *man* accommodates himself to meet the physical world, not the physical world to meet the wishes and whims of man; the physical world is the superior and man is the inferior; man yields, and the physical world does not—by and large. It is also clear that man's struggles with man change the ranks or social levels of the participants so that some men win and others lose; some are victors and some are vanquished, so that we have this same relation of superior and inferior as a result; and it is always required of the inferior that he conform or accommodate himself to the standards of the superior. But this proposition must be qualified somewhat.

Says Simmel:

> Every social occurrence consists of an interaction between individuals. In other words, each individual is at the same time an active and a passive agent in a transaction. In the case of superiority and inferiority, however, the relation assumes the appearance of a one-sided operation; the one party appears to exert, while the other seems merely to receive, an influence. Such, however, is not in fact the case. No one would give himself the trouble to gain or to maintain superiority if it afforded him no advantage or enjoyment. This return to the superior can be derived from the relation, however, only by virtue of the fact that there is a reciprocal action of the inferior upon the superior. The decisive characteristic of the relation at this point is this, that the effect which the inferior actually exerts upon the superior is determined by the latter. The superior causes the inferior to produce a given effect which the superior shall experience . . .

That is, if the subordination is really absolute, then there is no spontaneity on the part of the inferior; the inferior is but a lifeless object, and this is an unsatisfactory relation from the standpoint of the superior; he cannot cause it to act satisfactorily upon himself.

Hence, the superior always has to leave a certain amount of *freedom to respond* to his subject. If the master abuses and crushes his slave, the slave becomes helpless and unable to work for the master, and thus the latter is deprived of the essential satisfactions of slavery. If the despot allows his tyranny to run away with him and utterly impoverishes his subjects and maddens them by extortion, then they rebel and throw him out of his position; he is deprived of the satisfactions of the superior position. If the orator criticises and insults his audience without restraint and abuses his power, the audience will leave him orating to himself. The lawgiver is not unqualifiedly superior; he can go only so far without stirring up that which jars him out of his lawgiving. The journalist leads, but he is influenced by public opinion. And from all of this it is clear, as Simmel says, that "all leaders are also led, as in countless cases the master is the slave of his slaves." "I am your

leader, therefore I must follow you," said one of the most eminent German parliamentarians, with reference to his party.[1]

4. Some Examples of Accommodation

Remembering Park's remark that "the term accommodation . . . has a wide and varied use in sociology," we may now pass on to illustrate this type of social process by examples; and many large volumes would not exhaust the subject. Accommodation *is* a wide and varied process. And we are confining our illustrations to the field of human relations, to the relations of men to their *social or human environment*—the second of the environments listed above.

1. Naturalization.—In its original sense, this term means to be made natural, that is, "at home" and at ease, in a new social environment. It means that the *stranger* is modified to such an extent that he is no longer strange. We speak frequently of feeling "quite at home" or of being "not at all strange" at a friend's home or of being "at home in the language." This means that we are no longer worried, no longer uncertain, no longer ill at ease; we know where to go about the house and how to behave at meals and what to say and not say to our hosts. We sometimes remark of a foreigner that he acts "like a native," which means that old habits have vanished and new habits have been so perfectly acquired that the foreigner has lost his foreignness. And this is the real meaning of naturalization.

But in America we use the term to symbolize the *legal process* only by which foreigners are made citizens. It is first of all a ceremony, a ceremony in which a foreigner answers satisfactorily certain questions propounded by the proper authorities relative to the nature of our political organization and then pledges his willingness to conform to the requirements of the same and forswears his allegiance to any foreign potentate and especially the potentate of the country of his birth or previous citizenship. He promises in public to abandon his old life patterns—habits, usages, sentiments, traditions, at any rate such as conflict with those to be adopted—and to follow faithfully the life patterns established and preserved here. That is, he yields; he submits. If he proposes to change our laws, we do not like it, and we do not admit him. Then he can go back home. If he becomes a citizen, it is on *our terms* and not his.

But of course naturalization really means more than the process described above. It has come to mean at least a certain degree of participation in the culture of the adopted country. It has come to mean a harmonization of the foreigner's life patterns in conformance with the principle expressed in the proverb, "When in Rome do as the Romans

[1] *Cf.* Park and Burgess, *op. cit.*, p. 695 *ff.*

do"—and don't criticise. The submission may be outward only, but that is the really important thing, for we do not care much what foreigners think if they only behave as natives do. Conformance may be a hardship, as it often is, but it is a lesser hardship than having to return to the land of origin.

2. Compromise.—If the foreigner, above mentioned, were to propose certain modifications in our laws and standards of value as a condition of his becoming a citizen, the authorities dealing with him would not listen; they would instantly reject him; they would say that he did not have the right attitude; they would say that we could very well get along without him. A person who asked to join the church but insisted on a change in the creed at some vital point would not be admitted. A student who comes to a university, comes to modify his life in accordance with the practice at the university and would be rejected if he insisted on a radical change in standards to suit his wishes.

In most departments of life, however, we do not find the same proud indifference to newcomers. Some organizations want members; indeed, our nation wanted them during certain periods of its history. Under such circumstances there is usually a disposition, on the part of the superior, to do some yielding; concessions are made; the requirements for entrance are modified somewhat; there is a measure of bargaining. But let us not forget that, while this looks like assimilation, it is really accommodation, in that both parties yield not to each other but *to a higher interest* or principle. This point will be made clear when we discuss accommodation to an impersonal principle a little later.

Says Professor Ross:

> The necessity for cooperating prompts the unlike to compromise their differences and abide together rather than go asunder or fight each other. As the pressure grows they consent to more compromises; as the pressure lightens they refuse to compromise longer. The medley of peoples making up the Austrian Empire remained for centuries in one state chiefly because, if they failed to hold together, foreign conquerors would reduce them to a status poorer than they were vouchsafed under the Hapsburgs. During most of the two centuries before 1815, the discordant elements in Austria had to stand shoulder to shoulder in wars involving the fate of the dynasty. After the relations of Austria to her neighbors had become stabilized, the long-pent discords broke on the surface in the revolution of 1848 and later in the adjustment by which Hungary obtained self-government. The downfall of the military empires in Eastern Europe, 1917–1918, allayed the fears which held unlike peoples in one leash and each people would have nothing less than full self-determination.
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> Compromise involves strain, for each compromising element has to yield something to which it feels itself entitled. Consequently one means of promoting good will among the diverse ethnic elements incorporated into a society is to lessen, so far as possible, the number of occasions for compromise. In case these

elements inhabit distinct districts or regions this may be done by allowing every such area the utmost measure of home rule. The federal type of government is, therefore, peculiarly suited to the needs of the peoples lately under the Hapsburg or Romanoff scepter, who wish complete freedom in all cultural matters yet have good economic reasons for remaining in some kind of political union.

In case the unlike are not segregated but live intermixed, the only means of avoiding occasions for compromise is "culture autonomy." This contemplates that government should concern itself with little else than order, defense, and economic relations, leaving each national element to organize as it pleases and provide itself as it will with churches, schools, libraries, hospitals, charitable institutions, means of recreation, etc. The law would probably not make education obligatory, restrict child labor, or regulate marriage and divorce, but such matters would be left to the religious authorities of each nationality.[1]

A most illuminating statement of the inner side of compromise is given by Simmel.

On the whole, compromise, especially of that type which is brought to pass through negotiations, however commonplace and matter of fact it has come to be in the process of modern life, is one of the most important inventions for the uses of civilization. The impulse of uncivilized men, like that of children, is to seize upon every desirable object without further consideration, even though it be already in the possession of another. Robbery and gift are the most naive forms of the transfer of possession, and under primitive conditions change of possession seldom takes place without a struggle. It is the beginning of all civilized industry and commerce to find a way of avoiding this struggle through a process in which there is offered to the possessor of a desired object some other object from the possessions of the person desiring the exchange. Through this arrangement a reduction is made in the total expenditure of energy as compared with the process of continuing or beginning a struggle. All exchange is a compromise . . .

Every exchange presupposes that values and interest have assumed an objective character. The decisive element is accordingly no longer the mere subjective passion of the desire, to which the struggle alone corresponds, but the value of the object, which is recognized by both interested parties but which without essential modification may be represented by various objects. Renunciation of the valued object in question, because one receives in another form the quantum of value contained in the same, is an admirable reason, wonderful also in its simplicity, whereby opposed interests are brought to accommodation without struggle. It certainly required a long historical development to make such means available, because it presupposes a psychological generalization of the universal valuation of the individual object, an abstraction, in other words, of the value for the objects with which it is at first identified; that is, it presupposes ability to rise above the prejudices of immediate desire. Compromise by representation, of which exchange is a special case, signifies in principle, although

[1] "Principles of Sociology," p. 228. *Cf.* Bogardus, "Fundamentals of Social Psychology," p. 214.

realized only in part, the possibility of avoiding struggle or of setting a limit to it before mere force of the interested parties has decided the issue.[1]

Why do boys, men, or nations engaged in a struggle or, before becoming involved in it, seek to adjourn it rather than carry it through to its natural conclusion? Simmel thinks that the *conciliatory attitude* is elementary and seeks to avoid struggle, just as the *disposition to quarrel* is an elementary attitude and seeks to promote it. Yet it is not identical with the peaceful disposition in general. While the latter avoids struggle under all circumstances or carries it on, if undertaken, always without going to extremes and with an undercurrent of longing for peace, the conciliatory attitude of which we are speaking manifests itself with peculiar force after surrender and after the energies involved have exercised themselves to the full; it retrieves the situation; it endeavors to remove the roots of the conflict.

But both mental attitudes—conciliation and the disposition to quarrel—have been developed as matters of utility in the struggle for existence. If the latter had been the only disposition and had not been counterbalanced by the former, the race would have perished long ago, consumed by its own passions. Pacifism, therefore, is not any new and strange attitude in the world, not a late invention simply to irritate the pugnacious when they decide to "save the country"; and it cannot be condemned merely on the grounds of its essential unreasonableness, for the disposition to quarrel is just as unreasonable; all such impulses are unreasonable.

3. Conversion.—A quite rapid form of accommodation is conversion, a social process usually associated with religious practice, but a form of modification widely found; political and other conversions occur all the time. A person, let us say, lives along according to certain habits and in conformity with certain standards of the group; he is adjusted, comfortable. Now, suppose a representative of another group passionately and logically—if the two are compatible—passes condemnatory judgment on these habits and ways and proposes a different plan in the presence of the person of whom we are speaking, and this person hears and understands. This makes a crisis, and peace gives place to internal conflict; struggle is on again. Oftentimes the struggle is carried on in silence, within the organism of this person. But more or less suddenly there is a decisive break from the old and an eager adoption of the new. Let us take an actual case.

An all-American tackle has this to say:

> Princeton played Chicago in a big intersectional game in the fall of 1922. During the first half the Tigers were weak in spots, brilliant at intervals, but lacking in good defense. Something was wrong in the line. The Maroon team

[1] Quoted in Park and Burgess, *op. cit.*, pp. 706–707.

battered its way through for three touchdowns. The half ended with the score 18–7 in favor of the Chicago eleven.

The Tigers went into their dressing rooms between the halves. The players had no more than flopped down on the benches and rubbing tables when Bill Roper, the Princeton coach, came tearing in.

"Where's Pink Baker?" he yelled. Baker, the husky lineman, was sitting in a corner, his head resting on his cupped hands. Roper approached him. "Baker," he said, "what's wrong with you? Forgotten how to play tackle? Chicago is having a regular parade through your side of the line." The coach then went into detail to show the lineman just what was wrong with his playing. Still under the stress of emotion, he continued: "Listen here, Pink, I'm going to put you on trial for three minutes at the beginning of the second half. Going to give you a last chance. If you don't smear those Chicago plays in the manner you are capable of, I'm going right out on that football field and before the whole crowd I'll rip that Princeton football jersey right off your back. It'll be the last time you'll ever step on a Princeton field, too. Remember, three minutes." And Roper walked away.

You cannot realize the significance of that talk unless you knew Pink Baker. He is the kind of fellow who would rather have his right arm torn off in preference to his Orange-and-Black jersey. And suddenly a transformed Pink Baker ran out on the field at the beginning of the second half. No fleet-footed backs gained any yards through Baker. No crushing off-tackle plays made any headway through the big blond tackle. Instead, he not only played a whale of a defensive game but proved an inspiration to his team-mates, who managed to stage one of the greatest comebacks in modern football, Princeton winning 21–18.[1]

The famous evangelist, Dwight L. Moody, tells the following story:

I met a man in New York who was an earnest worker, and I asked him to tell me his experience. He said he had been a drunkard for over twenty years. His parents had forsaken him, and his wife had cast him off and married someone else. He went into a lawyer's office in Poughkeepsie, mad with drink. This lawyer proved a good Samaritan, and reasoned with him, and told him he could be saved. The man scouted the idea. He said: "I must be pretty low when my father and mother, my wife and kindred, cast me off, and there is no hope for me here or hereafter." But this good Samaritan showed him how it was possible to secure salvation, got him on his feet, got him on his beast, like the good Samaritan of old, and guided his face towards Zion. And this man said to me: "I have not drunk a glass of liquor since." He is now a leader of a young men's meeting in New York.

Mr. Moody gives numerous other examples. Harold Begbie, in his books "Twice Born Men" and "Souls in Action," gives accounts of many such transformations. The story of the prodigal son, the story of St. Paul, of John Wesley, of Jerry McAuley is but confirmatory of the reality of conversion. We have the same type of phenomenon in "falling in love," which changes many habits; in cases of capitalists becoming

[1] *Columbus Despatch*, Oct. 24, 1926.

anticapitalist; in cases where lazy people wake up and go to work. The fact of such change, such modification of life direction, is incontestable.

The explanation of the process is another matter. We can see pressure in the shape of suggestions of danger, hope, possibility, and the like applied. We do not yet know what happens within the organism. Some still speak of it as a supernatural phenomenon. However, that may be—and there is no scientific evidence—the mutation takes place. The point of interest in this connection is that conversion amounts to a migration from one group to another. It is not unlike the movement of an Italian or Syrian to another country. The habits, customs, standards, and values of the old group are abandoned, and those of the new group are taken on. This is the first point.

The second point is that the individual converted undergoes the change and not the standards and customs adopted. The man in Moody's story was modified and not the so-called divine plan of salvation. Bill Roper did not change the rules of play to suit the condition of Pink Baker; Baker underwent the change. Jerry McAuley did not insist that the Almighty modify his attitude on drink and bumming; Jerry was the one made over; he said, "*Thy* will, not mine, be done."

Bogardus points out that

> . . . the maintenance of conversion depends not only on a store of habits that may be resuscitated, but also upon the social stimuli that function. If these come from constructive, sympathetic religious contacts then conversion may hold long enough for the necessary new habits to become established. But if all the convert's social contacts be non-religious, anti-religious, or vicious then conversion represents a precarious accommodation.[1]

4. Slavery.—A widely found condition of human affairs—another accommodatory social process—is what has been called slavery. The term *slavery* may suggest a result, an end, and slavery is that; but it is also a movement, a life direction of the yielding and conforming kind of which we are speaking. But what is slavery?

The world's workers, since earliest times and in recent times more than ever, have been dividing themselves ever more thoroughly into specialties. The minuteness of the present subdivision process is one of the marvels—and sometimes the laughingstock—of the ages; some times we call this *specialization*, and we shall learn more of it later. And by this division of labor we mean an arrangement, an understanding, by which one worker does one kind of work exclusively. But—and this is more important for our purposes—we mean also an arrangement by which men's wants are provided for, not by their own labors but by the labors of others. A society without any division of labor would be a society in which each man worked to satisfy his own wants and nobody worked for anybody else.

[1] "Fundamentals of Social Psychology," p. 215.

Now, this dividing process can be brought about in two ways. One is the way of the so-called *free commerce*, by which we mean the way with which we are familiar and which we ordinarily adopt when we look for a job and are employed; theoretically, we choose the kind of work we would like; we go and bargain with the employer; we can accept his terms or not, just as we please—if we are not starving. Sometimes we speak of this as the *wages system*. The other way is the way of subjugation of workers so that those who serve masters are disposed of as people dispose of their plows, horses, and money, while the masters remain free. This subjugation can be imagined as restricted to certain services such as tilling the land, herding the cattle, and doing other stipulated services—outside of which the party is more or less free. Or we can imagine a subjugation in which almost no liberty remains, in which the whole outward life of the servant is regarded by the master *as a means* to his purposes, where the entire personality is absorbed. And this is what we mean by slavery.

Every slave, as opposed to the freeman, is subjected to almost unlimited authority. He is property, a possession, in the same sense that a ring or a cow or a house is a possession. Secondly, slaves are at a lower social level in that they are limited politically and are looked down on by their masters and other free people. Thirdly, the labor of the slave is always compulsory. The free laborer may leave off work when he pleases; he may starve if he wants to. But the slave cannot leave off or starve; he must work; moreover, he is just another tool. Thus, slavery may be defined as that arrangement within any social system wherein some people are the property of others, must work for others, and are politically and socially at a lower level.[1]

It is most difficult, if not impossible, for some of us to imagine ourselves as enduring such subordination. And many people, coming to themselves in such a condition, like the prodigal son have rebelled and thrown off the yoke. History gives us plenty of examples. In such cases, accommodation reverts to conflict and the ground is prepared for a new adjustment. What we are concerned with, however, is slavery as an example of accommodation, for we have here human beings in a subordinate place and yielding to something fixed. The slave modifies his habits of life to suit the master; the master does not modify his habits to suit the slave. The master has all the rights and privileges, and the slave has all the duties and responsibilities.

Since it is difficult, if not impossible, for some of us to imagine ourselves in such a condition, we can hardly see how any person has ever endured it. But what else is there to do? Anything different would be —worse. Slavery is, then, in one sense, a compromise; it is a choice between what is very bad and exasperating and what is inhuman and

[1] Nieboer quoted in Park and Burgess, *op. cit.*, p. 676.

devilish. And yet, very often, a certain state of mind, a kind of outlook, is cultivated so that the condition is not merely endurable but actually approved. Let us look into slave attitudes.

In the first place, there may be the yielding of despair, the conformance that is preferred to death, the endurance that sees no way of escape. Many slaves are in that frame of mind—and also many wage earners, although wage earning is supposed to be a case of free commerce; accommodation persists because anything else would be something worse; they see no way *up;* and the only open road is *down*—down to harder work, more brutality, infinite pain. Good work and flattery are perhaps the only mollifying or neutralizing methods.

Secondly, there is the conformance which is accompanied by pride. Such persons find comfort in doing their master's work well and holding up an "employer's good name," as one old servant described it. The "good-work" idea expresses, in part, possibly, the so-called *instinct of workmanship,* wherein some seem to find much satisfaction.

Thirdly, there is the conforming endurance which is due to ignorance of anything different. Persons born in slavery and kept uneducated and away from all outside contacts never know that any other arrangement exists or is possible. The slaves of an African chieftain have no knowledge of popular suffrage as we know it in this country.[1]

Fourthly, there is the conformance which is supported by the satisfaction in being relieved from many of life's obligations. One old servant, writing during the Civil War, expressed herself as follows:

> How well off the servants are in these years of the war, for they have no rent to worry about and no anxiety about their coal bill, nor how food, etc., is to be got in and paid for, no taxes nor cares like so many poor working men . . . A great deal more could easily be written, and we hope some old servant may also speak out in favor of domestic service, and so let it be again what it has been, and when both will look on each other as they ought, for there has always been master and servant . . . [2]

This concluding sentence suggests a fourth support for conformance, namely, prolonged training in tradition. This servant held, as many are taught, that "there has always been master and servant" and that it was foolish and wrong to expect or try for anything different; she was taught and habituated that way, stereotyped. Hence, she was afraid of anything different. Thus, she justifies the lack of opportunity for personal development.

5. Debtorship.—The debtor is a familiar figure; we all know him and, unfortunately, have sometimes been him. The writer was intimately

[1] *Cf.* the sufferings endured by the pupils in Squeers' school as described by Dickens in "Nicholas Nickleby."

[2] Quoted in PARK and BURGESS, *op. cit.*, p. 694.

acquainted with a man who became involved in debt while undertaking his very first independent economic enterprise as a young, unmarried man; and he never succeeded in escaping debtorship as long as he lived. What are some of the implications and results of this condition? What part early discouragement had in keeping him in this state is not known. But that he was, throughout life, without a sense of freedom, that he felt the accusing finger of public self-righteousness pointed in his direction, that he met most people with something less of courage and comfort than was guaranteed by his normally light-hearted and genial disposition, that he and his family underwent many deprivations and modifications—these matters are well known. The role of debtor was organized for him in the minds of outsiders. He adjusted himself and played the part to the end. This case suggests certain matters which are worthy of comment.

In the processes of *commercial* dealing, it is not unusual for the exchanges to fall short of exact equation. Indeed, our judgments with respect to the values of goods and services have never been so precise and accurate that a perfectly equitable exchange was possible. By the use of money, the balance is most nearly struck; but in barter the greatest difficulties always attended an exchange. It is not going too far to say that we are all in debt all the time in the sense that we do not pay so much as goods and services are actually worth, have actually cost, although we often seem to overpay. These inobvious cases, however, are not our concern here. We are more interested in examples, such as the case cited above, where the condition is unmistakable and admitted.

A familiar figure is the person who buys furniture, an automobile, a farm, an education, or something else and *promises* to pay for the same at or by a specified time and in a prescribed manner—instalment buying, let us say—but proves unable to do so by reason of sickness, being robbed, being thrown out of work, or other misfortune. What is the sociology of this state of affairs?

Manifestly, and often contrary to all appearances and pretense, this person is not on the same social level as his creditors. Is he on a higher level? Plainly not, for he cannot meet his creditor face to face with the same feeling of assurance, with the same confident independence, as he had formerly -unless he is a hardened sinner. He is dominated by a feeling of limitation in movement—he cannot travel as he might have done without this debt; he gradually matures a judgment that he is less free than formerly to use his money as he pleases; he cannot forget the fact that the creditor "has a string on him." If he is conscientious, that is, takes pride in his former position and seeks to recover it, he denies himself many things in order to make the stipulated payments. This is modification of personal habits in conformance with the creditor's wishes, and these are backed up by the law.

On the other hand, the creditor feels expanded in power and elevated in position. Formerly, he could meet this man only as an equal. Now his status is changed; he plays a new role; he is a creditor; he has this man and his family in his power. Thus, while the debtor sinks, the creditor rises. And the creditor's family rises with him; there are modifications of life all around. For customs, laws, and conventions are back of the creditor. They stand there like mountains, immoveable and pitiless; they cannot adjust—except slowly—they cannot change; adjustment has to be to them; the debtor must come up to them. The question is not whether he is able or not; he *must* come up; the courts are ready to back up the creditor in compelling him. But if the courts are appealed to, then the case passes out of our immediate purview; it is thrown back into the realm of conflict from which a new adjustment—in the shape of some sort of settlement—issues; the debtor may be forced into bankruptcy, in which event the creditors take what they can get; the debtor may be required to pay so much a week into court; debtors have been publicly whipped and otherwise humiliated.

Two modes of adjustment are open to debtors. They may save and curtail and struggle to pay off the debt and regain economic independence—that is one mode. Or they may adopt a philosophy of despair and sink to a lower level, gradually surrendering all hope of recovery, inuring themselves to the houndings of creditors, hardening themselves to the accusing fingers, learning to endure deprivation and disesteem. But this is modification in order to live at all with a big, unalterable and undeniable fact—the fact of the debt relation.

So much for the individual. What may be said of groups? During and since the World War, the nations of Europe have incurred heavy financial obligations to the United States—the figures are immaterial here save that the amounts are so large that these nations are finding great difficulties in paying them back. The debts are huge; and they are almost unpayable. Now what modification, what change, is taking place in these countries as a result? Says Rt. Hon. Philip Snowden:

> No American who has visited Europe occasionally during the last few years, and who has come in touch with public opinion, can have failed to be impressed by the growing antipathy to the United States . . . The unpopularity of America in Europe is due to her post-war attitude to European resettlement. Rightly or wrongly, she has managed to create the impression that, when her fear of the German menace was removed, she left Europe in the lurch, devoted herself to taking financial and commercial advantage of Europe's misfortunes, and was concerned only in her own material interests. This view . . . exists, and nothing has done so much to give it apparent justification as America's policy on the matter of the Interallied debts.[1]

[1] *Atlantic Monthly*, September, 1926, p. 401.

This statement by a distinguished Englishman reveals a modification of feeling and thinking. And there is in Europe an enormous amount of readjustment in action going on; taxes are high; the prices are high; the wages have not kept pace. Consequently, millions of Europeans have had to scale down their living in countless ways, going without education, going without books, going without travel, going without new furniture, going without milk, going without adequate medical attention—innumerable accommodatory deprivations. And this condition is, of course, an unstable equilibrium, a condition which is endured for the time being because it cannot be avoided.

There are countless other examples of accommodation. We might mention the adjustments which we all have to make when in a crowd—the hesitations here, the devious movements there, the pausings and sallies in other directions to avoid collisions; we might mention the dressings for parties when we are tired; we might mention the waitings while others talk, the waitings while others eat, sleep, use the automobile, occupy a favorite chair; although almost starved, we wait for the hostess to begin eating; although bursting with energy and burning for activity, we are quiet in church. In his remarkably frank and illuminating life of Queen Victoria, Lytton Strachey sketches an interesting case of accommodation where the queen was really the subordinate, and her adroit and cynical minister, Disraeli, was the master; and monarchs have often had to readjust to get along with their incorrigible ministers and nobles. We might mention obedience to the law; we might mention *toleration* of all kinds and in all circumstances; we might mention the *caste system;* we might mention the dominance which the physician exercises over his patient, the clergyman over his parishioners, the males over females in a patriarchal society, the Whites over the Negroes in American society. Accommodation is a very prevalent type of *modus vivendi.*

It is plain now that there are, as we have suggested, two main types of accommodation—accommodation to the physical world and accommodation to our fellows and their culture. And there are two main sorts of the latter—the balanced, or draw, arrangement, wherein an equilibrium is reached without any particular advantage to anybody, as in a tug-of-war or a game of checkers, and the subordination-superordination type, as in slavery or debtorship, wherein some have most of the rights and privileges and others, most of the duties and responsibilities. And it is also clear that these social arrangements are generally unsatisfactory and, therefore, unstable.

5. Antecedants of Accommodation

In describing these examples—slavery, debtorship, compromise, and the rest—we have not been able to keep entirely away from reference

to antecedants or causes. But what was incidental and marginal in the previous discussion must now be brought into the central place. Why does not conflict continue until it has wrought its logical results, namely, the extermination of one party? Or, to put the matter in another way, how is accommodation possible?

1. Inertia.—In the competition and conflicts of life at any time and in any place, many find themselves falling behind; the struggle is too intense and too rapid for them; from sheer weariness or inertia they drop back into the less intense parts of the struggle and simplify their life so as to endure, but upon a lower level. They may not care for the prizes of life; they may be physically incapable of securing them; theirs may be a general apathy toward all struggle.

The workmen in a certain factory were given equal rights with the management in running the business and enjoying the profits. But they were too inert, too dead, too unambitious to take advantage of their opportunities; they preferred to remain in their irresponsible but comfortable adjustment. This is paralleled by the inertia of the masses in using their powers in the political sphere; having the vote, they refuse to use it for effective public criticism and thus endure evils without number. Perhaps inertia has been one of the chief factors in impeding social progress all down through the centuries.

2. Ignorance.—The sheer inability of individuals and groups to see ways out of their subordinate positions is also responsible for a great deal of subordination at lower levels. When the spoilsmen are in the saddle, what can ignorant people do? What could the slaves in the South do but submit and make the best of it? What could the serfs in the Middle Ages do? What can laborers do when they know that they are exploited by capitalists? They do not know where the roots of the tyrranous system are. They do not know how to pull them up. Hence, the violent overturnings of all past time.

And this ignorance has been a chief factor in keeping the millions of religious people in spiritual darkness and, therefore, in the hands of fanatics—medicine men, quacks, charlatans, and ecclesiastical despots, that is, keeping them in a subordinate place. The millions have not been allowed to investigate for themselves; they have not been trained to discriminate; they have been encouraged to hold fast that which was committed to them in spite of all opposition. On the other hand, the shackles of religious superstition have been broken largely by scientific inquiry, by painstaking investigation, by critical thinking, that is, by an organized and searing intellectual approach to the world.

3. Training.—Many accommodations, possibly most of them, are made through training, through daily cultivation, through continuous "conditioning." Take the case of slavery mentioned above. The young were born in slavery; they were brought up to understand that

they were slaves; little by little the slave stereotype etched itself in their systems. And the same idea is clear in the field of religion. The ancient Jewish traditions had it—as the Old Testament shows—that the first man acquired an ineradicable taint called *sin*, in a moment of indiscretion, which was transmitted invariably to all succeeding generations. As later theologians phrased it, man was conceived in iniquity and born in sin—a fine compliment to the Almighty's management of the universe. Thus, here we are, poor, luckless mortals—tainted and stubbornly believing in the taint. How did it all come about? Through training, through the painstaking, persistent inculcation of that idea; the church has devoted itself largely to the task of etching this notion so that is could never be forgotten or eradicated. And training is everywhere and has always been the forcing of mental growth in certain directions pleasing to the trainers. Training also gives a different sense of values.

4. Pacifism.—Many are too peaceful in disposition to fight or to continue long in it if once embroiled. Being of conciliatory and compromising temperments, they prefer to salvage something from the struggle and to end it or prevent it, at any rate. Being gentle and humane, they abhor cruelty and blood and keep away from these things as savages keep away from tabooed areas. Hence, they endure much from the aggressive and always have to accommodate themselves to conditions created by those who readily overpower them.

There is not only this feeling of aversion, but there is, also, in some cases, the positive conviction logically worked out, that struggle is unnecessary and a great waste, that it is utterly unsafe to have men's passions released as physical struggle always releases them. Many pacifists have the courage of discussion and debate but not the courage of the duel or war. So they accommodate themselves to very terrible situations many times, for the madness which is released in war does not leave them unscathed—and thus tends to prove their contention. They argue; they investigate; they wait—yield—until such time as man can be more sane about his social relationships.

Thus, we have the curious paradox well illustrated that original nature and human nature are both against subordination and for it; that some like to yield and some to dominate; that some persons like to yield at some times and dominate at others. And if this were not so, there could be no organized society; there would be the chaos of individual against individual, eternal strife, and rapid degeneration. Accommodation is a salvatory art, or a vast and complex series of arts, without which the human race would cease to make progress. Compromise and conciliation are among the greatest of human inventions. Animals know nothing of these things.

6. To What Is Accommodation Made?

The answer to this question has already been given by implication. Here we have only the task of making the point explicit. And of course we are thinking only of accommodation among and to human beings. We accommodate ourselves to (1) an individual, (2) a group, and to (3) impersonal principles. These are the possibilities; let us look at them a little.

1. To an Individual.—We mean by this those modifications, those adjustments, large and small, which are made by individuals and groups to an individual from personal attachments and for other reasons. The old servant already mentioned was attached to the master and delighted in him. A phenomenon of rather recent discovery is known as the "crush;" and by this is meant that one person, usually a female, abandons herself to another woman "soul and body;" she must be in the company of the other all the time; she thinks and feels as the other does; she selects and rejects continually in the light of the other's tastes and decisions; she is, so to speak, "under a spell."

A very clear case is that of the hypnotist and his subject. The hypnotist is in control of the subject, makes suggestions, and gives commands which are carried out. So complete is the subordination of the subject that he will endure pain, make himself ridiculous, break engagements, assume work or stop it—all at the dictation of the master. These are but examples of a type of subordination which is illustrated from all walks of life.

There are countless cases of *groups* subordinating themselves to individuals. A religious congregation will admire and worship a minister; the business organization will change its plans and actually lose money out of personal attachment for a manager; the political party will often endure defeat rather than break with a leader; the gang will prostrate itself before its hero. In religion, in business, in politics, in recreation—everywhere we find this group submission to a person.

2. To a Group.—Individuals continually find themselves at the mercy of groups—the fraternity member to the organization, the individual voter to the party, the church member to the congregation, the teacher to the school board. Nothing is perhaps more common than the subordination in which people continually find themselves to groups to which they belong.

Nor is anything more common than the subjection of a minority group to a majority group. Indeed, that is the constitutional rule under which Americans are supposed to operate. The various race groups which have come to America have had to modify their life patterns in countless ways to succeed here. The following case is reported from the West Indies by Weatherly.

If there is such a thing as the African type of mind it cannot have been totally obliterated within the two or three centuries of contact with Europeans, even though that contact was of a character least calculated to produce an independent social attitude. Supposing the Negro to have originally possessed little objective cultural equipment, his mind was not a *tabula rasa*. He at least had interests and capacities, and these have found small outlet in his new home. Repression of these interests and capacities has thrown him back on those primitive interests which are more or less furtive and which function on the instinctive rather than the rational level. Most of such survivals as can be traced are therefore in the field of emotional expression and superstitious practice. Certain elements of African dances are still traceable in some of the islands, but they are rapidly becoming so conventionalized as to be little more than suggestions. Chants in the original tongues have now become meaningless lingo. African folksongs have largely disappeared, although their forms are possibly preserved in some of the current folk songs. Religion has modelled itself almost completely on the churches and practices of the whites.[1]

3. To an Impersonal Principle.—No "draw" can be had in a conflict with an impersonal principle. An individual or a group either submits to it or destroys it by ignoring it; a principle which is not on top is no principle; if a *folkway* is not generally triumphant, it is not a *folkway;* if a law is not obeyed, it is not a law; if one is not guided by evidence in the search for truth, then truth does not rule the life of the so-called *searcher;* when principles are modified, they are no longer principles.

Some of the fundamental principles to which we daily make accommodations are cleanliness, honesty, fair play, the value of marriage, the high value of the individual, chivalry, loyalty to the constitution or the monarch, democracy, tolerance, truthfulness, science, and dozens more. These principles are accepted as standard, as superordinate, and harmonization with them is effected by modifications in the life ways of those who hold to them.

An especially interesting phase of this sort of accommodation is the modification we make in our goings out and comings in relative to the aleatory or luck element in life. In discussing the struggle for existence, we took note of the "struggle with fate." We really have the same idea before us again. The term *alea* is from the Latin meaning a *die* or a cast. The aleatory element is that phase of our life which often appears to be "set" either for us or against us by somebody. "The cards are stacked against us," we sometimes say; or they are for us. "Fortune favors the brave," is another saying of similar import. We shoot carelessly—and bring down a big bird. We take a throw of the dice—and turn up double sixes every time, as was said of Roosevelt. We step outside in high spirits, ready for a fine day's outing—and turn our ankle. We see the promising young person picked out by the grim reaper while the "old soak" lives on. One ship makes the voyage

[1] *A. J. S.*, Vol. XXIX, No. 3.

safely, while another hits the iceberg and goes down on her maiden voyage.

We do not refer to the results of folly. Loss comes even with the best of judgment. We refer to the inscrutable, the incalculable mystery out of which our various life portions come very unequally; we refer to the undiscovered forces which determine that we shall have "something for nothing" today and "nothing for something" tomorrow. And we refer to the sobering effect that an awakening to this luck element has on many people, the modification it produces. In the one case, speaking broadly, the accommodatory form is religion, as we shall see when we come to the chapter on that subject; it is accommodatory because the larger features of religion have been prayers, sacrifices, and quiet resignation to the inscrutable Will or Power behind the scenes. In the other case, we have science, which is an aggressive attempt to penetrate behind the veil and find out what forces bring good luck today to this one and bad luck tomorrow to the other one, in what human beings call such an unjust fashion. Sometimes it seems as if science were the superordinate and not the subordinate; but science comes upon the inscrutable just the same as religion; and the writings of many distinguished scientists reveal bafflement and a certain amount of resignation. As a matter of fact, scientists play with the ripples and waves on the surface of life and nature like children splashing about near shore; they are mostly ignorant yet of the vast ocean depths. Indeed, we can go further and say that *all culture*, that whole complex of arts, law, morals, usages, religion, and the rest, constitutes an immense accommodation to the Nature amidst which we live, the workings of which are very slowly being made out.

Questions

1. Is differentiation a "process" or a static condition?
2. What are some of the limitations of science?
3. Show how accommodation is a result of competition and conflict.
4. Can you illustrate accommodation from any of your experiences?
5. What is the difference between accommodation and assimilation?
6. Why is "naturalization" considered under accommodation?
7. Describe carefully any "compromise" that you have made. Were the results more satisfactory than if you had fought?
8. What really happened to "Pink Baker?" Has anything like that ever happened to you? If so, give the circumstances.
9. When a young man endeavors to win the affections of a young lady, is that a case of accommodation?
10. Who is the subordinate in your home and why?
11. To what impersonal principles are you subordinate?
12. Compare ignorance and inertia as causes of subordination.
13. "Stratification" was discussed in what other connection? Why consider it here?

14. If we all believed in and practiced peaceful adjustment of differences, would we have any radicals?
15. What is the relation of organization to accommodation?
16. Have you ever been homesick? If so, what was the cause? What did you do to cure it? Were you entirely amiable while you suffered? Do you think "foreigners" are ever homesick?
17. Show how folkways and mores are cases of accommodation.
18. What characteristics of people (1) hinder and (2) help adjustment?
19. In what degree is it true that "all leaders are also led?"
20. Does accommodation end struggle?

CHAPTER XI

SUGGESTION-IMITATION

We are still considering major social processes, social interactions, characteristic "goings-on"; these are the plots of the social drama which interest us now. The next social process selected for treatment is a double affair, a social Siamese twins. We can hardly think of imitation without at the same time thinking of what is imitated—which leads directly to suggestion—and we can hardly think of suggestion without thinking of what comes out of it—which leads often to imitation. In this chapter, then, we have to deal with a more obviously circular form of interaction—the activities of people forming a continuous hail of suggestions, these being taken up by others who act imitatively and suggest to yet others, and so on without end.

The inclusion of this topic at this point is, of course, quite arbitrary in the sense that the order of treatment is not necessarily logical. In social life, we do not all participate in competition first, then in conflict, then develop differentiated functions, then suggest and imitate, and finally accommodate and cooperate; our life is not quite so regular. All of these processes, and numerous others, intermingle and intersect with one another all the time in the most inscrutable ways, and it is rather daring to give priority to any one of them. We might have noted the suggestion-imitation aspects of competition, conflict, and differentiation, for these processes have such aspects. On the other hand, we might, if we had space, take note of the competition aspects, the conflict and differentiation aspects of suggestion-imitation, for there are such phases to this complicated process. We are merely dipping our small ladles into the broad stream of the social play and taking up a few characteristic contents.

SUGGESTION

1. Definition

Suggestion has been defined in various ways. Bechterew describes it as "the direct infection of one person by another of certain mental states" or "the penetration or inoculation of a strange idea into the consciousness, without direct immediate participation by the 'ego' of the subject." This is passive suggestion. But there is also active suggestion wherein the subject necessarily takes part by attention,

reflection, judgment, and will. These two phases of the process are obvious to all of us, for while we are actively attending in one direction, we are at the same time open to impressions from other directions, and thus active and passive at the same time; we may be intent upon the book we are reading—direct suggestion—but become vaguely aware that we have been called to do something about paying our overdue taxes—indirect suggestion. Our environment is continually furnishing us with hints, noted and unnoted, for our next or for future movements.[1]

"By suggestion" says Ellwood, "we mean the process of communicating an idea from one individual to another, when the idea is accepted more or less uncritically or without rational ground."[2] According to Allport, suggestion may be regarded from three points of view and thus defined in three ways. First it is a process of building up predispositions toward behavior in certain ways. We might think of these predispositions as being organized around the native drives or urges such as hunger, sex impulses, fear, and the like; and we can also think of them as being organized about and enlargements of certain acquired patterns, such as habits of action and belief—religious, political, aesthetic, and others. Looked at in this way, suggestion is the process of forming attitudes or prejudices; the emphasis here is upon what takes place within the subject; it is suggestibility.

In the second place, suggestion may be regarded as some external signal or stimulus which releases or sets off predispositions already built up. When we are already very fond of pie or detest it, attracted to foreigners or abominate them, emotionally aroused by the flag or untouched, deeply in love with some one or antipathetic—these are predispositions which are easily touched off. This is what we mean when we say that a person is "quick on the trigger"; we mean that he is like gunpowder—ready to "go up in the air" or, like a turtle "sink into his shell" at the mere mention of a certain matter; we mean the cue that touches off our readiness to respond in certain ways.

In the third place, suggestion may be defined as that process by which these predispositions are augmented or intensified. Thus, if we are fond of pie, we may be made to be more fond of it by certain acts or words of others; or we may be made to detest it. If we dislike foreigners, we may be made to hate them by the suggestions of others. We find that advertisers and propagandists are all the while working to enlarge our predispositions in certain directions and dwarf them in others.

It will be evident that these three views are all important for a well-rounded view of the subject. It will also be apparent that the first and the third views are similar, the latter referring to an advanced stage of the process indicated by the former. It will also be obvious that the

[1] *Cf.* PARK and BURGESS, *op. cit.*, p. 410.

[2] "The Psychology of Human Society," p. 347.

second view is the more common one. This view stresses the fundamental characteristics, namely, the strength of the predispositions, the immediacy and automaticity of the responses.[1]

2. Suggestibility

These points but confirm our own observation that, in certain ways and upon certain matters, we are all very impressionable; we are very suggestible; we are "quick on the trigger" when certain hints are given but are left cold by others; we "go up in the air" when some matters are mentioned but are quite indifferent to others; and we vary in suggestibility. Why is this? What are the reasons why some stimuli affect us always and others do not or why the same stimuli affect us differently at different times? In other words, we come now to inquire briefly into the nature and causes of suggestibility. We might consider first the internal conditions and second the external conditions.

1. Internal Conditions.—The first part of the answer to the question of our impressionability is found in our *predispositions*, native and acquired; it is found in the response mechanisms present at the moment. Illustrations are abundant and at hand. If we already fear Catholics, then we are very sensitive to hints from the Klan; fearing, we are already getting away from Catholics as quickly as possible, and hints from the Klan but help us in our flight; or, fearing them, we are ready to believe that they are planning to dominate the country, and cues from the Klan but nerve us to fight them the more viciously. Thus, the Klan works with a set-up which we already have, either to set it off or to strengthen it. If we need or believe we need a new suit of clothes or a new dress, then we are especially attentive to the announcements of the advertisers about bargain sales and the new fashions; our wants are a weakness into which these manipulators put their verbal and pictorial hooks; our needs are systemic conditions which are ready for inoculation. If we are Republicans, then we are especially susceptible to favorable remarks about Republicans and are ready to believe terrible things about Democrats. If we are laborers and members of unions, then we are impressionable to hints against capitalists. Thus, our suggestibility is partly a matter of our training, our moulding, up to date; it is partly a matter of our mental structure and how we have been in the habit of responding. Since we all have prejudices, we are all susceptible; since we are all brought up in groups with certain folkways and mores dominant, we all have prejudices.

Again, we are suggestible in proportion to the *absence of inhibiting* or competing set-ups. This is but the negative aspect of the situation described above which might be regarded as positive; it is equivalent to saying that while we are strongly conditioned in certain directions and upon certain matters, we are unprotected and weak at others. For

[1] *Cf.* Bernard, "Introduction to Social Psychology," p. 284.

instance, if we are drinkers, we are impressionable to stimuli from liquors, liquor bottles, the clink of glasses, the smell of a barroom, conversation about drinking, and the like—unless we have made a New Year's resolution or pledged ourselves to the temperance society to quit drinking; this acts as an inhibiting factor to these suggestions. If we are fond of football or the theater, then the preparations of others about us to go to the game or the show, their conversation, their enthusiasm are suggestions which we find it hard to resist unless we have determined to study or to do something else.

Says Bernard:

> The unfilled mind operates as a favorable factor in suggestibility in a great many types of cases. But it can thus operate only if there are certain behavior mechanisms in the mind which are effectively conditioned to stimuli. This condition is likely always to exist, even in those of the lowest intelligence quotient or with the least training.[1]

The animals below man are highly suggestible in the direction of their instinctive and simple acquired interests or needs. Feeble-minded persons, like the lower animals, are highly suggestible in the same way and thus find it impossible to meet the highly developed and complicated restraints of ordinary social life. The young, like the feeble-minded and the lower animals, are highly suggestible in the direction of their relatively few preconditioned responses. They can build up, however, many conditioned responses whereas the feeble-minded and the animals cannot do so. The uneducated and the inexperienced are like children with respect to suggestibility. The same is true of the so-called *backward races.* Men and women of culture are also very impressionable to the suggestions of skilled manipulators in those fields in which they lack experience or other rational inhibitions; the most careful scientists are often sold "gold bricks" by high-powered salesmen.

Many *mental diseases,* such as hysteria, functional amnesia, absent-mindedness, dual personality, and the like are very favorable to suggestibility in some directions. During great emotional stress, one is usually more suggestible—at the time of a death in the family, for instance. Fatigue, fasting, and intoxication make us all more susceptible. These interfere with the nerve pulsations, cause the weaker, because acquired, reactions to cease functioning, and the individual is given over to the control of the older and stronger impulses. Thus, the tired person or the one who has fasted some time is usually more irritable and less reasonable than the one who has not poisoned the tissues in these ways. It is under such conditions as these that excellent and sensible people often do the most fiendish things.

[1] "Introduction to Social Psychology," p. 305.

We might also speak of the presence of *fixed ideas*, manias, and various fears as heightening suggestibility in line with these outgoings. There are all degrees of intensity here, from the mild peculiarities, foibles, hobbies, up to and including the wildest insanities. To sum up, we have, then, among us and everywhere vast numbers of biased people, empty minds, sick minds, children, absorbed folk, who constitute the suggestible part of the population; and, indeed, none of us is free; we always have some weak point or several weak points by which we may be taken captive.

2. External Conditions.—What takes us captive? The answer is, very naturally, the stimuli which impinge upon us from without. Suggestions reach us from many parts of our world; but we are interested in the suggestions which reach us from other people, from the members of our own species. Then, of course, wherever there are people in action, there are suggestions. This leads at once into the problem of imitation; but there are several points to be made before we take up that matter.

Monotony and rhythm in the stimuli reaching us are important factors in aiding these stimuli to do their work. If the teacher talks in a monotonous tone, we either become fixed upon it, as it were, or we utterly lose interest and go to sleep or do something else. The rhythm of the music and the dance take us in almost invariably—unless we are righteously opposed to dancing and dance music, which is inhibition. We seem to be very susceptible to stimuli in these forms in our work, in recreation, in worship, and elsewhere.

Very important, also, are the *duration and repetition* of the stimuli. The criminal who is stolid and unyielding finally breaks down and confesses when put through the "third degree," which is almost the severest ordeal any man has to go through. In the evangelistic meeting, the perpetual reiteration of the same theme finally weakens the sin-ridden and gains the results sought; as the result of high pressure for a time, some begin to surrender, then more, and, finally, droves respond. In a certain hymn, the idea "where He leads me I will follow" is repeated three times in the chorus, and the chorus is sung with each stanza, so the singers say this phrase a *dozen* times. Again:

It's the old time religion,
It's the old time religion,
It's the old time religion,
And it's good enough for me.

This same thing is found in advertising, no one being able to go out any more without being assailed at every available point by glowing descriptions of numerous commodities.

A closely allied feature is the *volume* of stimuli. This is well illustrated again from advertising. Indeed, we might truly say that duration and repetition constitute volume. Volume of stimuli cuts off other

pressures by outdoing them and thus leaves a clear field for the particular pressures applied. There is no particular reason why we should chew A's gum more than B's except that we see it advertised more frequently, more sumptuously. If we have been continually plied with the idea that our soul is lost, then we are apt to save it or have it saved according to the pattern prescribed by those who have been most persistent in helping us reach the fixed idea that it is lost.

That undefinable but real thing which we call *prestige* also has its weight. The factors composing it are numerous and various, but some of them are old age, special skill, high position, erudition, or superiority of some kind. The Bible has immense prestige with many because it is a very old book and is supposed to be inspired. When the makers of a certain cigarette recently plied us all with the idea that great singers and public speakers were testifying that this particular brand of "coffin nails" did not hurt but actually improved their voices, they were using prestige. When some one clinches an argument with the assertion that some great author, banker, military leader, statesman, or scientist did this or said that, he is using prestige; and we find it very difficult to resist such an argument; we tend to respond promptly and automatically. We are "charmed," or "hypnotized," or "fascinated" by the big, the overpowering, the superior.[1]

3. The Ubiquitousness of Suggestion

According to Bernard:

> Suggestion operates in almost every sphere and aspect of life. It is a short cut method of controlling effectively conditioned behavior. It is in itself quite devoid of moral character and may be used indifferently for ethical, non-ethical, or anti-ethical ends. It is frequently said that rationally directed conduct is of a higher type socially than suggested behavior. This is of course true, but it is not possible to be self or socially conscious about everything. Short cut controls in behavior are inevitable.[2]

The greater volume of stimuli reaches us from our immediate surroundings—the home, the school, the playground, the local clubs, in short, the primary groups. But an increasing amount comes from books and magazines and especially the newspapers and the movies. These tell us more and more what to think and what to do and how to feel. These things "make up our minds" for us all along the line. We think we are acting of our own accord and in the light of our own judgment, when, as a matter of fact, this is almost impossible considering the amount of pressure, the strength of it, and the ubiquitousness of it.

[1] *Cf.* Bogardus, "Fundamentals of Social Psychology," p. 124.
[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 320.

Besides that inevitable pressure which we cannot escape simply because we live among people with these developed means of communication, there is a vast amount of special interest manipulation. Having nothing to meet but the pressures applied by the members of our families, our friends, and the like makes the problem of individual decision tremendously difficult; but when we have sharpshooters of skillfully directed stimuli all about us trying to impregnate us with their own special charges, and when we rarely can know who they are, where they are, or how they work, the problem is immeasurably complicated. The advertisers are bad enough, but the propagandists are worse. According to these, we must always be doing something different from what we are doing. We do find some relief in the struggles which they have among themselves to outdo each other in getting our attention. But, in spite of this, the pressure they apply is terrific. We are everlastingly watched. The Evil Eye of primitive man was no more potent for direction than the pressures which modern experts use. But now we are ready to consider imitation.

IMITATION

1. Some Definitions

According to Judd, imitation is used to "designate any repetition of any act or thought which has been noted by an observer. Thus one imitates the facial expression of another or his mode of speech."[1] The conception is narrowed by Kirkpatrick:

> In general, we think of acts as imitative when they reproduce acts that have been observed by the performer. The psychological basis of imitation is the general tendency of the idea of an action to result in the action. In imitation the idea of the act comes more or less directly from the perception of the act as performed by another. It is imitative just in proportion as the idea and the impulse are derived from the perception of the act.

He points out that if a hungry child begins eating when he sees some one else eating, the act is not properly imitative, since the child knows how to eat and is hungry; it would eat at the sight of food. But when it tries to eat *like* someone else or eats when it is not hungry because it sees some one else eating—that is imitation.[2]

The term is broadened again by Baldwin who uses the notion to cover the kinds of actions already noted and, in addition, repetitions of actions of the imitator himself. Thus, one imitates oneself and sets up what is called *circular reaction*. Stout points out that we must carefully distinguish between the ability to imitate and the impulse to imitate. We might take again the case of the child eating. It knows

[1] Park and Burgess, *op. cit.*, p. 390.

[2] "Fundamentals of Child Study," p. 129.

how to get food to its mouth—that is its ability. But its impulse to eat may be set off by the sight of food or by somebody else trying to eat; this latter would be imitation if the child were not hungry. When the cough of one man sets another man coughing, it is evident that imitation here applies only to the impulse to cough; the second man does not learn how to cough from the first man; he is simply prompted to cough at this time by the coughing of the other man.[1]

Bernard says:

> Imitation is the doing what the other person does because perception of his behavior sets up in the imitator the same or similar responses to those which serve as stimuli. The imitated behavior may be either a total overt response or symbolic behavior. It is not possible to imitate or copy the behavior of another unless that behavior has been conditioned as a response organization in the imitator to the behavior of the one imitated, or of some one behaving as he does, as stimulus . . . Thus imitation is a social category within the field of the conditioned response.

2. Kinds of Imitation

Two types and four subtypes of imitation are distinguished by Bernard. These are suggestion imitation—automatic and accidental, and purposive—by trial and error and projection. We must understand what these things mean.

1. Suggestion Imitation.—*a.* There is first of all that sort of imitation which we might call *automatic.* We go to the tap and turn it, and the water runs out. Similarly, we act on people. We say to a person: "You are a liar." That speech is a turning of the tap or a pulling of the trigger—whichever simile seems the more appropriate. The point is that there is something ready to come forth—of itself, automatically—and we simply occasion the coming. We do not force it out; we simply make its coming possible.

Conditioned as we all are to react to certain stimuli, we are ready to be angry at such a speech, we are ready to lift our hats when we see others doing so, we are ready to run when we see others running, we are hungry when we see others eating, we are ready to get in step on the sidewalk when we are walking with others, we are ready to beat time with our foot, we are ready to yawn when we see others yawn. We do these things automatically, without taking thought, without our being aware what we are doing. And we have already pointed out that there are many copies about, many cues to follow, many hints to take, many stimuli plying us all the time.

How these copies take hold of us unawares may be illustrated as follows: The writer was traveling on the train one day and was more or less relaxed. At a certain station, three men entered and occupied the

[1] *Cf.* Park and Burgess, *op. cit.*, p. 392.

seats in front of him. These men awakened the writer's attention because one of them had a heavy bandage around his neck. One of the three took the overturned seat and, hence, was riding backward facing the writer. As this man conversed with the other two, he made a peculiar and fascinating little curl of his lips at the conclusion of each remark. This individual performance attracted the writer at the time, but as he was talking to no one he had no occasion to try it; he does not remember having tried to imitate it at the time. But his surprise was great when, lecturing to a class a few days later, he found himself curling his lip in this fashion as well as he could. It was an entirely unconscious assumption of a mannerism of another person; it was like a mysterious infection. It seems quite clear that this sort of thing is going on all the time and to a much greater extent than is known.

b. There is much imitation that is merely accidental. We mean by this that two similar things are noticed to occur together and then, by calling attention to the coincidence, they are made to go together thereafter. Allport says:

> One day while the writer's baby was visiting, the hostess observed him wave his hand aimlessly up and down. She at once drew his attention and waved her hand, at the same time crying "bye-bye." The affair interested him greatly, and thereafter he would react either to the sight of a waving hand or to the sound of "bye-bye" by waving his hand.[1]

Doubtless, many imitative actions originate in this fashion.

2. Purposive Imitation.—*a.* There is much imitation by trial and error. When the present writer began to learn to write, he wrote in a copy book—note the significance of the term *copy* here—with a fine, legible example at the top of the page, and he was supposed to reproduce this exactly on all of the open spaces provided. A copy was set; it was accepted as standard; it was authoritative; no deviations from it were allowed—except as they could not be avoided because of unskill. We might say that this copy had prestige, for it was accepted implicitly as the one to follow; criticisms of it and improvements upon it were not tolerated by the teacher, who represented the school system, the public, and the mores of the time. The beginner did not know why this particular copy had to be followed; all he knew was that it was the required standard. It was running hand; therefore vertical and backhand writing were taboo. The teacher helped some in offering suggestions as to the right way to hold the pen, the correct posture, the kind of pen point, the kind of ink, and so forth, but skill had to be painfully acquired by trial and error. This might be called *required purposeful imitation.*

There is much voluntary purposeful imitation. We listen to Kreisler play the violin, Challiapin sing, and, being interested in these types of

[1] Quoted in BERNARD, *op. cit.*, p. 324.

activities, we set these up ourselves as examples. We watch them carefully, we study their technique, we take note of the type of music they use, and in many other ways allow these copies to dominate us. Why we pick out Kreisler and Challiapin as against Elman and Gigli is another problem. What we have to note here is that whatever the line of our interests, whatever the field, we usually proceed to find a notable example which we can follow rather than work out expertness for ourselves and by ourselves alone; we wish to write like Sinclair Lewis, sing like Challiapin, play the piano like Hoffman, dance like Irene Castle, orate like Phillips Brooks, dress like the Prince of Wales, swim like Gertrude Ederle, act on the stage like Jane Cowl, and so on indefinitely. We select these examples voluntarily, and they are given prestige and thereafter cast a spell over us so that we reproduce them to the extent of our capacity or determination; but our efforts are largely failures at first.

We are mostly unaware of the immense advantage there is to us in having many excellent examples about. By having these available in almost any desired line, we can shorten our period of trial and error considerably, and we do not need to wander too far afield; this is clear. It is also clear that trial and error must have been indefinitely prolonged and greatly narrowed in earlier times when there were fewer models of excellence. In a primitive tribe, there is no one to imitate in playing the piano, in painting fine pictures, in manipulating watchsprings, in handling airplanes. When we say that its life is very poor, we mean, in part, that it is poor in excellent copies.

b. Projective imitation occurs when the imitator creates for himself a new behavior pattern similar to that of the model by the use of internal and abbreviated trial-and-error methods instead of overt trial-and-error methods. Suppose that we wish to learn to sing like Gigli. We can, if permitted, observe and study him carefully and try to take on his technique, trying and failing, trying and failing—physically. But we can also use our *imagination*, we can use our thinker, and try out mentally what he does and then, having it all framed up, try it out overtly; in other words, we can plan what we do beforehand. Also, we can get pictures of Gigli and some of his records and thus learn from him if we are unable to reach him personally. These are symbols, and we can take them instead of the person they represent as our copy.

In all of our purposeful imitation, we always have to use our imagination. We are not with our copy every minute; we cannot always see every detail of its construction; there are some parts of most techniques which cannot be revealed in any way. Gigli could sing before the imitator, and the latter could see—what he could see—but Gigli has no way of revealing what goes on down his throat, the size of his vocal strings, the way they are drawn or loosened in making certain notes, how the throat muscles behave what goes on in his nervous system,

and so forth; all of these things have to be imagined by the imitator. And, of course, if the mental projection is wrong at certain points, then the activity goes wrong. But, also, few of us can carry out in an absolutely faithful manner all that we can picture as desirable to carry out. Here is a source of a vast amount of variation in conformance; we fall short and corrupt the pattern in our reproduction, and we sometimes surpass it and improve upon it.

Now, we can see what *trial and error* really means and how unavoidable it is even when we have a copy before us. We fail in perceiving exactly what the copy is; our perceptual analysis falls short or goes awry; there are many obscure places in the technique. Then our mental plan, our conception, is awry. And at these obscure places, we have absolutely no recourse but to try and fail—unless we can find another copy with these gaps filled in. Our objective is visualized fairly completely, but we can find no full record of the tiny steps to realize it fully; we must just stumble along.

We might speak of this projective imitation as rational imitation. Suppose that we are beginning college but have never fully learned the technique of studying. If our desire is actually to get what the course and the college have to offer, then we have two recourses—find some copies to imitate or flounder about and do the best we can. We may find a copy in the teacher or in some students who are making excellent records and seem to know how to study.

But rational imitation has the additional meaning that no human being can carry through all of the experiments that human beings have carried through since the beginning—with respect to the arts of living. No human being has the time or the energy to do this. Therefore it is not laziness but simply good sense to start with what others have found out and to copy them, to learn what they have learned and then to do as they have done. As the records of the past become more complete, we have more and more copies to choose from, and we have a better selection. Animals cannot make any use of these records; young children cannot make much use of them. It is a mark of maturity and intelligence when we use them more and more, abbreviate our learning process, and avoid the errors which past people have made.[1]

3. Kinds of Models

We have contrasted our present time with primitive times with respect to the kinds and numbers of copies available. Undoubtedly, there are many more in our time, and they are much more accessible, in real and in symbolic form. But there are some models which every age and every people has. We must now notice a few of these.

[1] Bernard, *op. cit.*, p. 323 *ff*. *Cf.* Ellwood, *op. cit.*, p. 341 *ff*; Faris, "The Concept of Imitation," *A. J. S.*, November, 1926, p. 370.

1. One of the very first, of course, is the *mother*. Imitation does not begin at once except as we speak of organic sympathy as a phase of it—the mother shuddering at some fright and the babe in her arms shuddering in consequence. Imitation can begin only when the child can perceive what the mother is doing. But then it cannot "take in" its mother as a whole. It takes in and copies certain acts such as kissing, caressing, hugging, cooing, laughing, looking frightened, and many more and tries to reproduce these in its childish way. From her it acquires something of the tone of voice, of the vocabulary, of the way of walking, of what she considers is good taste in dress, of what is proper and improper in relations with others, of what to do on this occasion and what not to do on that.

The mother has a powerful influence upon the child. By the end of the fourth year, it is a simplified miniature of her. If the child is a girl, she has the same tastes in clothes, the same company manners, the same fixed ideas about what is good and bad, the same virtues, the same techniques, the same absurdities. We admit this when we speak of the "little woman." If the child is a boy, we have the same thing within the limits laid down by the sex difference. This is not rational imitation but largely automatic; it is spontaneous response to a situation, or parts of situations, in which the mother plays a most conspicuous role—as food giver, as comforter, as protector. And, of course, no child at this age grasps the full significance of mother. It is only much later when this child is grown up and has children of his own that he begins to appreciate the parental position. But at this early age, the ground patterns, the fundamental attitudes, are established—many times to the enormous advantage of the child in later life and sometimes to its incalculable disadvantage and sorrow.

2. In the most primitive societies, the *father* was more or less an uncertainty; therefore, he did not play so conspicuously the part of model as the mother. And the same might be said of those societies where polyandry prevails; there the true father is hardly known. In later and our own times, there was and is very little doubt. Thus, from earliest times, the mother has been a model in ways in which the father has not. For example, the child has generally learned affection and modes of expression from the mother first and, in many cases, alone. Throughout history, the term *mother* has been a symbol of tenderness and care.

As a rule, throughout human history, the father has been away from the children more than has the mother. Hence, a greater volume of stimuli has come from her, and her life patterns have been more strongly impressed. Yet the father has other patterns which have been and are essential. He has come to suggest strength and power, and the child has generally felt more restrained and respectful as we all feel in the

presence of strangers. The father has generally been imitated with respect to his activities—by boys more than by girls, of course—his mastery of outside affairs. If he has picked up the child and tossed it to the ceiling, the child gains the idea that he has almost unlimited strength; his very roughness has left its impress and has often been reproduced by the child in dealing with others.

The father has stood, to the child, for connections with the big world outside the home. Among primitive hunters, it was the father who went away to chase the wild boar or the lion, who went out in boats to catch the seal or the whale, who went out against an enemy tribe to murder and pillage. These were commanding, thrilling patterns for imitation. At the present, if the child goes to the office or the factory, he is impressed with the activity, the hustle and bustle, the power over others, the control of wealth, and many other patterns. Thus, the mother, through human history, has been associated invariably with the home, with the gentler virtues, with comfort, with quiet; and this pattern or this system of patterns has been so thoroughly impressed, stamped, into the human race that it is hard for any of us to believe that women are not especially created for the home. On the other hand, the father has been the outside worker and performer, and what he has done has furnished examples for the young so that they have come to believe that his position and his power are also acts of the Almighty.

3. Of course, *brothers and sisters* have usually carried on their living processes before younger brothers and sisters and have, therefore, provided many copies. In the cases of a younger child, these older persons begin to be models almost as soon as the parents.

> They are so much nearer him in age and in recency and vividness of experience that he can understand them much better than he can older people, like his parents and their friends. They talk the same language, have the same desires, hopes, fears, disappointments, powers, limitations, only in slightly greater or lesser degree. They also have the same or very similar moral and intellectual development and standards. Hence, after he has made a preliminary adjustment to them, there is no one so capable of teaching the young child as an elder brother or sister who is not much older.[1]

Speaking very generally, much the same sort of thing might be said about playmates other than relatives. These are of many kinds, and they provide numerous examples for imitation. The "only child" is under a decided handicap unless he or she can find playmates who will make up for the lack of near relatives. Whereas the home group tends toward fixed and uniform ways and, in modern society, has a small number of members, the play group does not tend toward such uniformity, has more members, and, therefore, provides more and more various

[1] BERNARD, *op. cit.*, p. 354.

copies; it is the true prototype of the larger society into which the child is moving.

One of the most advantageous lessons which the play group teaches and illustrates for newcomers is the lesson of fair play; the child who escapes conditioning in this direction is badly equipped for life. Another model is cooperation; if this idea is not impressed, the child is also badly equipped for living with others.

4. The *teacher* has been a model in all ages but in various forms. Among primitives, the one functionary, besides the parents, who might be dignified by this title is the witch doctor, the shaman, the priest, or whatever he is. He enters as a model only when he is curing some disease by driving off the devils or when he is protecting the place with some kind of preventive magic or when he is initiating the young into the mysteries of the secret societies. At all of these times, however, he is full of mystery, full of wonder, and a setter of patterns for imitation. Along with the parents, he carefully instils into the young the awful necessity of doing everything as it has been done and as he is told to do it. Thus are the folkways and mores of the group reincorporated and perpetuated.

As the school system—to be examined later—emerged, the teacher as a specialist came into existence, was differentiated from other occupations, and, under all circumstances, has been a powerful copy for the young. Here is a case which is suggestive:

Case 3. A. R. (girl): Has wanted to be a teacher ever since she can remember. Second of four children of laborers living in exceptionally poor circumstances. A. says that teacher let her be monitor in the fourth grade (which appears to be the time of the fixation of this interest), and that she enjoyed this because she "liked to show the other children up." In the eighth grade still liked teaching for the same reason, the opportunity to control others. Left high school in Sophomore year with poor grades in all subjects.[1]

This reveals the imitation of a teacher as the means toward a desired end. Speaking in a more romantic vein, we may say that some of the finest bits of literature extant are tributes to teachers for their examples.

5. Then, speaking for modern society, there is the postman, the milkman, the street sweeper, the policeman, the preacher, the undertaker —the present writer once conducted the funeral of a dead bird with all of the ceremony which he had seen used in the cases of human beings— the storekeeper—and which ones of us have not played store—the railroad engineer and conductor, the magician, the dancer, the lecturer, the professor, the writer—and how much we try to imitate certain writers, especially if we have an ambition to write—the nurse or doctor who comes to our home, the coachman, the taxi driver, and so on. Primitives have very few models to imitate; we have very many; we

[1] MACKAYE, "The Fixation of Vocational Interest," *A. J. S.*, November, 1927, p. 358.

have almost everything we could wish to select from—in the cities, especially.

George Arliss, the noted English actor says:

> For some year or more after this I held steadfastly to my determination to be a clown when I grew up. Later, I decided the life of an omnibus conductor would be perhaps more to my taste. Still later I decided that I would be a schoolmaster, and at the age of twelve I finally concluded that I would be a clergyman.[1]

But later he met an actor.

Forty thousand school children in Nebraska were asked recently what they wanted to be when they grew up. A large number wanted to be aviators.[2]

6. Then we may take note of ideal models. We find that actual, real, models are very inadequate at many points; we find this as we grow up from childhood. Indeed, as we grow, we rarely imitate any one person completely or try to do so. We take a trait from the doctor, another from the minister, another from father, another from the coachman, another from the teacher and gradually build them into something which is not on land or sea; we make something like an ideal which we try to follow. And we find that this process is aided by loss of interest in certain models. At one time, we wanted to be engineers or nurses; but now we do not want to be these. Take this example of the process of idealization:

> Case 6. G. E. (boy): Third of four sons, two eldest of whom are high school graduates. Arkansas family. When ten years old in Arkansas, G. ran a rusty nail into foot and it was cut out by a doctor without use of an anesthetic. Apparently a very rough job, accompanied by shock to patient. G. says he then made up his mind that when he grew up he would become a doctor so that he "could do things like that without hurting people."[3]

This case illustrates imitation on two levels, the level of the real and actual—the doctor—and the level of the ideal—"do things like that without hurting people."

Many of these ideals are constructs made of the parts of actual living models. But many of them are made from day dreaming. Many of them are made from romantic stories which are read—inspiring the reader to be a detective like Sherlock Holmes, say. "The Imitation of Christ" is the title of a book written several hundred years ago, and this book illustrates what we are discussing. Then there is Santa Claus, whose spirit we try to take on at Christmas. There is God, whose nature far transcends our own at every point and whom we should like to imitate. As great personalities recede into the past and become less distinct in

[1] "Up the Years from Bloomsbury: An Autobiography," p. 10.
[2] *Columbus Dispatch*, Feb. 16, 1928.
[3] MACKAYE, *loc. cit.*

actual outline, they take on more and more the character of ideal personalities; we unconsciously crown them with halos—as with Lincoln, Washington. And so, we have at the present time not only these numerous actual models which we have mentioned in the above paragraphs but also all of the more or less unreal models which history and tradition have preserved for our time; and adding these two groups together, they make a very large number with a vast amount of variety.[1]

4. The Importance of Imitation

With these things in mind, we are now prepared to understand that imitation is a very large factor in our interactive social life; that is, suggestion-imitation is one of the major social processes. So very important and fundamental has this process seemed to certain students that they have made it *the* social process. The Frenchman, Gabriel Tarde, was an early student of this subject, and this is what he says on the matter:

> There is not a word that you say, which is not the reproduction, now unconscious, but formerly conscious and voluntary, of verbal articulations reaching back to the most distant past, with some special accent due to your immediate surroundings. There is not a religious rite that you fulfil, such as praying, kissing the icon, or making the sign of the cross, which does not reproduce certain traditional gestures and expressions, established through imitation of your ancestors. There is not a military or civil requirement that you obey, nor an act that you perform in your business, which has not been taught you, and which you have not copied from some living model. There is not a stroke of the brush that you make, if you are a painter, nor a verse that you write, if you are a poet, which does not conform to the customs or the prosody of your school, and even your very originality itself is made up of accumulated commonplaces, and aspires to become commonplace in its turn.
>
> Thus, the unvarying characteristic of every social fact whatsoever is that it is imitative. And this characteristic belongs exclusively to social facts[2] . . . It has been proved through careful tests that everybody in the same village walks on the average at the same rate of speed.[3]

Now, all of this is very sweeping—even shocking, if true. And it is entirely in line with Tarde's central thesis, namely, that "society is imitation" and that "imitation is society." To him these terms are synonymous. We may decline to go as far as he does; but we cannot go to the other extreme, consistently, and say that there is no such thing as imitation. There is much, very much, imitation in the relations of individuals to each other. But there is much spontaneously developed

[1] *Cf.* Bernard, *op. cit.*, Chaps. XXII, XXIII.

[2] Quoted in Park and Burgess, *op. cit.*, p. 21. See Tarde, "Laws of Imitation," translated by Parsons.

[3] Parsons, "Tarde's Laws of Imitation," p. 195.

and accidental similarity which can hardly be shown to be imitation.[1] Many lament the conservatism which dominates family life, politics, religion, education, and the rest; yet they find it prodigiously difficult, when they try, to think up and do something that is really different. Besides, we can never start *de novo;* we always have our background of patterns; and they always color what we try to do next.

5. Imitation and Social Evolution

It will be evident from what has already been said that imitation is a very important factor in relation to social evolution. We might illustrate this in several ways.

1. Imitation and Social Continuity.—It is more largely true than most of us suppose that imitation preserves the past into the present, that the results of past experience are made available for the future. The thoughts, the feelings, the activities of past generations become incarnated in the new generations and survive—good and bad. Let us take an illustration: When we took to wearing clothes, what styles did we adopt? We adopted the styles our parents forced on us. What styles did they force on us? They forced on us the styles—we are speaking now of styles in a large sense and not of the seasonal fashions—which their parents forced on them. What styles were forced on them? The styles forced on *them*—and so on back into obscurity. Today, in this country, men wear one kind of clothes and women wear another kind—largely from imitation in the way already indicated.

Or take the case of language. What language did we learn? We learned the language of our surroundings. How did this language come to be the language of our surroundings? Largely through imitation. Suppose a very original child said: "I won't learn this language; I won't be a mere imitator." Then what? If he said it in the form given, it would prove that he had already been an imitator. If he refused to use these symbols, then what would he say, what symbols would he use, and how would anybody know what he said? We either have to take up the current language or remain inarticulate; we either have to converse in terms which are familiar and have known meanings or not converse at all. Suppose some one said: "I am going to worship, but I am not going to imitate anybody; I am going to do something original." Then what? Suppose he went and stood on his head at a certain point at a certain time and called that *worship*. But nobody else knows this behavior as worship. He cannot, therefore, worship with anybody unless he gains a following—when there is imitation. Or take writing. If we say we won't imitate but are going to make a new kind of writing and do make it, what is our advantage? Nobody can read it, and so we are the same as if we had not written it. We are able

[1] *Cf.* Faris, "The Concept of Imitation," *A. J. S.*, November, 1926.

to say, then, that imitation is a very important factor in social continuity. This can be shown in any field of activities that we care to select.

2. Imitation and Social Conservation.—Of course, we have really been arguing this point as well as the former one all the time. But we have to deal here with a somewhat narrower field. The emphasis here is upon the actual preservation of the past for the use of the present; we have to deal with the belief that what has been is better than what any one can think up now. It is often assumed by young folk that the people of the past never learned anything of value for the present, and therefore they proceed to purge themselves of every kind of survival—as suggested above. Many find their best life sport in a gleeful iconoclasm.

Now, it would be very sad if it were true that our ancestors had never learned anything that we might profitably copy; but it might be true, if sad. It is not within our province here to show that our ancestors have learned much that we would profit by knowing. But *if they did* learn anything, then imitation makes it available for us; it is usually our privilege to pass judgment—such areas as religion, government, family, property arrangements excepted—on what has been learned and to use what we can; the past provides us with a large number of copies which we cannot follow because they are so numerous.

But we are thinking now especially of those points of view, those theories of life, those techniques, which the past developed, and which may be regarded as very superior; these are worth preserving; and imitation helps to preserve them. We may disagree stoutly as to just what these are, but whatever we decide they are, they are preserved.

As we grow older, however, we become well adjusted to certain ways of life and feel quite at home in them. Then we do not want them changed—the language we use, the kind of poetry or food we like, the religious ritual or creed which has been set up; we deem these good; we are attached to them; then we do not want them modified. This is conservative conservation; it is conservatism. Then, the elders, being in positions of influence—remember the models pointed out above—and getting hold of the young in the impressionable stage, condition them so that they automatically reproduce all of these things and find themselves disabled and inhibited from doing anything very different. Thus, the past not only *abides* in the present but also *dominates* it. And thus a vast amount of originality is strangled at the source.

Let us illustrate this from Arthur Guiterman. A desert rat was observing an ostrich with its head in the sand. The rat asked the ostrich "rather brashly" why he was behaving in this crazy fashion. The ostrich replied that he was entirely safe when in this position.

> Said the Rat, "You silly pigeon,
> There's another end in view."

Said the bird, "It's my religion,
And I know that it is true

That you simply can't behold me
When my head is out of sight,
For it's what my fathers told me
And my fathers must be right."

Then the watching hyena said to himself:

"Oh, I'm glad his fathers taught him
That extremely useful thing."

—"Wildwood Fables."

We see imitation working at social conservation in preserving the lore of the past. Take proverbs as an example. As the earlier people thought that they had learned something about the arts of living that was fundamental, they compressed this knowledge into proverbs, maxims, sayings, slogans, mottoes. These folk summaries became perpetuated and dominant because they were so general as to be uncriticizable by the young; they seemed to be true; they answered man's constant demand for short cuts.

3. Imitation and Social Change.—On the *intention* side, imitation is often entirely conservative, reactionary; it takes an already existing copy and keeps it in existence. But on the *result* side, it always promotes modification. It is now important to see how this is so. Let us take any familiar cultural trait—say, writing.

The present writer has already called attention to his experiences in learning this art. He had a model at the top of the page; and he was expected exactly to reproduce that model on every line to the bottom of the page; for the most part, he endeavored to do so; at least, he had no purpose to change the form; and there was no idea further from his thoughts than that of inventing a new form. But what actually happened? His first reproduction, in spite of the most heroic efforts to make it exact and in spite of the teacher's threats, was a pitiful caricature; there were departures at countless points; the learner found that he absolutely could not be a perfectly faithful copyist in spite of the best of intentions. And as he went on from line to line, the work gradually and imperceptibly became a compromise between the model at the top and the lines already written, so that it was with considerable difficulty that the last so-called *reproduction* on the bottom of the page was recognized as having any relation to the model at the top. Thus, what we are pointing out is that *exact* reproduction is impossible; exact reproduction is impossible even with the most reliable machinery; changes creep in in spite of the most painstaking efforts to reproduce faithfully. No human being can do anything twice in exactly the same way. No two

human beings can do exactly the same thing in the same way. The variations may be ever so minute, ever so imperceptible, ever so undiscoverable; but they are always there in spite of the utmost faithfulness in intention. And the more the attempted reproductions the more numerous the variations. Hence, the social diffusion of social arts makes for their modification even among the most faithful imitators. Imitation furthers change. Great numbers of unconscious changes finally make a social movement.

And a very nice question arises here: How much change does anything have to undergo before it is no longer the same thing? If a man takes his father's razor and puts on a new handle, is it the same razor? If he then puts in a new blade, is it the same razor? Could this man be said, properly, to have his father's razor if he had put on two new handles and three new blades? From the side of materials, the answer would be negative. From the side of function, the answer would be affirmative. But what is a razor—form or function? Now, we can think of a form of architecture, a form of creed, a form of ritual, a form of government—anything—in exactly the same way.[1] The unavoidable changes introduced by imitation go out in many directions, pertain to many parts, and move at unequal rates. This unavoidable modification is what, in the main, keeps the social order plastic; otherwise, it would become as hard and unyielding as the hardest of granites.[2]

4. Imitation and Progress.—There are hints in the foregoing to the effect that imitation really makes a contribution to social progress. Attempted exact and conscientious imitation yields change, as we have just said. Now, some of these variations, indeed, many of them, must be worthless functionally, in any given case. But some of them may turn out to be valuable. From our own personal experience, we know that the blindest kind of imitative endeavor leads occasionally to real discoveries. In the laboratories, in cooking, in talking, we all chance to produce modifications which are later found to be advantageous and are set up as models in their turn.

In the second place, the imitation of outstanding leaders, when they are chosen as models, is a factor in progress because it diffuses these leader patterns through the population, thereby making conflict crises and enforcing selection. This makes for progress, if it is admitted that these leaders are of any use to man. If it is not admitted that leaders are of any use, then we fall back on the proposition advanced in the previous paragraph, namely, that the imitation of leaders is a cause of change, and change is the soil for variations, and out of many variations some good ones often appear.

[1] Or take the ship of Theseus, about which the Athenian philosophers used to argue so much.

[2] *Cf.* Bogardus, "Fundamentals of Social Psychology," p. 147.

In the third place, suppose we say that we do not know what progress is and, therefore, cannot know when we have it; suppose we say that we cannot tell whether given variations like democracy, the automobile, telephones, literacy are progress or not—what then? Well, we may fall back on the truth that any imitative act, automatic or intentional, is an experiment in that, and to the degree that, variations from the model always follow; it is an adventure, for nobody can tell what the results will be. There is plenty of adventure in intentional and designed modification of or departure from standards; this we understand easily. But we are not often mindful of the fact that there is hair-raising adventure in imitation. And the *privilege of adventuring* is and has been one of the coveted goods of man.

6. The Laws of Imitation

Tarde has pointed out some so-called *laws of imitation* which are worthy of notice in conclusion. But we must be careful to think of "law" only in the descriptive sense, in the sense of generalization.

1. The imitative movement proceeds from the inferior to the superior. We almost never find that the rich imitate the poor; the wise, the foolish; the strong, the weak; the healthy, the sick; the privileged, the unprivileged. But the reverse of these is much found. The poor try all the time to ape the rich, the weak try to ape the strong, the foolish try to look wise.[1]

2. In the absence of interference, imitations tend to spread in a geometrical progression. We do not know exactly what is meant here by *interference*, but, letting that pass, we can say that if copies are recognized as good, they are taken up in this fashion. One man may set a copy for as many persons as can see or hear him; then these can set this copy, more or less accurately, for as many as can see or hear each one of them, and so on.

3. Imitations are refracted by their media. This is what we have pointed out by saying that there is no such thing as absolutely perfect imitation. So much for Tarde.[2] Bogardus has made some further suggestions which we must include.

4. Conscious imitation operates more or less *directly in proportion to the imputed superiority* and more or less *inversely in proportion to the social distance of the action or idea constituting the stimulus*. Tarde noted the effect of the superior upon the inferior but not the effect of the *imputed* superior. The Prince of Wales may be no expert in selecting clothes, but he is thought to be, and when he came out in 1926 with a pink shirt, pink shirts came to be "all the rage" for men in the immediate neighbor-

[1] *Cf.* Sumner, "Folkways," p. 184 *ff.*

[2] Parsons, "Tarde's Laws of Imitation."

hood and for many others all over the civilized world. A certain store sent out this advertisement:

CHARTER HOUSE—England's great school, founded before the Cromwellian era, famous no less for its personalities than for its scholarship—has come to give the weight of tradition to American students in their dress.

Again, the distance between the stimulus and response is also a factor. If the imitative behavior follows the stimulus at once, imitation is easier and may be more faithful. Also, it is noticeable that we imitate according to mental and physical proximity. Thus, lawyers imitate lawyers and not poets; preachers imitate preachers and not blacksmiths.[1]

Imitation assumes three leading forms which we can only mention in closing: (1) Fashion imitation is the competitive copying of the new and current. It manifests itself in such phenomena as the craze or the fad. (2) Convention imitation is the non-competitive copying of the formal. It is the imitation of highly regarded *forms*, such as the ritual in the church, lodge, or fraternity. (3) Custom imitation, which is the copying of the well-established ancestral usages and ideas—monogamy among us, for example.[2]

Questions

1. What social processes have we considered so far? Do you understand that these are all types of interaction?
2. The chief *aims* of science are what?
3. Approximately how many people are there on earth? In what ways do they come and go from the United States?
4. What are the chief characteristics of a community?
5. How would you define *suggestion?*
6. Are you more suggestible at some times than at others?
7. What types of persons influence you most and how?
8. As a rule, when are people most suggestible, when they are ill or when they are well? What is the relation of advertising to suggestibility?
9. Consider contact and interaction in relation to suggestibility.
10. How does monotony affect suggestibility?
11. How would you define *imitation?* What is the relation between suggestion and imitation?
12. Do human beings ever imitate animals? Why? Do animals ever imitate human beings? Give examples.
13. What is the relation between imitation and social continuity?
14. What is "projective imitation?" Do you ever practice it? Give examples.
15. What models have you imitated most? Make a list of them.
16. Do you think that everybody in the same village walks on the average at the same rate of speed? What evidence can you give to prove that this is not true?
17. Give examples to illustrate *at the same time* both the conservatism and the progressivism of imitation.
18. Show how imitation is a time saver.
19. What is meant by a *scientific law?* Are the "laws of imitation" examples? Are statute laws examples?
20. What parts of this chapter are particularly unscientific?

[1] "Fundamentals of Social Psychology," p. 145.

[2] BOGARDUS, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

CHAPTER XII

COÖPERATION

There is a very true sense in which we may think of cooperation as the most inclusive and fundamental of all the social processes, the survival and increase of the human race and of culture constituting the evidence. If human beings had always remained in isolation, they would have perished ages ago. We cannot think of contact, or interaction, or communication without thinking of cooperation. There is cooperation in competition—as we shall see later—in conflict, in accommodation, in imitation, in differentiation; one's opponent must cooperate to the extent of fighting back, or there can be no conflict; if inferiors do not function with superiors and superiors with inferiors by yielding and dominating, their relations are other than what we have called *accommodation*. So we might almost say that cooperation is *the* social process itself.[1] Working together, consciously or unconsciously, is found everywhere.

And we might say that competition, conflict, rivalry, and other forms of opposition are but aberrant variations to the main theme—which is cooperation. To adapt a proverb, it is certainly an ill wind that blows nobody any good. But our purpose in this chapter is to think of cooperation in a somewhat narrower way—as just another one of the many social processes.

1. Definition

Co-operation is the relation between activities that promote the same result. Nothing is indicated by the word co-operation as to the nature of the activities as such, but only as to the relation between them. Activities of the most extremely different kinds may be in co-operation: stoning a frog, battering in a jail door, wiping dishes, riveting bolts in a skyscraper, charging a redout, or framing a constitution. The only thing designated by the word co-operation is the relation between activities that contribute to a common result. Organization is the complex form of co-operation. The word denotes a two-fold relation, the relation of difference combined with the relation of co-operation when each activity is made more effective in promoting the common result by its relation to other and different activities. As soon as one actor begins to direct the activities of the others toward the common result, his own activity is differentiated from the activities of the rest. And usually he directs some to do one kind of work and others to do other kinds. But co-operative differentiation may arise spontane-

[1] See Case, "Outlines of Introductory Sociology," p. 550.

ously without conscious planning. Indeed the development of this relationship of differentiated co-operation is the main feature of evolution.[1]

Giddings adds a thought and states the matter in a slightly different way:

> Not all like-response, however, can be described as coöperation. Like-response may result in nothing useful or even tangible. It may end in an aimless activity, or in mere uproar and confusion. It is coöperation only if the like activities of the similarly responding individuals are by some means correlated and brought to bear upon some particular work or task which is necessary or useful, or which, at any rate, is supposed to be useful.[2]

These two quotations give us the gist of the matter. Hayes places the emphasis upon relationship, differentiated activities, spontaneity, and organization. Giddings, approaching the subject from the angle of like-response—which would be the opposite of the differentiated activities of Hayes—insists that the activities must, in some way, be useful, or at least be thought to be. Both would place emphasis upon "activities that promote the same result." Hence, by way of a brief statement, we may say that cooperation is the conscious or unconscious merging (as streams flow together) and the coordination (as the timer in an automobile sets off the explosions) of the activities of two or more individuals toward the achievement of desirable objectives impossible to any one or any lesser number of them. And this is what we see going on about us all the time.

Yet we cannot explain it. We cannot yet explain how it is that nerves, muscles, bones, arteries and the rest *work together*, cooperate, in the raising of an arm; this is an impenetrable mystery as yet. But we *do* raise our arms and lower them; we do stand up, walk about, and sit down; these are obvious facts. We know that nerves, muscles, and the rest are materially connected. On the other hand, individuals are spatially separated and apparently disconnected and distinct organisms. Yet I place myself beside you, and we become as one in rolling a log, carrying a trunk, harvesting a crop; we work together. Plants help each other indirectly, remotely, and unconsciously. Animals help each other in these ways and sometimes consciously and directly. But with man, this helpfulness is *recognized* as of great value; it is promoted; it is one of his glories.

That is to say, corporate action occurs on all levels, from that of the plants through that of animals and also upon the purely human plane.

> As members of society, men act as they do elsewhere from motives they do not fully comprehend, in order to fulfil aims of which they are but dimly or not at all conscious. Men are activated, in short, not merely by interests, in which

[1] HAYES, *American Journal of Sociology*, November, 1925, p. 340.

[2] "Descriptive and Historical Sociology," p. 352.

they are conscious of the end they seek, but also by instincts and sentiments, the source and meaning of which they do not clearly comprehend. Men work for wages, but they will die to preserve their status in society, or commit murder to resent an insult. When men act thus instinctively, or under the influence of the mores, they are usually quite unconscious of the sources of the impulses that animate them or of the ends which are realized through their acts. Under the influence of the mores men act typically, and so representatively, not as individuals but as members of a group.[1]

There *are* connections of some sort, therefore, between cooperating individuals. We are discussing cooperation as *a form of interaction*. What is the nature of these connections? Are they ultimately material, as in organisms? They always have a material base—as we saw in a former chapter. But the base is not of the same kind as the base of the connections between the parts of an organism; people do not cooperate for the same reason that the tail of a snake follows the head or the caboose of a train follows the engine. Human cooperation is grounded in interstimulation in the form of *communication* at the several levels already noted. And probably communication is the basic, all-inclusive form of cooperation; at any rate, it is not easy to see how cooperation, in its higher forms, at least, could have come into existence without it. Communication of some sort, then, is one of the indispensables which we shall continue to assume.

2. The Foundations of Cooperation

Excluding, for the time being, that kind of cooperation, that unconscious and indirect kind, which is illustrated by the bees and the flowers or by dead vegetation furnishing soil for living vegetation, and sticking rather closely to the narrower and more human type, we may profitably consider certain foundational and central features of cooperation and thus expand the definition somewhat.

1. Sympathetic Radiation.—It is hardly possible for *cooperation*, in the limited sense in which we are now using the term, to begin and to endure without what we may call *sympathetic radiation*—an outgoing warmth, an infecting kindliness. Antipathies are effective preventatives of cooperation. People who dislike each other do not communicate much and, therefore, do not merge and coordinate their energies and focus them upon selected objectives. As conflict is the natural accompaniment of antipathy, so cooperation is the natural accompaniment of sympathy. Cooperation can hardly begin without at least neutral feelings. But, as we know from abundant experiences, feelings of warmth and tenderness strongly promote cooperation; radiated affection is a powerful builder of social unions.

[1] Park and Burgess, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

As Ribot has shown, this sympathy usually has three phases. The first is *organic*, and it is illustrated in our midst all the time. The baby cries, and the mother's organism—before she thinks about it at all—responds. We notice that someone is about to receive a blow on the head, and our heads, as we watch, unconsciously and automatically assume avoidance or defensive postures in concert with the person menaced. Some of us have watched a tight-rope walker, and we have leaned this way and that as the walker did. When people scowl or frown in our presence, we are apt to scowl or frown with them. We all laugh at a joke as much, perhaps, because we see others crease their countenances or otherwise make merry as because we see the point. It is well known that waves of coughing, sneezing or clearing the throat spread through audiences. In walking with a person on the street, it seems natural to us to fall into step.

We might, and we do, speak of this as *imitation*. Between sympathy and imitation, at any rate in this primitive stage, Ribot finds only one difference: "Sympathy everywhere marks the passive, receptive side of the phenomenon; imitation, its active and motor side." And it would seem that sympathy of this kind is really a property of living matter.

The second phase is psychic and largely *emotional*. Broadly speaking, it is apparent in social unions created by waves of fear, indignation, benevolence, joy, or sorrow, which spread through a population. That is to say, there may be a sympathetic radiation of any strong emotion. And this phase differs from the first in that it is usually quite conscious. We not only "weep with those who weep," but also we *feel* weepy as well; our "heart goes out" to them, as we sometimes express it; we feel their pain, joy, sorrow, or affection.

And yet, as Ribot has been careful to point out, sympathy may exist without any "tender emotion," which is the popular conception of it. Bees cooperate and form societies, but they are indifferent toward the wounded. It is well known that many gregarious animals actually shun and desert wounded companions. Some men actually hasten away from suffering rather than toward it in order to escape the pain which the sight of suffering usually awakens. And this impulse to escape may actually awaken, or transmute itself into, a positive aversion.

The third phase is also psychic but is more *rational*. This is the most conscious of all the forms, and it consists largely of an agreement which is founded on "unity of representation." As Spencer has stated it, "the degree and range of sympathy depend on the clearness and extent of representation." What does this mean? If we simply tell our friends that we "feel bad," that awakens a very slight amount of response because the representation is too indefinite; while we "feel bad" in the head, our friends may begin to feel bad in the feet, and thus the correspondent expressions will be very different. But if we explain to

them carefully, if we fully represent to them, just what the situation is, and they are able to understand what we are saying by reason of some previous experience of a similar character, then they can fully sympathize.

A tempermental similarity seems necessary, as well as experiential similarity. It is necessary because otherwise communication is unsatisfactory, representation is inadequate. The timid do not usually sympathize with the daring, nor the cheerful with the melancholic, nor the vivacious with the phlegmatic, at least on the rational level; they have such different objectives and values; their activities do not focus in the same place. But we really are trespassing on another topic, and so shall pass on.[1]

2. Thought Synthesis.—The enduring foundation of all cooperation of the highest type is thinking together; indeed, this *is* the highest type of cooperation. No doubt, it all rests back on the organic and emotional kind, but cooperation advancing no further than these levels is apt to be spasmodic and easily disrupted. Emotional sympathy may prompt; but rational sympathy must direct. Emotional sympathy may start action; but rational thought has to guide—if anything worth while is achieved.

Examples of this foundational feature of cooperation are not so numerous as we could wish; but many are available. Numbers of people assemble every day to reason themselves together with respect to a business, religious, governmental, or other project. The field of scientific investigation furnishes excellent illustrations. Investigators are in sympathy with the search for the truths about the world; they respond to the appeal of mystery. Then they develop techniques of investigation and divide up the territory, each taking one or more narrow fields for careful examination, each using the processes of deduction, inference, hypothesis, and the rest, and all contributing a mite which sooner or later fits into a larger and ever larger whole—a theory, a law, an established conclusion. If scientists conflict, their conflict is impersonal; it is all in the interest of clearing away untruths; it is all contributory to ultimate solutions. But, again, we have trespassed; we have already opened up the next subject.

3. Actional Coordination.—Investigations, criticism, expressing scientific views are all activities; and activities which proceed in such a way as to be regarded as cooperative, *focus*, first of all, at prescribed and understood *times*. If we are traveling and have to change trains at a certain junction point, and the train we are to take at the junction leaves ever so little before the arrival of the train we are on, that is not cooperation so far as we are concerned. If several doctors are to hold a consultation over a patient and they reach the patient's bedside one at ten o'clock in the morning, one at noon, another at two, and a fourth

[1] PARK and BURGESS, *op. cit.*, p. 394.

at four, that is not cooperation. If the workmen in a factory start to work at "any old time," that is not cooperation. All genuine cooperation is characterized by this synchronizing feature. Cooperative activities either parallel each other or succeed each other in acceptable ways.

The *place* is also important. If the train we are on does not go to the anticipated junction at all but goes somewhere else, that is not cooperation for us. If the doctors go to several different hospitals instead of to the one specified, that is not cooperation so far as the patient is concerned. If all of the workmen in a factory concentrate themselves about one machine or remain out in the street, that is not cooperation. As with the time, so with the place; effective cooperation is produced by each participant *locating* himself at the understood and agreed-upon place or places.

The *direction* of the flow of energies or activities is also fundamental. If those who engage in rolling a log do not all direct their energies in the same way, they neutralize each other's efforts and make the outcome incalculable. If some strive for sanitation and beauty in a city while others strive for filth and ugliness, that is not good cooperation. If some workmen in a factory continually destroy what others have produced, that is not good cooperation. And so in the home, the church, the school, the government, certain directions of the flow of energies have to be agreed upon and then faithfully followed.

This latter point introduces the problem of *objectives*—the thing worked upon or toward. Cooperative activities, as we have already pointed out, are activities which are related in that they come to focus upon selected objectives. If the makers of the school curriculum cannot agree upon the objectives of education, then they cannot agree as to what should go into the course of study. If managers, stockholders, and workmen cannot make up a social mind as to what the factory is to produce, then they are estopped from cooperation. If young people, when they marry, cannot decide upon some values which they will try to realize, there can be no great amount of cooperative unity.

Thus, to sum up, the foundations of cooperation are enough sympathy so that people do not utterly repel each other, enough thinking together so that something in the nature of an acceptable plan is evolved, and then the flowing out of energies in time and place toward the accomplishment of the plan.

But another word must be added. Effective cooperation, at least on any scale, can endure only when each participant *can assume*, as he does his own part, that all others are doing theirs. If one man agrees to make heels for shoes, another soles, another uppers, another laces, and so on, one working here, another there, another in a third place, then each must be able to feel sure that all others are doing their parts; each must work in the assurance that when the various parts contributed by

each one are fitted together, they will make a whole which has value. Thus, the highest type of cooperation is based on trust, on confidence, in others; for the makers of any modern product work mostly out of sight of each other, and they cannot be everlastingly watching each other; it would incapacitate them for their own service if they tried to do so; besides, this sort of thing would really be slavery. The growth of cooperation, then, depends in a large part upon the growth of trust; a quiet assurance, on the part of each participant, that all others are doing as they agreed to do is an absolute essential to effective cooperation.

3. The Development of Cooperation

Is man a cooperator by original nature? Or is he, by original nature, a selfish, uncooperative individualist? To put the matter in another way: Has man developed the cooperative arts as naturally and as inevitably as his body took the shape it did—two legs, two arms, five fingers, two eyes, one nose, one head, and so forth—or have these arts been forced upon him? Both views have been held and stoutly supported, but we cannot go into the various arguments here. Let us ask these questions, however: If man is a born cooperator, why is there *so little* cooperation, and why is the furthering of cooperation so difficult? On the other hand, if man is a born non-cooperator, why is there *so much* effective cooperation about us? Perhaps the only assumption we need to make here is that organisms, human beings included, would *rather live than die* and that human beings especially would rather *live better than worse*—at least many of them—and we know that throughout his experience on earth, man has always been faced with situations wherein cooperation was the only alternative to disappearance or living on the margin of subsistence. At any rate, whether born a cooperator or forced into it, there have been plenty of forces at work conditioning man in the direction of cooperation. In a broad way, we may now examine some of these.

1. The Assaults of Physical Nature.—The physical world provides the necessities of life—materials for food, clothing, and shelter—and also the materials for the luxuries. But on the other hand, as we noted in an earlier chapter, nature does not "care" very much for man; it is well furnished with calamities such as floods, earthquakes, fires, storms, and the like; life is precarious.

To combat these, to maintain life at all on an acceptable level, man has always had to use his wits and his strength and the wits and strength of his fellows—consolidated. And when we see that powerful cooperatives are continually overwhelmed by nature's onslaughts, we sometimes wonder about the chances of the lone individual, the non-cooperator! What chance has he ever had? Hence, throughout the course of life on earth, the assaults of the physical world have been sharp reminders

to the survivors that they had better "get together" if they cared to survive any longer, sharp reminders that they had better pool their resources and work in harmony at setting up stronger buildings, irrigating their land, walling up the streams, developing medicine, and doing many other things.

We do not forget that cooperative unions have survived in the struggle for existence, that cooperation was probably an advantage, and that therefore man was a cooperator long before he was aware of it, either by the physical heredity route or by accommodation or both; that is, cooperation saved man before he was man; take the cooperation between mothers and offspring. We do not forget these facts. But as soon as he had the wit to see it, the struggle for existence said to man as plainly and as forcefully as anything could be said: "Link your wits and your strength, or the weeds, the germs, and your other enemies will get you."

Apparently, man has been rather slow to learn this lesson, and we still have, in this enlightened day, those who think that they can "go it alone" and take care of themselves; we still have those among us who have not yet become alive to the trend of the ages. But the message was grasped by some in dim immemorial times, and rational cooperation began; and it has been increasing in amplitude and in efficiency ever since; it has gradually become one of the main objects of man's endeavor to promote it.

2. The Assaults of the Spirits.—Since the time when *imagination* was born, man has *believed* that he lived amidst a world of spirits. Spencer tells us that

> . . . as in fever bodily derangement co-exists with mental derangement, the inference is that the same agent causes both. And if some unhealthy states are produced by indwelling demons, then others are thus produced. A malicious spirit is either in the body, or is hovering around, inflicting evil on it. The primitive form of this interpretation is shown us by the Amazulu. Even a stich in the side they thus explain: "if the disease lasts a long time," they say, "he is affected by the Itongo. He is affected by his people who are dead." The Samoans supposed that the spirits of the dead "had power to return, and cause disease and death in other members of the family" . . . The New Caledonians "think white men are the spirits of the dead, and bring sickness." The Dyaks who, like the Australians, attribute every disease to spirits, like them, too, personify diseases. They will not call the smallpox by its name; but ask—"Has he yet left you?" Sometimes they call it "the chief."[1]

And so we might multiply examples indefinitely.

Thus, from the earliest times, man has believed that he was dwelling precariously amidst *two* worlds—the physical and the spiritual. And, as the physical world seemed to be dual in character—rewarding him in the shape of material necessities but punishing him by stamping his

[1] "Principles of Sociology," Vol. I, p. 231.

life out as carelessly as a man stamps out the life of a worm—so the spirit world, teeming as it was with countless numbers of disembodied agencies, was dual—rewarding and punishing, some spirits lifting him to the mountain top of bliss while others plunged him into an abyss of sorrow, some bringing him good luck while others brought him bad. So men, from the remote past down to the present, have sized up the situation.

That there existed no such spirit agencies was not known. Man had to conduct himself, therefore, as if there were. He thought that they assaulted him—and let us note here that rewards have always been taken for granted, as requiring no explanation, while punishments have been resented and regarded as phenomena to be explained—and there was nothing to do but take precautions against them. Thus, the problem was not essentially different from that which man faced in dealing with physical nature. If the assaults of nature forced him to cooperate, the assaults of the spirits also forced him to cooperate. What was one lone primitive man to do in the face of this teeming, whimsical, imaginary environment? Hunt a medicine man, an exorcist, a priest—that was one possibility; but that was cooperation. Or he might call on his fellows to join in prayers to these agencies to let him alone; but that was cooperation. Or he might ask his companions to assist him in making presents to these powers; and that was cooperation. And these, as we shall see in a later chapter, are not fanciful cases; examples of these very exercises might be assembled in great number. Hence, man's relations with the imaginary environment have worked powerfully to keep him united with his fellows.

3. The Assaults of Human Beings.—There is evidence from at least three fields of human affairs that the activities of some human beings have forced cooperation upon other human beings.

a. Enemies Within.—As a hungry individualist—which man has always been and is, in part—man has always been more or less a thief and a murderer. The new human society, described in the early chapters of the Bible, was not blissful very long before one member stole some forbidden fruit and another became a fratricide. Honest workers have always been pestered by those who would rather steal than earn their bread by the sweat of their brow. And so, from earliest times, men have had to organize, to cooperate, to protect themselves and their property from the enemies within. Our legal machinery of policemen, laws, legislatures, and courts constitutes the evidence for this assertion.

b. War.—As there have always been individuals who preferred to take what they did not earn, so there have always been groups—families, tribes, nations—which have been governed by the same theory. The early city builders, menaced as they were continually by the hungry nomad bands, found their lives hanging on cooperative enterprises in

building strongholds and walled cities in which to dwell and trade; hence, in a sense, city walls came before houses, the first calling for wider cooperation than the second. "The master-builder of big permanent unions," as Ross aptly says, "has always been the fear of being attacked."

But attacking calls for cooperation as well as resistance to attack. Leaders have always known that straggling, undisciplined forces have never been a match for well-knit, cooperative forces. And in no part of the social domain, perhaps, has more effort been put forth to link human beings into effectual, compact, units than in the army and navy. During the World War, each of the attacked nations—whichever it was—strained itself to the utmost to tie everybody into the service in some effectual way. The quarrelsome, the slackers, the selfish, the intolerant were all forced into the service or put out of the way as disintegrating influences. Political parties were called upon to sink their lesser differences and help in the big task; religious denominations were required to cease their bickerings and overlapping and pool their forces; industrial concerns were urged to cease their wasteful, cutthroat competition and get behind the great enterprise. War is urgent, gigantic, compelling; all lesser strivings and ambitions have to be submerged or transmuted that the *nation* may stand as a unit before its enemies.

c. Industrial Competition.—Actually, this is only another example of the same thing; it reveals cooperation as the result of pressure. Managers do not spend weary hours investigating the market, studying the costs of production and distribution, bargaining with disgruntled workmen, hunting for improved methods, for fun; they do this because their industry and their job depend upon doing it. Managers are not solely governed by aesthetic standards when they weld their organizations into things of beauty and harmony; they do it to retain the market, to keep alive, and to make profits.

We often hear today that "competition was never so keen," and we may know that great changes are taking place in industry in the way of eliminating waste, increasing efficiency, producing better goods or services and in other ways. There is enough on the tongues of orators, in the papers and magazines, to assure us that these changes are real even if we have no first-hand evidence such as automobiles, mouse traps, vacuum-cleaners, and numerous other devices. Thus, to sum up, the doctrine framed, announced, and propagated by all of these assaulters of human beings is simply this: Unite or perish.

4. The Play Impulse.—If we analyze any form of play—tennis, golf, checkers, cards, football or what not—we are soon struck by the nice and precise timing, directing, placing, and focusing of energies; organized play is a very high type of cooperation; play is in essence cooperation; an uncooperative game is unthinkable. It is true that play is distinguished from certain other cooperative enterprises in being mostly volun-

tary; it is largely a free and joyous merging, timing, focusing of energies and ingenuities for the satisfaction that comes out of it; play is not a life saver in the sense in which a fist fight or a war may be.

But the point we are making is that, from time immemorial, people have usually not been satisfied to play much alone; they have always been eager to play with others; and they have never been able to play with others without rules, and rules are simply a form of organization, one kind of cooperation. There is plenty of talk about the necessity of "teamwork" in play, which means mostly—cooperation.

Then whatever, by way of force, is behind play is behind cooperation. It may not seem very scientific or very satisfactory to postulate or assume a "play impulse" and to erect it into a force which produces cooperative play. Whether there is or is not such a propulsive force in our lives is a much-debated question. Some have postulated a play instinct. Perhaps all we need to say here is that play activities correspond to some abiding needs of the organism; and when organisms play they tend to play cooperatively; and organisms will submit to rules, suffer some loss of freedom, undergo great hardships, in order to keep "in the game." And play, perhaps, is unexcelled as a disciplinarian in the arts of cooperation, developing attitudes which manifest themselves in all sorts of work and organization.

Now, we might pick out other so-called *causes* of cooperation and say enough about them to emphasize them or to diminish confidence in them. What we had better see, however, is the truth that all social life is *serial*, one thing always leading to another—and many others. Suppose that a loose and somewhat atomistic group is attacked by some outsiders. Then sympathetic radiation is intensified, emotional attachments are reenforced, and the people knit themselves up into a higher integration for the assault and the reply. But the union thus resulting instantly becomes the *cause* of other phenomena, starts an unending series of actions and reactions which continues as long as the group survives and longer. That particular union calls out leaders and division of labor; it calls out workers to build protective devices of one kind and another; it calls out police power to deal with rebels or slackers; it calls for the storing and conservation of food; it calls for attention to the sick and wounded; it calls for alliances with friendly neighbors; it calls for hundreds and hundreds of developments of hundreds and hundreds of kinds. Thus, life's connections are serial; and every result is a cause, and every cause is a result, as far back as we can go. And man has been involved deeply in this "conditioning process," from the earliest times, the young always being born in it and growing up knowing nothing else. Coming down through the ages is the testimony that cooperation has proven itself to be a most valuable type of relationship.[1]

[1] *Cf.* Ross, *op. cit.*, p. 242.

4. Forms of Cooperation

A satisfactory classification of the various forms of cooperation has not yet been worked out. Indeed, the principles of classification are not yet clear. Giddings says:

> Cooperation develops into various forms and through successive stages of complication step by step with the development of successive modes of mental and practical resemblance, and of the consciousness of kind.
>
> It may be simple and direct, as where neighbours help each other in planting or harvesting; simple and indirect, as in barter, or more highly developed exchange; complex, where the direct and indirect forms are combined, as in manufacturing operations; and highly complicated, as in the modern business world, where the complex forms enter into further combinations, and where these, in turn, enter that greater cooperation of industrial with political, educational, religious, and pleasurable enterprises, which together make up the entire activity of modern communities.[1]

Thus, Giddings gives us a few suggestions as to *principles* of classification.

Other possibilities are (1) from the standpoint of the *amount of compulsion* involved, whereupon the forms of cooperation would be two in number, namely, voluntary as in play and involuntary as in the army or in a prison; (2) the *source of power* or authority, whereupon we might think of individual ascendancy as in despotisms or social ascendancy as in democracies; (3) the *amount of consciousness*, whereupon we would have forms varying all the way from those which are automatic to those which are highly rational; (4) the *division of labor*, whereupon we would have such forms as those within and between the sexes and within the numerous and various professions such as law, medicine, preaching, engineering; (5) the *extent* of cooperation, whereupon we might think of very small groups like committees or families or, on the other hand, very large societies; (6) the *interest content* of the unions, whereupon we might think of political, religious, educational, economic, recreational cooperations; (7) the *amount of organization* involved, whereupon we would distinguish between cooperative enterprises with very little permanent structure and those with a great deal of it. These are but a few further suggestions as to possibilities; little has yet been done to follow out their implications. We must point out that no single principle governs the choice of the forms now to be briefly considered.

1. "Antagonistic Cooperation."—This phrase would seem, at first thought, to express a contradiction, but as a matter of fact it names precisely a kind of relationship which, while superficially and immediately antagonistic, is remotely but fundamentally cooperative and is found all about us. The newspapers tell us now and then that our farmers

[1] "Descriptive and Historical Sociology," p. 354.

put crows and robins under a protective taboo; and this seems absurd, because the crows eat the corn and the robins take the cherries and, therefore, work against man. But in a more important sense, they are the friends and helpers of man, for they continually destroy insects which are also enemies of man. Thus, the birds cooperate with man against the insects; their destruction of grains and fruits is tolerated on account of their services. Madame Pommerol says of the inhabitants of the Sahara desert that the people of the towns and the nomads are enemies by caste and race but allies in interest. The nomads need refuge and shelter, while the townspeople need messengers and transportation; hence, the ties of contract, quarrels, fights, raids, vengeances, and reconciliations for the sake of the common enterprises of plunder.

Sumner says:

> The plants and animals of the desert are rivals for what water there is, but they combine as if with an intelligent purpose to attain a maximum of life under the conditions . . . McGee says of the desert of Papagueria, in Southwestern Arizona, that "a large part of the plants and animals of the desert dwell together in harmony and mutual helpfulness (which he shows in detail); for their energies are directed not so much against one another as against the rigorous environmental conditions growing out of the dearth of water " . . . The Seri protect pelicans from themselves by a partial taboo, which is not understood. It seems that they could not respect a breeding time, or establish a closed season, yet they have such an appetite for the birds and their eggs that they would speedily exterminate them if there were no restraint . . .
>
> Antagonistic cooperation is the most productive form of combination in a high civilization. It is a high action of the reason to overlook lesser antagonisms in order to work together for great interests. Political parties are constantly forced to do it. In the art of the statesman it is a constant policy. The difference between great parties and factions in any parliamentary system is of the first importance; that difference consists in the fact that parties can suppress minor differences, and combine for what they think most essential to public welfare, while factions divide and subdivide on petty differences. Inasmuch as the suppression of minor differences means a suppression of the emotional element, while the other policy encourages the narrower issues in regard to which feeling is always most intense, the former policy allows far less play to feeling and passion.[1]

A particularly familiar and interesting case is that of marriage under some conditions. Sumner says:

> The sexes differ so much in structure and function, and consequently in traits of feeling and character, that their interests are antagonistic. At the same time they are, in regard to reproduction, complementary. There is nothing in the sex relation, or in procreation, to bring about any continuing relation between a man and a woman. It is the care and the education of children which first calls for such a continuing relation. The continuing relation is not therefore "in

[1] "Folkways," pp. 17, 18.

nature." It is institutional and conventional. A man and a woman were brought together, probably against their will, by a higher interest in the struggle for existence. The woman with a child needed the union more, and probably she was more unwilling to enter it. It is almost impossible to find a case of a group in which marriage does not exist, and in which the sex relation is one of true promiscuity. A woman with a child entered into an arrangement with a man, whether the father or not was immaterial, by which they carried on the struggle for existence together. The arrangement must have offered advantages to both. It was produced by an agreement.

The family institution resulted and became customary by imitation. Marriage was the form of agreement between the man and the woman by which they entered the family institution. In the most primitive form of life known to us (Australians and Bushmen) the man roams abroad in search of meat food. His wife or wives stay by the fire at a trysting place, care for the children, and collect plant food. Thus the combination comes under the form of antagonistic cooperation.[1]

Antagonistic cooperation, then, may be described as the combination of two or more persons or groups to satisfy a great common interest, while minor antagonisms are suppressed or overlooked (accommodation). Some of this is of a very high order, being rational, as Sumner has pointed out. But most of it is quite irrational because unintended. Few of us, none of us, can foresee the secondary and tertiary consequences of a given act; the act may be well intended and work great harm; the act may be ill intended and work some good. But where the forces of the world and life, despite apparent and minor antagonisms, seem to work together, we have what Ward has called *synergy*.

2. Differentiation of Function.—We are prepared, by what has just been said, to understand that differentiation or specialization is really a very important phase, we might call it a kind, of cooperation. Let us look about us. If all human beings can do nothing but roll logs, how can we have any ice-cream cones or all-day suckers? Or if all persons are coat makers, how can we have any telephones? If all are engineers, how can we have any dentists? It is thus clear that cooperation cannot proceed beyond the simplest stages without differentiation of function; and it is clear that the higher and more prized forms of cooperation are those in which the specialization is the most refined. The sexes are different as we have noted; but their differences are complementary and but parts of a larger whole; each sex is specialized in structure and function and is, therefore, greatly limited; but two organisms so specialized are stronger when working together than one organism carrying both specialisms would be.

North, we will recall, has pointed out that there are two broad groupings of differences or specialisms—the individual and the social. The individual differences are innumerable and cannot even be mentioned

[1] "Folkways," p. 345.

here; but while many of them contribute nothing, so far as we can see, to the total working together of human beings, many of them do contribute much. The *social differences* are mainly classifiable into four groups—differences of function, rank, culture and interest.[1] Now, taking all of these types, which ones necessarily supplement and complete each other? It is safe to say that the *functions* of workmen in a factory do for the most part; it is also safe to say that the functions of honest workers and those of thieves do not. It is safe to say that, in many cases, the differences in *rank* as between leaders and followers do; it is equally safe to say that the differences in rank as between the castes in India do not—except as we think of castes merely as occupational groups. It is safe to say that differences in *culture* as between the various scientists and thinkers of the world do; it is equally safe to say that the differences in culture as between the learned and the ignorant do not. It is safe to say that the differences in *interest* as between bankers and thrifty people do; it is equally safe to say that the differences in interest as between the chaste and the lustful do not. Thus, while high types of cooperation are necessarily based on specialization, high types of specialization do not always contribute to high types of cooperation. There is, therefore, an amount of specialization or differentiation which falls outside of the area of cooperation.

We must always evaluate specializations or differences with reference to what they contribute toward making wholeness. The matter cannot be left to purely individual whim, else the clever crooks and the expert loafers would rank as high as the philanthropists and scholars. Differences are valuable when they complete a larger whole which goes to complete a still larger whole, and so on. The higher and more complex forms of cooperation call, therefore, for the greatest amount of rational differentiation; they put a premium on that which is *constructively different*. A person, then, is not valuable to society—and not worth much to himself—when he does nothing but imitate; he is just another one of the same sort. He is valuable because he differs and has experiences which others do not have and learns something which others do not know but which they need in order to round out and enrich their lives. Indeed, the only value which one person has over any other in a group is precisely in the degree of original differentiation which he shows—unless the situation calls for machine-like operations in which one unit is as valuable as another and no more.

Let us drive home this essential point by reference to religious sects. Many have bemoaned the fact that we have over 200 sects in the United States, and they have called attention to the waste of overlapping and competition; these are great evils, no doubt. But they could be tolerated more readily if religious sects actually devoted themselves to the investi-

[1] "Social Differentiation," p. 3 *ff.*

gation and testing of their creeds and rituals, to scientific experimentation with them, to the work of extracting their values, and, thus, to the general enterprise of contributing something to the total of religious truth. There would be infinite gain here in having so many sects, because each one professes to recognize and preside over some distinctive phase of religious truth—when it does not claim to have the last word and, therefore, behaves only in a defensive manner.

It is hardly desirable, therefore, that religious sects should disappear or abandon their specialisms; it is desirable that they should all pursue them the more assiduously and continually contribute what they have actually found out to the commonwealth of truth. As bigoted standpatters, as blind conservators of "the faith once for all delivered to the saints," as competitors for monopoly positions in numbers and wealth merely, they are cumberers of the ground and nuisances. As schools of truth seekers and truth testers, however, they would be an incalculable asset to civilization. But so much for differentiation in relation to cooperation.

3. Mutual Aid.—We have all participated in the joyous activities of picnics. The work of preparation is entered into gladly, one providing one ingredient, another something different, and a third something more, without niggardly thought or slack hand, until all is ready. Upon reaching the appointed place, each is happy to gather wood, make a fire, do the cooking, set the table, wash the dishes, or do anything else that makes for the success of the whole. All is voluntary, and each vies with the others in doing as much as possible for the satisfaction of everybody. No "force" is required or thought of; and, all engaging with all enthusiasm and skill and generosity, the occasion is most gratifying.

From this familiar experience we may move on, in thought, to recall community fêtes, parades, sociables, dances, and other spontaneously cooperative enterprises in which people are continually engaging in activities in the picnic spirit. The younger generation, of the cities, at least, knows little about the delights and the achievements of the old-fashioned "bees" of various kinds—husking corn, quilting, raising barns, mending roads, shucking nuts, peeling fruit, and the like—but these are unsurpassable examples of mutual aid. On thousands of occasions when families have been "burnt out," the neighbors have appeared on the scene with clothes, dishes, food, timber, and other necessities, for purposes of rehabilitation. "Exchanging work" has been a practice among farmers from early times.

In times of sickness and death, there have always been neighbors who were ready to leave their own work and call a doctor, sit up at night, act as nurse, do housework, care for the children, entertain relatives, contribute food, and gladly do any one or more of the hundreds of necessary duties left undone by the natural performers on such occasions.

Sickness and death have called forth an immense amount of mutual aid during man's existence.

How much of this type of cooperation there has been and is in the world no encyclopedic volume could report. Most of it has been done so quietly, so unobtrusively, and has been taken so much as a matter of course and as just ordinary human decency, that not a calculable part of it has ever been recorded; nor have such helpers cared to boast of what they have done. It may be assumed, therefore, that humanity is much richer in human helpfulness than appears in the record. It has been a matter of pride with "Odd Fellows" of all sorts—Pythians, Masons, burial organizations, and hundreds of others that have sprung up as if by magic in the time of need and have helped unostentatiously.

How does all of this come about? Ross says:

> The simplest cooperation is *mutual aid, i.e.*, the spontaneous combination of efforts without submission to authority. Since it goes against the grain it is more resorted to in hard times than in easy times.[1]

That is one view. But Kropotkin says:

> The mutual-aid tendency in man has so remote an origin, and is so deeply interwoven with all the past of evolution of the human race, that it has been maintained by mankind up to the present time, notwithstanding all vicissitudes of history. It was chiefly involved during periods of peace and prosperity; but when even the greatest calamities befell men . . . the same tendency continued to live in the villages and among the poorer classes in the towns; it still kept them together, and in the long run it reacted even upon those ruling, fighting, and devastating minorities which dismissed it as sentimental nonsense. And whenever mankind had to work out a new social organization, adapted to a new phasis of development, its constructive genius always drew the elements and the inspiration for the new departure from the same ever-living tendency. New economical and social institutions, in so far as they were the creation of the masses, new ethical systems, and new religions, all have originated from the same source, and the ethical progress of our race, viewed in its broad outlines, appears as a gradual extension of the mutual-aid principles from the tribe to always larger and larger agglomerations, so as to finally embrace one day the whole of mankind, without respect to its divers creeds, languages, and races.[2]

Sympathy would seem to be the soil out of which it grows. Kropotkin continues:

> Unless men are maddened in the battlefield, they "cannot stand it" to hear appeals for help, and not respond to them. The hero goes; and what the hero does, *all* feel that they ought to have done that as well. The sophisms of the brain cannot resist the mutual-aid feeling, because this feeling has been nurtured by thousands of years of human social life and hundreds of thousands of years of prehuman life in societies.

[1] Ross, *op. cit.*, p. 243.

[2] Kropotkin, "Mutual Aid," p. 168.

It is a short and easily taken step from sharing things and services in times of special need, that is, sharing irregularly, to sharing when there is no special need, that is, sharing regularly. And then we have *communism;* and communism, to a greater or lesser degree, has always been and is with us. The organizations growing out of mutual aid, however, are voluntary, while communism, as a social system, is, or tends to become, compulsory; in the one case, people share because they want to, while, in the other case, they share because they have to. Hence, down through the ages, the mutual-aid tendency has been neutralized by the desire for outright and private ownership, by the pride of those who have refused to lean on others, and by the trickeries of those who have taken advantage of generosity. So that, as wealth has increased, voluntary cooperation has given ground to involuntary cooperation; the practical difficulties of administering a society according to the mutual aid principle have become too great.[1]

And yet, what do we make of the increase of public highways, of public education, of public postal systems, of municipal ownership, of state waterways, and the like if we are opposed to communism? Pension systems are on the increase; all kinds of insurance are on the increase; there never was so much private and public charity as there is today. Childless couples have to pay taxes to educate other peoples' children; non-owners of automobiles have to pay taxes to build and maintain roads for automobile owners. This is not mutual aid—in the strict sense of the term—but it is communism—as far as it goes—because it is mutual aid made obligatory.

4. Organization.—In considering organization as one kind of cooperation, we are but drawing together certain threads of tendency, which have already been mentioned, and endeavoring to see them woven into a patterned fabric. As Hayes says, "organization is the complex form of cooperation." It is cooperation at a certain pitch of delicacy and effectiveness. Cooperation can exist, as we have seen while considering mutual aid and antagonistic cooperation, without much organization; but organization cannot exist without a high type of cooperation.

But what do we mean by organization? Speaking in biological terms —which means using analogy—an organization is a whole of some kind equipped with *organs;* and an organ is a whole composed of smaller organs —cells and tissues. The amoeba is an organ and an organization all in one; but it is a very low type of organization because it has only one organ, and the one organ has to do all that is done. The higher forms of life have numerous organs, specialized parts, which are kept alive when they work for the whole of which they are parts and work in certain definite ways; one organ breathes for the whole system; another digests for the

[1] *Cf.* Ross, *op. cit.*, p. 245.

whole system—and, therefore, for itself—another provides circulation for the whole—and thus for itself—each serves itself by serving all.

And there is something *very similar* to this in human society; a committee, for example, might be regarded as an organ of the appointing body; it is but an instrument which, theoretically at any rate, serves itself by serving the whole; and it does work which possibly no other committee can do, that is to say, is highly specialized; and it usually does it quite voluntarily, that is, is controlled by the mutual-aid principle. It is true that the government in a country is much like the brain, in that messages go to it and emerge from it working toward the control of the whole people; the transportation system in the country is much like the circulatory system in an organism in that both carry supplies to the place of need and, therefore, keep the specialized parts alive; the telegraph, telephone, radio and printing systems are much like the nervous system—and so on. Hence, many writers, having noticed this close similarity, have held that human society *is an organism*, a very large organism, a very complicated organism, an immortal organism, a very versatile organism, it is true, but still an organism.[1]

This usage constitutes the famous *biological analogy* about which so much has been said by certain biologists and some sociologists; it is the case, par excellence, of reasoning by analogy of which we spoke in the first chapter. But does this method of reasoning really help us any? An analogy helps if it enables us to *see* more clearly, if it is a case of going from the better known to the less known, if it actually advances our knowledge. But this analogy helps far less than has been supposed, because it is not a case of going from the more familiar to the less familiar; we know as much, or more, about society as we do about organisms; the biologists are very uncertain as yet just how, down to the last detail, any organism or any organ works;[2] the functionings of an organism are yet just as mysterious as the workings of society—when we come down to details.

Thus, it would seem that this analogy has been absurdly overworked. Let us admit, if it helps any, that society is an organism, that it is at least an organism. The important question then is: Is it anything more? By saying that society is an organism, we say that society has a physical base from which it can never escape and that it has parts which function in specialized ways in the service of the whole. But the relations of these so-called *organs*—committees, clubs, groups, institutions—are not mainly physical, as we have already tried to show in dealing with "contact;" they are psychical, and the difference is fundamental. The relations between the parts in society are established by the *communication of*

[1] SPENCER, "Principles of Sociology," Vol I, p. 449. *Cf.* SMALL, "General Sociology," p. 157.

[2] See HENSHAW WARD, "When I Rraise My Arm," *Harpers Magazine*, August, 1926.

meanings; and meanings are not communicated between the parts of an organism. Thus, the biological analogy breaks down; but it is not so much wrong as it is incomplete.

But again—after this digression—what do we mean by organization? We now have the materials in hand for an answer. We mean by organization *a whole composed of specialized parts cooperating by means of communication;* it is mutual aid brought to its highest state of efficiency by means of intelligence. Yet, as Case says:

> Social organization is not so much a state or a condition to be attained, as a complex *process* which constantly renews itself, and, in progressive societies, renovates and elevates itself to higher and more inclusive levels, coordinating larger and larger numbers, with reference to more numerous interests, and upon the basis of more equitable and socially efficient principles.[1]

5. Enlarging Areas of Cooperation

A careful survey of history shows us that human beings have not been steadily tending toward atomism or separateness from the "dawn man" to the present. On the contrary, they have been tending mainly—with many slips, of course—toward cooperation. If we go back, says Giddings, to the little group of blood kindred which was the earliest human community, we find that

> . . . a few brothers and sisters, recognizing their maternal kinship, maintained a common lair or camp, struggled together against beast and nature, and together obtained food supplies. Within that little band the competition of the Darwinian struggle had, in a measure, ceased. Toward all life that lay beyond the circle the rule was unrelenting war. Hence, then, at the outset of human life, the two standards (benevolence and brutality) were already established. Helpfulness, compassion, forgiveness even, were right and expedient within the group. Remorseless enmity, cruelty, treachery, any expedient was right toward those men or creatures against which the band must struggle for its own existence.
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> By the combination of such small hordes, in relatively large aggregates, tribes were formed. By the federation of tribes, leagues or confederacies were formed. By the consolidation of leagues, nations and states were formed. By the consolidation of petty states, the vast terrritorial nations of modern times were formed. And practically all of this integration was accomplished by war . . .
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> A closer examination of the internal phenomena of human societies shows us, furthermore, that the extension of sympathy and the gentler virtues from horde to tribe, from tribe to nation, has proceeded only as fast as the conception of likeness among the incorporated elements of the enlarged community has grown up in the minds of the people. The notion of the stranger and the notion of the enemy were identical in the early days of the human struggle, and the identity has never wholly disappeared . . .
>
> A further inspection of the detail of the process shows us also that when men are in agreement upon fundamental matters of great importance for the purposes

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 580. *Cf.* Cooley, "Social Process," p. 19 *ff.*

of every-day life, they may live in outward harmony, actually maintaining habits of non-aggression and non-resistance as far as physical combat is concerned, while differing radically in minor matters, and maintaining the fiercest kind of industrial, commercial, and intellectual struggles. As everybody knows, this is the state of things that exists at the present day in nations like the United States, where actual warfare of section against section, or class against class, is practically unknown; where riot and insurrection are rare; and where, as compared with the internal disorder of ancient times, individual assaults are infrequent. There is fundamental agreement in such a population upon certain great principles of civil organization, of individual liberty, of standards of conduct, and of loyalty to human destiny. In all lesser matters there is the widest difference; and in its commercial and intellectual modes the struggle for existence is fiercely continued.[1]

Giddings has given us a survey of the political development up to the great *nation;* and the question about which many thinkers are spending sleepless nights is this: Must the nation be the "be-all and the end-all" of this process? Or must the nation deflate its mythology about absolute sovereignty and submit itself to still larger unions or to one world union? Many persons cannot see why the process of combination, once having left the individual, should logically stop at any point short of universal inclusiveness; they cannot find any reasons why national boundaries are natural and necessary limits. And so the leaven of cooperation which made the clan, and the tribe, and the federation, and the nation, continues to work; only, the World War has shown that world organization cannot be brought about by war; the war method has been shown to be possible only on such colossal proportions that it is suicidal to all; that is, conquests, subjugations, and victories are becoming vestigial. What then?

Thoughtful people are more and more emphasizing the method which has been operative *within* small groups from the first—sympathy, mutual aid, organization. And that method has been attempted for the whole globe since the World War. We refer, of course, to the League of Nations. A new situation confronted belligerent leaders during that gigantic conflict; the war was prosecuted on such a large scale and so many people were demanded that leaders found it necessary to state their aims in order to hold their followers together and keep up morale. Hence, the publication of the intention that when the war should end, provision would be made for a permanent institution to promote peace among men. And perhaps the idea of the League of Nations was one of the most effective ideas serving that general purpose; the people kept back of their leaders in the expectation that a world organization would be set up.

[1] "Democracy and Empire," p. 354 *ff.* See also Wilson, "Co-operation and the Community Spirit," *Publications American Sociological Soc.*, Vol. XI, p. 113.

The armistice with Germany was concluded upon the basis of the Fourteen Points of President Wilson, of Jan. 8, 1918. The fourteenth point was this:

A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.

At its second plenary session, on Jan. 25, 1919, the Preliminary Peace Conference passed the following resolution:

The Conference, having considered the proposals for the creation of a League of Nations, resolves that:

1. It is essential to the maintenance of the world settlement, which the Associated Nations are now met to establish, that a League of Nations be created to promote international cooperation, to insure the fulfilment of international obligations and to provide safeguards against war.

2. This League should be treated as an integral part of the general treaty of peace, and should be open to every civilized nation which can be relied on to promote its objects.

3. The members of the League should periodically meet in international conference, and should have a permanent organization and secretariat to carry on the business of the League in the intervals between the conferences.

The Conference therefore appoints a committee representative of the Associated Governments to work out the details of the constitution and the functions of the League . . . [1]

The League actually came into being on Jan. 10, 1920, with the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, Panama, Peru, Poland, Siam, and Uruguay—fourteen in all—as the first members. Within the next two months, many more states joined, and the total was finally over fifty. Germany is now a member. Some of the Latin-American states have withdrawn. The United States has never joined, although the United States has always been a league of nations.

The Permanent Court of International Justice, an arrangement which had been advocated by the United States for over fifty years, came into being at The Hague, Sept. 14 to 15, 1921, when the Second Assembly and Council of the League of Nations proceeded to the election of the eleven judges and four deputy judges of the Court.[2]

When considering the *social processes*, we came to understand that they are very numerous and that they are universal. We learned that scholars have not always agreed as to what ones are major and most important. Now, in taking up the question of *social organizations*, we are somewhat in the same situation. There are very many. Just how

[1] "Handbook of the League of Nations," 1920–1923.

[2] See CASE, "Outlines of Introductory Sociology," p. 618 *ff*. Also, an account of the Cooperative Movement in India, MATTHAI, *Better Business*, August, 1917.

many there are in the world or in any given society nobody knows. But some of them, like the social processes, are universal. In the next several chapters we shall examine some of these.

In carrying forward our thought, we must always keep in mind *activities.* And we must also keep in mind *group activities.* In addition, we must remember group activities of the *routine* sort, activities that are repeated over and over from generation to generation. We must keep in mind, moreover, the fact that there are "blocks" of these routine activities which are *knit up into webs;* they are interlinked and interlocked in hundreds and thousands of ways. Beyond this, we must bear in mind that these interlinked and interlocked systems of activity routines form *wholes* which are more or less distinct and individualized yet not at all independent; each one is always a part of a larger whole which we call *society.*

What happens is that individuals cooperate to construct these systems of activity routines; the young are brought up within them, adopt them, and learn to perpetuate them. Individuals build organizations and are built by them in turn. Sometimes these systems of activity routines are called *institutions*—when they are old, compact, and influential.[1] But it will serve our purpose if we think of these systems as organizations, organizations being defined as cooperation plus specialization. Human organization is superior to animal organization in that it is cooperation and specialization ever more highly integrated by means of developed communication. And we have to remember, in addition, that the social processes go on all the time inside these organizations; and these organizations carry on the social processes in relation to each other.[2]

Questions

1. List most of your important models.
2. What are the chief criteria of social differentiation?
3. Study the definition of *cooperation* given, and then make up one of your own.
4. Describe carefully a case of cooperation.
5. In what connection was specialization considered previously?
6. Why is communication so important for cooperation? How did we describe communication?
7. Give an example of sympathetic radiation.
8. What is the relation of isolation to cooperation? Is cooperation important for social unity?

[1] On institutions, see ARNESON, BARNES, COULTER, and HUBBERT, "A Gateway to the Social Sciences," p. 108; JUDD, "The Psychology of Institutions," p. 3; HEATHERINGTON and MUIRHEAD, "Social Purpose," p. 127; PARK and BURGESS, *op. cit.*, p. 796; SUMNER and KELLER, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 88; ALLPORT, "The Nature of Institutions," *Social Forces*, December, 1927; SPENCER, "Principles of Sociology," Vols. I, II, III.

[2] On the growth of social organization there is no more informing or subtle work than COOLEY, "Social Organization."

9. Does the physical environment force people to fight and cooperate at the same time? Show this.

10. Describe the best case of teamwork with which you are familiar. Why do you consider it the best case?

11. Do you know of any cases of "antagonistic cooperation" in your own neighborhood? If so, what are they?

12. Why is differentiation discussed again under cooperation? Is differentiation the same as specialization?

13. Give some examples of mutual aid from your experiences.

14. Bees like honey. Flowers produce it. Is that a case of mutual aid? Why?

15. Work out carefully all of the essentials of an organization which you have helped to create. Be detailed.

16. In what ways does an organization differ from an organism?

17. What examples of "enlarging areas of cooperation" can you name?

18. Is it unscientific to say that "cooperation ought to increase among men?" Is it any more unscientific than to say that men need food?

19. Can an organization be strong without sympathy? How about a factory?

20. Which promotes cooperation more, war or peace?

CHAPTER XIII

THE INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION

1. Play and Work

A bit of doggerel which the writer learned as a boy in school was intended to give some excellent advice in language which children might understand. It ran as follows:

> This is the way
> To be happy and gay;
> Work while you work,
> And play while you play.

But there was no attempt, on the teacher's part, to distinguish between *work* and *play* or to indicate what portion of time should be alloted to each; apparently, it was assumed that the distinction was clear and that "any fool" would know the difference.

In taking up the discussion of the industrial organization, however, it is necessary to differentiate these types of activities and show their relations to our social system. And, of course, we begin again with activities, which are most numerous and versatile among men. But numerous and various as man's activities are, we can make rough classifications of them. One of the first divisions of them that we make in common speech is the one already given—work and play; there are work activity routines and there are play activity routines. Many people complain of having to work all the time and of having no time for play. On the other hand, many seem to be playing all the time and appear to have no time left for work. But what is the difference between these two types of activity routines? In discussing this matter here, we are preparing the way for this chapter and also for a later one on the recreational organization.

In many respects, these activity routines are similar; at times, and in certain points, they are so similar that an observer cannot tell whether a given person is working or playing; and participants themselves admit, now and then, that a given activity is now work and now play. We can see that they are both forms of activity as against inactivity; they are both exhausting at certain times and in certain degrees; they are both difficult at times and require an amount of skill; there is much routine in both when once learned, and they are both carried out rather automat-

ically under certain circumstances; they are both often used as a means of livelihood; they both may be carried on alone or in cooperation with others. Thus, there are many similarities.

But there are differences, and these are the points we are after. Football making can be distinguished from football playing; the routines are altogether different, and we call the first *work* and the second *play*. Card making can be distinguished from card playing. In these cases, the motions made are different; there is a difference in direction, in speed, in materials worked upon, in results attained, in morale accompanying the activities, and so on. But the main difference is found in the *attitude* of the participant; the main difference is at a point which is not observable from outside. If the worker approaches and carries out his activity routine with the understanding that the chief results are to be in the nature of *immediate satisfactions*, that is, satisfactions felt during the period of acting, then this activity is play. On the other hand, if the player approaches his play without enthusiasm because the results are to come at some future time, that is, the satisfactions are to be felt after the activity is finished, then his play is work.

Thus, the distinction is based on the relations between the activities as to (1) the nature of the rewards and (2) the time of their realization. Play is activity for its own sake; work is activity undertaken for some other consideration. The satisfactions which come from work are outside, and in addition to, the activities; the satisfactions which come from play are in, and a part of, the activities. In both cases, the activities are mediatory or instrumental; but in play, the reward *is* the satisfaction enjoyed while the action is going on; whereas in work, the chief results come at some subsequent time. Then, if work is actually enjoyed and there is little or no thought of later results, this work is play. Conversely, if play is engaged in for some later result, then it is work.

Since play is instantly pleasurable, and since work is that kind of activity which brings later satisfactions, and since we are all so intent upon the present, then why work? Why not play all the time? Here we stumble upon an inescapable life condition. We have to lay ourselves out to garner the necessities of life—or have somebody else do it. We either have to work ourselves or work others; these are the only possibilities.

Thus, we work, we expend, we endure pain in order to live and to live well. It is not our custom to talk yet of "playing to live," but we may be able to talk that way sometime. Now we take it for granted that work is a lesser evil than starvation. "In the beginning"—to employ the language of Scripture—was work, since man started at zero. Thus, another point in the distinction is clear: Work is the customary name for activities which have to do with gaining the necessities of life, whereas

play is a name for those activities which have to do with the luxuries—at any given stage of civilization.[1]

2. Natural Resources

Leaving aside, for the time being, those activities which people engage in for instant and extra satisfactions, let us think in this chapter of the other type—activities engaged in for later satisfactions and because of necessity. Now, to what do human beings apply their energies when they work? If we are city dwellers, we can look about and see people driving trucks, selling goods, printing papers, cutting hair, digging ditches, exchanging money, and doing countless other things. But they apply their energies, for the most part, to materials which have already been worked over and changed from their original shape; and we might call these *secondary* materials.

But if we are country dwellers, we note that people apply their energies directly to land, to streams, to mines, to forests, to rocks, and to flora and fauna; and we might call these materials *primary*. Ignoring the secondary materials for the time being, we may say that, broadly speaking, there are two chief kinds of the primary, namely, the non-living and the living; and man is tied irrevocably to these things; whatever else he may have, some of these he must have. But they each present to him very different problems and call for very different types of response—which is the value of the distinction here made for our purposes. A technique learned for one of these types is not of much use in relation to the other; there is a vast difference between the handling of rock and the handling of cattle. Thus, the very nature of these resources shapes man's activities and thus affects his social organization.

1. The Non-living Resources.—The earth provides man with such indispensables as support for his material body, fire to keep him warm in low temperatures, the chemicals out of which his body is constructed, and such additional acquisitions as metals, sand, water, coal, and precious gems. But all of these are *outside* man's body and sometimes at great distances from it; activity, as we have said, is the bond between man and these things. These things have to be appropriated and appropriated in a particular manner.

Coal is usually hidden away in the earth and has to be dug out; it is inert and heavy. Metals are also tucked away in the earth's crust; they are also inert, some of them are heavy, and they are not always in a pure form. But the treatment demanded by coal and by the metals is very different. Then compare the treatment demanded by coal and that demanded by water; containers which would hold one would not hold the other. People have had to learn, either by the trial-and-error

[1] See Sumner and Keller, *op. cit.*, Vol.I, p. 95. Hart says that modern work is from long-accumulated habit, not fear of starvation, see *Survey*, Vol. XLIX, p. 555.

method or from tradition, how to behave in these situations. We might go into very great detail about this.

Fire is an especially interesting case, not only because of its relation to coal and ores but also because of its "temper" and variability and its social attractiveness. The *temper* of fire means its moodiness or fitfulness, its readiness to rage and run wild in some materials and under some circumstances, and its stubbornness in others; it has always been a challenge to man's versatility. And when fire is said to be "an excellent servant but a poor master," this is a bit of folk wisdom concentrated in a proverb for the use of decendants. "The taming of fire," to use the expression of a noted writer, has been a wonderful accomplishment; it has developed man's capacity to think and has also called forth such virtues as patience and alertness.

As a socializer, fire has had few peers. All animals are afraid of it, and man was probably afraid of it at one time. How he succeeded in conquering it nobody knows. But once acquired, it had to be watched and handled gingerly. In its manipulation, man had to learn cooperation to keep it as a servant. But once under control, it made a vast difference in human relations; it warmed man and comforted him; it drew the people together for protection from the wild animals of the bush; and drawn together around the fire, people are very different, as we all know. It became the center of the home, the interesting, the attractive center. It made a center for story telling and thus helped to contribute something to literature and social continuity. The outreachings of these services are too numerous and intricate to follow here. We may close this section by saying that what man is now is partly a product of what he has had to do in relating himself to the non-living world.

2. The Living Resources.—As we have already seen, man cannot live directly from the inorganic world. His vitality is derived from the inorganic indirectly by way of the organic. He depends, therefore, directly upon what the inorganic can produce and raise in the way of living forms; and these are of two kinds, broadly speaking—flora and fauna. The challenges which these things have always presented to man have varied with the organism and have varied utterly from those presented by the inorganic. Let us see how this is so.

First of all, we have to notice that the inorganic world remains as it is found for a rather long period; the substances of this realm can be located and their behavior predicted, to a large extent. The same may be said, to a lesser degree, of the various members of the flora world. But plants grow up and die—and that presents something new for man; that calls out an entirely different set of reactions. Especially it calls for foresight, a crop growing up and spoiling unless manipulated at the proper time. The rocks, coal, and minerals are reliable and permanent; but there are seasonal fluctuations in flora life which have

to be watched; decayed fruit cannot be rejuvenated. So much for the gifts which nature offers of her own goodwill.

If man proceeds to *coerce nature*, as he is now doing more and more, and changes the character of her products to make her yield a larger return, the problem is very different again and much more complicated. Let us look squarely at this point—and now we are thinking of primitive man—he has to throw his seed away, apparently, and then wait around awhile in uncertainty until it sprouts and grows; and then he has to carry out suitable cultivation, erect effectual barriers, and then hang around until the harvest. And we all see that the harvestings of grapes, apples, wheat, barley, and celery are all different processes; and they are all utterly different from the harvesting of coal, water, or iron ores. The domestication of the flora of the earth has challenged man to the heights of patience and ingenuity.

Fauna, again, call for entirely different reactions on the part of man. Animals can run, they can hide, they can fly, they can swim under water; and thus in many ways they can elude man. The rabbit as good as says: "Here I am, but if you want me you will have to catch me." And birds have not been known to come out of the skies and fix themselves on a spit before man's fire; it is not authentically recorded that fish have jumped out of the water and flipped into man's waiting frying pan, all scaled, cleaned, and buttered. We have to think, then, of the great varieties of activities characteristic of animals and then think of the demands which these activities have placed before man. But, again, if flesh is not used at the proper time, it spoils just as crops do. That feature also demanded certain responses on the part of man. At any rate, out of characteristics such as mobility, decay, and others have come vast numbers of challenges to man's ingenuity, his sociability, his patience, his foresight, and his skill. The domestication of flora and fauna has been a remarkable achievement.

But man has domesticated himself. All over the earth and away back in time, some men have recognized resources in other men, just as they recognized resources in coal, berries, rabbits, and other natural gifts. Man's body is a food resource, and in many parts of the world, and formerly more than at present, human beings have found their mates to be tasty morsels; we refer, of course, to cannibalism. But human beings are also work resources, and from earliest times, slavery, in one form or another, has obtained. The man who was alert enough to recognize this source of energy, and had the strength to tame it, was relieved from many exacting and arduous duties. Human beings came into the hands of others, for food or work, by capture or for crime and debts. But the point that interests us is that the subjugation of other human beings called forth specialisms and types of social organization very different from those growing out of efforts to conquer other resources.

Thus, we see that the natural resources of the world—inorganic, organic floral, organic faunal, and especially man—challenged human beings in a great variety of ways, evoked from man a variety of responses, and thus played an immense role in shaping his developing social life; they challenged him to hard work, to patience, to alertness, to ingenuity, to foresight, to specialization and cooperation. This organized attempt to conquer and use the natural resources we call *production.*

3. Production

As we look about us, and as we study history, we can see that human beings everywhere are and have been engaged in this work of appropriating natural resources and transforming them, converting them, into usable forms. Let us analyze this work of appropriation and transformation, which we have called *production*, and let us give special attention to two aspects—the *factors* in it and the *forms* it has taken.

1. Factors. *a. Labor.*—We have already stressed the fact that natural resources do not thrust themselves into man's organism when and where they are needed; we have called attention to the fact that man has always had to go out after them, wrestle with them, subdue them, remake them, and thus earn his bread by the sweat of his brow—or some other person's brow. And this is what we have called *labor* or work; and labor is one of the two chief factors in the exercise of appropriation.

Say Sumner and Keller:

> Men are not so well aware as they might profitably be that they can "make" nothing. The operations of men consist in moving things into or out of the way of natural forces, and in combining, deflecting, or dissipating forces, by taking advantage of what knowledge has been gained concerning their ways and adjusting interferences accordingly. Nothing is "created"—indeed, much energy is "lost"—in that transformation of one form of natural force into another upon which man prides himself. The heat stored up in coal is set free by putting the coal into the way of a flame; it is metamorphosed in turn into the expansive power of vapor, into linear motion, into circular motion, into reversed circular motion, into a series of blows or more intricate movements—a loss of the original energy of the fuel taking place at every step. The power in the coal is deflected and divided, its place of incidence is changed, but nothing is "created."
>
> The operations of men can be exerted only upon materials furnished, permanent qualities and all, by nature; the activities of mind respecting them are reflections on experiences in the past and conclusions as to the meaning of them, with inferences as to what is best to do in the present and future whereby these materials may be endowed with utilities for men. Metals, shell, bone, fibers, hair, are made into weapons, implements, dress. This operation is labor, and it is a characteristically human activity. Toolmaking, wherein the human organs are strengthened and extended, and both those organs and also things in nature are imitated in the form of artifacts, is specifically human. Spiders work at web-spinning and bees construct honey-combs; yet these operations are largely

the externalization of some bodily secretion. Even if birds and animals, for instance, beavers, collect materials entirely outside themselves and build them into independent structures resembling those of man, yet these activities are directed by instinct, never improving under conscious experimentation. With some little qualification, therefore, it may be held that labor distinguishes man from other animals.[1]

We are accustomed to reiterate the ancient conclusion that labor is a curse, and the study of primitive man shows how that notion gained currency and entered the traditions. The savage dislikes labor so much that he has to be satisfied with immediate satisfactions. It is said by some travelers that laziness is so pronounced "that anyone who, so to speak, has an atom of food in the house, will not go to work before he is driven to it by hunger—which, so long as affairs go poorly, he tries to forget by sleeping." The savage knows as well as the civilized man that more work will bring more product; but as labor increases in extent it becomes more exhausting and the extra increment of satisfaction is not regarded as worth the extra effort.

Instead of being a curse, labor is a blessing—if life is worth living. Where nature offers man a bountiful food supply at practically no cost, there little effort is expended and civilization does not flower forth. There have been many scholars who have commented upon the way in which so-called *civilization* hugs the cooler zones. Where nature offers too much for no effort, there civilization lags. On the other hand, it lags also where nature offers too little, as in the frigid zones.

It is now necessary to take note of labor specialization. As we look about us, we do not fail to observe, first of all, perhaps, that there is *sex specialization*. We have already seen that the sexes are quite different—mentally, physically, and actionally—and a large part of these differences are identical with specialization.

Sumner and Keller say:

> The fact that *Homo* is a bisexual organism remains, and will ever remain, one of the steadfast and inexorable ultimates of human life, to which, through mores and institutions that take shape about the attending interest, adjustment will be made. Primary and secondary sex differences constitute, as between man and woman, a series of essential contrasts, thorough-going, all-pervasive, inevitable, and immutable, such as do not exist as between man and man and woman and woman. It follows, of course, that if sex-specialization was the first specialization, then sex-cooperation was the first cooperation.[2]

From a prolonged study of the life of primitive peoples, these writers have made up the following list of categories of sex occupations:

[1] SUMNER and KELLER, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 103 *ff.*

[2] *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 111.

(*a*) Almost or quite exclusively of males: Weapon-making, canoe-building.

(*b*) Almost or quite exclusively of females: grain-grinding, carrying, gathering, drink-making.

(*c*) Prevalently of males (in the hands of men more than twice as often as in those of women, and in the order of prevalence): sewing, weaving.

(*d*) Prevalently of females (in the same general proportions as the preceding and in order of prevalence): water-carrying, pottery-making, house-work, trading, hide-preparation, spinning, care of the children, cooking, fire-tending, wood-getting.

(*e*) Mutually pursued (running from male prevalence to female): house-building, clothes-making, basketry.[1]

This is not to say, however, that the lines of labor specialization followed by the sexes in the past and in the present were and are inevitable because of sex structure and function; many of them have had and now have no relation whatever to sex; most of them have been and are simply folkways and mores—usages. Neither does it mean that the lines of specialization developed in the past, as above indicated, and, made almost sacred thereby, must at all costs be preserved in the future. It is a fact, not widely known, that each sex has crossed the traditional boundaries of each other's work spheres countless times in the past; and the outook is that more of this will occur in the future; and there is no reason except superstition and prejudice why it should not. One piece of labor, however, not mentioned in the above list, will never be undertaken by men—bearing children; but that is practically the only fixture in the whole range of activities.

But, of course, specialization has made its way through the centuries *within each sex*. From the earliest times, some men have learned more easily how to track animals, how to build canoes, how to make fires, how to drive engines, how to paint; and the same has been true of women. So it has been that specialized occupations have multiplied as civilization has advanced; they have multiplied and diversified until we now have thousands of occupations, which means thousands of specialisms. When the English visitor, Harriet Martineau, came to this country in 1840, she noted that there were but *seven* occupations open to or at least pursued by women; now there are more than a hundred times as many. And the outlook is that women will, more and more, take their place with men in any field that they care to enter; the old taboos are disintegrating. Many think that the trend is such that in the future no artistic hunger, no "instinct of workmanship," will ever have to go unsatisfied or be sublimated to make life endurable.

We can also see *group specialization* originating and developing through the ages. Each family has been and is a case of group specialization. There have always been groups of men who did the fighting;

[1] *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 136.

there have always been groups of persons who were priests; there have been and there are groups of specialists called *teachers*, called *bricklayers*, called *automobile makers*, called *pin makers*, and what not. And we can even go farther and speak of *tribal specialization* in cases where tribes find themselves in possession of some natural monopoly such as salt, pipe clay, or flint. Then the tribes organize their activities for the preparation and trade of this commodity. The Chibcha Indians of Colombia prepared and exported rock salt, which abounded in their territory, in return for cereals which they could not grow from their barren soil.[1] And so, to conclude, specialized labor has been one of the legs, so to speak, by which the industrial organization has made its way forward, a chief factor in what we have called *production*.[2]

b. Capital.—The other leg of this biped organization is capital. We have already alluded to the fact that the capital of the human race at the start—was zero; its lot was destitution. But now there is a vast amount of capital. What, however, is capital? The economists have struggled valiantly to erect a satisfactory definition but have not always ingratiated themselves with each other in so doing. Our space prohibits extended argument, but we may gain a fairly satisfactory notion in a few paragraphs.

(*a*) *The Nature of Capital.*—If we are asked today if we have any capital to invest in a particular enterprise, what is wanted is *money*. But what is money? A Yale student once defined it thus: "Primitive money is anything which is worth more to the man who has not got it than to the man who has, and for which the man who has not got it will give something he has to get it." This, of course, would not pass muster before the economists. But, in short, money is "any medium of exchange," and we shall have more to say of it later.

Returning to the first thought, what is wanted in the promotion of business enterprise is money; and today we tend to think of capital largely in terms of money or a medium of exchange; in terms of those symbols called *dollars*, *francs*, *rubles*, *letters of credit*, *drafts*, *notes*, *stocks*, *bonds*, *mortgages*, and the like. A particular business enterprise can run on these things—and yet it cannot. The fact is that all of these "currencies" or flowings are symbols and stand for something else; something of value is always behind them and puts "stuff" into them; otherwise, they are worthless and will not circulate or flow about. What is behind these symbols?

Around us everywhere are tools—spades, plows, needles, hoes, dishes, linen, automobiles, buildings, land, and all of the natural resources we have mentioned—and people are using these resources in the production of other things, in transformation. Raw materials are made over by

[1] *Cf.* SUMNER and KELLER, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 150.

[2] SPENCER, "Principles of Sociology," Vol. III, p. 340.

the application of labor into every makable thing. These things enable a better use of raw materials, which gives better finished products—endless cycles of action and reaction. Some raw materials are made up and consumed—destroyed—but some of them, such as machinery and stored grain, are not consumed but are used to further production. We might say, then—without distinguishing too finely—that cápital is anything useful which is saved up for future production and consumption; capital is that part of our accumulations which remains after we have used up and destroyed what we need or think we need; capital is "energy stored up against the struggle for self-maintenance"; capital "is labor accumulated, multiplied into itself—raised to a higher power, as the mathematicians say." And, of course, it includes the circulating symbols or titles to all of these things. Capital is essentially a result of human foresight—forgetting the luck of some imbeciles.[1]

(*b*) *Kinds of Capital.*—In considering what capital is, we also pointed out two kinds of capital—subsistence capital and auxillary or production capital. The first kind is that which is immediately necessary to the maintenance of life and that which is used *up*—destroyed—when used at all; examples are food and clothes. The second kind is that which is used to increase capital—of both kinds; examples would be machinery and money. The first is the kind which is indispensable to continued existence; it is what is necessary at the subsistence level. The second is that which is additional and which grows as it is preserved and is used to raise the standard of living. Thus, the first is necessary to life; the second is necessary to a standard. The second is the kind which becomes the ever thicker mattress which man stuffs between himself and the assaults of nature.

2. What Is Produced.—It is necessary to draw attention to two kinds of goods which come from the cooperation of labor and capital in the industrial organization. Were we to neglect this distinction, a very large area of labor would be forgotten—and an ever-increasing area. We refer to the production of material goods and of services. These must be stressed by a comment or two.

a. Material Goods.—The worker takes a bit of steel and machines it into a valve stem; the farmer sows his wheat and raises more than he sows; the ditch digger excavates a trench, puts in the sewer pipe, and fills in the trench again; the shoemakers make shoes; the miner gets out the coal or the ore; the packer takes the cattle and gives us beef. What we see in these cases is that some material thing is acted upon, transformed, and brought out in finished form. Thus, we can notice a vast number of activities which always result in material goods in some form; the workers engage in their work, and they do not return empty-handed; they produce material goods in countless forms. From the

[1] Sumner and Keller, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 107 *ff.*

beginning of man's work activities to the present, and in the present more than ever before, some things have been transformed into other *things*.

b. Services.—But what shall we say of the activities of many people who do not produce things? Are they work? Are they production? Take the teacher; he exhausts himself—for the really good teacher this is largely play—at his teaching, but no-*thing* comes out of his efforts. Take the doctor; he exhausts himself—and for the really high-class doctor this is play—at his healing, but there is no material result. Take the lawyer, the minister, the manager, the coach. These people do what we call work; but there are no space-occupying, handleable results such as we have from the machinist, the miner, the bricklayer, the farmer, the tailor. Yet we do admit—and tradition supports us in this position—that these people are workers and that they produce what is needed by themselves and by others. They go through motions, through routines, which require skill and are exhausting; and they go through them partly because of the reward which follows—we pay them. We must conclude, therefore, that services are goods, and exceedingly valuable goods; and we must conclude that servers are producers. The industrial organization, then, produces material goods and services, and these are intertwined and mutually supplementary and complementary all the way through. Any given consumable that we can name is a product of the transforming operations about which we have spoken and also of these intangible service operations.

4. Distribution

When goods are produced in factories, how do they reach the consumer, and what does the consumer send back in exchange for them? These are two of the many problems connected with distribution. Another problem is this: How is it that those who work at the production of food and clothes sometimes starve and freeze? These questions suggest two meanings of the term *distribution*, which we must examine a little.

1. The Functional Aspect.—We might appropriately give this name to the first of the matters suggested above, namely, the circulation of goods and services from producer to consumer and the return which is made for them in other goods, services, or the symbols of these. Sometimes our wages will buy more of the necessities and luxuries than we want. Occasionally, we catch more fish, shoot more game, grow more corn, raise more cattle, build more engines than we ourselves can use. Now, when we put such results together with the specialization of labor and production which we have already considered, we clearly see the need for distribution. The specialist in watch making cannot live on watches. How is he to obtain the other nine hundred and ninety-nine sorts of goods

and services which he needs—in addition to the watches? He needs only one or two watches for himself; what can he do with the others that he makes? Two or three points must be made concerning these problems.

a. The Contents of Distribution.—The contents of distribution are, as we may readily imagine, primarily goods and services—shoes, bicycles, cheese, geese, lettuce, cloth, bolts, gum, running street cars, teaching school, and the rest. The coal is brought out of the mine, the grain is taken from the farm, the gum is transported from the "gummery," the cattle are shipped to the stock yards. These things are made over and then put in circulation again, passing through various hands, taking on refinements, and, finally, reaching the consumer. These are familiar matters.

But when we finish our particular work of mining, making watches, trimming windows, and the like, we are not given so much of each variety of goods according to want or need; we are not paid in coal, watches, window trimming, gum; many of these things we could not use at all. We are paid in *money;* and this is one of the wonders of the world—this money. This money may be in the form of greenbacks, coin, or check. These are symbols, we remember; they are of no value in and of themselves. The marvel is that we can take these things and go to trade them for what we need and the amount we need.

The contents of distribution, then, are of two kinds—the materials and services which we want or need *and* the symbols of these which are readily exchangeable for them. We have said all that space permits about the first; we must now consider the second.

The name usually applied to these symbols is *money*, and Fisher defines money as that which "is generally acceptable in exchange for goods." He adds:

> The facility with which it may be thus exchanged, or its general acceptability, is its distinguishing characteristic. This general acceptability may be reenforced by law, the money thus becoming what is known as "legal tender;" but such reenforcement is not essential. All that is necessary in order that any good may be money is that general acceptability attach to it. On the frontier, without any legal sanction, money is sometimes gold dust or nuggets. In the colony of Virginia it was tobacco. Among the Indians in New England it was wampum.[1]

Simmel states the advantages of money over barter thus:

> The fact that money can be subdivided into minute parts makes it possible to weigh the value of an object in terms of money more precisely than in terms of other objects. Again, the new form of exchange—this money economy—gives to one what he needs specifically and to the other what everybody wants in general and what he can therefore immediately exchange for what he needs specifically. Money creates a form of exchange which permits the realization of a maximum of subjective enjoyment.[2]

[1] Elements of Economic Science," First Edition, p. 134.

[2] SPYKMAN, "The Social Theory of George Simmel," p. 220.

Since money is not the specific thing wanted, not a drink, or a package of gum, or a trip to Europe, but is immediately exchangeable for any of these, this is what we mean by its being generally acceptable; therefore, it circulates widely. But it usually circulates within a given population, a nation, state, or tribe; it is not generally acceptable all over the earth, except in some internationally acceptable form such as the travelers' cheques, the express orders, the letters of credit which we take abroad with us. Dollars will not pass in Zululand; the wampum which the Indians found generally acceptable will not pass with us. Thus, money is clearly one of the folkways; it is a usage which has grown up; it is an institution; and money markets, such as banks, stock exchanges, and the like are institutions. Money rests ultimately on *confidence,* widespread trust, and truthfulness. The money device could not survive in a society composed of habitual liars.

Money is a means to facilitate trade, to make trade more easy and fluid. How did people trade without it? The answer is *barter;* and by barter we mean the direct exchange of the goods and services themselves without transmuting them into easily circulating symbols; and barter was universal before money was invented. We all know something of this sort of exchange, for we have all traded knives, ribbons, and other trinkets; and we all know what a long-drawn-out process it is. In such cases, no one wishes to lose, and all wish to win. The problem is and has always been satisfactorily to equate values. Thus, every exchange has had to be a special case. One could not exchange pound for pound of coal and diamonds; one could not give yard for yard of fence wire and gum. If a farmer came to town with ten bushels of wheat, how much was it worth in terms of shoes, clothes, machinery, and dish ware? Many stories might be included to show the time involved, the patience, the arguments, the computations, the quarrels, and other difficulties attendant upon barter.[1]

b. Transportation.—The delivery boy brings the groceries from the store, either on foot or in a vehicle; he is part of the transportation system. The truck driver takes them from the wholesaler and delivers them to the grocery; he is part of the transportation system. The railroad, steamship, trolley, truck, or other conveyance connects up the wholesaler with the various producers; they are part of the transportation system. The telegraph lines, telephones, mails, radios, and all other means of communication are part of this system in so far as they are used to buy goods and direct their delivery where they are needed. Banks, express companies, stock exchanges are part of this system in so far as they facilitate the flow of money from consumer to grocery or other retailer, to wholesaler, to producer, in exchange for the goods and services and also the flow of capital so that producers may produce on

[1] SUMNER and KELLER, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 155.

an ever larger scale. Round and round go the goods— one cycle starting with the raw materials and ending with final comsumption, the other cycle starting with savings and going into eternal multiplication in the form of the tools for production.

We have marvelous carriers in our day, and they are steadily endeavoring to make the flow of goods from raw materials to the ultimate consumer speedy, safe, cheap. But they have all had a checkered history, successes and failures playing hide-and-seek with each other more rapidly than most of us imagine. Fifty years ago, there were no trucks. One hundred years ago, or a little over, there were no railroads. Five hundred years ago, there were no steamships. We can go back and back, losing numerous conveniences as we go, until we reach the end. The earliest transportation system consisted of the *hands*, man's marvelously deft and capable hands. These caught the food from the environment and conveyed it to the mouth. And the hands were the first, as they remain the last, link in this complicated, extended, ever vigilant transportation system.

Starting with his hands away back at zero, man has added from time to time, various tools, domestic animals, and fire. He learned how to make and propel rafts and canoes and thus move burdens about after he had used his back—or the backs of his women—for countless generations; he made small and then larger sailing vessels for the waters, and carts into which slaves or cattle were hitched for the land; he made steam engines a little while ago, put them on tracks and in front of cars; he discovered electricity and strung wires along the tracks to direct the trains, and then he built trolley lines; then he made internal-combustion engines and fitted these into fleet trucks and fine passenger cars—improving the highways meanwhile; finally, he has fitted these engines into airplanes and has opened up a new era in commerce. The history of transportation is a history of romance without many peers!

c. Marketing.—The producer very naturally wishes to sell his product, and the server wishes to sell his services, to the consumer who wants them. But there are some people who do not want them; certain people do not use automobiles, pork, beads, coal, straw hats, canes, and many other things besides. A phase of distribution, then, a very important phase, is that process, that complicated series of interactions which we call *marketing;* and marketing means the work of locating, within the total population, those persons who already want or can be made to want what the producer has to sell. Here is a producer who is making hairnets; his factory is located in some one spot. A thousand miles away is a person who wants a hairnet. Now, how is it possible, how is it made possible, for these two mutually complementary persons to get together? Or, here is a man who has made a machine to manufacture

a certain article for which nobody feels the need. Now, how can he persuade people to buy what he produces?

To meet such situations, there have developed, during the marvelous expansion of the industrial organization, many subsidiary units of various sorts. The transportation system has developed as we have seen. But the wholesale house has also developed. This is a depositary for various lines of goods located in centers nearer the people. In addition, the retail store has developed as a substitute for the early peddler and the small temporary stand on the street corner. These stores have all of the goods available on display and for sale within reach of the people, so that the people may actually go and see what is offered that most nearly fits their needs. The person who wants a hairnet but does not know that there are any for sale goes to the retail store and finds them there. Thus, the various producers connect with ultimate consumers through what are known as *middlemen* who actually display for buyers what is produced. The producer and the consumer get together in these ways.

Moreover, within the last century or so, producers have taken to announcing through print what is produced and thus connecting up with the consumer. A manufacturer in Camden, N. J., puts it in the papers, states it in bills and pamphlets, that he is making certain kinds of pickles. These announcements circulate easily among the people, and so the consumer and the producer are brought together. But this producer does more than simply *announce*, or give information to the effect, that he is manufacturing a certain kind of pickles; he puts what is called *appeal* into his announcements; by means of these announcements, he makes your mouth water for his pickles; he makes you want them when you had never thought about them before at all. And more and more he confines himself to the production of pickles and turns over this work of information and appeal to specialists who render this service. This is what we call *advertising*, which means calling attention to or forcing the people to leave off whatever else they are doing and *advert* to these goods. Advertisers now claim that they can *sell* anything, for they now know how to create new wants.

Thus, transportation and marketing are very complicated series of interactions which have for their purpose the circulation of goods and services to those who already want them and to those who can be made to want them. In the flow of goods *from the producers*, the transportation systems, the wholesalers, jobbers, retailers, and advertisers play an immense role. In the flow of money *from the consumers* back to the producers, banks and other credit institutions play an immense and ever more important role.

2. The Ethical Aspect.—Distribution has another aspect which we must notice in passing. We are all familiar with the fact that some

of us have poor clothes, insufficient food, uncomfortable homes, no automobile and cannot go to Europe or have adequate medical care. On the other hand, some of us have many more clothes than we can wear out, much more food than we can eat, luxurious homes, several expensive automobiles, can go to Europe any time we wish, can hire the services of the most costly physicians; we have, as is sometimes said, "money to burn," which means, of course, that we have anything we want that money can buy. More simply stated, we are familiar with poverty on the one hand and with great wealth on the other. In this country and in others, a very few people own the bulk of the capital accumulations of the ages, and the bulk of the people are not much above the subsistence level; indeed, there are always people who are starving to death amidst plenty. If this sort of thing is quite satisfactory—but it never is to the "have-nots"—then there is no problem. But since it is not satisfactory to the have-nots, then we may say that the distribution system is defective at some one or more points; the wealth which is produced seems to reach some people in greater quantities than it reaches others.

Now, the distribution system, considered merely as an immense machine for circulating goods and services among the people, is quite adequate; all of the people *can be reached* by railroads, trucks, wholesalers, retailers, advertisers; no person need starve in a civilized country in ordinary times because he cannot make a satisfactory physical connection with producers. Where, then, is the difficulty? The difficulty is not one but many. But chiefly the difficulty resides in the theory of *ownership* of wealth and in our inability to equate exactly in the process of exchange. Barter had its difficulties at this point, and while the money economy has less difficulties at some points, it has more at others. In early times, a bushel of wheat would exchange for a pound of tobacco, let us say. But suppose that both are valued in terms of money. We say that this is easy. But one of the central problems of the ages has been just this: How much money is equal to a bushel of wheat? When both wheat and tobacco *have been* stated in terms of money, then the exchange is simple. But *how are they*, how do they come to be, stated in terms of money? That is the crux of the whole matter; and it is at this point that the distribution system breaks down, leaving such inequalities as we have mentioned. If a man receives ten dollars a day for his services, how has it come about that he receives ten dollars and not five or one hundred?

It is often said, naïvely enough, that he receives "what he is worth" or that he is charged "what the traffic will bear" when he goes to spend his money. But how is it decided what he is worth? And worth to whom? In other words, we have up for consideration the question as to what *each person's share is* in the total accumulations of wealth of a given nation or of the world—the total accumulations made since man started

capitalistically at zero. So, in reflecting upon such matters, we shall have to open up the question of *property*. As human beings started capitalistically at zero and each produced only for himself and only what he needed, no questions arose as to ownership—if each one used up what was secured at once. When a primitive man caught a fish, he ate it at once, as the animal does, and his title to it became irrevocable in that nobody cared to open him up and take the fish away. Consumption, then, constituted the first title. The man might have reasoned thus: "I cannot eat all of this game, but somebody will try to steal it if I attempt to save part of it for the next meal. What shall I do?"

We can, then, see two lines of activity developing—saving and theft—and these forces have always been mutually conflicting and contradictory. To save is to run the risk of losing by theft, but not to save is to run the risk of dying of hunger during a lean year. Traditions, folkways, however, were not long in springing up among early men, and these defined what we call *rights* in what was produced. The man who killed the animal was, by that act, the owner of it; that idea became embedded in usage and was more or less respected. The man who found the mine was, by the very act of finding it, entitled to its return. The man who made a digging stick was, by that act, entitled to use it when he wished. Uniform types of behavior developed with respect to goods, and violators were punished. These ways, for the most part, have been sanctioned by law.

Now, what is property? The root idea of the term is found in its etymology. Going back to the Latin, we find the adjective *proprius: proprio, propio, propre, proper*, and meaning "own," as in "my proper self." We find this term in the word *appropriate*, which we have already used several times. Going to the Teutonic languages, we find such terms as *eigentum, eigendom, ejendom*, meaning "owning," from *eigen* meaning a "self" and *dom* meaning a "realm"; thus: the realm of the self. Property, then, is something which is attached to or a part of ones' self; it is something suitable, it is becoming, it is useful—possibly ornamental. "That which I have touched belongs to me; I put my hand to it; it is mine. The property I hold is the expansion of my own person."[1]

When we speak of *capital*, therefore, we are calling attention to energy stored up against the struggle for existence and for a standard—and ignoring ownership. But when we speak of *property*, we are calling attention to *ownership*—and ignoring the origin and nature of the thing owned. Thus, the central problem is this matter of ownership. What is meant by that? How have ownership and title come about? Such questions have been perplexing the minds of men since the human race began to save, began to accumulate a surplus over and above actual needs, began to leave something unconsumed on the spot—for the next meal. But we cannot settle them here; we can only insist that the issues be clear.

[1] Sumner and Keller, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 247 *ff.*

We may point out, however, that there are at least two major theories as to just what each one's share of the total accumulated wealth should be and as to what constitutes a genuine title to it. In the first case, there is the theory—and the correspondent practice—that each should have just what he can get by means, fair or foul, and that "possession is nine points of the law," that is, possession creates genuine title; "to the victors belong the spoils." This theory simply ignores the problem of equating values; it says that there is no problem of justice; or it says that what we mean by justice is just this sort of thing. It says that those *who have* an inadequate share at any time and in any place do *not deserve an equal share*, because they are lazy or stupid or both. It says that, after all, the struggle for existence, with absolutely free competition, determines worthiness and title.

On the other hand, there is the theory that worthiness to share and proper title are determined upon the prior assumption of human worth because of membership in the human species and of need. This theory holds that every worker and capitalist makes an undeterminable contribution to the total; it holds that there is no known way by which it can be justly decided that John Doe, laborer, and John Doe, capitalist, have each earned a certain amount. Since each one's share cannot be computed therefore, each should have at least a *minimum share* in proportion to whatever the total will allow, and this minimum should be raised as rapidly as the total accumulations increase. Thus, if there are five people in the family and only three cakes, then these cakes should not go to the stronger and more unscrupulous but should be divided up into five parts—on the basis of membership in the family. This theory simply ignores equating on the basis of effort, ingenuity, or contribution and proposes to apportion to each what is needed for health and decency as far as the total will provide.

The first theory stresses effort, ingenuity, aggressiveness, ambition, struggle, determination, as qualities and characteristics which should be rewarded with the lion's share—ominous phrase—because, in the last analysis, these really determine the matter; and of course it has to be admitted that in the past such has generally been the case if we add crookedness and inheritance. The second theory stresses the ultimate and inestimable worth of human beings *as such*, sick or well, well formed or deformed, lazy or ambitious, brilliant or stupid. It simply says that any attempt *to grade* rewards must be made on the basis of surviving folk standards and is, therefore, a recognition of the utter impossibility of equating, for these standards are just survivals from the age of brute struggle. This theory stresses the necessity of taking the problem up from an entirely different point of view; it stresses the desirability of enlarging that mutualism which is more and more characteristic of *human beings* and of giving to everyone *as much as possible;* it stresses

the urgency of doing *for all* just what we now do for helpless infants, for the sick, for the defective; it says that no man's worth can be overrated and that therefore no man can get too much of the total world's accumulations. From this point of view, ownership and title would inhere in membership in the human race and not in any incidental or accidental contributions made to accumulations. From this point of view, the inconsistency of making rewards turn on struggle, effort, service, in some cases, and making them turn on lucky inheritance, in others, is apparent. This is what we mean by the *ethical aspect* of distribution.

5. Consumption

If we are clear visioned, we can see a stream of goods and services taking its rise in all parts of the globe, a stream ladened increasingly with marvels of many kinds, the wonder things of production, a stream overflowing with nourishment and refreshment. And we can see this stream flowing ever more unerringly toward *us* to be consumed, to be slowly or rapidly destroyed. All over the world, people are working for us to enrich and hurry along this stream. All over the world, specialization and cooperation increase apace, that the necessities and luxuries may safely reach those who need or want them. And we are all the time developing in our wants and needs. There was a time when people did not need or want soap; but today all civilized people need it and want it. Compared with primitive man, what all of us use and want today makes material for a story that reads like a fairy tale.

What do we *use* from day to day? The list would be too long to include here, even the list of a poor man. But what do we *need* from day to day? This is a very different matter; we do not have the answer yet, and nobody knows when we shall have it. There is, as we have already noted, a very decided difference between what we need and what we want. And this difference is the familiar difference between *necessities* and *luxuries*. It is fairly safe to say that in civilized countries most people use more than they need and less than they want.

In making this distinction, there are two fundamental bases of judgment—physiology and the standard of living; or, perhaps we had better say, science and custom. We all agree, and science has abundantly shown, that the body needs certain ingredients in order to keep alive, although the debate is always going on as to just what, in detail, these are and in what proportion. Some say that we need meat; others insist that we need only vegetables. The facts are that each organism is a special case by itself, and one person will thrive on what would be slow starvation for another. A good living, therefore, for each person is an individual problem to be worked out by experimentation and by using the results of scientific investigation. How foolish, then, to rely blindly on the folk usages at this point! "What is one person's meat is another

person's poison," is a bit of folk wisdom which strangely contradicts many folk usages. How foolish it is, then, to fast twice a day, or once a week, or a day at a time, simply because tradition stresses the necessity of so doing—unless we habitually overeat; but this can be known only by scientific investigation.

But, from another angle, what we need is closely connected with what we *think* we need because we have always had it and like it. In other words, what we *need* is not easy to disentangle from what we *want;* and what we want is largely a matter of what we have had from childhood and, therefore, have learned to like. What we need is determined by the prevailing standard of living. On this basis, the primitive man needs and wants grubs, raw fish, beads, feathers, few clothes, and the rest and does not at all care for many other things; but the modern man wants—and needs—ice cream, automobiles, well-fitting clothes, and hundreds of accessories which the primitive man would spurn.

It is clear, then, that the necessities of one time and place are not those of another time and place. It is clear, also, that luxuries continually pass over into necessities as the standard of living rises and that necessities pass over continually into luxuries as the times grow hard and the standard of living falls. The general trend, however, seems to be of the former kind—the continual passing of luxuries into the class of necessities. But we see clearly that these terms, *necessities* and *luxuries,* are both relative, and that they can and do mean something only in relation to the standard of living of the time and place.

The general striving, moreover, is for more consumption goods, and this striving is shaped and directed very largely by what our "set" wants; we want very nearly what they want, and that makes mass production possible. If we never wanted anything that anybody else wanted, we could never have a well-organized and efficient industrial system; each want would be a separate and special case calling for a unique technique, and in the last analysis, each would have to provide for himself and for himself alone everything he wanted, since he would be the only person in the world acquainted with what he wanted.

Not only do we want what others want, but also we want what others want us to want. This point is illustrated from two departments of life. (1) We learn to want what our parents and the immediate circle of friends want us to want—certain kinds of food, clothes, other goods, and professions; usage obtains here. (2) But we also learn to want what the producers, by means of their salesmen, want us to want; they are high-pressure persons who make a living, in part or wholly, by not only informing us as to what others are using, that is, what is in fashion, but also by pressing down on us, truthfully or untruthfully, the numerous merits of the various commodities, and showing us that we are barely existing without these things. And thus, increasingly, actual

physical needs are being divorced from wants, so that we want more and more according to the fashion.

Originally, production grew up in response to innate, spontaneous, and natural needs, needs made conscious by bodily depletion; primitive man was not always hankering after something that he did not have. But today, production has this base and also the other one just discussed, namely, demands awakened by outside pressure; it is determined more and more by what consumers can be made to want. The actual and basic needs are supplied, of course, and more certainly and of higher quality, else consumers would die and cease to want; but industry is organized to sell what is produced, and what is produced is determined, more largely than most people know, by what can be sold. Thus, the so-called *banquet of life* is not only provided by the producers and distributors, but also we are made to sit at it. We used to say that you could lead a horse to water but you couldn't make him drink. But man is easier to handle; you can both lead him to water and make him drink—by assuring him that he is thirsty. This reaching out after necessities and luxuries is what economists call *demand*. And the response of producers is what they call *supply*. And since producers, by means of artificial stimulants, create a good deal of the demand, they can measure it and make the proper adjustments.

This prepares the way for a word or two concerning what Veblen calls *conspicuous consumption*.[1] What is this? It is nothing other than the consumption of luxuries in an ostentatious manner such as elaborately formal and costly dinners, clothes, houses, travel, and the rest. We used to see this sort of thing in court life; in modern America, it is on every hand; here is a lady spending $75,000 in a year on her wardrobe; here is a man handing out $10,000 in tips on a single trip across the ocean; here is a dinner that costs $15 per plate; here are private yachts and Pullman cars—everyday newspaper commonplaces. Now, there is no physiological demand for this sort of thing; the body makes no call for twenty suits of clothes in a year, it makes no call for a private yacht, it makes no demand for the distribution of $10,000 in tips. What is behind this sort of extravagance? On the innate side, can it arise from anything other than vanity? But is the organism protected any better thereby? These are very interesting questions which we raise here but leave for classes to discuss.

In conclusion, we may review our outline and call attention to the chief points. Starting with ourselves, we notice our hungers and cravings, some of which are organic in origin and most of which are cultivated. These wants drive us to work—or to a pretense at it. In working, which is painful generally, we produce things the consumption of which is pleasurable. But specialized working divorces us from the direct

[1] "The Theory of the Leisure Class," p. 68 *ff*.

production of most of what we actually need. We have to trade, therefore, to obtain that portion of necessities which we do not produce. Trade, to be efficient and satisfactory, calls for money which is a suitable medium of exchange—being translatable into anything that men wish to sell or buy by way of goods or services. But specialization—indeed, life itself—means that we are producers and consumers at the same time but consumers of only a fraction of what we produce, the balance being put in circulation and exchanged for what else we want. Thus, in ten thousand visible and invisible ways, we are all bound up together in the producer-distributor-consumer system; and this is what we call the *industrial organization*. It is not a static whole but a dynamic, functional whole; and within it, human beings are being ever more intimately, dependably, and subtly related. We can picture hundreds of thousands of groups and individuals performing millions and billions of activities to extract from nature what they want, transform it, pass it on, and then consume it. The industrial organization is a gigantic yet delicately adjusted affair; it is not fragile, and yet it often breaks down; it is one of man's most remarkable achievements.

Production and distribution have been well organized, and organization is proceeding apace. Consumption, on the other hand has not organized itself so rapidly; nor can it. If people might some day get together *as consumers*, they might dictate to producers instead of being largely dominated as now. But the problem of organizing consumers is much more involved, although vast strides are being made all the while, as witness the various cooperative purchasing societies that are springing up in ever-increasing numbers.

The whole thing may be summarized under two heads: (1) the performing of some one or more of the adaptive processes into which the entire work of the world is or may be divided and (2) getting paid for this work in some medium of exchange and using this medium to satisfy the wants of the worker. This is the industrial organization in a nutshell.[1]

Questions

1. What is the particular mood in which scientists tackle their problems? Are you ever in this mood?
2. Is cooperation helped or hindered by an increasing population? Give reasons for your answer.
3. What are the essential differences between play and work? Can you always tell when your play becomes work?
4. Define an *institution*.
5. Are there any natural resources available for man except those in the physical environment? If so, what?
6. How was the first capital acquired? Was labor or capital first? If labor was first in time, is it first in importance?

[1] *Cf.* ALLPORT, "The Nature of Institutions," *Social Forces*, December, 1927.

7. What are the different kinds of capital?

8. What are the essentials of production? Of efficient production?

9. Why is money so valuable, because it is hard to get or because it is a medium of exchange?

10. What different means of transportation can you name? What is the relation between increasing facilities for transportation and social unity?

11. Is it unscientific to consider the "ethical aspect" of distribution? Consider this carefully.

12. Why are your clothes your own property? Show how they are.

13. What are the essentials of ownership?

14. What is the value, to any one, of more property than he can use? Have you created all of the property you own?

15. What is meant by *standard of living*. Describe a minimum standard; a maximum standard.

16. Have we neglected any essentials in considering the industrial organization? If so, what are they?

17. What sciences are especially concerned with the industrial organization? Name all you can.

18. What parts of this discussion (this chapter) are most unscientific? Are any biases illustrated? What ones?

19. Can it be scientifically demonstrated that stealing is harmful (1) to the stealer, (2) to those who are robbed?

20. What would make work more like play? Would it be desirable to do this?

CHAPTER XIV

MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY

If the first task of life, the universal need to which the industrial organization corresponds, is to live and to live better, then the second task of life is to live continuously, to endure. On the individual side, this means that organisms strive to live as long as possible. Human beings alone take their own lives, but very few of them; they live as long as possible, covering the so-called *alloted span* of threescore years and ten and then living much longer in many cases. On the individual side, *living* and *living continuously* are not distinguishable except as we think of the short, intense life as contrasted with the long, complacent, and monotonous existence.

But on the social or group side, there is a genuine difference; groups dislike dying as well as do individuals. Whereas individuals may stave off, for a long time but never absolutely, the final day of "going West," groups can and do perpetuate themselves indefinitely; thus, individuals come to an end, but groups go on; the individual is mortal, but the group is the nearest thing to immortality that we know anything about; and the only sure immortality that the individual may count on is that which he has by making his name a household word in his group. How do groups go on when individuals die?

There are only two ways—a point to which we have already alluded—by which groups can perpetuate themselves—*adoption* (which corresponds to immigration) and *generation* (a group may accept outsiders generated elsewhere into its membership and thus make up for depletion caused by deaths and resignations)—and most organizations have no other way of perpetuating themselves; sororities, fraternities, lodges, factories, churches, play associations, governments, and many others regularly make up for losses by adoption. But we are not concerned with this method, except very indirectly, in this chapter.

The other way, namely, generation, is the only way available for the total population of the globe, as we have already seen. And this method, being bound up closely with and dependent upon, certain imperious impulses, very early took on a social shape, took on an institutional form, which we have to examine here. The sex interest very early in human, if not in pre-human, history became one of the nuclei about which a social structure began to take shape, a structure composed of routine interactional activities and fixed modes of thought, a structure

which has had most to do with the perpetuation of the human species. This structure is marriage and the family and all that—and more than—we shall be able to include under this head.

Not that primitive man saw that an institution was called for to guarantee perpetuation and then organized the family; he did nothing of the sort. Other creatures perpetuate themselves, and they do not organize families to any great extent. It is conceivable that the human species could have perpetuated itself without marriage and the family. We can hardly argue, therefore, that the family was set up by design. On the contrary, marriage and the family grew out of men's activities to satisfy private impulses, individual hungers, just as the industrial organization grew. They felt sex wants; they satisfied them; habits unconsciously formed and became general in groups, becoming group ways or folkways. And, therefore, what we mean by marriage and the family is a more or less consistent complex of usages which are approved when criticised and which are imposed on the young arriving within the group practicing them. The family, as Burgess says, is "a unity of interacting personalities,"[1] and marriage is the formal way of entrance into this unity. But let us take up matters in order.

1. Courtship

Following our plan of working, in our thought, from the familiar to the unfamiliar, we may call attention first of all to some well-known matters. Antecedent to that ceremony which we call the wedding, as our common observation and as gossip shows, young people of opposite sexes manœuver themselves relative to each other in a fairly well-understood manner; and this we call *courting*. Its beginnings are often obscure—even to the parties most concerned. It is a larger and more inclusive procedure than would issue directly and solely from the physical impulse to mate, for prostitution would take care of that; it represents a struggle and a compromise—a conflict between an imperious desire and a social requirement, and a compromise in that it is an attempt to satisfy both demands, an attempt to gratify the inner urge by being near and touching the loved one and, at the same time, remain properly within the regulations of the group.

While the beginnings are often obscure, the process consists essentially of some special attentions on the part of the male to a certain female—some approaches to formerly neglected or tabooed subjects of conversation, numerous expressive affirmations of mounting affection, some discoveries of like-mindedness, suitable reciprocation on the part of the female, and, possibly, an agreement signified by an engagement ring, which is a ring of a special kind; also, there is a partial avoidance of other eligibles of the opposite sex. Of course, there is vastly more in the

[1] *The Family*, March, 1926.

process than any outsider can discover. The sexes begin a special and delicate series of experiences from which they have hitherto restrained themselves—or have been restrained by the all-seeing social eye. But all of this is familiar to most of us. What is it like in other societies?

1. Early Courtship.—In China, for instance, young people have never, until recently, selected each other by fumbling experimentation, as they do among us. There, the parents do the selecting, and the personal likes and dislikes of the spouses have nothing to do with the matter. Courting, as we know it and as a special preparation for marriage, does not exist except in a few cases. In India, the selection of mates has likewise been in the hands of the parents and is often made by them at the time of birth; marriage takes place in that country much earlier than with us.

If we go backward through our own stream of culture to the days of chivalry in the twelfth century, we find that courting was a much more pretentious, arduous, and exacting affair—at least, among the upper classes—than it is with us. With us almost everything depends upon the price exacted of the male by the female. But in the days of chivalry, the public also exacted a price.

> To show courage and endurance of an almost superhuman order in the eyes of the maiden of his heart became the supreme ideal of many a lusty knight, and, it may be truly added, the "open sesame" to the affections of the fair "daimoiselle." Indeed, one nobly born English maid boldly declared that she would wed no man who was not "handsome, courteous and accomplished, and the most valiant of his body in all Christendom." Her guardian therefore proclaimed a tournament, with the damsel and her estates as the rich reward of the victor.

Now, this attitude was not the natural outgrowth of affection; it was a pose required by the social standards of the time. This was the period when romantic love was born.

In Roman society, the will of the parents was absolute, and their choice was governed by considerations of wealth and family convenience. Often girls were betrothed in childhood. The Latin language contains no terms corresponding to our English words *court* and *woo*.[1]

A passage from Goodsell carries us back farther:

> Reference has been made to wife capture and wife purchase as modes of obtaining mates which were widely prevalent among savages. But what can be said of mutual choice and affection in primitive marriage? It seems clear enough that wife purchase could not have been the original custom of securing wives; for this implies a higher degree of social and economic development than was reached by primitive peoples among whom the property sense is rudimentary. On the contrary there is some evidence to show that in the lowest groups a considerable degree of freedom of choice is allowed to the woman. Westermarck has collected

[1] *Cf.* Goodsell, "The Family as a Social and Educational Institution," pp. 150, 227.

some valuable material which indicates that, at the beginning of human history, marriage was grounded in the mutual attraction and consent of the parties. With rare exceptions the male among the rudest peoples appears as the wooer. The female, less dominated by sexual passion, must be courted; and thus she plays a prominent role in sexual selection. Nor is this fact surprising. Darwin, Groos, and others have shown that courtship, in one form or another, very generally prevails in the animal kingdom. Male birds and animals alike not only fight fiercely with rivals of their own sex for their mates, but follow these conflicts up with attempts to charm the female onlookers in various ways. Why should not primitive man have employed the same tactics? In a state of nature, where each individual man or woman was his own food provider, the female, as previously stated, was very nearly the equal of the male in strength and self-reliance, and was by no means so dependent upon his prowess in war and skill in the hunt as she later became. Hence she could, and probably did, choose among her suitors. It may be objected that the sale of girls as wives is a common practice among primitive groups; but it should be remembered that, although purchase marriage is and has been a general custom among savages, most of the peoples are far from living under primordial conditions. The Australians, Bushmen, Hottentots and Gold Coast Negroes, who frequently arrange for the sale of infants in marriage shortly after their birth, are by no means in an absolutely primitive social condition.

Even among savages who contract for the marriage of their children with complete indifference to their wishes, the engaged couple sometimes break the contract, when they reach maturity, and the girl elopes with another suitor. Elopements used to be common among the Dacotah Indians and are stated to be the rule among the Kurnai of Australia. A few North American Indian tribes were surprisingly generous in permitting freedom of choice in marriage to their girls. Among the Creeks the consent of the woman was regularly obtained by courtship; and no Pueblo girl was forced to marry a suitor against her will. The rude Maoris of New Zealand have a proverb which runs: "As a kahawai (a fish) selects the hook which pleases it best out of a great number, so also a woman chooses one man out of many." Another instance is furnished by the Dyaks of Borneo, among whom the women are apparently given entire liberty in the choice of a husband.

Thus, marriages grounded upon mutual liking are not quite so rare in savage groups as certain anthropologists would have us think. Indeed, there is some reason to believe, as Howard has suggested, that marriage began in free choice, passed through the stage of contract and purchase arranged by family or clan, and with the decay of the kinship group and paternal power, became very slowly, once more an individual matter as in modern times.[1]

2. Characteristic Features.—Among us, the period of courtship is often very long, running into the years—the parties, or one of them, being slow to reach a conviction of the desirability of marriage, being reluctant to relinquish what is poetically called *freedom*, or being hindered by inadequate finances or kinship obligations. In many other cases, the period is ridiculously short—altogether too short for any real under-

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 23 *ff.* See SUMNER and KELLER, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, Chaps. 46, 47.

standing, any adequate preparation, briefer than is ordinarily occupied in selecting a pair of shoes. Courting practices vary greatly, also, with the wealth, the position, and the education of the lovers. But something in the nature of a wooing process precedes the marriage contract among us and all over the world; even capture is a "rough" form of wooing.

And in this, the world over, the male is almost invariably the aggressor. In our society, as a rule, the female must not woo directly. An aggressive female drives away all but mollycoddle males; she is ridiculed by observers; she is required to remain modest and coy, slightly indifferent in demeanor although not unresponsive. Not that the physical world cares a fig about who takes the lead; it does not. Not that the female is passionless and indifferent to mating; she is not, and most females would pick up mates in a hurry if the mores did not decree otherwise. But here we have it—usage dictates otherwise, and that is the way we go.

Yet females are usually adepts in the subtleties of indirection; they have had long training in these arts; within the confines of the restraining usages, women have learned how to be aggressive as well as men. A recent advertisement in a Philippine newspaper contained the following:

> Being aware that it is indelicate to advertise for a husband, I refrain from doing so; but if any gentleman should be inclined to advertise for a wife, I will answer the advertisement without delay. Am young, domesticated and rather good looking.

What a charming evasion of public requirements this is! And there are countless other subtleties which have become second nature to the so-called *weaker* sex. But with us it does not *seem right* for women to take the lead, although teaching for a sufficient period could make it seem perfectly proper; and some students of the subject claim that we shall never have a eugenic or sound family life until things are changed about so that females will regularly seek out and marry the husbands they desire as the fathers of their children.[1]

3. Public Interest.—While so much of courting, because of a certain levity with which public wooing is greeted, is carried on in private and in secret, nevertheless, the relationship being matured, its intent must ultimately be brought to the surface and acknowledged to society by a formal application for a license to marry. Having "wooed and won," the male must declare what it is all about in a prescribed manner. And we see here that this private arrangement is not so private after all and that the freedom which is presupposed is rather fictitious. The larger group will put its fingers into the affair. Physical impulses and natural desires would dictate activities of mating and living together without any public acknowledgment. But the public has decreed against that, and

[1] WALLACE, "Social Environment and Moral Progress," p. 139 *ff.*

no union is regarded as properly set up without this telltale "scrap of paper" called a *license.*

The future seems pregnant with further developments along this line, further and more exacting inquiries into the fitness of young people to marry and produce offspring, inquiries that have to do with educational attainments, inquiries that have to do with health, inquiries that have to do with heredity. The marriage business is more and more the public's business, and a blacklist of procreators is in the making. But this is only reasonable protection for the public, for the offspring, and for the wooers; it is a sign of intelligence taking the place of tradition as a guide in this growingly important arrangement. The union and fusion of personalities may be ever so complete and the relationship may look as if it had been established in heaven, and yet the results may be utterly disastrous, supremely tragic, as we all know. This is just one of the numerous cases in life where good intentions are no guarantee of desirable consequences.

2. Marriage

Marriage has been defined by Sumner as the fusion of two lives and their interests for the fuller satisfaction of the interests of both, and with special reference to the procreation and nurture of children. We must carefully keep in mind that, in ordinary usage, *mating* and *marriage* are two very different series of activities. Mating was practiced long before marriage; and marriage was developed partly by the device of taboo as a method of regulating mating and for other ends.[1] But let us note some further steps into this union, and some of the forms it has taken.

1. Ceremonial Aspects. *a. Betrothal.*—Among us, betrothal is usually a quiet and private affair between the parties involved; but among earlier peoples, it was a public affair and of great significance; it might be called the *first formal act* in the marriage drama. Among the ancient Hebrews, betrothal was a solemn contract involving certain customary formalities—the giving of money or a written instrument. Abraham's servant gave rich gifts to Rebekah's mother and brother, both persons standing in a special relation to her, that he might win the damsel for his master's son Isaac; and this was a sort of proxy wooing. Among the Greeks, the betrothal was a business-like arrangement between the parents—the girl's consent being taken for granted—and there were no religious rites. The practice was very similar among the Romans. The early Church did not interfere with the current usages but directed its energies to the work of establishing the prohibited degrees. Yet it did press upon its members the duty of seeking the blessing of the priest upon their union. And this allusion requires us to point out that

[1] Sumner and Keller, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 1495.

betrothal and marriage were largely secular matters before they became solemn religious sacraments. The secular and the religious strains still run parallel![1]

b. Nuptials.—As we observe our wedding ceremonies, we note that the two most interested parties stand side by side; and this is symbolic. We also notice that, as a rule, parents, other relatives, and friends are assembled; and this also is symbolic. Contributory, but not necessary, features are the music, the flowers, the processional, the wedding breakfast, and the somewhat surreptitious departure; and these, too, are symbolic. We mark, in addition, the presence of an official—minister, mayor, or justice of the peace. What do these features mean?

We have already noted that while, in essential respects, this union is a private arrangement between two people, as a matter of fact it is an arrangement in which outsiders have a deep interest; and this interest is attested and expressed by their presence at the ceremony; the ceremony is but the continuance of a procedure of which the procuring of the license is the beginning. The ceremony is a more or less artistic dramatization of an inscrutable process—the inward emotional and intellectual union of two human beings, it is a formal and public pledge; it is like the oath in a court room. But why is the public so deeply interested?

The public is concerned for two reasons chiefly—property and offspring. A married couple nearly always accumulates some property; marriage is a joining of complementary and supplementary forces, in part, for this purpose; it is a kind of industrial organization. In case the couple is in entire accord throughout the period of the union, no problem arises. But if there is disagreement and separation, to whom does the property belong? And how can the contentions of the two producers of it be adjudicated? This partnership cannot be permitted, any more than any other partnership, to dissolve without review; general disturbances would be sure to follow.

Again, it is usually assumed that marriages will produce offspring. In case there are no children, no problem arises. But if there are offspring and the union careens toward dissolution, what then? Our humanitarian standards of concern for the innocent require that they shall suffer as little as possible. If a union threatens to break up, then who will care for the children? The whole development has been in the direction of ease in locating and charging responsibility. The public's sense of fair play is outraged when young people make a promise, as they are free to do or not to do, and then nonchalantly repudiate it, leaving children dangling in the air. Thus, the wedding celebration is a public checking up of what any young couple proposes to do. It is a solemn illuminator to them, moreover, of what responsibilities they are assuming.

[1] *Cf.* GOODSELL, *op. cit.*, pp. 62, 87, 149, 164, 188.

In our society, it is always required that offspring come only *after* the wedding, after the public promise. In some backward societies, no restraint is imposed on imperious sex impulses (until after marriage); hence, unmarried men and women mate quite freely; and if there are offspring, that is no crime, for they are regarded as acquisitions to tribal strength and are cared for by the mother with the aid of the group, the care, however, not being very costly. But a long development has issued with us in severe disapproval of such an arrangement; offspring which arrive before marriage are usually not esteemed to be "pure"—foolish as this is—but tainted in some way, and a very ugly epithet has been invented for them. Laying aside the absurdities, there is a core of justice in this requirement; it is but an expression of the public's determination to be sure about responsibility, about lineage, and about property rights.

An additional safeguard is the marriage certificate. The official solemnizer might forget or die; the witnesses might die or separate to the four corners of the earth; conceivably, nobody might remember what actually took place. Then what about the rights of a repudiated wife, a henpecked husband, or abandoned children? How could various claims be established? The solemnization certification is retained in the public archives; thus, the contracting parties cannot repudiate their contract. A marriage certificate is given to them; it is their personal guarantee that they sought and won the public's approval; it is something they can fling in the teeth of backbiters and scandalmongers; it is what the wife or husband may use in calling the other to account for certain irregularities.

Certain innocent features of the wedding are survivals from the past. At the proper place, the solemnizer announces: "If, therefore, any man know of any reason"—either of the parties having another spouse, for example—"why these two should not be joined together, let him speak now or forever after hold his peace." Then he pauses—awful moment—for objections. This is a survival from ruder times when personal histories were not so easily ascertained. The ring is a material symbol, visible to all, of the inward agreement and the public promise; it is a survival of the gift once made to the bride and goes back farther, perhaps, to the days of wife purchase. Another feature is this: At a certain point in the ceremony, the solemnizer asks: "Who giveth this woman to be married to this man?" Then the father or male guardian steps forward with the bride and places her beside the man. This little detail is a relic of the good old days when the daughter was private property and the owner could do with her as he wished; only in those days he rarely *gave* her away. From many points of view, it would seem more appropriate for the mother to do the giving, since she is always and in a peculiar sense the real owner of the daughter. It is interesting

that fathers never give their sons away; but here we have been guided by the tradition of male supremacy.

Another feature of the marriage, a feature which is rarely heard of among us but which had a large place in the past, is the arrangement of the dower or property exchange—a central element in the marriage. Sometimes, the father gave a dower with his daughter; sometimes, he extracted something in the nature of a purchase price from the groom. Around the world, there are, and there have been, innumerable varieties of usage; and they all show that marriage is but a series of folkways and mores of the particular place and time; they all show that there is nothing absolutely right or wrong about any arrangement that does not work actual harm to the contracting parties, the offspring, or the public; they all show that the public has always been interested.[1]

2. Forms of Marriage. *a. Monogamy.*—In our society, it is required that one man marry one woman—at a time. But easy divorce rather nullifies or mitigates the rigor implied. Yet we call the arrangement *monogamy*—one marriage. In a man-made society, it would be more correct to call it *monogyny*—one wife. The corresponding form, in a woman-made society, would be *monandry*—one husband—but this term is rarely used. Exceptions to this one-at-a-time arrangement are called *bigamy*—two marriages—but bigamy is illegal and is severely punished when found out.

The *advantages* of monogamy are numerous—"we" think. Some of those proclaimed are: (1) that one man brings into the union enough masculinity, and one woman brings in enough femininity, to meet the needs of the man and the woman and the growing children; such a union is adequate both educationally and economically; (2) it is possible to have more families, more unions, when the sexes are taken two at a time (we might have pointed out when discussing birth rates that the sexes are born in the ratio of about 106 males to every 100 females; but the death rate is a little higher for males; hence, normally, the sexes are about equal in numbers); (3) a union of two is probably more stable than a union of three or more, where jealousy is an ever present menace.

The disadvantages of monogamy are: (1) that many excellent people, especially women, are left out of wedlock, unmarried and unproductive, since some populations, because of certain exigencies, especially war, rarely have the sexes in equal numbers; (2) it binds inexperienced persons in a supposedly indissoluble union before they understand what they are doing; that is, monogamy presupposes a body of knowledge about marriage which can be gained only by marriage. Rather free divorce, however, dulls the point of this objection. There is really no answer to the first disadvantage noted.

[1] *Cf.* SUMNER, "Folkways," Chap. IX.

b. Polygamy.—Here, again, the terms need clarification. *Polygamy* really means many marriages, and it could be applied to our one-at-a-time arrangement—some people marrying as many as a dozen times in the United States. The correct term is *polygyny*—many wives—in a man-made society. Strictly defined, however, it refers to that arrangement where one man has two or more wives at any one time; and this form is now widespread over the earth and has a history running back to the earliest times. There are probably more polygynous families on the earth than any other kind. The Old Testament pictures this form as prevailing among the ancient Hebrews.

If we study these families, the polygynous families of earth, we shall find that the wives taken are of *three* kinds. One kind is the *status* wife, the wife who is equal in rank with her husband. To illustrate, there are only seven women on earth, so it has been said, from whom the Prince of Wales may select a wife; that is, there are only seven women with something akin to his position, and who would not be offensive to the English people.

In the second place, there is the *love* wife. The Prince might not fancy any one of the eligibles, but he will be compelled to marry one of them just the same—if he marries at all. To mitigate the rigors of this requirement in past times, certain of the highborn were permitted—and many times they did so without permission—to take the lady of their choice, to marry a real affinity. If, as has been usual, the status wife was taken by the right hand, then the love wife was sometimes taken by the left hand; this was sometimes called a morganatic marriage.

A third type of wife often found among earlier peoples is the *slave* wife. Chieftains of certain African tribes usually have a number of slave or work wives to do their work for them. This practice probably came about by chieftains taking a number of women of the tribe for wives. This inevitably left many men without hope. There being no available wives at home, these men raided neighboring tribes and carried the women home after butchering the men. Wife hunting has been the cause of innumerable tribal wars. Concubines, strictly speaking, are not wives but kept mistresses of low-class origin.

c. Polyandry.—A much less frequent but still existent form of marriage is that in which the woman takes two or more husbands—*poly*, meaning "many," and *andros*, meaning "man." At least two kinds of polyandry have been distinguished: (1) There is the case where the woman takes her husbands from any source and according to inclination, within the rules of the time and place. (2) There is the case where she marries the eldest brother of several and then takes all of the younger brothers as they grow up. Of the Todas, a backward people in southern India, we are told by one writer that:

If there be four or five brothers, and one of them, being old enough, gets married, his wife claims all the other brothers as her husbands, and as they successively attain manhood, she consorts with them; or if the wife has one or more younger sisters, they in turn, on attaining a marriageable age, become the wives of their sister's husband or husbands, and thus in a family of several brothers, there may be, according to circumstances, only one wife for them all, or many; but one or more, they all live under one roof, and cohabit promiscuously.[1]

This is called *fraternal polyandry.*

d. Group Marriage.—Many students of marriage have been much puzzled by the apparent paucity or absence of regulations, as compared with our own requirements, found among some primitive peoples. And they have assumed, hastily, as it would now seem, that the earliest relations of the sexes were promiscuous. More careful investigators have found, however, that there are no cases of utterly unregulated sex relations and, especially, marriage. What seemed like promiscuity is now seen to be group marriage—fraternal polyandry being an example. Other cases are those in which all the men of a tribe or section of a tribe take all the women as wives but take them according to well-defined rules. Thus, while the relationship looks very loose from our point of view, it is still a regulated relationship.

e. The Earliest Form.—The question is quite natural: What was the earliest form of marriage? *Mating*, as we clearly understand, has always been the primordial base of marriage. Our interest, then, attaches to the beginnings of that body of regulations and ceremonies which are the symbols of the actual union.

The early chapters of Genesis give us a picture of what early Hebrew writers conceived the original form to be. This picture presents a case of simple, unceremonious, yet divinely sanctioned pairing; Adam took one wife, and Eve took one husband. But this arrangement was unavoidable, since there were no other eligibles around at that momentous time. Were these Hebrew writers producing fiction or fact? They were not averse to polygyny, because they glorified Solomon who had rather more than his share of wives.

Curiously enough, some modern students believe that simple pairing for a longer or shorter time was probably the earliest form. The evidence is too long to review here, but it is taken from two main sources—primitive man as we now find him, and the relations of certain animals. First, Westermarck says that no case of a people living in unrestricted sexual communism can be found today and that the arrangements which have the appearance of communism, namely, group marriage and wife lending, may be otherwise interpreted.[2] And if we put beside this point another, namely, that monogamy goes back as far as we can follow, the case

[1] SPENCER, "Principles of Sociology," Vol. I, p. 654.

[2] See LOWIE, "Primitive Society," p. 62.

would seem fairly clear. At any rate, pair marriage tends to become more and more prevalent.[1]

Relative to the other point, it may be said that the simple pairing arrangement is frequently found among the lower creatures, and it is the more usual form among the manlike apes; it is an arrangement, however, of longer or shorter duration. Among the creatures below man, there is no standard and no public opinion to uphold it.[2]

We have now examined some forms of marriage from the standpoint of the *numbers* of the sexes involved; and it is obvious that man has experimented in all possible directions; every conceivable arrangement has been tried somewhere on a fair scale. Probably, however, monogamy has been the central thread through the plot—taking things in the large. But we must look at some forms from the standpoint of the *sources of the spouses*, the numbers question being neglected for the moment. So far as we can find out, there are no matings without regulation. Considered from this angle, there are two forms of marriage.

f. Exogamy.—We may fall in love with a brother, sister, father, mother, uncle, aunt, but we cannot marry them; in our time, it is both abominable and illegal to do so; such unions are extremely offensive to public taste; and this feeling of abomination is quite universal, although there is endless variety as to who comes within the prohibited degrees. Exogamy means, then, that there is a circle—it is of a different size in almost every group—*outside* which people must choose their mates. We have already reminded ourselves of the taboos attaching to immediate members of the family. In some instances, first cousins cannot marry. In other instances, the circle is drawn outside second cousins, and sometimes it has taken in relatives to the seventh degree. In many cases, persons of the same name are prohibited from marrying; thus, under certain circumstances, a Macdonald could never marry a Macdonald, no matter what the kinship distance. The limitations and requirements at this point run into amazing complexity even among very primitive peoples.

Violation of these restrictions is called *incest*, and it is usually severely punished, primitive peoples often being the most severe. There is an almost universal feeling of horror at the thought of unions within the prohibited degrees. We ourselves experience it when we read in the papers about some unnatural father cohabiting with his daughter, or a brother with his sister. Why is this? Hobhouse holds that the aversion is instinctive, a trait of original nature; and Lowie accepts this view. But a nice question arises here: Is the well-known aversion the cause of the innumerable and contradictory regulations imposed, or are the

[1] Sumner and Keller, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 1878, 2049 *ff.*

[2] *Cf.* Spencer, "Principles of Sociology," Vol. I, p. 643; Goodsell, *op. cit.*, p. 8 *ff.*; Ellwood, "Sociology and Modern Social Problems," p. 65 *ff.*

regulations the cause of the aversion?[1] Many of us can testify that the idea of mating with near relatives has never occurred to us, although we have, the while, longed for a mate. There is no very satisfactory evidence either for or against the age-old supposed evils of inbreeding, except in the case of defectives.

g. Endogamy.—As human beings have always required marriage to take place *outside* a fairly well-defined area, so they have always required that it take place *inside* a variously defined region; as persons have never been permitted to marry too near home, so they have never been permitted to go too far afield. Endogamy means that marriage must take place within a prescribed area. Negroes are outside this prescribed area for Whites—as a rule. Royalty is usually required to marry within royalty. In India, people cannot marry outside their caste, but this regulation is undergoing modification. Sometimes these restrictions are defined in law; but in most cases, they are defined in the conventions, and violators are subjected to various indignities and sometimes ostracized.

If close inbreeding has its dangers, as many aver, then outbreeding would seem to be most desirable from every point of view, the farther out the better. But we are on two different levels here. The ill effects of inbreeding are essentially *physical* and *mental*. The ill effects of outbreeding are primarily *social*. In the latter case, we have reference to the lack of sufficient common background to make psychic union and effectual cooperation possible. People of very diverse, not to say contradictory, training nearly always have a serious time of it learning to live together, the marriage of Catholics and Protestants, of Jews and Gentiles, of the rich and the poor, of caste and non-caste members, of Americans and Chinese, being ready examples. Moral authority over the young is divided; the children grow up in a sort of social "no-man's land." Much depends, however, upon the intelligence, the affection, and the determination of the parents; ignorant and impetuous parents nearly always find themselves quite baffled by the problem.

3. The Family

There are two outstanding meanings of the term *family*. When we, ourselves, speak of a family we usually refer to a group composed of father, mother, and some children. But our usage covers a great many variations from this norm, for example, a father and some children, a mother and some children, parents without children, children without parents, some children with grandparents, and so on.

1. Numbers.—But investigators of social arrangements often speak of the *Grossefamilie*, or the Great Family, by which they mean any one or all of the combinations above mentioned and, in addition, all persons

[1] *Cf.* Lowie, *op. cit.*, p. 104 *ff.*

tracing descent from some real or mythical ancestor and living together in a community. In this use, the family is a fair-sized kinship group and is almost identical with the *clan;* indeed, the Scotch clan may be taken as an example of it. Thus, all the MacDonalds, if actually related and living in a given area, would constitute a family. Among the Slavs, several households of relatives will often live under one roof, work together, and hold property in common.[1]

Among us, when people marry they usually go off by themselves and found a new home; they are a new family. But in many parts of the world, when young people marry, they live with one or the other of the parental groups. In China, the woman goes to live with her husband's family and becomes subject to her mother-in-law. In other places, the husband goes to live with his wife's people. In these cases, marriage does not mean the founding of a new family; it means the founding of a new procreational unit. So much for the distinction based on numbers.

2. Authority.—From the standpoint of *authority* within the family, it is possible to distinguish three forms—the patriarchal, the matriarchal, and the democratic.

a. The Patriarchal Family.—One of the most familiar signs of the patriarchal family is the taking of the man's name in marriage. There is no justification for this apart from custom. Another sign is that the males hold title to the property. A third indication is that the father is the final arbiter of disagreements. Thus, the patriarchal system vests three prerogatives with the father—name, ownership, and rulership.

As we look back in history we find that the authority of the father increases; his word is law. The spirit of the historic past is well phrased by Euripides, who said that "a woman should be good for everything at home but abroad good for nothing." In addition, his ownership is more absolute, reaching not only over material and other goods but also over the bodies of the members of the family as well; we might give many examples to show the power of life and death over wives and children. With respect to the name, absolutism has not changed very much. These and additional privileges have given males the dominant place in society.

b. The Matriarchal Family.—This form is quite unknown to us—except in rare families and communities where "mother" has gained an unusual amount of power; and the arrangement is rare in the world. Says Lowie:

> There are a few instances of matrilineal communities, so rare that they can be counted on the fingers of one hand, in which women either exercise unusual property rights or play a remarkable part in public life. Probably the best known illustrations are furnished by the Khasi of Assam, the Iroquois, and the Pueblo Indians.

[1] See THOMAS and ZNANIECKI, "The Polish Peasant," Vol. I, p. 87 *ff.*

Among the Khasi there is a well-nigh unique combination of female prerogatives. Here the houses, real estate and the prized family jewels are not only transmitted in the maternal line, as is also the case in British Columbia, but are held by the *women* of the maternal line, *i.e.*, they descend from mother to daughter. In one locality even the position of pontiff is held by a woman, her successor being chosen from a group of her female kin . . . In the household, in spite of feminine ownership, the woman's elder brother ranks as the head, and when the husband after initially matrilocal residence establishes an independent domicile he is its undisputed lord . . . Politically, the sovereignty is transmitted in the maternal line but from male to male member; only where male heirs are wanting does a woman succeed; and she in turn is succeeded by her son not her daughter. This system is assuredly called matriarchal only by courtesy.

It is probably the Iroquois that furnish the closest approximation to a matriarchal condition. Here the women arranged marriage and probably owned both houses and land. Some of the most important ceremonial organizations were largely constituted and managed by women, from whose numbers there were also taken three of the six ceremonial officials of the sib. Women nominated a candidate for a vacancy in the council of chiefs and had the right of admonishing and impeaching an unworthy chief-elect. Nevertheless it remains a fact that even among the Iroquois no woman had a place in the supreme council of the league.

In Pueblo villages the status of woman is decidedly less important than among the Iroquois. As Professor Kroeber has well put the case, "It is in the woman's ownership of the house that the so-called matriarchate of the Zuni centers and rests." Women have no voice in governmental affairs . . . [1]

These usages and others have led certain investigators to assume that, far back in prehistoric times and before the patriarchal organization came into existence, there was a corresponding matriarchal organization, that is, an arrangement wherein women were supreme in authority, ownership, and name. But a *metronymic* family where descent was reckoned in the female line, property descended that way, and men went to live with their wives—is one thing. A *matriarchate*, which means female domination throughout the whole social order—is quite another. The first was a natural development, first because the connection between sexual intercourse and the arrival of offspring was not understood, and second because the connection between the mother and her offspring was always obvious.

The objections which have been raised against the existence of a matriarchal organization are many: (1) Men have usually been stronger physically. (2) Men have usually been the fighters and have, therefore, been in possession of the weapons, and thus could defend themselves from domestic subjugation. (3) Men could always enslave wives from abroad or purchase them and thus be somewhat independent of their own women on the sexual side. (4) The work of the women gave them

[1] "Primitive Society," p. 189.

little opportunity to gain prestige, to become heroines by saving the tribe in case of attack, and to be made into goddesses after death. (5) The development of pastoral industry, where people are perpetually on the move, played directly into the hands of the men. (6) The males have never had nursing children to handicap them in any direction.[1]

c. The Democratic Family.—A comparison of the matriarchal and patriarchal arrangements makes a basis for distinguishing a third type to which we may give the name *democratic* family. As the matriarchal arrangement was an extreme in one direction and, therefore, unstable—if it ever existed—so the patriarchal would appear to be an extreme in the opposite direction and would seem, now that we can examine it dispassionately, to be giving place to a more stable arrangement because a more balanced one. Let us look at what is transpiring under the heads already noted—name, rulership, and ownership.

With respect to the name, very little change has taken place or is in promise. Occasionally, the woman's name is saved from complete obliteration by being joined to that of the man, thus, Miss Brown becomes Mrs. Brown-Jones; but Mr. Jones never becomes Mr. Brown-Jones. Again, famous women sometimes retain their original names after marriage for advertising purposes. Further, there is the Lucy Stone League which continually presses the idea that our naming system is a useless survival and ought to be changed.

But the question may be raised: What are the demands of democracy at this point? Or better yet, perhaps, what are the demands of common sense? There has to be a name. *Numbers*—"Mrs. 567,892,431"—would not do at all, for there are too many people in the world. Then which name? It is a question whether women lose any prestige or suffer in any way because of the present arrangement; and any change would probably cost more by way of irritation and complication than it would be worth. We simply have to do here with a colorless folkway which survives because there is pressure in the trend of things, as already noted.

With respect to *rulership*, the situation is very different. Undoubtedly, rulership has been vested in the male throughout historic times. But there is some evidence that an arrangement is emerging which vests authority according to *competence* rather than according to tradition; there is evidence that the marriage relation is more contractual. In more homes, the parties are considering themselves as the servants of, and participants in, a mutually enriching whole and not as imperious autocrats in a petty kingdom. Married people are talking more of what they can contribute and less of what their rights are. The wishes and ambitions of both husbands and wives are tending to receive as much consideration and recognition as is possible within any cooperative enterprise.

[1] See Ellwood, *op. cit.*, p. 83 *ff*; Hartley, "The Truth About Woman," p. 131 *ff*.

Outside the home, in the larger society, the democratic principle is at work, and women are entering business and politics and religious work almost as they please. They are playing an ever larger part as leaders wherever they are able. But this is so familiar that we need not dwell upon it.[1]

As to *ownership*, much might be said. Throughout historic times, the male has been the owner. But there has been a good deal of modification even at this critical point. It is not uncommon for a wife to control the income of the home and to have property in her own name to use as she pleases. Women more and more run their homes as they wish, buy and sell furniture, have the house remodelled, send the children to this or that school, and so on—matters that are familiar to all of us.

The new Russian marriage code grants: (1) equal rights to husband and wife in regard to property acquired during the marriage period, (2) equal rights to financial support in case of unemployment during a limited time and to a limited extent.[2] These are but a few straws showing which way the winds of marital relations are blowing, but they are suggestive and might be supported by others. In other words, women are being admitted to the status of personalities—"votes for women"—and that spells doom for many of the accepted man-made ways.[3]

4. Divorce

We have now given a few hints of how the family is formed. Is it an absolutely permanent structure? Our familiarity with human frailties prepares us for the proposition that, while the *family type* of human organization seems to be permanent, any given form of it is subject to change; and we all know of particular families which have dissolved. Certain religious authorities emphasize the notion that "marriages are made in heaven" and are, therefore, indissoluble. This is the sacramentarian view. The other view is that marriage is a contract like any other contract and, therefore, can be dissolved at will within the bounds of justice.

But families are dissolving right before our eyes every day. How? Broadly speaking first, in two ways -death and separation. Since

[1] See Collier, Virginia M., "Marriages and Careers," especially Chap. II.

[2] Danchakoff, Vera, M. D., "Russia's New Marriage Code," *Current History*, May, 1927.

[3] *Cf.* Carey, "This Double-headed Monster, The Family," *Harpers Magazine*, January, 1928, who makes a rather violent protest against this democratic movement and argues right manfully that a man should be master in his own house since there cannot be two masters. See, also, Cutler, "Durable Monogamy," *A. J. S.*, September, 1916; Dealey, "The Family in Its Sociological Aspects," p. 109 *ff.*

nothing can be done about the first kind, however, we pass it over. Separation may be formal or informal. The latter type is known by various names; there is desertion, where one party simply takes French leave without providing a forwarding address; there is mutual agreement, where the two parties concerned simply arrange their affairs and live apart—having had enough of marriage.

Formal separation is called *divorce*. We noted in the beginning of this chapter that the larger social group is always interested in the organization or foundation of families; logically and practically, it is also interested in their disorganization. As groups have usually insisted on being consulted with reference to union, so they have insisted on being consulted with reference to disunion. Thus, *informal* separation is frowned upon as a breaking of a contract, not only with the other party to it but also with the larger group; and it is severely punished—when the culprit can be found.

Our papers are full of news about divorce, about the breaking up of families—especially the prominent ones. And there are frequent complaints that divorce is scandalously easy among us, which means that the complainers are comparing two different standards and estimating ours as the lower. Before joining in this chorus of complaint, that is, quieting our emotions, let us first try to get some evidence.

1. The Divorce Rate in the United States.—In 1867, the first year for which statistics for the whole country were gathered, there were 9,937 divorces. In 1906, the number had swelled to 72,062. Again, from 1867 to 1886, that is, during a period of twenty years, 328,716 divorces were granted. In the next two decades, 945,625 divorces were granted. This would seem like the increase of a ravaging disease.

But the *population* increased rapidly during these periods. Our figures, therefore, mean nothing until compared with this increase.

Period	Population, increase	Divorce, increase
1867 to 1886	60 per cent	157 per cent
1887 to 1906	50 per cent	160 per cent

These figures appear to show that divorce has been outrunning the population in this country 3:1. In 1906, there was one divorce for every twelve marriages for the country as a whole. The rates differ very greatly for various states.

2. Divorce in Other Countries.—How do our totals and rates compare with those of other countries? Are we more "divorceful" than others? The following table shows the totals:

	1885	1905
United States	23.472	67.976
France	6.245	10.806
Germany	6.161	11.147
Switzerland	920	1.206
Denmark	635	549
Italy	556	859

Of course, the total populations and the movement within these various countries would have to be brought into the picture before any valid conclusions could be drawn. But when all phases of the matter are examined, it becomes clear that the United States has more divorces, as a rule, than the rest of the civilized world put together; we outstrip them all in this particular, as patriots sometimes boast that we do in others.[1]

These are the facts. What is their significance? Much evidence has been assembled by way of explanation—and extenuation. It may be that we are the most lawless people in the civilized world; it may be that we are ceasing to be hypocritical and simply legalizing separations which exist to the same degree in other countries but are not legalized; it may be that the notion of the sacredness of marriage is disintegrating. Statistics give definite facts in definite form; but they *always* have to be interpreted. What are the trends? May we expect a world-wide increase in divorces? Is the trend toward trial marriage—"associate," "companionate," or whatever fancy name we care to give it—by this circuitous route?

3. Divorce among Primitive Peoples.—It may balance our views on this question and give us a basis for comparison if we note that among primitive peoples divorce is rather easy. The marriage bond is broken on the flimsiest of pretexts—or none. This holds true of the Point Barrow Eskimo, the Negroes of the Gold Coast in Africa, and certain tribes of Asia and America. Other tribes make certain stipulations such as mutual consent, consent of the chiefs, et cetera. The liberties of men and women differ greatly, the widest freedom usually resting with the man.[2]

Among the Kirghiz, a Turkish tribe of southwestern Siberia, few men have more than one wife, owing to the high price extracted from the groom by the bride's family, and very rarely is a woman divorced, although under Mohammedan law the husband's authority is unlimited. Among other peoples where religious scruples are lacking, all sorts of forces operate to dissolve marriage. Sheer bravado often tempted the

[1] See ELLWOOD, *op. cit.*, p. 114 *ff.*

[2] GOODSELL, *op. cit.*, p. 28 *ff.*

Crow Indians publicly to discard their wives on festive occasions as an evidence of strength of soul, and it mattered little whether or not there were children. Often wives were stolen by rival military organizations, and deprived husbands were without redress and lost caste by trying to recover their women. In general, it may be said that husbands have usually hesitated some time before divorcing virtuous women. Among the Kai, husbands are unwilling to surrender their wives even in cases of elopement. But among primitives, as with us, the presence or absence of children makes a profound difference in the stability of the family.

Says Lowie:

> Difficult as it is to generalize, we shall not go far wrong in stating that while the primitive family is not nearly so loose a unit as the theoretical power to divorce might suggest, it is nevertheless on the whole considerably looser than our own, though its instability diminishes markedly after the first few years of matrimony.[1]

It would seem, then, that regulation originated among very rude people, although there was much freedom. Then public concern increased through the centuries, regulations multiplying continuously—at least in the western world—until a culmination was reached; this culmination is revealed in religion, in the sacramentalist doctrine of the Catholic Church and the regulations accompanying it, and it is revealed politically in England of a few decades back when divorce was almost impossible—except for the rich. In the United States, there has been a vast reaction, almost a landslide, from the rigid position of the Puritans. In this country, we are inclined to lean backward toward primitive freedom—and call it "modernism." Many grounds for divorce are recognized, the various states differing widely in their lists—New York having only one, and New Hampshire fourteen. Several states have enacted what is called the *omnibus clause* by which divorce is granted for incompatibility; and greater freedom than this, granted any regulation at all, is hardly conceivable. And we present a curious spectacle to the world in this, namely, that persons who are legally divorced in one state are, strictly speaking, lawbreakers in others.

What are justifiable grounds of divorce—provided one hesitates to take the extreme position and denies that divorce is justifiable under any conditions? This question has been perplexing the minds of legislators, both secular and religious, for a long time. If the grounds of union, the justification for marriage, are love, then is the decay of love a sufficient basis for divorce? It is plausibly argued that the decay of affection destroys the core of the home and, therefore, leaves the union but a mere husk. If marriage is for personal satisfaction without risk, then is there justification for divorce in disappointment and dis-

[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 68–69.

illusionment? If people expect children when they marry, then is sterility a reasonable ground? In other words, what are the standards which should apply here, and where may they be found?[1]

On the other hand, if people can so easily slip out of marriage contracts which they are free not to assume, will not this bring *all* contracts—religious, political, economic—into contempt? Can we look for a deep respect for a business agreement, a political promise, with an acquaintance or an unknown party in those who have no respect for a promise to a loved one? Many people who would look with favor upon freer divorce, taken by itself, look with disfavor because of what it seems to imply by way of anarchy in the larger social order.

5. The Use of the Family

So the discussion rages about us. And no one is quite sure, although many *seem* sure, what the results of our present tendencies will be or what can be done about them. Undoubtedly, the world has never before known such pertinent—as well as impertinent—discussion of the subject. The questioning and analytical propensities which have been generated and equipped by science and philosophy have been indulged to the full in the inorganic and lower organic worlds; and they have not been turned back by the taboos upon love and marriage. And out of such inquiries as have been made, certain realities stand out rather more clearly from the haze in which they have been enveloped in the past. In other words, some moderns are trying to objectify this whole business of sex and sex relations and asking anew what they are all about. If, they say, we can find out and we ought to find out what a spade is and is for, is there any reason why we cannot find out and should not find out what sex union is for? Our usages have grown up unconsciously, for the most part; then, should we not become conscious about them? In other words, what is the relation between sex union and human welfare?

We started out, in this chapter, by assuming a close relationship between marriage and the family and group perpetuation. Now, is there really such a relationship? And if there is, how significant, how essential, is it? We have to consider several facts here in order to carry this thought through.

First of all, we have to admit what is in evidence everywhere in the subhuman world, namely, that a species can perpetuate itself *without* marriage or a family in the formal sense of these terms; that is, without contractual relations.

In the second place, we have to recognize that, up to the present time —although what the future may hold for us in this respect is unknown—

[1] On the need for case studies on this point, see Hart, *The World Tomorrow*, June, 1927.

there is no known way of perpetuating bisexual species without sex union. It is conceivable that, in the future, the eggs and the sperms might be artificially united regularly, as is now infrequently done for childless couples irregularly; but there is no widely practicable method known for procreation except sexual intercourse. Yet this sexual intercourse is only of a momentary duration; it does not take on a regulated and institutional form among any creatures but human beings.

In the third place, we have to admit that sex unions of a somewhat permanent character provide a comparatively and sufficiently safe way of draining off imperious sex impulses and passions *when*, as with man, *there is no mating season.* And this is a highly important point, for man is peculiar in two respects relative to this matter. First, he has no mating season, as animals have—and as he once probably had—to regulate his sex expression; he can mate satisfactorily at any time and is sometimes described as the creature who "loves the year around." Second, man has undertaken to build a costly civilization, and he is not so supercharged with energy that he can spend it lavishly in *two costly directions at the same time;* he cannot exhaust himself sexually and at the same time accomplish much culturally.

Now, permanent marriages, as a rule, provide a sufficient outlet for sex passions without the dangers of destructive diseases and seriously crippling cultural output. It is fairly well established that libertines do not contribute much to social wealth; they have nothing much in the way of creative energy left after they have tasted the many forbidden fruits.[1]

In the fourth place, Ogburn has shown from an analysis of the United States Census figures that fewer married men commit crimes than unmarried, that fewer married persons go insane, that fewer married persons are found in poorhouses, that the death rate of married men is much lower than that of the unmarried. Marriage, therefore, is "the best insurance in the world."[2] Insurance against what? Against crime—which is anticultural; against insanity—which is anticultural; against pauperism—which is anticultural; against premature death—which is anticultural. Reversing this proposition, it would appear that a more or less permanent family life has something to do with one of man's chief purposes—the production of a decent civilization. And it is to be observed in this connection that man does not wish *mere perpetuation*, mere continuance. The animals simply keep going on because they know nothing different; something different never occurs to them. But man wishes to live and to live more abundantly; to him perpetuation means more than a safe margin of births over deaths.

[1] See Unwin, "Monogamy as a Condition of Social Energy," *Hibbert J.*, Vol. XXV, p. 662 *ff.*

[2] *The American Magazine*, February, 1925.

In the fifth place, we shall have to admit that, before the Industrial Revolution—say, 1750—the family functioned in many directions toward cultural ends; it functioned economically, politically, educationally, religiously, and took the main part in thoroughly initiating its young into the mores; but now most of these services have been withdrawn, in city homes, at least, and given over to other institutions. The *modern* family—what is its use? A good deal might be said for the services of the family yet in introducing its young to the basic mores of society—language, modesty, industry, attitudes, and the like. No doubt, the family is incompetent at many points, and it undoubtedly "spoils" the young at such an early age that little can be done for them afterwards. The more we know about training the young the more we realize that *early* shaping is the most important kind; but it is the kind that requires experts.

There is vast use for the family yet, and two points may be suggested. Presumptively, nobody in the world is more interested in or cares more for the "innocents abroad," the strangest of aliens, than parents; and we will recall that human beings are distinguished on earth in that "they care for each other," even if Nature does not care for them. Presumably, nobody in the world is more ready to make sacrifices for the welfare of the young than the parents; presumably, none gets an earlier opportunity to begin the shaping process—or can get it. Presumably, the young come to families in small enough numbers so that they can be readily handled; compare the average teacher and her class with the parents and their class.

In the second place, marriage gives sufficient outlet for sex impulses without the dangers of the sexual diseases which are so terrible in their consequences; but this point has been mentioned before.

Concluding, we may say that there are two main attitudes which we can take toward the family. First there is the sacramentalist attitude which holds to the proposition that the family was not made on earth or by man and, therefore, is one of the "untouchables" of the earth; therefore the matter is not really open for discussion; it is all managed by a wisdom which is much superior to that of man. In the second place, there is the view that the family, like industry, like education, like recreation, like government, *grew* by trial and error in crude fumbling responses to need and, therefore, has taken the numerous forms which we have studied; that it has changed in the past, is changing now, and may be expected to change in the future; that it is an instrumentality which intelligent people may use for their own welfare as they understand its functions and more clearly define what they want in life. And we take it that these attitudes are irreconcilable; each one must take his choice—on the basis of the evidence.

Questions

1. What social processes are illustrated in the industrial organization? What ones in the family?
2. Could there be any industrial organization or family if people could not communicate? Show this.
3. Is money a means or an end? Explain.
4. What forces are at work in courtship? How did we define *forces?*
5. In the United States, young people select their own mates. In China, the elders do the selecting. Which is the better system and why? Can we be scientific here?
6. How would you define *marriage?* Do animals marry?
7. Is it just a prejudice that we favor monogamy, or are there scientifically demonstrated advantages in this way?
8. Name the various kinds of interactions found in marriage.
9. What kind of family is described in the Bible?
10. What are the points at issue in the coming of the democratic family?
11. What changes in our social life would follow the founding of a truly democratic family?
12. Is monogamy a folkway or one of the mores? Give reasons.
13. Is any importance to be attached to the fact (is it a fact?) that the seemingly most progressive peoples are monogamists?
14. What is the real meaning of *companionate marriage?* Is it a new thing on the earth?
15. How would we proceed to study divorce scientifically?
16. What is the significance of the fact that there are more divorces in the United States than in the rest of the civilized world? Are we, therefore, less law abiding and more immoral?
17. Could we get along well without any family organization? Why?
18. What functions does the family perform?
19. What is the most conspicuous display of bias in this chapter?
20. Has the physical environment anything to do with the form of the family? If so, what?

CHAPTER XV

THE RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATION

Reference has already been made to the three environments—the physical, the social, and the so-called *spiritual*—amidst which we all live, from which we never can escape, and with which we have to get along. After considering our relations with the first two of these, we must now give some attention to the third. And we deal with man's relations to it in the third place because the organization which has grown up is almost as old, if not as old, and is quite as universal and influential as the industrial organization and the family.

But *is* there any third environment? Had we raised this question at some earlier time, it would not have been taken seriously; it is not yet regarded as a sensible question by the most of the people on earth. It is not our purpose here to advance arguments either for or against the existence and reality of this environment; countless persons have been trying to prove and to disprove its existence for ages but with little success from a scientific viewpoint. The spiritual environment *may be imaginary;* but the vast majority of human beings *believe* strongly that it is most real, indeed, more real and compelling than the other two; and being assumed to be real, it has had to be dealt with; here, as elsewhere, man's overt reactions have been shaped by his beliefs. Hence, we are solely concerned in this chapter with what men have believed and what they have done accordingly; it is the function of some other discipline to establish the reality or non-reality of this environment.[1]

Sumner and Keller present our aim in this chapter very definitely and clearly in the following:

> Reverting to the religion-series as a whole, and including all members of it, we find that just as all forms of the industrial organization, property, war, and government represent adjustment to the natural and social environment, and as all forms of marriage represent adjustment to the life-condition of bi-sexuality, so do all forms of religion represent adjustment to the supernatural environment. In the presence of the aleatory element and the conception of the spiritual environment society could not do otherwise than develop a set of mores, involving both theory and practice, for getting along with these life-conditions. Religion is, in a word, society's adjustment to that which is, in any age, beyond knowledge —to the aleatory element, as personalized, through long ages of human evolution, in the spirit-environment. As an institution, it is a framework of customs, rites,

[1] See Cole, "Relations between the Living and the Dead," *A. J. S.*, March, 1916.

symbols, phrases, scriptures, apparatus, altars, temples, costumes, and various other details. The institution holds the ideas together and perpetuates them.[1]

1. The Aleatory Element

Reference has already been made to this feature of human life, but some further comment seems necessary. It is the common experience of men to realize that *efforts* and *results* are rarely proportional. A careless return of the tennis ball (effort) sometimes produces a remarkable shot (result), whereas extraordinary effort on another occasion sends the ball wild. On one occasion, a reckless speculation (effort) brings a fortune (result), whereas the most carefully planned investment at another time brings complete loss. Sometimes the student fails to study diligently (effort) and secures excellent marks (result), whereas at other times the expenditure of much effort brings only low grades.

> The liner drives upon a derelict, drifting awash; the tire picks up a nail; the billiard balls collide just as a hard shot and an excellent position are about to be won; the grounder hits an uneven spot and jumps over the fielder's head. Then disappointed men groan over bad luck and "jinxes." The liner shaves the derelict; the nail merely scratches the surface of the tire; a kiss results in making a shot and attaining a position uncontemplated; a safe hit is deflected into the fielder's hands. Then fortune's favorites exult over good luck and talk of rabbit's feet and horse-shoes. Luck may play a trivial part in human life; it may also make or ruin.[2]

Now, it seems that men usually, but unaccountably enough, expect good luck and take it to be normal; and it is quite clear that bad luck is universally unacceptable and taken as abnormal. A man takes good fortune as his due, effort or no effort; and he takes bad fortune as undeserved, effort or no effort. He usually regards "something for nothing" as much better than "nothing for something." And while there are always the optimists who hold, in spite of everything, that this is the best of all possible worlds, there is much evidence to support the proposition that men have brooded more upon bad luck than they have reflected upon good luck. The "whys" of reflection are always more insistent in relation to ill fortune. Yet no measurements have ever been made of the relative amounts of good and bad luck coming to each person; each one develops a view out of his own experiences, and one bit of bad luck is usually enough to offset a good deal of good luck.

But what is luck? Two types of answers have been suggested. Here is an illustration of one type:

[1] *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 1429. Much of what follows in the next four sections is taken from this encyclopedic volume.

[2] Sumner and Keller, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 737.

Luck is a name for that which is inexplicable on a given stage of knowledge or in view of man's unwillingness to take the trouble to get or to apply that knowledge. It is variation from the expected. "Chance is the emergence of a situation not rendered necessary by what was previously known." It is what men are too ignorant or too unenterprising to figure out. Omitting the latter consideration as representing the entrance of the personal equation, the importance assigned to luck varies inversely with the amount of knowledge and directly with the amount of the inexplicable. This means, however, since the knowable is immeasurably vast, that the luck element will always be an immense factor in human destiny.[1]

This is on the assumption that the world is orderly, that nothing happens without adequate cause, and that there would be no such thing as luck to an omniscient being.

The other type of answer, the more familiar and popular one, is that all things are in the control of and manipulated by invisible and whimsical supernatural beings. If a man stubs his toe, it is not because he lifted his foot carelessly or did not see the obstacle but because some spirit is pestering him; if he has a disease, it is not because he became infected with germs but because some supernatural agent is tormenting him; if he has a good crop, it is not because the soil, seed, and weather are favorable but because some being is on his side; if the ocean liner hits the derelict, it is not because the lookout was away, the steering gear out of order, or because of a fog and many other possibilities but because an invisible personal agent drove it on.

Here, then, are these acute experiences. And here are two ways of viewing them—one of which is the product of prolonged and careful investigation, and the other the product of imaginative guessing. Which view is the sounder? Which view has more incontrovertible evidence to support it? Of course, many have little difficulty in choosing, because they have been brought up that way. But we must not forget that both theories are interpretations of the same phenomena; and we must not forget that there are two parts to both views—the evident facts and the inferences drawn from the facts. And we can all easily go astray at both points, as countless numbers have done and still do. It is barely possible that primitives are as *logical* as moderns—granted their assumptions.

2. The Spirit World

Neglecting the first view of what luck is and continuing the argument of the second—which is our theme in this chapter—we have to ask how human beings ever came to postulate the existence of such vast numbers of whimsical personal agencies. What sorts of experiences led men to conclude that the world was filled with invisible, supernatural powers? In other words, how did human beings come to account for luck by means of spirits? Whence came this grand illusion—if it is such? It

[1] Sumner and Keller, *loc. cit.*

is easy to become lost in vagaries at this point. Some have said that animals have a modicum of the illusion and that therefore it is a part of our hereditary equipment. Others say that it is a realization pressed into man's thinking by the spirits themselves, that is, a revelation. We are not yet prepared to affirm that everyday experiences of fortune and misfortune themselves actually summoned into being the idea of a supernatural environment; it is probable that the notion came from other sources altogether—as we shall see in a moment. But, the notion existing, it was soon recognized as a handy one with which to account for the inexplicable in life; the notions of "spirits" and of "luck" fitted together like shoe and foot.

But coming to grips with the problem of how man probably came to hypothecate these invisible and whimsical agencies, let us take the naturalistic view. Several common experiences may be taken as the soil out of which this inference might have developed.

1. Fear.—It is common for *us*, in our time, to be terrified, to be overwhelmed, to suffer the agonies of the damned in one awful moment, in the presence of something unexpected and inscrutable—a hair-raising yelp from behind, stealthy sounds in the dark, an awful storm, the threat of death, and many more phenomena. And it is a fair assumption, supported by much evidence, that primitive people were not more calm and imperturbable in the face of terrifying experiences than we are; indeed, they were regularly terrorized by what seems trivial to us. They were afraid of the dark; they were afraid of enemy raids; they were afraid of dreadful storms and noises. This fact needs only to be advanced to be recognized. Our point, however, is that *fear sharpens the imagination;* the person inspired by some terror, after the first paralysis passes, can usually, does usually picture the source of the fear. Now, we cannot follow this into the intricacies of the objects imagined; we simply take note of the relation between fear states and imagination states.

2. The Shock of Death.—There is a notion, prevalent in some quarters, that *birth* is the greatest of all mysteries; and we sometimes suppose that primitives were stirred to reflection and wonder by this event. This phenomenon, it is true, is well calculated to fill with awe the minds of biologists and enlightened parents; but the primitive man was not impressed very much by the humble arrival of a puny and helpless creature. What shocked him was *death*, and especially the death of a "powerful, domineering, hard-hitting warrior" or magnificent chief. This was mystery, indeed—the body all action and show one minute and inert and defenseless the next! This was occasion for fear and wonder.

Not that primitives harbor any notions about the "sanctity of human life"; they do not. Plenty of examples of utter indifference to life may be found among them. There is the story of the Papuan who

ran to a tree, climbed it, and then cast himself down from the top and broke his neck while in a rage because his wife surreptitiously finished his half-smoked cigarette. But death is avoided because of the organic propulsion toward life. As with animals, moreover, so with primitive man, there is little knowledge of how to commit suicide.

On the other hand, what was there by way of evidence for disproving the natural and unconsciously evolved notion that men lived forever? How do *we*—you and I—know that we must die? We do not *know* it, but we believe it because we have been told so; we have no first-hand and incontrovertible evidence that we must, such as we have that we must eat and drink. We know that others die; we know that history records no exceptions—but we might be an exception. But primitive man had no such quantities of evidence as we have; he knew nothing of natural causes; and since most primitives die by accident, he had a loophole for his personal dialectic. Hence, death was a shock, an inexplicable bit of bad luck.[1]

3. Illusions.—We do not always know in this day of experts when a person is actually dead. We are all surprised, every now and then, to learn of supposedly dead persons coming back to life. Exhumations of bodies buried before modern sure-death embalming methods were employed, reveal ghastly evidence of burial before death. This is *our* knowledge situation. Was early man in a better position to distinguish between deathlike states and actual death? The habitual identification of life *with the breath* was an aid, but not an infallible test. The African Bushmen have a proverb: "Death is only a sleep."[2] And have we not often heard something of the same sort at funerals?

If, however, a person could endure suspended animation for a little time and then revive, what was to hinder belief in a long period of suspended animation? The actual decay of the body was not conflicting evidence; the body, however, might be embalmed; and we still have with us the belief in rejuvenation. The breath oftentimes seemed to "come and go" as if an independent entity.

Many bodily conditions, moreover, such as fever, delirium, swoon, apoplexy, epilepsy, migraine, disorders of the brain circulation, and yet others produce something akin to suspended animation. These phenomena bother moderns a good deal. What could primitive people make out of them? Could they distinguish between an epileptic fit and death? Thus, suspended animation, from whatever source, was probably the basis for the growth of many illusions, for the interpretation of many experiences as something other than what they actually were.

[1] See SUMNER and KELLER, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 775; TOZZER, "Social Origins and Social Continuities," p. 113 *ff.*

[2] SOLLAS, "Ancient Hunters," p. 410.

4. Dreams.—This idea of illusions may be expanded in one particular direction by reference to dreams. We all have dreams, and many of us still regard them as signs and portents. What must primitive people have made of them? Let us picture a small tribe living in the forest. The men have just returned from a hunt. The women have brought the game in and have prepared the meal. The hungry men have eaten ravenously and then have rolled over by the fire to sleep.

After a time, one of them arouses himself, becomes thoroughly awake, and starts to tell about his (dream) exploits. He declaims about traveling up the river, up the mountain side, into the cave, and killing sixteen bears with his naked hands; he tells this in all seriousness. "But," say the women (who have not been sleeping), "you were not away hunting bears, you were right there by the fire sleeping all the time." But the man indignantly reaffirms that he was away and killed these bears.

Now what could be made of this? Would it occur to them that they were *double?* For evidently one part remained by the fire while the other part chased bears. This seems fantastic to us; but how could primitive men avoid the conclusion if they reasoned at all? They could, they thought, remain at home and be away at the same time; they could be in two places at once.

Now, let us couple dream experiences, this sense of duality, with death phenomena. It is not uncommon for us to dream of the dead; it could not have been uncommon for primitives. But what is the interpretation of this? If they—the dreamers—were dual, were not others dual? Then, were not the dead dual? If they—the dreamers—were actually recombinations of separable parts, were not all others so? And if they—the dreamers—had their separable parts reunited after a brief period of separation, what was to hinder the separable parts of the dead from reuniting—when? Time is nothing here. And if the mysterious part never returned, so far as they knew, did it cease to exist? Was there any evidence available to prove that it was not living on? And if men were dual, were not dogs also dual—for they barked and seemed to chase things in their sleep? And if dogs were dual, were not all other animals? This surely seems quite logical.

But a further point needs to be noted. Did this invisible part have any shape, and if so what? When *we* have some wild dream escapades, what are we like? Are we locomotives, or pigs, or trees, or anything other than ourselves? Does not our dream self have the same shape as our waking self? In dreams, our bodies are lighter, more tenuous and permeable, perhaps, and move more swiftly; but they are not strange, fantastic, unrecognizable things. With primitive man, the situation could scarcely have been different. As with us, so with him, his other self was similar in shape to his material self. His dream self, like ours,

could run, walk, jump, float, fall, get hurt, and enter into all of the experiences of his waking life. Thus, his double was believed to be *personal.*

Here we have, then, in the most sketchy fashion, the argument tracing the development, out of common, everyday experiences, of an imaginary population filling an invisible world; and as the generations passed and the numbers of the dead increased, so the numbers of spirit beings increased—beings ghostly in form but with generous impulses and bitter enmities, suffering the same joys and sorrows as men, foolish, whimsical, indifferent, attentive, cruel, kindly, crafty, and so on, filling a world with men raised to the *n*th power.

And we have to be clear, further, that these temporarily or permanently departed doubles were readily conceived of as still being interested in human affairs, in their own affairs of a little time before, and not as immediately going off into unrelated parts. They still liked bear meat; they still had an old score to settle; they still wanted to beat a wife; they still wanted to help a relative; they still wanted to mix in human affairs; and they could still be managed as men were managed. And thus was the life of primitive man complicated beyond calculation. Here was a —as *we* see it, an imaginary, but as early man saw it, a real—world which had to be gotten along with, but a world extremely mysterious and difficult to deal with; and more difficult as the numbers of spirits increased.

Assuming, therefore, the reality of this supernatural environment, it is no wonder that primitive man—and most men since—gave an exceptional amount of time and energy to dealing with it. It is no wonder that men believed that when they were dealing first hand with the physical and social environments, apparently, they were really dealing with this spiritual environment, for this spiritual environment was always mixing in and assuming material form. Thus, in a sense, there was only *one* environment—the spiritual. And here, as is now clear, is the early explanation of good and bad luck, an explanation made necessary by the phenomena of luck, by the existence of the spiritual population and by the absence of verified knowledge; for the conclusion reached was that the spirits caused everything and, therefore, the luck. Primitive man could not *prove* this to *our* satisfaction; but he could prove it to his own satisfaction; he could prove it—by simply admitting it.

Now, we are prepared to expand some of these notions considerably and thus to enter upon a discussion of religious organization; for this is the soil out of which religion grew in such profusion. But first, what is religion? We must do the illogical but pedagogical thing here and give a brief formula or two as something to work with.

3. Definitions of Religion

Countless persons, scholars and others, have made attempts to define religion; and some of these definitions must now be presented; they will be the more readily understood in the light of what has already been said. Sumner and Keller quote the following:

D'Alviella begins by listing the elements which he regards as "common to all organized religions" as follows: "(1) The belief in the existence of supernatural beings who intervene in a mysterious manner in the destinies of man and the course of nature. (2) Attempts to draw near to these beings or to escape them, to forecast the object of their intervention and the form it will take, or to modify their action by conciliation or compulsion. (3) Recourse to the mediation of certain individuals supposed to have special qualifications for success in such attempts. (4) The placing of certain customs under the sanction of the superhuman powers." This author then works up to a definition in the following terms: "The conception man forms of his relations with the superhuman and mysterious powers on which he believes himself to depend." Later on it is added that religion as defined implies "something exalted and mysterious in the character of the being adored."

Brinton finds the prevailing sentiment in fetishism, animism, and all the polytheisms to be fear of the unknown; and elsewhere remarks: "What I think is the essence . . . in all religions is their supposed control over the destiny of the individual." Mason comes through with the simple definition that, "in a general sense, religion is the sum of what is thought or believed about a spirit world and what is done in consequence of such thinking." He very naturally wants the "verbal elements" of such a definition as Caird's explained—the latter's formula running to the effect that religion is "man's ultimate attitude toward the universe." Ratzel declares with pompous Teutonic vagueness that religion is an "affirmative relation of human consciousness to something objectively perceived, which determines things in the highest instance and to which man stands in personal relation." A culture-historian writes: "All that is religion which unites man, as such, with something which he has recognized or regards as above himself, on which he feels himself dependent, and to which he therefore pays reverence."

Gumplowicz regards religion as "the conception of those ideas which arise in the human spirit concerning all those things which it is not in a position to apprehend through its senses but to know which it is driven by an unconquerable need of its nature . . . Religion is therefore no artificial product of the human imagination but a *naturally-necessary function* of his (man's) finite and limited spirit, which is ever coerced by a longing that is not to be quieted—coerced to pass the boundaries set by nature . . . All religion is merely a spirit-reflex, called into being by the unknowable." Lippert warns us that religion and mythology are not the same thing. "Any fabulation whatever about heavenly or other natural phenomena may be made perfectly manifest as a fact; but if it cannot be demonstrated that it serves in some form or other as a support of the cult, we have no right to designate it as the expression of *religious* ideas, unless we want to dilute and delete the concept "religion."

Religion may be defined as any system of words, acts or devices, or combinations of these, employed to obtain welfare or to avert illfare through the use, exercise, or favor of the orenda of another body or bodies.

In trying to differentiate between religion, on the one hand, and magic or sorcery, on the other, Robertson Smith says:

From the earliest times, religion, as distinct from magic or sorcery, addresses itself to kindred and friendly beings, who may indeed be angry with their people for a time, but are always placable except to the enemies of their worshippers or to renegade members of the community. It is not with a vague fear of unknown powers, but with a loving reverence for known gods who are knit to their worshippers by strong bonds of kinship, that religion in the only true sense of the word begins. Religion in this sense is not the child of terror; and the difference between it and the savage's dread of unseen foes is as absolute and fundamental in the earliest as in the latest stages of development . . . Religion is not an arbitrary relation of the individual man to a supernatural power, it is a relation of all the members of the community to a power that has the good of the community at heart, and protects its laws and moral order. This distinction seems to have escaped some modern theorists, but it was plain enough to the common sense of antiquity, in which private and magical superstitions were habitually regarded as offences against morals and the state.

If this distinction, which is parallel to that made by Lehmann between white and black art, holds good, then it is probable that many peoples have nothing but magic and sorcery.[1]

But perhaps we have had enough definitions, and by way of a simple formula we may say, in conclusion, that religion is *belief* in supernatural agency and what is *done* about it. And here we have some *subjective* phenomena—beliefs, opinions, views, theories—and some *objective* phenomena—sacrifices, prayers, altars, worship, and the like. It is now necessary to consider these two phases of religion in some detail.

4. Subjective Aspects

We are already prepared for this phase of the subject by the considerations introduced a few pages back, namely, the widespread belief in the reality of a supernatural environment. Under the heading of beliefs, notions, creeds, and so forth, we now have to note a few of a great number.

1. Animism.—The vital element supposed to survive after death has been variously named *ghost, spirit, shade, soul, wraith, specter, apparition, phantom.* The term *soul,* although its etymology is not certainly known, is perhaps the most inclusive of them all; and we now turn to the body of beliefs and doctrines about souls, their nature and their behavior. This body of beliefs and doctrines is called *animism,* a term derived from the Latin. And in considering these matters, we must be

[1] See Sumner and Keller, *op. cit.,* Vol. II, p. 1427; also, Wieman, "Definitions of Religion," *J. of Religion,* May, 1927, p. 301.

careful not to impute to early man such rarefied and metaphysical views as we commonly have. Primitive people were more concrete and realistic. To them souls were embodied or disembodied; and they were at all points similar to their possessors except that when departed they were raised to a higher power; they were simply the persons without the material body. The Bible contains this: "Handle me and see, for the spirit hath not flesh and bones, as ye see me having."[1] The qualities assigned to the departed spirit were:

> . . . tenuosity of structure, speed of movement, sudden appearance and disappearance, power of protean transformation, and other equally disquieting characteristics, some of which could scarcely have an origin outside of nightmare.[2]

When the soul was in the body, the body was animated, that is, alive, "quick," and when it was out of the body the body was dead, it had "given up the ghost," it had "expired." Perhaps the Homeric conception of the soul will serve as well as any for illustrative purposes.

> The prevalent terms for soul were words, like the later *pneuma*, signifying "breath" or "wind." The *psyche* was regarded as the energizing principle of the body; yet the body it was with which the personality was identified. The body was the *autos*, or self; the only other Homeric term for the living body is a circumlocution. "Hence it seems that the soul was a separate being for the continued possession of which a man would strive. The soul and the man were a sort of dual personality; when the hero in distress poetically 'addressed his noble soul,' it is a survival of this dualism. Thus there was a close bond between a man and his soul; a strong man had a strong soul, and a weak coward a contemptible one.
>
> The soul had various ways of leaving the body: in fainting it was breathed out, to return apparently by the same way when recovery occurred; in death, it departed regularly by way of the mouth, sometimes in a flow of blood, or it followed the spear withdrawn from a wound. In all cases, it 'flies' in haste through the air, departing with mourning. 'And from his limbs his soul was gone in flight to the home of Hades, mourning its fate, leaving behind both manliness and youth.' When the soul had once 'passed the bulwark of the teeth,' it returned no more to vivify the body. It became an *eidōlon*, like in all respects to the dead man, a being which, if the dead body were treated carelessly, might return to earth."
>
> Existence in the beyond was conceived of in terms of existence during life (projectivism), for the dead were supposed to retain the feelings of living men: desire for property, love and pride, jealousy and pain; they even bore their old wounds and by appearance and action indicated their station in their former life. Kings and judges ruled and judged as before. When the soul of Patroclus appeared to Achilles in a dream, he was like to the dead man even in the matter of clothing; and that the dead retained human desires appears from the cry of Achilles to Patroclus, after the body of Hector had been ransomed: "Continue

[1] *Luke*, XXIV: 39.

[2] SUMNER and KELLER, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 792.

not thy anger, O Patroclus, if thou, in the home of Hades, dost know that I have loosed Hector. I received much ransom and thou shalt have thy share." Yet the Homeric shades, like as they were to men, were unsubstantial. As "mere *eidōla*" they flew about "beneath the earth" with thin cries, huddling and clinging together like bats dislodged from the roof of a cave, disappearing like smoke, "like a shadow of a dream," "without mind," and forgetful of all unless temporarily resuscitated by a draught of blood. When Achilles in the dream tried to embrace the shade of his comrade, "he did not take him; but the soul fled with a shriek beneath the earth, like smoke, and Achilles roused up in alarm." The disembodied soul, finally freed by having received its "share of the fire," departed to the realm of the unseen (Aïdēs), never to return; as an eidōlon it preserved there much the same qualities which the visitation of Patroclus revealed to Achilles. Odysseus, making the journey to the spirit-world, completes the picture by his description of the various shades. Here it is that one encounters the thin twittering of the spirit-voice, as of a bat. This conception of the voice of the dead as a twittering, chirping, or whistling sound is rather wide-spread; Tylor shows its prevalence among the Algonquins, Maoris, and other Polynesians, Zulus, Romans, and Hebrews.[1]

Thus, the soul is identified with the body, the breath, and has most of the characteristics of the person. It is also recognized in dreams, is identified with the (to the primitive man) inexplicable shadow that always skulks about when the sun shines, it is seen in the water when people stoop to drink, it is in photographs. "Tell me," asked an African woman whose photograph had been taken, "when I am dead, will my face disappear from that?" "No." "But if I move away from water, my image disappears." It may assume the form of animals and go wandering about; hence, the belief in werewolves and world dragons; it may take on bird or insect form and also dwell in trees, flowers, and rocks.

Countless theories have been spun out as to where the soul is located in man's anatomy.

Among the Seminoles of Florida, when a woman died in childbirth, the infant was held over her face to receive her parting spirit and thus acquire strength and knowledge for its future use. These Indians could have well understood why at the deathbed of an ancient Roman, the nearest kinsman leant over to inhale the last breath of the departing.[2]

Sometimes the soul is in the blood, and, hence, the almost universal preciousness of blood. Sometimes it is in the heart, sometimes in the head, in the hair, in the stomach, in the pupil of the eye, in the great toe, in the larynx, in the thigh, in the saliva, in the tongue, and, of late time, in the pineal gland, and in other parts according to the people examined. Hence, we have an explanation of the numerous practices in connection with all of these parts—head hunting, scalp taking, pre-

[1] Sumner and Keller, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 795.
[2] Sumner and Keller, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 815.

serving hair, manipulating blood, and all the rest. Hence, also, the theory that everything has a soul, is animated by souls, and that there is "a world-soul" develops bit by bit.

2. Eidolism.—If we think of *animism* as the complex of beliefs and doctrines about *embodied* souls, then we may think of *eidolism* as the body of beliefs and doctrines about *disembodied* but not permanently "laid" souls.

It is the general theory that the soul remains in the neighborhood of the dead body for a varying period; and many peoples believe that it may return temporarily from the spirit world. Under these conditions it is a ghost or eidōlon. If it were not for these ideas there would be no point in setting eidolism off from animism in general, or from daimonism; eidolism has to do with the soul *after* it is disembodied and *before* it becomes a daimon, that is, with the transition-period in the life of the soul . . . The matter of concern in the present instance is the period of sojourn between death and departure for the spirit-world.[1]

There are abundant cases to illustrate this point, but we must be content with a general observation or two. In the first place, primitives quite generally believe that the *good spirits* require very little attention and that they will go on doing good without it if they are just let alone and not offended. It is the *evil spirits*, the malignant souls, that make trouble and challenge man's ingenuity. And this distinction is significant for all of the objective phenomena which we shall examine later.

In the second place, the interval of sojourn which the ghost is imagined to make near the corpse ranges from "a common minimum of three or four days to a year or more." And it is this "hanging around" that creates the problem and complicates human behavior tremendously. This continued presence of the ghost near the body, that is, near the grave, even after the decay of the body, is a common supposition of primitive peoples which has lasted down into the present. This idea has taken such a stout hold upon the human imagination that it is shaken off only with the greatest difficulty.

It persists, even in enlightened minds, in the form of vague fears, uneasiness, and distress; few persons, however emancipated, would care to pass a dark and stormy night in the receiving vault of a cemetery. There exists latent in nearly all of us the fear that has remained a tradition through the successive stages of societal evolution. It cannot be explained or rationalized away; at a pinch it springs to life; for it is firmly rooted in the deepest-lying strata of the mores. The conception of the ghost, or disembodied soul, is one of the basic notions—best illustrated, perhaps, in actual mortuary practices—in the mental outfit of the race.[2]

But since primitive men, as modern men, are not always consistent, there is no sharp and final distinction between the transition period and

[1] SUMNER and KELLER, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 833.

[2] SUMNER and KELLER, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 839.

life in the "other world." For no one knows when ghosts decide to retire hence for good; and they often return—so it is believed. We include under this head, therefore, a bare remark on the other world. Generally speaking, it is regarded in two ways—a realistic replica of this world or an idealized and more grandiose place, with the latter notion prevailing, perhaps. The ideas of "heaven" and "hell" are conspicuously absent from primitive minds. Life goes on in the next world where it left off here, only under better auspices. Hence, there is no reluctance to go there, and surviving relatives, while they feel the loss, do not "carry on" as some of ours do at the time of death, for death is advancement, and it is certainly not considerate or generous to raise a fuss over the advancement of relatives. We may recall the familiar idea of the "happy hunting grounds" of the American Indians.

3. Daimonism.—Eidolism passes by imperceptible gradations into daimonism.

> Whereas the ghost or eidolon is the disembodied soul of a particular individual, recently dead . . . the daimon is farther along the road to godhead, being a spirit of secondary intention, generally not identifiable as the soul of any deceased person . . . The term daimon covers all varieties of spirits, from the ghost, but not including it, up to and inclusive of the divinity or god. Daimonism is therefore the doctrine about spirits, both good and bad; and about these as the effective agency of everything entering into human experience which is referable to luck and the imaginary environment . . . Eidolism and daimonism differ primarily in the fact that ghosts or eidola are the identifiable spirits of known persons while daimons are spirits whose human careers are unrevealed except through inference.
>
> The daimon, while a more evolved construction, is a replica of the ghost in all essentials of disposition and character, such likeness by itself suggesting the origin of the former in the latter. The daimons are more powerful and longer-lived ghosts, controlling the aleatory elements and the unfolding of personal destiny as the recently dead cannot. They are anthropomorphic, have temperament, character, and ways of acting, and are susceptible to influences which man can cause to be exerted. They do both good and ill, the latter preponderating; "ghosts are not wholly angry, and the gentler form of ghost may and does become a god," but they are more likely to be envious and malignant toward men. Especially, therefore, are ill fortune and calamity to be accounted for by their agency. The life of man comes to be regarded as at the sport, from moment to moment, of these superior powers. Nothing in history is more calculated to excite pity for the human race than the existence of the set of beliefs about spirits . . . Daimonism, involving as it did all the hopes and fears of mankind, could not but become a world-philosophy. It stands forth as the salient feature of the race's mental outfit. It accounted for everything that needed accounting for. It therefore led to a complete life-policy . . .
>
> First of all, it offered a sweeping explanation of two problems that are vital and ever-recurring throughout the life of the race: whence comes ill? What is the relation of goodness to happiness?[1]

[1] SUMNER and KELLER, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 931 *ff.*

Furthermore, it provides a mostly hidden current out of which flows crude superstitions and wild manias when widespread calamity overtakes man—the late World War furnishing the evidence. Yet, by erecting this immense system of beliefs, men did not crawl out on the limb and saw themselves down to destruction; they concocted tremendous challenges for themselves, challenges to their skill and ingenuity; and these have been extremely useful in other directions.

Of course, these spirit-beings multiplied in number as men did and as the ages passed. And, of course, they ranked at different levels, as men did. Ancestors, powerful in this life, became more powerful in the beyond. Heroes, clever and successful in this life, became more clever and successful in the beyond. Every characteristic in this life became more or less exaggerated in the next as men's imaginations played with them and as long as they could be remembered and traditions could be kept intact.

And here we have the basis for those doctrines known as *polytheism* —belief in many gods—and *monotheism* or *henotheism*—belief in one dominant and supreme deity; and we are all familiar with the latter from our contact with the Hebrew traditions.

4. Fetishism.—A dominant strain of belief, within the tangled skein which we have tried to outline so far, is that of *spirit possession* or obsession; and perhaps the chief evidence of this possession has been some kind of abnormality. "The essence of possession is the occupation, temporary or permanent, of a person or a thing by a spirit not original in him or in it." The indwelling souls native to men, animals, and nature, have not been thought of as "possessing" them in the sense in which we are now speaking.

Possession is a more incidental, fortuitous matter, where a ghost or daimon, or even the soul of a living man, is conceived to have penetrated into some object or person with whom it has no original connection. The possessing spirit is imported, not innate.

The possibility of this ghost-infection being widely admitted, we have, in consequence, an astonishing number of beliefs relative to the results of such "foreign occupations." For one thing, *inspiration* becomes possible, the indwelling spirit possessing wisdom much beyond that of man relative to the chief concerns of life. When men are possessed, they become prophets, sages, wizards, medicine men, saviours, and the like. When writings are possessed, they become "sacred books." And this latter case leads straight to the point: when any *material object* becomes possessed it is a *fetish*—something fabricated.

Among the objects which become fetishes through their connection with souls of the dead the *grave* stands first; extensions of the grave are the cave, the moun-

tain-top, a body of water, or a tree within or upon which the dead are regularly disposed.

But the list of other examples is inexhaustible—the finger nails, the hair, the entrails, a toe or finger, a sword, an arrow, a garment, a hut, a neighboring bush, an animal, a flag; and most of us are familiar with buckeyes, horseshoes, and rabbits' feet. In India, the snake is a fetish; among the Persians, the fly; a chief in Togoland had a fetish nail on his little finger; the Indians of South America ascribe supernatural powers to hair, nails, teeth, claws; in Uganda, the navel cord of a prince is dried, set with pearls, and hung up on a post, and a man is set to guard it—and so on indefinitely. The mania for patent medicines is a survival of fetishism.

Now, we can understand magic and sorcery, for they consist in the arts of using possessed objects to find out what is going to happen and then to see that it does not happen. But in making these remarks, we are trenching upon later discussion.

5. Totemism:

Though plants and even inanimate things may be totems, the characteristic representative is the animal. That would be a reason for treating the subject in juxtaposition to animal-fetishism. In view of the attitude of primitive man toward animals, he does not revolt in the slightest at tracing his descent from them; and if he does that, it is natural enough that he should preserve an attitude toward the animal-ancestor not dissimilar to the one maintained toward the human forefathers. Groups are found to designate themselves by animal-names, such appellation being regularly explained in some parts of the world as the name of the original ancestor. Where that is not the case, the animal-designation may be that of an ancestor's familiar spirit. In any case there is involved a special and intimate relation between a group and the living eponymic animal, meaning the one whose name the men bear, including as a typical feature a taboo at all times, or at all but brief and exceptional periods, upon eating or even upon killing the animal. Such an animal is called a totem and the views and practices involved are known as totemism.[1]

This statement cannot be enlarged upon, for lack of space. But it may be said that as a living system totemism is found on a grand scale only in North America and Australia.

This all too brief survey, this barest outline, of man's theories, opinions, guesses, notions, in short, beliefs relative to the inexplicable in life must now be closed. We have seen that, from earliest times, man has been filling the world with prepotent agencies, constructing out of his imagination, probably, an all-enveloping, powerful, but largely invisible environment. Now, after building this world, what has he done to get along with it? How has he behaved relative to it? What routine activities has he performed with respect to it?

[1] SUMNER and KELLER, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 1017 *ff.*

5. Objective Aspects

After studying what man has believed about the supernatural, we can see that *three* attitudes are possible, and have been taken and worked out into behavior patterns: (1) He can *avoid* the spirit world—or try to;(2) he can *make his peace* with it, or try to, (3); or he can *coerce* it—or try to. These, as we can see, and speaking broadly, are the only possibilities; these, as study reveals, are the actualities. We must now look at these briefly.

1. Avoidance.—A significant part of every religion, every system of religious practice, on the earth is what we may conveniently call the *avoidance cult.* This consists in dexterities of many sorts designed to keep people out of the way of the malignant spirits. We have spoken of possessed or obsessed persons or objects; these can be avoided. If the disembodied soul of the dead man is hanging around the grave, then the relatives and others—if they fear the soul at all—can stay away; and they can mark the grave in some way or let loose a story so that all others will stay away; they can make the grave symbolic of danger.

Disguise has been a widely used method of avoidance. After some sort of spirit manifestation, such as a sudden death, a violent illness, the loss of a pet dog, or some other unhappy experience, people have taken the precaution to change their appearance so that the spirits could no longer identify them in relation to the situation. For one thing, they dressed differently; and this is the source of our practice of wearing a mourning costume—especially black. For another thing, they daubed themselves with paint of various colors. For another, they made themselves hideous masks—assuming, naïvely enough, that spirits could not see through them. For another, they knocked out their teeth, cut or pulled off their hair, let blood run over their bodies, carved their flesh in curious ways.

An especially interesting case of this disguise is the change of name. Primitives regard the name with much more awe than we do. To them it is an integral part of the person, a bit of private property, always a means of identification. To escape danger, therefore, they changed it or permitted no one to speak it in their presence.

They *talked* differently; they talked quietly or boisterously, so as not to be recognized by the ever present spirits. They omitted the mention of certain topics, for the souls were always listening. They talked upon different subjects than the usual ones, so that the listening agencies could not connect them with any trouble that had occurred.

It has been a common practice for people to *move away* out of the spot, out of the hut, out of the neighborhood, at the occurrence of any calamity. If one member of the family died, that was taken as a bad omen, and the survivors made themselves scarce at that place.

Certain Papuans believe in two spirits which kill male children, not out of malovelence, but because they wish to draw to themselves the little ones who become their property after death. "And so the careful Papuan mother is not willing to let her child leave the house, after the oncoming of darkness, without an escort." Among the Yoruba, when the bull-roarer, representing the voice of a certain daimon, begins to be heard, "all women must shut themselves up in their houses, and refrain from looking out on pain of death." The Akamba are always moving about, and for good reason: "it may be lack of water, but more often the place has become unlucky: deaths in the family, sickness among them or their cattle, or the absence of children; any of these misfortunes will induce the Mtumia to have recourse to the wisdom of the medicine man, and his verdict will generally be that the village is unlucky, the haunt, perhaps, of mischievous spirits, and then the family moves elsewhere."

But we need not multiply illustrations. We need only think of what we do when we recognize that an oncoming automobile is certainly going over the spot we occupy or the lightning is likely to strike there; we move—and that is avoidance.

So it develops that a great many things *must not be done;* the grave must not be touched or approached except in the prescribed ways; the hut must not be reinhabited; paint must not be daubed on except in certain ways; certain names must not be mentioned or certain words spoken—on to an incredible extent. And here we have the *taboo* as an aspect of avoidance: Thou shalt not kill; thou shalt not steal; thou shalt *not*—depart from the prevailing usages.

The taboo, by its nature, does not admit of experimental verification. The native does not dare, by ignoring it, to make the test; or if by chance, involuntarily, he does, still he is more likely to support the theory by promptly dying of fright than to live to note the non-appearance of the consequences.

And it is clear that the taboo on the religious side is closely connected with the "holy." The tabooed place is the holy place, the tabooed thing the "unclean" or holy thing—or both at once, for the two terms run together, the tabooed day being the holy day or "holiday." There is the "industrial taboo" on the use of certain kinds of food, on working certain days, on using certain kinds of tools; there is the "property taboo" limiting appropriation; there is the "civic taboo" operating to protect public servants and undertakings. It is almost impossible for modern, and more or less liberated people, to begin to comprehend the numbers of restrictions with which primitive people hedged themselves about and the elaborate detail of them. But, interestingly enough, they were not without their disciplinary value; the oil and the coal now in the earth could not have been so riotiously wasted under primitive life as they are today.

2. Propitiation.—But, of course, it was clear to primitives, as it is to those of us who are just now onlookers, that avoidance was not always

possible—the spirit world being so congested as it was thought to be. Another attitude, therefore, was assumed; the people endeavored, within their lights, to make peace with the malignant powers; they practiced the *arts of propitiation.* We can see—but we cannot stop to elaborate the point—that propitiation might work foresightedly, before the fact, and try to keep souls well disposed, and it might also work after the fact and try to prevent further damage. And, of course, men have always been able to draw on their experiences in dealing with each other in the everyday relationships; the most ignorant person knows that his companions are appeasable, both before they harm him and afterward; we all deal with each other in this way.

One popular way, at all times and among all peoples, has been to offer an expensive *gift*—choice foods and drinks, costly raiment, a prized weapon, a fine animal, your wife. And here we open up the question of *sacrifice*, a term derived from two Latin words meaning to "make holy." But it is clear, from the very nature of souls, that gifts could not be made directly, that is, in material form; they could be given only indirectly, that is, in a transformed state. Fire was much employed in this transformation, and foods, raiment, weapons, animals, and wives were burned on altars and elsewhere and thus dispatched to the spirits.

Again, another way to mollify an angry and menacing individual is to dose him, shower him, with *praise*, to "pile it on thick," to play the sycophant toward him. And this method has been widely characteristic of religious practice. Quite universally one finds adulatory songs and hymns. The spirits and gods are called grandiose names, "great," "wonderful," "all powerful," "mighty Lord," and what not to the limits of the vocabulary.

Another way is to make the proper obeisances. As the chieftain, in life, requires his followers to bow, kneel, lie flat on the ground, or crawl, when in his presence, so it is widely believed that he requires the same when disembodied. Hence, the countless and varied practices of bowing in sacred places, kneeling at appropriate times, holding the hands in proper ways, bumping the head on the ground, and showing in other ways a truly subservient attitude; for, as the worshiper debases himself he thinks that he exalts the object of worship. And one may take a vow to do continuous honor to the mighty—to sing his praises every two hours for twenty years, to give a tithe of his income, to renounce certain practices that are displeasing, to build an altar to his name, to make regular sacrifices, to join him regularly in a sacramental meal.

Now, putting all of these practices together into some kind of order we have *worship;* and *ritual* is the major portion of it. Here we have, in our modern churches, the outcome of a long, half-conscious, fusional process. Of course, fellowship and dramatic arts play a large part with us; but we still have a large element of the old; in our church service we can find all

of the features we have mentioned—hymns of praise, messages from an inspired book, prayers to and pleadings with the powers to avert ill fortune or "bless," or both, kneeling and standing and prostrations, an atmosphere of restraint, altars, temples, special robes, processionals—all organized to influence the supernatural powers in the interests of man's welfare.

3. Coercion.—A third way of dealing with human beings, and a way, therefore, employed with invisible agencies, is to take the aggressive; not to skulk about in fear, not to beg and to bribe, but to employ pressure; as with men so with gods—there are ways in which they may be gotten "on the hip," so to speak; there are ways in which they may be controlled, managed, compelled. They may be compelled to stop tormenting or actually to aid the aggressor.

Suppose that there is a "possessed" person nearby, what can be done? Well, we can avoid him, possibly, as we have seen. We can also placate the "possessor," possibly. Or we can get control of him, get him at a disadvantage and drive him away or force him to work for us in the cause of relief. Let us notice these two ways, for a moment.

One of the most popular practices is to try to drive the malevolent soul away from the body and the neighborhood. One way to do this is to make the body of the "possessed" as uninhabitable as possible. Accordingly, heroic measures are taken; the body is beaten with all kinds of instruments, it is prostrated and tramped on with no light steps, it is stuffed with nauseous messes of one kind or another, it is placed by the fire and roasted, it is put in a dugout and given a boiling bath, it is slashed. The Sumatrans, in cases of insanity, put the afflicted into huts and set fire to them, leaving the sufferers to escape as best they can. The making of intolerable smells in the immediate vicinity of the spirits is another method. Sometimes the people or the "specialists" in afflictions get about the body and make bloodcurdling noises, also horrible gesticulations and grimaces. Among the California tribes, the *exorcist* or "specialist" sits opposite the sufferer and barks at him after the manner of an enraged cur for hours. Among the Columbian Indians, the worker drives the spirit away by pressing both clenched fists, with all possible force, into the pit of the sufferer's stomach. Of course, if these somewhat rough operations killed the victims, as they often did, that was no loss; the sufferers might better be out of the way—than "possessed." So much for the *positively* aggressive side, examples of which could be multiplied at great length.

Now for a word merely about the negative side of compulsion. We might speak of this as early "preventive medicine," for it consists essentially in providing obstacles to spirit attacks. If there is possession in the neighborhood, then people take to themselves "charms" of various kinds to avert spirit aggression—wearing a buckeye, keeping a bit of glass over

the heart, attaching a string to the loins, putting some bits of paper on a grave, putting a spear over the door. We often hear of people who lead "a charmed life," which means that they seem to be protected in some way. In the strictly literal sense, baptism is a charm, for spirits have never cared much for water. We will recall Tam-o'-Shanter's ride home.

With these mere hints as to the numerous and various types of religious practice, we must pass on to say that the life of the primitive—and many a modern—surrounded and harassed as he was by the countless agencies which his imagination created, would have been utterly intolerable but for the "specialists" who developed to aid him. These specialists—who always appear at the time of need—were the witch doctors, shamans, wizards, sorcerers, augurers, diviners, charmers, and the rest. For ordinary people could not expect, being preoccupied with attending to daily affairs, to spend much time studying the ways of spirits; they were unable to analyze all crises and prescribe. Hence, these specialists wedged themselves in between the people and their imaginary world—to prognosticate and to cure. And, whereas ordinary people had to live within the minutely described routines, the specialists were permitted and expected to experiment—and, therefore, became the first scientists in any technical sense.

And so man, from the earliest times, has been burdened with an immeasurably heavy weight of fear and some very costly activities; he has been burdened with a tremendous load of time- and energy-consuming practices crudely calculated to keep him "right" with his imaginary environment; and he has also been burdened with specialists who have deceived him and exploited him, although not usually intentionally, at every crisis and in between times. And so he has remained burdened, for the most part, to the present time. A colossal blunder—all of this? How else has man learned?

6. Modern Religion

Our emphasis has been mostly upon primitive religion, religion as it originated among men, took form, and has remained in broad outlines to late times. The mores—and we have been considering nothing else—of the masses change slowly; and they seem to change more slowly in religion than elsewhere; they seem to change more slowly in religion because there is no satisfactory means of checking up, of *verification*. To illustrate: Let us give two knives, a flint knife and a steel knife, to an Eskimo to use in skinning an animal. He can know assuredly in a moment or two which is the better knife for this purpose; the evidence is before him, obvious and convincing; and any other Eskimo would reach the same conclusions; no *argument* could upset the *demonstration*.

But suppose that we give the Eskimo two religious creeds, the Presbyterian and the Methodist. How could he choose between them? How could he test them? Is any sort of verification possible, and if so, then what kind? Would happiness be the test? He could be "conditioned" so that he would be equally happy with either. Would health be the test? He could be equally healthy with either. Would survival in the long run be the test? He could survive equally well with either. And suppose that an observer noted that Presbyterian Eskimos died off more rapidly than Methodist Eskimos—what then? It could hardly be *shown* that these creeds had anything to do with the matter.

The facts are that a very large part of the value of any given religious belief or practice is *subjective;* it is within the believer. If he *likes* to believe in and worship spirits, then he likes to do it; the proof of the pudding is in the eating; he enjoys it and who can go behind that? A belief or practice may be very harmful, but it may be still very delightful. If harmful beliefs and practices were always painful, then life's program would be easier to make up; but they are not, as we all know.

And behind all of this *liking* is the early conditioning, the training from childhood. We like in religion, as elsewhere, what we have been trained to like; and what we have been trained to like we later find necessary—if there is no predetermining persistent outreaching from original nature, as there surely cannot be in this case. Of course, this means that we like what others, those who have taught us, like; we are habituated *that* way, that particular way, and not some other particular way.

Hence, nobody can prove, to persons so conditioned, that there are no spirits, that there is no God, because the argument never can be fully cleansed of this cultivated taste and because people having this taste need spirits and depend on them; and the contrary of this proposition is also true. Thus, verification in religion is almost impossible at best, even if one honestly seeks to verify.

But suppose that one does not want to verify; suppose that it is sincerely believed that it is dangerous to try to verify; suppose that it is assumed that a sinful doubt is implied in the very wish to verify; suppose, in addition, that there is a rigid "mental set" in favor of accepted beliefs and practices and a determination to remain loyal to them. Then there is not much progress. But these are exactly the conditions which we have tried to describe in the foregoing pages; hence, stagnation for milleniums—almost stagnation; but not quite.

For, in the long run, all that man believes and does affects his survival. In the course of the ages, therefore, positively harmful religious beliefs and practices have gone out with the people who had them. Thus, change has been enforced.

The utmost efforts of the faithful, moreover, to retain the old beliefs and practices in their earlier forms have resulted in modifications. This

point was established in principle during the discussion of suggestion-imitation.

In addition, comparison has been an eye opener and doubt maker. When people knew nothing whatever of what others believed and did, to say nothing of the reasons, they knew no better than to cling to the old. But when contacts began to widen—the entrance of the Moors into Europe, the crusades, Columbus discovering America, the great wars, commerce, missionary activity, and the like—the people began to learn of other ways, some to become more confirmed and set in their own, but others to see new values and reach after them; the missionaries of late years have very generally enlarged their conceptions of other religions and have become less enamoured of all of the features of their own.

Further, the development of modern science has put many an old notion and practice to rout by critical analysis; and religion has not escaped. Careful research has shown all thinking people that there are no imps, devils, angels, ghosts, spirits, malignant or friendly, that anybody can locate anywhere; it is possible that they do exist, but the most searching inquiries have not found them. People have been of late, therefore, relieved of a frightful burden of fear, of an immense mass of superstitions, and of the duty of performing great numbers of time- and energy-consuming practices.

Yet, again, the more thoughtful have become skeptical, in all ages, as to the worth of their theories and practices *in critical situations*, that is, when bad luck has overtaken them. It seems clear that there is nothing like pain and loss to make men cry out "Why?" Crises in life have always made fine soil for doubts to sprout in; and we can see this illustrated many times in the Bible.

But we cannot pursue this fascinating line of thought. We have indicated that religion has changed slowly. It is changing more rapidly of late. By making a place for, and developing specialists, religion provided for its own change; it provided for criticism of itself and correction; for, as we have said, it gave birth to the scientific movement. And there are some tendencies in modern religion that might profitably be noticed in conclusion.

First, modern beliefs and theories about God, about immortality, about the nature of man, and so on are more and more based upon and made to coincide with what science and philosophy can find out about ultimates; and they are based less and less on tradition. This is an immense gain. Thus, religion has come to be more reasonable—even when it is more genuinely mystical. Thus, beliefs and notions are not regarded as sound in relation to the past but in relation to the future.

In the second place, there is less quarreling over theological terminology "transubstantiation" and "consubstantiation" –because it

cannot be made, in the nature of the case, to have precise meaning. Do we believe in the existence of God? Yes or No? It all depends upon what is meant—and very few can accurately say what they think they mean. Not that people do not discuss theological terminology; they do—more than ever, perhaps—but they have largely ceased to quarrel, to excommunicate, to damn each other when they disagree. And this is vast gain.

In the third place, religion is becoming more and more experimental. It has recovered itself in this respect. The trend now is toward holding to those beliefs and practices which are justified of their works. Take prayer. Is it of any use to pray any more? Well, that depends upon what one prays to and what one expects in answer. But what we are pointing out is that no one can say that prayer is useless until that one has proved conclusively, by long experimentation in his own case, that it is useless. This is what we mean by the experimental attitude; and there is a good deal of psychology these days to support prayer if for no other purpose than the gathering up and pulling together of one's own self for the duties of life. And so with other features of religion.

Finally, religion—especially Christianity—is trending toward emphasis on righteousness, justice, dependability, *in social relations*. Men have used religion largely to get themselves ready for heaven, taking life on earth and among other people as a trying preparation and more or less of a nuisance. But there are plenty of signs that religion is stressing *worth* here and now, tolerance and consideration here and now, service and justice here and now, honest and useful work here and now—and letting the future take care of itself.

We may conclude by saying that man has slowly, tortuously, and painfully awakened to the fact that he is at the center of, at the circumference of, or somewhere within, a great and compelling mystery. In spite of his progress in organized effort to understand, he does not yet understand himself, let alone what is all about him. If he has no pain or loss, he is usually indifferent to this mystery. But pain and loss have forced him to come to grips with reality and try to comprehend it. How? Well, since the beginning, men have been trying to find out how. They are still trying. We are now trying. It is one of the distinguishing marks of a human being that he tries. With respect to the what-now-seem-foolish aberrations of the past, such as we have touched upon, it may be said that, without them, without all of the apparently absurd fumblings of the past, we should be today exactly where these fumblers began to fumble. We owe more to these fumblers than we can ever repay. They did as well in their time, probably, as we are doing in ours. Only a fool would scoff at them; and scoffing, let it be remembered, is not argument. What they, in their right senses, would have wished doubtless is that *we* take up where they left off and keep up unremitting search for

the meaning of it all. It is vitally important for each generation to scrutinize carefully what is bequeathed to it in the stream of social heredity, preserve what is of value in it, discard the rest, and keep pressing on. Religion has been, is, and will continue to be of extraordinary interest to man. But religion has changed, is changing, and will continue to change. After science has done most of its work, men may be more religious than ever.[1]

Questions

1. What two environments have been mentioned already?
2. Where was "the struggle with fate" considered?
3. Give some examples from your own experience of "good" and "bad" luck. What is meant by *luck?*
4. Do you ever "take a chance?" Give instances.
5. How can we prove scientifically the existence of the material world? Has this ever been done?
6. Do you think that the spiritual world is less real? Why?
7. What crises have you had in relation to other people?
8. Do you think that, on the whole, death has been a greater shock to people than birth? Why?
9. Have you ever had dreams similar to that of the hunters referred to? What significance had they for you?
10. Are people justified in assuming the existence of spirits? Why not? Were primitive people?
11. What definition of religion appeals to you most and why?
12. Are you familiar with any cases of belief in animism? If so what are they?
13. How do animism and eidolism differ?
14. Is there any fetishism in America? If so, give examples.
15. Are there any sacred places that you consistently avoid? Why?
16. Are the methods of dealing with the spirits mentioned the only ones? What ones do you use?
17. How does modern religion, as you know it, differ from primitive religion, in (1) creed, (2) in practice?
18. How can we *verify* in religious matters? Be explicit.
19. Do you think that there can be a science of religion? Why not?
20. What are the main differences between fundamentalism and modernism?
21. Is the religious organization as compact and well organized as the industrial organization?

[1] For some useful information on the modern trend, see *The World Tomorrow*, December, 1925. And, of course, there are thousands of books on the subject.

CHAPTER XVI

THE EDUCATIONAL ORGANIZATION

Those who are in this class do not need to take one step away to begin the work of tracing out another complicated social system. Let us simply ask ourselves what we are doing now. We are reading this or another book; we are discussing with a functionary called a *teacher;* we are mixing chemicals or dissecting plants or examining rocks or writing a theme. All of these are routine activities, and they are publicly approved procedures.

We are in a room which is set aside for such purposes. We can see that these particular exercises dovetail with and are parts of still larger activity wholes. The subject we are studying belongs in a certain department; the department belongs in a larger whole which is called a *college;* the college belongs in a larger whole which is called a *university;* the university belongs in a larger complex system of thinking, feeling, and action which we call the *school system.* And we are all deeply involved in this system whether we like it or not. What is it all for? How did it come to be? Let us examine these and other questions briefly.[1]

1. The Uneducated

In studying the *people* all about us, in a former chapter, we came abruptly upon the rugged fact that the human race survives on earth by producing young after its own kind and by these young gradually slipping into the places of the elders as the latter pass on. In any reproductive area, these young come along in numbers and at rates which we can ascertain. At any given moment of time, say July 4, 1928, at 9:55 A.M. every tribe, community, or nation is confronted with a certain number of these new arrivals distributed among the various families —and sometimes outside them—according to the careless ways of the stork. Also, there are a few just some seconds older, some just a few minutes older, some a day older, some a week older, some a month older, a year, ten years. For any given area and particular time, the number of these newcomers can be known. In the United States, there are approximately two and one-half million babies born every year. Let us visualize this invading horde.

They are small when born. But insects are small when born; there is no necessary handicap in being born small. The handicap comes, however, in the initial size in relation to the later adult size and responsi-

[1] Education might be regarded as one of the social processes. See Bobbitt in *School and Society,* Apr. 18, 1925.

bility; it comes in helplessness and immaturity, and probably the human young are the most helpless and immature of any young. The human baby dies very soon if it is not cared for; and in primitive groups where the care is crude, perhaps 75 per cent of the babies die under one year.

The supplementation of infantile weakness, therefore, by adult strength has been more and more regarded as a first charge upon the latter as human beings have come to desire perpetuation and plan for it. A primary obligation rests here, for neglect means excessive cost in human suffering and possibly extinction. But helplessness, as we have seen, excites saving sympathy.

The young are endowed, if they are normal, with what we call *capacity*, although we do not know exactly what that is; they are constructed—developing bones for rigidity, muscles for strength and flexibility, circulation for health, nerves for sensibility, brain for coordination, limbs for locomotion and other services.

But they are helpless, when born, and immeasurably alien. We might have used the baby as the best example when we talked of isolation in a former chapter. It cannot hear for a little time after birth; it cannot see; it cannot touch anything in a narrowly discriminating way; its senses of taste and smell are undeveloped. It is, therefore, *out of communication*. It is, therefore, utterly ignorant, utterly destitute of knowledge about its new environment, for no baby has any innate ideas. "For what constitutes a child? Ignorance. What constitutes a child? Want of instruction . . . " said Epictetus a long time ago. And Tennyson, overcome momentarily by a sense of his own impotence, was moved to say:

> But what am I?
> An infant crying in the night;
> An infant crying for the light,
> And with no language but a cry.

Here they are, then, in our society, and there they are in every society—the babies, the "innocents abroad," to use Mark Twain's famous phrase, in transition from one incomprehensible world into another; thrust out; thrown up on the shores of time like pathetic driftwood on the beach; not the product of forethought, but the product of passion; living, but not knowing how to live; growing, but not knowing how to grow; energized, but utterly ignorant of how to direct energy; endowed with capacity, but possessing no estimate of it. Yet this is the stuff from which human beings start. Which way will they live, grow, develop?

2. Possible Types of Growth

The more thoughtful adults stand about and stare at these helpless mites and wonder. If the new world is a mystery to the young, the

young are a mystery to the old. Like birds pausing on a limb but ready to go, which way will they go? The very young cannot say, for they do not know; there are trends in them, but they are not always freely revealed at the start. Yet, as observers now know more than ever before, the *type of start* conditions every stage of the going and the finish. If we cannot discover the innate trends by interrogating the babies, we can learn something later by watching the going; we can learn something *after the fact.* And this is what we have always had to do and do now more accurately than ever. But even before this, as mere outside observers, we can see *two* possibilities.

1. Natural Growth.—They might grow *naturally,* physically and mentally; they might grow as animals grow; they might grow as the feral people grew—eating, wiggling about, sleeping, walking, and running, sneezing, coughing, as their impulses dictated amidst the situation; they might grow without any restraint except that which the physical environment would give them; they might go naked if they could survive. Kept alive for a year or so, the babies might grow up to be creatures of some kind. But what they would be like we do not know save as our previous study of feral people may give us a clue. This is one thinkable possibility.

2. Artificial Growth.—But, with the few exceptions already noted, the babies are never allowed, anywhere on earth, to develop naturally; they are never allowed to develop without *social pressures.* Rousseau, we will recall, grew weary of the artificiality and absurdity of his time, revolted to what he called *naturalism,* and made it his sleepless care to keep his boy "unspotted from the world."[1] And by making this objective his "sleepless care," he really exercised an "unnatural" influence; he applied a pressure which is not "in nature" and, therefore, sanctioned *artificial* growth—which is the only other possibility. The young are not born in deserts, in uninhabited areas; they are born in families, in communities, amidst culture, among people; this is a part of their new world, and, from many points of view, it is the most significant part—for way of growth. They are born amidst, but unaware of, this environment; and the minute they are born, this environment, this social world, begins to apply pressure to shape the growth. We know that this is the case with ourselves; Mother soon begins to croon a ditty to the baby and talk baby language and dress it; Father soon begins to tickle its toes and take it for a hobbyhorse ride; admiring relatives and friends gather about to stare and wonder and comment. Social pressure soon begins with us. But it begins just as soon with primitives; the young of primitive peoples may be wild, but they are not "natural" any more than ours are; the ways, the life routines, of these people

[1] MUNROE, "The Educational Ideal," p. 160 *ff.*

begin to impinge upon the newborn at once; the shaping of growth begins at birth.

a. There is *physical* shaping, as where the young must be circumcised or have their feet bound or have a board strapped on their heads to give them the correct shape or have some tattoo marks or the tribal sign cut into the skin or, later, have their teeth filed, their hair cut, their eyelashes pulled out—and so on. Youngsters may not grow naturally, on the physical side, anywhere in the world. *b.* Nor may they grow naturally on the *mental* side; they have to fear what the adults fear and enjoy what the adults enjoy; they have to hate what the adults hate and love what the adults love; they have to believe what the adults believe and disbelieve what the adults disbelieve; they have to assume what the adults assume and deny what the adults deny. *c.* Nor may they grow on the *actional* side naturally; there are always the countless dexterities and skills to acquire—how to eat, how to talk, what to wear, how to shoot, how to paddle, and the like without end. What we really have to realize, then, is that nowhere are the young left *undirected.* We really do not know, therefore, save as the cases of feral men already noticed give us a clue, what *natural growth* would be like, for there is so little of it. The universal shaping which goes on is the thing that makes it so difficult to say precisely what "original nature" is.

Actually, then, for human infants there is only *one* possibility—artificial growth—and any adult anywhere in the world, if he has lived or does live with others, is an artificial product; he is the product of *art*—poor or good. And the arts being so different in different places on the earth, of course the products are different.

Looking at any individual, then, from a purely local point of view, we might see him as a severely standardized and faithful copy of the prevailing life patterns of the locality. But looking at him from a world point of view, we might see him as an outlandish variant, a curiosity, an astounding exception to anything that "nature" knows, a thoroughgoing experiment in a new mode of living.

3. The Desire to Shape

But the point toward which we are driving in this discussion is this: How does it come to pass that *human adults* concern themselves to such an extent with the shaping of the young? Animals have no such concern. The old cat may box the ears of the overplayful kitten, the old dog may growl at the tormenting puppy, the old hen may peck the thieving chick, the cow may bunt the calf around—but there shaping ends; animal shaping is casual and incidental. But human shaping, although less organized and intelligent as we go back, is persistent and organized; there is no time when it does not exist; among human beings the world over, human shaping is systematic, is organized, and is con-

tinuous; among human beings, the shaping pressures are regularly applied in many ways until the work is regarded as complete, until the new reproduce the old. Yet this shaping business has been a heavy charge upon the time, the energy, the savings, and the patience of those undertaking it—always. There is no tribe of people on earth, no significant human group, which does not make some attempt to direct the growth of its young. The practice is universal; this is astonishing, but it is a rugged fact. And we do not refer to the fact that adults, while engaged with their usual routines of life, always thereby provide examples which the young imitate; such casual and inadvertent shaping goes on all the time, but it is not what we have in mind here. We have in mind a more or less continuous, positive, and systematized pressure, an aggressive and somewhat definite program of which the latest and most conspicuous example is the tax-supported and compulsory school system.

We can see, further, if we examine the course of social development, that there have been two main forms of this shaping pressure, what we shall call the *informal* and the *formal*. Examples of the former would be a father teaching his boy to shoot a bow and arrow or a mother teaching her daughter how to bake. This sort of thing is aggressive, but it is casual; it is pressure, but it is irregular; it is systematic, but it is not highly systematic. On the other hand, and growing out of this informal shaping, is the formal or school type of education, where specialized persons are set apart to teach, and the young devote a specified number of hours for a specified number of days to the work of learning a specified body of knowledge. Of course, this latter type has been the most costly in every way. In the former case, the father was shooting anyway, perhaps, and took only a little extra time to show his boy; also, the mother was baking anyway and found it easy to instruct her daughter; there was nothing very costly about it all. But in the latter case, the teacher prepares especially to shoot or bake for the sole purpose of instructing; teachers are all the time doing what the evident necessities of the situation do not demand in order to shape the young, unless we think of ignorance and helplessness as a situation necessitating such work—which we have come more and more to do. Informal shaping has always gone on and still goes on more and more; but formal shaping has developed until it has become a consuming public interest.

Yet, it has never been entirely satisfactory to all concerned, in either case. Those who have provided the money for formal education have not always done so gladly; they have often had to be compelled. Those who do the teaching are rarely satisfied with their program. The young themselves have fought against this increasing pressure, resenting again and again what they have been compelled to learn. Considering the difficulties attendant upon the building of a system of pressure, why have people engaged in it more and more?

The motivation to engage in shaping the young is a very involved matter, and we cannot undertake to analyze it fully. It is easy, also, to slip into speculation and to suppose, as some do, that a divine urge to instruct was implanted in man at some early time. But we would direct attention to something more natural; we would direct attention to the actual situation and endeavor to see what, in the immediate environment, must have aroused people to undertake the education of their young.

1. Fear.—After our study of religion, we are prepared for the truth that primitive people *have* to shape the growth of their young to save themselves. There are the multitudes of spirit agencies about and the numbers of taboo safeguards. The uninstructed young would naturally violate these taboos and thus offend the spirits and bring down calamity upon the whole group. But the elders could never stand indifferently by and see that happen—even if they cared nothing for the young. Fear, then, is a large element in primitive motivation.

Among ourselves, fear plays an appreciable part. We do not press our young along certain economic lines because of fear of the spirits; we press them along because of fear of poverty and indigency. But in our religion, the fear element is still large, and it is the same old fear—fear of displeasing the supernatural; hence, the pressure to observe the taboos on the sacred, adopt the beliefs in the sacred, and avoid experimentation. In the view of most parents and of countless teachers, the Almighty is very whimsical even yet.

2. Affection.—Spencer says:

> Of necessity, the lowest human races, in common with inferior animals, have large endowments of this [parental instinct]. Those only can survive in posterity in whom the love of offspring prompts due care of offspring; and among the savage, the self-sacrifice required is as great as among the civilized. Hence the fondness for children which even the lowest of mankind display; though, with their habitual impulsiveness, they often join with it great cruelty.[1]

There is little evidence available upon this point, but, undoubtedly, primitive parents desired their young to avoid calamities, as well as themselves. They were fond enough of them, moreover—organic sympathy, if nothing more—to want them to avoid suffering from rude hands by being offensive, to avoid danger from wild animals, to appear well before others, to show themselves courageous, and in all ways to be like the adults. The descriptions of initiation ceremonies, so characteristic of primitive tribes, show some of these things.[2]

The elders regularly maintain, among us, that it is largely affection which prompts them to sacrifice for the education of their young; and doubtless this is true in many cases. But by and large, money for schools has to be forced out by taxation. Yet those who protest against too much

[1] "Principles of Sociology," Vol. I, p. 67.

[2] See Lowie, "Primitive Society," p. 260; Thomas, "Social Origins," p. 213.

formal education are not backward in providing plenty of the informal kind—of a kind; they push the young around, they punish, they shower with ridicule, they spout bitterness, they wheedle, they reward.

But somewhere along the course of human development, the elders began to realize that what the young should know could be discriminated and organized. As the knowable increased in quantity, the elders began to realize that selection was necessary. As the meaning of human life became clearer and people began to think of directing their own social evolution, it was seen that the young must be prepared to surpass the present. Thus, with so many sentences, we have to pass over very large matters and long ages.

3. The Desire for Leaders.—The last point mentioned opens up another aspect of the matter which we must mention. The primitives, as we have seen, developed specialists of certain kinds. But when these public enlighteners were gone, what was to become of the tribe? This problem was evident at an early stage. The specialists, therefore, took the young and gave them their secret lore—that the people might not perish.

Perhaps no motivation is stronger than this now. If leaders could invariably be picked from the cradle, probably two-thirds or three-quarters of the young now in school, certainly in colleges, would be called home. But leaders cannot be invariably selected in the cradle. The need for leaders is so great, however, that the passing of much straw through the educational machine is justified if a few grains of wheat are thereby discovered. Besides, making a living is more than ever a specialism for which training is required; and therefore is shaping justified.

4. The Trend.—We cannot neglect to mention a force, operative here as elsewhere in society at all stages, namely, *the way things get going*. If fear and affection and other forces gave impulses to education and started the shaping process going, then the very way of its going helped to keep it going that way; it became one of the folkways; then it became one of the mores; all the time, equipment was being dedicated to the service; all the time, specialists—teachers and administrators—were being entangled and supporting the organization for various reasons. In other words, as we shall see later, this complex of desires to shape the young gave rise to a social movement which soon became institutionalized and fixed in the social order.

5. The Desire to Be Shaped.—Nor must we fail to mention the fact that, all through the ages, there have been those who *wished to know* what the sages knew, who hunted out the specialists and learned of them. And possibly no element in the motivation has been more compelling than this. The only point we wish to make in this connection, however, is that the eager learners helped to bring into existence an organization which satisfied them but also came to entangle those not hungering for the truth, as well.

But to sum up: The motivation to shape the young has always been a complex and poorly understood matter; we are not sure today that we fully understand what our immense undertaking is for. But we have seen what some of the chief elements have been; these have been fear of one kind or another, affection, the trend of things, the desire for leaders, and the search for instruction. But through it all is discoverable a vague longing, on the part of the adult population and especially the elders, for immortality of tribal and national orders; increasingly through the centuries, the old have revolted from the thought of their cultural accumulations perishing with them; and as foresight began to be a larger part of the mental outfit, concern for leaders increased. It is more than ever the concern of modern leaders that the future not only embody all that is of value in the past but also transcend it, that the visions which we see but fall short of become the actualities of the future. It is really pathetic to see what tremendous efforts are now put forth at such huge expense toward social reconstruction by means of education. This is a unique thing on the earth.

4. Education and Propaganda

A distinction, prepared for in the foregoing but not mentioned, must now be set out. We have spoken of informal and formal shaping or education. Within both of these types, we find two kinds of persons, two kinds of methods, and two kinds of content or subject matter. To one kind of persons, methods, and content we may give the name *education;* to the other kind, the name *propaganda.* Let us see what these mean.

If a medicine man takes a novice to train, to shape, he may be wholly sincere in his efforts and mostly interested in the welfare of the boy, he may show the boy all of the steps by which he effects his results, and he may impart information which is reliable and tested. On the other hand, he may secure the boy as a tool, being interested in his own advancement primarily, he may give the boy his conclusions without showing him how they were reached, and he may fill the boy with superstitions and sophistries. The one case is education; the other is propaganda. Let us take a modern example.

The school receives the ignorant child and proceeds to shape him. It may be interested primarily in the welfare of the child, his happiness and success; it may begin by locating the child mentally and then proceed by showing him how to find evidence for this or that conclusion which may be temporarily advanced; it may teach the child respect for evidence and love for the truth which the evidence supports; it may train the child to think independently and to avoid being a mere swallower of what others hand out; it may have no special theory to advance but rather help the child to build up his own theory. This is education.

On the other hand, the school may be interested more in itself than in the child, interested in building itself up and perpetuating itself; it may have a pet theory to inculcate and, therefore, to perpetuate; it may take advantage of the child's ignorance and lack of critical faculties to secure adoption of this theory by the child and thus build up a blind loyalty within the child for the notion and the school, to make the child an almost fanatical slave of the idea but not knowing exactly why. This is propaganda.

Let us be clear that these are both cases, that education and propaganda are both cases, of *forcing*, forcing the direction of growth, of forced generation. Educators and propagandists alike agree that growth should not be natural; they agree that it will not do to let others alone. But they differ in (*a*) their reasons for forcing—the one being interested in the satisfactory (to the child) growth of the child or adult, the other being interested primarily in his own prosperity; they differ in (*b*) the method of forcing—the one trying to show clearly all of the steps involved and helping the child to see plainly the reasons for taking them, the other trying always to present a favorable side and to keep the objectionable aspects hidden, trying not to help a child to grow but trying to finish it at once, trying to warp it a certain way; they differ in (*c*) that they succeed in their efforts, more or less, and the product, in the one case is an independent and informed thinker while in the other case it is an ignorant and fanatical partisan. The educator teaches his pupils how to discriminate, how to weigh, how to verify, how to be as sure of what they finally conclude as human beings can be; the propagandist teaches his pupils how to accept uncritically, how to be partisans, how to be loyal to partial views. In the one case, the pupil is the *end;* in the other, the pupil is merely a *means;* and no greater difference can be mentioned.

We sometimes suppose, because of the great emphasis given to propaganda during and since the World War, that this type of shaping growth is a rather new thing on the earth; and certainly our histories do not tell us much of its use before the war. But this thing is not new; it is as old as any kind of social pressure. When the early parent told the child to keep away from a certain spot because dangerous spirits lurked there, he was a propagandist; when the mother got the child out of the hut by saying that goblins were over in the corner although she did not think so and wanted the child away out of her path, she was a propagandist; when the medicine man impressed the novice with his own powers by means of tricks and made the novice his slave by means of deception, he was a propagandist. The inculcation of *conclusions* by the old has always been and is propaganda. We have to admit, now that we understand the matter better, that most of education up through the centuries has been propaganda; it has been an effort to shape the young according to the pattern of the old *without recourse to evidence*,

checked and verified, and mainly in the interests of the shapers. Education and propaganda have been intertwined all through the ages, and the two threads have not yet been unraveled.

Of course, it will be evident that there has been most and the worst propaganda where there has been most zeal to shape and where there has been the least possibility of verification; and, quite logically, we think of religion, for, as we saw, there is the least possibility of verifying in that area, and there has been not a little enthusiasm for directing the growth of the young. But there is a field hardly less fertile, and that is politics; for political leaders have usually been enthusiastic, and there has usually been no way finally and authoritatively to prove the advantage of one type of political system over another. In the economic world, there has been the least opportunity for propaganda because of the ready means of checking up industrial practices—until modern times. But now, with advertising in the forefront, industrial propaganda takes the lead, for practically all advertising is in the interests of the advertisers and is often false in its representations because it stresses the advantages to the buyer and minimizes or neglects the disadvantages; it also fills the minds of the people with sophistries about their needs and what will certainly supply them.

The formal school is differentiating itself more and more from all propagandistic efforts and is concentrating upon education in the strict sense, that is, upon shaping human intelligence to be critical and to hunger for evidence. This means, of course, that the young are more and more asking embarrassing questions of all who attempt to direct them. This is one of the reasons for much of the protest that mounts up against modern education. The traditional and authoritative religionists, politicians, capitalists, and the rest call this questioning *heresy*, *atheism*, *bolshevism*, *license*, and other bad names; and it is all of these in their view. But the facts are that careful inquiry is undermining and sending crashing down vast structures of belief and practice erected in the past by propaganda.

5. The Curriculum

1. The General Curriculum.—As there are two types of shaping pressure—informal and formal—so there are two types of curriculum. There is the curriculum of the whole range of culture of any given group; there is the whole accumulated wealth of usage; and these things are confronting the young at every turn—going fishing with a certain kind of bait, skinning an animal in a certain way, making certain kinds of beads, speaking a certain language, saluting a certain flag, hating certain enemies, eating certain foods, dressing in a certain style, marrying a certain person, respecting a certain division of labor, avoiding certain tabooed

places, worshiping certain deities, obeying certain authorities; it is all there within the sense range of the child to be imitated and to be accepted; at any time, in any place, among any people, this is the situation.

2. The Special Curriculum.—As numbers increased, however, and as the routine patterns increased in quantity and complexity, problems began to emerge. As numbers increased, authorities increased; therefore, who was to take the lead in the shaping process? Were the parents to be left solely responsible? Was the chief to assume responsibility? Was the medicine man to take the lead? Who was the proper person to train the young? For, as numbers increased, then differences arose as to who best represented what was to be taught.

But there soon emerged a more critical issue. As numbers increased, the accumulated ways of the group increased; and they increased to the point where it became impossible for a person to learn and remember all of them in a lifetime. Then, as differences arose within the same people as to ways of living, there was the problem of selecting what was necessary and neglecting the rest.

A chief problem of the curriculum is, and has always been, this: Since the young cannot learn and remember everything that is believed and done in the group, what should they learn? What is fundamental? What ought the young to be required to know and do, whatever else they know and do? The warmest of debates has been going on over this ever since human ways became so numerous and so inconsistent that the young could not adopt them all. As a rule, the persons in positions of authority, now the chief, now the medicine man, now the priest, now the parent, now the specialized pedagogue have had their way—as far as stubborn original nature would permit. The selections of these authorities have been gradually embodied in a more or less systematized program of studies which we now call the *curriculum*. At any time and in any place, barring the result of inertia and the influence of past custom, these curricula are held to contain what is most important for the growth of the young and essential to the survival and well-being of the group.

We of the present time think that our program of studies embodies the quintessentials because it is the cream of what the past has learned by costly trial-and-error experiences. And who can gainsay this? Can the young, the inexperienced, the unshaped, do so? How old and how experienced does one have to be before being able to have a worthwhile judgment on this matter? Is *age* a matter of experience or of years? Who is best qualified to say that "four years of Latin" are essential or not essential—and to what? The young may not *want* or *like* this; but the question is always alive as to who is best fitted to pass judgment. In other words, when there is so much culture, what is the best of it, and how is it to be selected?

Any formal curriculum *is* a selection; it is a cultural distillation. Also, it is something that the young would have to shape up if the elders did not do it. The program of studies that we follow today has come out of the infinite sufferings of untold numbers of our ancestors and others. If we, in our day, find that it is largely worthless, a colossal negation—that is great gain; we can then know what *not* to study. The emphasis, as we have seen, is more and more upon positive inquiry, upon individual and cooperative research; and nothing like this has ever been seen on such a grand scale before.

Can it be safely assumed that the human race has learned anything during its long climb, and if so what? Certainly, the young have not lived long enough nor have they had enough experience to be able to tell the old very much about what is needed.

The curriculum is being steadily modified, moreover, to suit the capacities of the young as they grow; first things—from the standpoint of the young—are being placed first. There is also a good deal of effort made to make things "interesting." This means that the age-old belief in the original sin of original nature is vanishing; it means the inauguration of a program of child and adult study to find out what the outreachings of the young really are. Thus, education is actually becoming *education* or "leading out." But all of this cannot be accomplished in a day; it should not be brought about arbitrarily.

3. Weaknesses.—One of the gravest weaknesses of the curriculum of any people is always the overemphasis upon the cultural attainments of that people and its underemphasis upon the cultural attainments of other peoples. The American case is no exception. Except as the cultural attainments of other peoples have slipped in here and have gradually become incorporated into our social life and have thus influenced the making of the curriculum, there is little attempt to compare different cultures and to train the young to pass judgment upon their respective merits. Americans teach American principles of living; Chinese teach Chinese principles; the Yakuts teach Yakut principles. There is no publicly authorized teaching of bolshevism in America; there is no authorized teaching of the values in polyandry; there is almost nothing in our program to show the cultural goods of India.

This holds true in particular fields. Christian teachers do not, as a rule, outline Christian principles and then compare them point by point with Buddhistic principles. The assumption usually is that these other systems are *all* wrong and have nothing to contribute to the arts of living well and the meaning of life. Thus, while the curriculum, in the large, represents the best within a given country or branch of culture, it usually does not represent the best that the whole human race has learned.[1]

[1] See Smith, "The Role of Social Heredity in Education," *A. J. S.*, March, 1919, p. 566.

6. Other Features

We have now given some attention to certain prominent features of our educational system, the movement of the old to shape the growth of the young. We have pointed out the unique impulse to educate; we have distinguished between genuine and spurious education; we have shown what the curriculum is and what it means. But there are many other important features of our educational system, and they all deserve careful examination. There is the *teaching force;* there are the *arts of teaching;* there is the *material equipment;* there is the *method of administration.* But space prohibits more than passing reference.

1. Teachers.—A natural teacher is anything that experiments in the presence of learners. The fire burns the child—and thus enlightens him —the dog bites the child—and thus teaches—the witch doctor performs over the pain-racked mortal—and instructs the young novice—the rock resists the forward-moving toe—and enlightens the owner thereof. Changing nature is an excellent teacher. Normal persons learn a good deal by just living.

But without *human teachers,* the young always begin at the bottom in each generation, since nothing of human culture is transmitted by physical heredity. Human teachers are storehouses of knowledge; they are links between the generations; they are shortcuts. Then, they have something to say to the young to keep them from following fatal fires.

It is unnecessary to elaborate the point that teachers were first of all the adult companions of the young —parents, neighbors, heroes, witch doctors, warriors, and the like—and that through the centuries certain persons were more and more set aside for this special purpose, increased in numbers, given special training, until now the teachers constitute one of the most important groups in any advanced country.

2. The Arts of Teaching.—The arts of teaching were hardly "arts" at the beginning, save as parents, witch doctors, and others possessed what we now call *native ability* in this line. Possibly there has always been the "art that conceals art." But at any rate, there was no special training in the arts of teaching until modern times. As the impulse to education became more insistent, and as teachers multiplied in numbers, the idea grew that teachers themselves needed teaching, not only in the content of their subjects but also in the methods of presentation.

And of late, extraordinary emphasis has been placed here. The state has stepped into the picture, and laws have been passed governing the qualifications of teachers. Workers of this kind must now know their subjects and be able to present them clearly and fully. Impartation is now recognized as an art, and without it no teacher can hope to succeed. More than this, there is a recognized distinction between "impartation" and "drawing out."

3. Equipment.—At the beginning, there was no equipment except what was used for other purposes. If we should go into a primitive village today and ask to see the schoolhouse, nobody would know what we meant. But there has been a marvelous development along this line. Special buildings, of greater usefulness and finer appointments, have been set up in numbers increasing so rapidly that it is difficult to keep track of them. It would require many volumes merely to give the bare details of the grounds appropriated and improved, the special devices such as blackboards, maps, textbooks, lesson cards, pens and pencils, lights, lanterns, laboratories, sanitary features, desks which have been invented, manufactured, and spread abroad for the use of all by means of public funds.

4. Administration.—As pupils, teachers, buildings, teaching helps, and other adjuncts to the school system have multiplied, the problems of administration have emerged and multiplied, also; and they have come to such a development that special functionaries have been called out of the original undifferentiated mass to deal with them; functionaries such as inspectors, superintendents, visitors, nurses, and others have come to occupy a most important place in uniting all of the various elements into one harmonious and perfectly functioning whole; the school administrator has come to take his place alongside of the teacher as a specialist.

Hence, the development of the shaping process has included the differentiation between informal or casual education—which has always gone on and doubtless always will go on—and the formal, well-integrated, efficient school system. And within this gigantic enterprise, further differentiation has taken place in several directions—special teachers of many kinds, special administrators of many kinds, special training of many kinds, special methods of many kinds. In other words, we have an organization of the clearest outlines.

7. Educational Objectives

We might have touched upon this point under Other Features, above, but we have reserved it for special treatment because of its enormous significance. What have been the objectives, what are the objectives of all of this technical and costly effort? What is the movement for? We have given a general answer above—shaping growth. But growth cannot be shaped "in general"; it can be shaped only in particular. This matter, therefore, calls for some further consideration.

1. Conformity.—Among primitives, the shaping process is largely negative; it is a prevention of growth in certain objectionable directions more than it is a positive direction in specifically desirable ways. But to reject is to select, and, therefore, forbidding is equivalent to directing. The aim of it all is *education in conformity*, and our previous study of the folkways helps us to understand why this is so; the young must keep the

old ways so that the spirits will not be offended and work havoc among the living.

This objective has remained intact to the present time, although others have come to parallel and compete with it. But we now have the "melting-pot" idea and the "one-hundred-percentism" movement which is essentially a shaping-in-conformity process.

2. All-round Manhood.—During the Golden Age of Greece, the leaders became more conscious and purposeful in their educational efforts and less subservient to their ancestors and defined their educational objective—as far as they did define it—in terms of all-round manhood. Of course, this training was for boys, and for boys of the upper classes only; girls and the lower classes were largely neglected. The aim here was to prepare leaders, and, hence, Greek education prepared for variation and progress.

3. Morality.—The early Christians, finding themselves embedded in the injustice and immorality of the times, set up the ideal of *moral* training, that is, training in justice. They conceived the situation obtaining as arising, however, out of sinful hearts and a wicked original nature. They proposed to "save" the people and make them over into the form of their hero savior, make them clean morally, make them devoted to public service and the worthier aims of life. Their objective was excellent, but their methods and assumptions were not so good.

4. Immortality.—In the Middle Ages, the church—having given up its hope of remaking the world—being the main institution concerned with education, set up the aim of preparing everybody for heaven, preparing the young to pass through this world unscathed and surely to reach the blissful shores. Consequently, this life was depreciated and ignored as far as possible; any contact with it was regarded as contaminating and dangerous; anything that wicked human nature prized was wrong and devilish. By prayers, fasting, self-denial, self-discipline, restraint of every natural impulse, "mortifying the flesh," it was held that salvation would some day be realized.

5. Classical Learning.—With the rediscovery of the classics during the Renaissance, a new interest was awakened in *this* life—for many of those outside the church and for some within—and a new emphasis was placed on learning the beauty and wisdom of the past as it was found in the classics. But this movement engaged the attention of only a very few; the masses were hardly touched by it. The idea became fixed in the school system, however, and has remained to the present time.

6. Universalized Knowledge.—With the coming of the scientific movement in the fifteenth century, the objective of education was stated in terms of universalized scientific knowledge. It was held that people lived poorly and immorally not because they were "sinful" but

because they were ignorant, and ignorant especially of nature. Francis Bacon, a leader in this movement, thought that the classical training was not so much wrong as it was inadequate.

> His life-aim seems to have been to turn the learned world squarely about, to make it look forward instead of backward, outward into the face of nature, rather than inward into its dark and narrow self. Nature, not man, he perceived, must be the starting-point of inquiry; her laws, not man's vagaries, must be the object of study; her sure methods, not human guesswork, must be the model of research.[1]

7. The Gentleman.—Paralleling these developments—and what a flock of ideas we have now let loose—was the aim, promoted by certain of the aristocracy, especially in England, to make gentlemen, persons accomplished in manners, varnished and veneered, who would always do the *correct* thing under all circumstances. Schools were established for this purpose, schools which have since become very famous; and this ideal still dominates certain sections of English life. The private school in the United States is a continuance, although much modified, of this movement.

8. Training in Thinking.—The latest additions—a few of the latest additions—to this growing family of objectives, especially in the United States, are the *shaping of citizens* and *training in thinking*. The other objectives remain, in so far as they do not conflict with these later notions. The young are to be taught to function intelligently in a changing world; to function so as to realize their worthiest ambitions and at the same time work for the good of the whole to which they belong. And contributory to this end, nothing is more important than skill in thinking. Thus, the various departments in the university, the various subjects in the curriculum, may be conceived merely as furnishing different kinds of materials to be used in learning how to think inerrantly—some worthwhile knowledge being picked up, of course, by the way.[2]

But more and more it is "bad form" to announce lofty aims. As Bobbitt puts it:

> Objectives that are only vague, high-sounding hopes and aspirations are to be avoided. Examples are "character-building," the "harmonious development of the individual," "social efficiency," "general discipline," "self-realization," "culture," and the like. All of these are valid enough; but too cloud-like for guiding practical procedure. They belong to the visionary adolescence of our profession—not to its sober and somewhat disillusioned maturity.[3]

[1] Munroe, "The Educational Ideal," p. 43.

[2] See Bode, "Modern Educational Theories," Chaps. IV, V, VI, for criticism of modern objectives, of which we have named only a few.

[3] "How to Make a Curriculum," p. 32.

So the discussion goes on about objectives. And this discussion is evidence that the past is not dominating so much as it once did. It is evidence that there is more freedom to investigate just what kind of people we want in the world and, having found out, proceed to make them. It is evidence that the demands of the future are defining themselves more and more in the thinking of the present.

8. Education and Society

We must now conclude with a brief statement of the interactional relations between education and society; and we can follow the movement in two directions—from the larger society to the smaller educational institutions, and from the educational institutions to the larger society.

1. Society and Education.—Of course, the educational institutions are within the larger whole and are, therefore, affected in a variety of ways. Two or three hints of this influence may be noted.

1. The industrial organization is related to education in that it supplies the funds for its maintenance. The steady accumulations of capital might conceivably be turned back wholly into production and exchange and thus be confined to a narrow service. But what we see is an increasing proportion of this capital being diverted to the support of education. There is the diversion of raw materials into school equipment; there is the setting aside of enough money to pay teachers ever higher salaries; and there is the relief of the young from productive labor from birth to the age of sixteen years or longer. We might say that these three contributions make formal education possible.

2. The state has had intimate relations with education for a long time and has had a good deal to do with the shape education has taken. There are no countries where the school system is in operation wherein the state has not determined the number of years that the young are to go to school as a minimum, the number of months constituting the school year, the character of the curriculum to some degree, and the standards for teaching. Also, the state has found the money to keep the schools running. While industry has made and saved the necessary wealth, it has not voluntarily contributed it in sufficient quantities; this wealth has had to be drawn out by taxation. The state has intervened, moreover, in dozens of ways to direct the on-goings of education by determining not only educational qualifications for teachers but also various other qualifications as well. A recent article has called attention to the number of "blue laws" which have been passed and which have to do with these qualifications.[1]

3. With the equipment cared for by industry and the state, the family has been called upon to yield up its young for such instruction

[1] See Ewing, "Blue Laws for School Teachers," *Harpers Magazine*, February, 1928.

as has been agreed upon. Of course, schools could not run without children and students. These can come, in the last resort, only from the institution which produces them—which is the family. In some respects, this withdrawing of the children from the homes for a certain amount of instruction has meant a limitation upon what the family may do and not do with its young. In a very real sense, this requirement has amounted to a denial of that ancient property right which the family has always felt in its young. This enlargement of the horizon of the young in the schools, moreover, has had and still has violent repercussions within family life and has caused many breaks in the continuity of family traditions. In a very large way, the public education of the young has weakened family authority and narrowed family functions. Thus, the relations between the family and education have become more intimate as education has become more universal.

4. Religion has always been suffusing industry and the state and thus having an indirect influence on education. But it has also had its direct influence. We may say that formal education arose in the religious organization and has, only within recent centuries, separated itself therefrom. That is, one line of development has been separate on the administrative side from the religious organization; but the religious organization has always retained control of religious training, the Sunday school in the Protestant church and the parochial school in the Catholic church being the evidence. Much of education has gotten out from under the direct influence of the religious organization, but some of it yet remains. The religious organization has always affected and continues to affect formal education by stressing standards of character and promoting moral idealism for its various members, among whom are found teachers, school administrators, members of boards of education, and legislators.

5. The recreational organization has not been without its influence in formal education, and the relation between the two becomes more intimate as time passes. Play has usually taught the young the importance of "the rules of the game" and of standards of "fair play" which have made school discipline much easier than it would otherwise have been. The play organization, moreover, has been actually admitted into the educational organization—in the form of the various athletic organizations which are always found about schools. In addition, the subject of play has found itself in the curriculum in recent years, and we now teach "how to play" as well as "how to work." Perhaps a better understanding of play has had as much as anything else to do with the development of the educational theory which says that we really learn something only where we are interested and that we learn by action. Thus education and recreation have interacted in a great variety of ways.

2. Education and Society.—After reviewing a few suggestions as to what the larger society has done to shape education, we may turn the matter around, now, and note what education has done and is doing to society at large. We can offer only a hint or two of the larger influences.

1. The thing that the educational system has done the most of has been to take the raw material of the family and shape it up into something that we like to call *trained leadership*. It is, of course, ridiculous for us to say that all leaders have come out of the formal school; that is far from the truth; there were able leaders long before formal education was ever thought of. But more and more, the school—grade school, high school, and college—has made its impress upon the young devoted to its care and has sent them back into the world's work with a better equipment than they otherwise would have had. The educational system has taken hold of little Willie and Susie and has shown them, day by day and bit by bit, of what the better life consists and has "conditioned" them so that later on they would remain steadfast at such levels although back in a corrupting environment.

Walter Lippman has pointed out that the little red schoolhouse has taught everybody how to read; and this is a vast achievement. The home has not always done this, although we commonly say that there is more filial regard in the home than in the school. But at any rate, the educational system, by teaching the arts of reading and writing, has made the young able to approach all culture; it has made all culture available to the young. This is an enormous contribution to social unity. Mr. Lippman points out, however, that while the school has taught everybody how to read, it has not taught everybody how to *discriminate*. Thus, the school has prepared many people to read the wrong thing and has, therefore, contributed to the downfall of not a few. But more go up than go down. As educational technique improves, however, it may be possible to teach discrimination as well as the art of reading.

Reading and writing are so important because on them depends the development of those wonderful means of communication—telegraphs, mail systems, newspapers, books, and magazines—which are at the base of social unity and continuity, as we have seen. It would be useless to establish a mail system or a publishing house within the confines of thousands of backward tribes today, because no one can read or write. Their unity is the face-to-face kind that we see in small neighborhoods where talk is the common bond, and their continuity is in oral tradition. They do not expand in culture or in size, because the means of communication with the larger world are absent.

It is fair to say, then, that what formal education tries to do is to point out to the young what "life at its best" is and so strongly attach them to that type that they will continue to live at that level after they

leave school. And while 50 or 60 or 70 per cent of pupils and students never catch the vision of this "best life" and go out much as they came in, a certain unknown percentage does catch the vision and go out changed persons. These are the ones who "leaven the whole lump." The school gives back "persons."

2. Finally, the formal school trains the young rather consistently in the arts of truth finding and truth telling—which are ever more important for human progress. When the young learn by many exercises the various techniques of scientific research, and when they understand the immense importance of truth telling, they are not less but better equipped to meet the problems with which our civilization is confronted. The school has not contributed its best to the life of the child if that child can leave with no clearer notion of the importance, for social cooperation, of truth telling, dependability, integrity and many other virtues than it possessed when it entered. More than this, it contributes an enormous amount to the growth of the spirit of toleration, so that people who differ may still see themselves not as eternal enemies but as mutually complementary. Thus, by teaching the young how to investigate, how to transmit what they find, how to size up situations, how to live harmoniously with others, how to have access to the total cultural heritage, it makes an incalculable contribution to social life.

Questions

1. To what extent is the religious organization an educational organization also? Give illustrations.
2. Can there be "a science of education?" Discuss.
3. What "uniformities" may be found in education?
4. What social processes may be found in education?
5. What would you say is the fundamental difference, in the treatment of the young, between animals and human beings?
6. How can we estimate the relative influence of the physical and the social environments?
7. Try to visualize this enormous procession of the young over the earth. Would it be proper to speak of babies as "Innocents Abroad," to use Mark Twain's phrase?
8. Can you think of other "types of growth" besides those indicated?
9. Would you say that the term *shaping* is the equivalent of the term *education?* What are the differences?
10. What forces, besides those mentioned, are at work controlling the shaping process? Take your own case. By the way, what caution was given in an earlier chapter about the use of the term *social forces?*
11. Find an example of propaganda. Is there any propaganda in the schools? If so, give examples.
12. What is the relation between the curriculum of the school and the mores?
13. Can you choose from the numerous mores what are best for you?
14. Which is more important, good physical equipment or good teachers?
15. Teachers are specialized. Locate the previous mention of *specialization.* What does the term mean?

16. At the present time, we put (1) teachers, (2) methods, (3) equipment, (4) curriculum, and (5) pupils together. Does that make an organization? What is it all for?

17. Of those objectives given, which ones are more important and why?

18. Can society exist without shaping the young?

19. Show the relations between (1) industry and education, (2) the family and education.

20. What reasons could be advanced now for abolishing the school system?

21. How would you define a *teacher?*

22. Is training in thinking the same as the use of the scientific method? Find likenesses and differences.

23. How long should people go to school? Give reasons for your answer.

24. Is education the same as "conditioning?" What are the differences?

25. If *you* had to make up a curriculum what would you put in it?

26. Who should be the subordinate in a school, the teacher or the administrator? Why?

CHAPTER XVII

THE RECREATIONAL ORGANIZATION

We have already emphasized the fact that man is an unceasing actor. In a previous chapter, we noted that his activities fall into two broad classes—work and play. It was there pointed out that play is those activities which are voluntarily engaged in for their own sake, for the satisfaction which the activities themselves immediately afford. As Gulick says: "Play is more than a name applied to a given list of activities; it is an attitude which may pervade every activity."[1] And Mark Twain once said: "I have not done a day's work in my life. What I have done I have done because it has been play. If it had been work I should not have done it." Of course, we may allow something here for Mark's usual exaggeration, but this is a possible way to look at the matter.

As we look about us, we do not fail to observe a good deal of this play activity. In the house, the youngsters dance about, turn flops on the bed, rush upstairs and down after each other with hilarious laughter. Father and mother may dance about, also, or have some guests in for a game of cards or a sing. As we go outside the home, it is not unusual to find children in the neighborhood engaged in a game of I-spy, baseball, football, or London Bridge. It is noticeable, also, that crowds throng to the big games, baseball and football, and to the theaters and movies, as well as to the dances and picnics. All over the country, we find this, the games being adapted to the seasons and the climate. In every other country, we may observe many kinds of play activities. There is an immense amount of time and money devoted to play; and the amount is vastly greater if a good deal of work is really play.

1. Preliminary Observations

1. It is important to notice, first of all, that play activities and play associations transcend the home. The members of the family may and often do play together. But more often they join the members of other families in recreation. Play groups, moreover, transcend the local community often, being composed, as in football squads, baseball teams, bowling rinks, and the like, of persons from far-distant communities. Thus, play may go on in a narrow circle, but it may provide and tends more and more to provide links with the larger world. It helps to tie the members of the family together; it ties the family to the local

[1] "A Philosophy of Play," p. 11.

community; it ties the local community to other communities; and it ties up states and nations.

2. Play, moreover, has largely followed sex lines in the past. That is, the men have played together and the women have played together, and each sex has played a different set of games for the most part. These ways are part of the mores; it has been assumed that it was conducive to social welfare to have it so. But in these taboo-destroying days, the sexes are crossing these traditional lines and engaging in whatever games they wish. There are some games which are yet prevailingly male, but there is no longer serious objection to women's engaging in them if they wish. Thus, we can see in the past a long-established division of play, as well as labor, along sex lines.

3. Further, we have to notice that play has generally been regarded as an avocation rather than a vocation. When it has been a vocation, it has been regarded as work and not play. Thus, play has been held to be an activity for leisure time, leisure time being regarded as that time which was left after the work was done. Through the past centuries, very few people have appraised play as activity which might be engaged in with something of a purpose; play was something that might be engaged in when there was nothing else to do; one could play or sleep as one chose. Thus, the estimate of play was that it was a purely incidental matter, a side issue. When it was not thought of as utterly wicked—as among some extreme churchmen—it was held to be merely a "fill-in" or a "stop-gap" between labors; it was a permissible let down from the serious business of living. And, of course, this was no small concession where labor was hard and monotonous and continued from sunrise to sunset. But another view of the matter is now establishing itself. This is the view that play—diversion—is necessary to good work; and what effect this notion will have on the future organization of play is not calculable as yet.

4. We have to notice, also, that there are many degrees of participation in play activities. Mary performs on the piano while Father chimes in with a vagrant hum or wiggles a responsive foot to keep time. The children play blocks on the floor while Mother makes an occasional suggestion as to how the play should go on. The football teams struggle with each other in the mud and cold while the carefree mobs in the stands sing and cheer and leave with the blissful feeling that they helped to win. Participation ranges all the way from casual observation from the side lines, through reluctant engagement in minor parts, up to leadership and total absorption.

5. It is well to observe in addition that play activities are usually organized along *age* lines. Little children play with little children; young people play with young people; middle-aged people play with their own kind, and so do the old. There are numerous exceptions to

these arrangements, of course, but in the large, this is the traditional way. The games of the very young are too "silly" for the old. On the other hand, the games of the late 'teen ages are too strenuous and complicated for the very young or the old. Young people dislike to play with "kids" who have to struggle with what the former know so well. There is a hierarchy of games as there is of ages.

6. Wherever we go, then, we find all kinds of people at play, using their energy and time in what appears from the outside to be unproductive activity. How much time is given over to leisure, how much energy, how much money, how much equipment, how much of the earth's precious space—nobody knows; these items have never been computed. But there is a vast amount of each devoted in this way. And we have to observe that the distribution here, as with wealth, is very unequal—some seeming never to have any time or money or energy or place to play, while others seem to have nothing else. At any rate, we have focused our attention upon a vast mass of usages, a series of usages as definite, as concrete, as well integrated, as most of those which we have studied already. And because there is more and more cooperation and more and more specialization in the play world, we are justified in speaking of the recreational *organization*.

7. It is very much worth studying for its own sake. But it is very much worth studying from our point of view because of the influence which play groups have on the great initiation. Play contributes something toward the making of human beings as well as work does. The play group is a primary group, and Cooley says:

> The most important spheres of this intimate association and cooperation—though by no means the only ones—are the family, the play group of children, and the neighborhood or community of elders. These are practically universal, belonging to all times and all stages of development; and are accordingly a chief basis of what is universal in human nature and human ideals . . . Nor can any one doubt the general prevalence of play groups among children or of informal assemblies of various kinds among elders. Such association is clearly the nursery of human nature in the world about us, and there is no apparent reason to suppose that the case has anywhere or at any time been essentially different.
>
> As regards play, I might, were it not a matter of common observation, multiply illustrations of the universality and spontaneity of the group discussion and cooperation to which it gives rise. The general fact is that children, especially boys after about the twelfth year, live in fellowships in which their sympathy, ambition and honor are engaged even more, often, than they are in the family. Most of us will recall examples of the endurance by boys of injustice and even cruelty, rather than appeal from fellows to parents or teachers—as, for instance, in the hazing so prevalent at schools, and so difficult, for this reason, to repress. And how elaborate the discussion, how cogent the public opinion, how hot the ambitions in these fellowships.[1]

[1] "Social Organization," p. 24.

8. We have already said something about religion, and we may at this point appropriately advert to the relations between recreation and religion. As we found it difficult to distinguish between work and play, so it is not always easy to distinguish between play activities and religious activities. Allin says:

> We see that a pure play activity consists of a discharge of a relatively great amount of nervous force involving exhilarating vaso-motor reactions and a more or less excited condition of other parts of the body, giving rise in consciousness to a state of comparative pleasure, exhilaration and power, with a lack of the feeling of strain, effort or fatigue; that our activities as wholes are complexes involving such a variety of elements within the single activity that they can be characterized by no distinct physiological criteria; that the single activity must be regarded as either work or play according to which of these elemental reactions dominate in consciousness and hence the only possible criterion of the whole activity must be subjective; and that play refers to those activities which are accompanied by a state of comparative pleasure, exhilaration, power, and the feeling of self-initiative.[1]

If we leave aside that part of religious activity which is regarded as a painful duty and fix our attention upon that part which is exhilarating, then what is the difference between it and play? Church meetings are often pleasurable. It is the business of the revivalist to work up the people to some comparatively thrilling level and to give a sense of self-initiative and relief. The dancing of primitive peoples is often religious in character. The Hopi Indian snake dance, for example, is thought of by the participants as a religious exercise; to the uninstructed observer it is all play, but to the insider it is mostly religion.

Further, we often attend church meetings wherein are played the very same games that are used at home or on the playground. The regular worship is often relaxation; congregational singing is inspiring; many sermons are frivolous and humorous enough to make a hit at Keith's; seeing friends again is pleasurable. Thus, to sum up, there is often a very close connection between recreation—re-creation—and certain religious exercises.[2]

As a matter of fact, no sharp line can be drawn among work, religious activities, and play activities. The very same motions may appear in all three realms. Only the individual participant knows—if *he* does—when work transmutes itself into play or religion, when play transmutes itself into work or religion, and when religion transmutes itself into play or work. These realms merge into each other and overlap at countless points. And this, again, illustrates that unity which we have before noticed in society. If we were to take hold of any given insti-

[1] "The Survival Values of Play," University of Colorado *Publications*, November, 1920.

[2] See PATRICK, "The Psychology of Relaxation," p. 85; SIEDENBURG, "The Recreational Value of Religion," *A. J. S.*, January, 1920.

tution, say the recreational organization, and yank it out root and branch from society, we should find that we carried away with it a surprisingly large amount of every other institution, so interlinked and interlocked are they all.

2. Theories of Play

Numbers of investigators have devoted themselves through the ages to answering the question, why do people play? or how is it that they come to play? In consequence, many theories have been advanced, some of them approaching the truth and some of them being far from it. We cannot go into this further than is necessary to state and classify them—and only the more important at that. In these, we have some suggestions as to the causes of human activities and, therefore, as to the causes of society. This is the only justification for considering them at all in this connection.

1. The Surplus-energy Theory.—This is sometimes called the *Schiller-Spencer theory,* but the name is not exactly appropriate. Stated in a brief way, this theory holds that

> . . . highly evolved animals have developed many powers adjusted to many requirements which can not all act at once. Their more efficient organization, and hence better nutrition, gives a surplus of time and vigor not absorbed in providing for immediate needs. Hence many powers are inactive for considerable periods. Active, healthy nerve centers during the prolonged rest continually gather more energy and hence in time "are brought to a state of more than ordinary instability—a state of excessive readiness to decomposure and discharge," which they do owing to the multitude of stimuli which are continually besieging the organism.

Although Spencer

> . . . terms play activities as *superfluous and useless,* directed to proximate ends without ulterior benefit either individual or biological, yet he further admits that these activities "may bring the ulterior benefits of increased power in the faculties exercised" and "there results only the immediate gratification plus the maintained or increased ability," thus committing himself to the practicing or exercising utility of play. As to its psychological nature he speaks of satisfaction, gratification and pleasure and (asserts) that in play "there is a more manifest union of feeling with action.[1]

Thus, play is a harmless and pleasurable letting off of steam.

2. The Recreation Theory.—In rather sharp contrast to the surplus energy theory is the view that play is a line of action to recover exhausted energies. There are many statements from theorists that express this view. Play has been defined as "an occupation engaged in for recreation, rather than for business or necessity"—a very old notion. Lord

[1] Allin, *loc. cit.*

Kames, English gentleman and philosopher, over two hundred years ago said: "Play is necessary for man in order that he may refresh himself after labor." Guts Muths, sometimes called the *father of physical training*, over a century ago emphasized the recreative value of play. A later supporter of this tradition in Germany, Professor Lazarus, urged people to "flee from empty idleness to active recreation in play."

And there would seem to be some physiological, not to say psychological evidence for this theory. "A certain amount of rest and sleep are necessary, but beyond that a change to an active and interesting occupation is more restful than complete idleness." We still have with us the current bit of folk wisdom that "a change is as good as a rest." But just what takes place within the organism, that is, just what happens to make us feel renewed, is not yet clear.

3. The Relaxation Theory.—Patrick approves of the recreation theory but carries it farther than others. He goes into the reasons why relaxation is necessary and how it is a preparation for recreation in the sense of renewal and refreshment. He says:

> The common occupations of civilized life, especially among the intellectual classes, call for abstract reasoning, concentration of attention, and the use of the smallest muscles, such as those of the eyes and the fingers, in highly skilled activity—in writing, needle-work, and the manipulation of complex tools and machinery. Such activities have been acquired by the human race in comparatively recent times, and are for that reason more fatiguing and more likely to provoke nervous disorders than activities that are racially older.
>
> This is why professional men require shorter hours than laborers; it also explains why people get the most complete rest by going to the lakes, the forests, and the mountains, where they engage in hunting, fishing, canoeing, hiking, camping, and swimming—activities that our remote ancestors pursued for an unknown number of generations. These activities are restful because they are racially old, giving us a natural ability for them. This is why active outdoor recreations are much more wholesome than quiet amusements, and tend better than anything else to renew the strength and restore lost powers.[1]

In other words, we need a change; but we need a change back to savagery; we need to rest the lately-acquired parts of us while we give rein to the older parts—whatever these are. A noticeable weaknes in this theory, however, is that it does not account adequately for the play of children.

4. The Inheritance Theory.—In an address before the Physical Education Association, in 1901, Gulick said:

> The great interest that centers about plays and games is at least partially because they are racially familiar; they have old coordinations. Muscular coordinations that have been of great racial utility are acquired by the individual with great ease and joy.

[1] *Cf.* "Psychology of Relaxation," p. 49 *ff.* *Cf.* Bowen and Mitchell, "The Theory of Organized Play," p. 184.

This view, it will be apparent, supports the view of Patrick.

Bowen and Mitchell say:

> The inheritance theory explains clearly why the activities most commonly seen in the play of children are occupations of primitive life (running, throwing, striking, and climbing), rather than some of the quieter and more cultured occupations of civilized life (writing, painting, needlework, and studying). It is simply because we inherit from our ancestors, not from our descendants.[1]

The eminent psychologist, G. Stanley Hall, took hold of this theory and qualified it in the following manner: He insisted that

> . . . the view of Groos that play is practice for future adult activities is very partial, superficial and perverse. It ignores the past, where lie the keys to all play activities. True play never practices anything racially new. I regard play as the motor habits and spirit of the past persisting in the present, as rudimentary functions akin to rudimentary organs. In play every mood and movement is instinct with heredity. We rehearse the activities of our ancestors, back we know not how far, and repeat their life work, stage by stage. This is why the heart of youth goes out into play as into nothing else, as if in it man remembered a lost paradise.[2]

The qualifying phrase in the above which awakens doubt is the repeating of life work "stage by stage." Now, there may be an ancestral longing or craving abiding in the organism; there may be, for nobody can yet say that there is not. But it is simply not true that the life work of the past is repeated *stage by stage;* in passing from infancy to old age, human beings do not recapitulate in this careful way; therefore, certain educators, like the great Herbart (1776–1841), were on the wrong track when they advocated planning an educational program in accord with the so-called *culture epochs* through which the human family had passed. The facts are that many primitive activities are utterly neglected by modern children, that many reversions occur, and that new games are continually appearing.

But Hall was probably correct when he criticised the view of Groos, who said that "play is practice for future adult activities." The child engaging in spontaneous play surely does not know what its life mission is to be and, therefore, cannot select its preparatory training accordingly. The chief way in which play can be so forward-looking is by its being imposed upon youngsters by adults—when it is education.

5. The Instinct Theory.—It is quite obvious that

> . . . every child breathes, winks, swallows, laughs, cries, etc., without trying to do so and at first without being aware of it; in a similar manner he later tries to stand, strike, run, throw, talk, etc. Such activities are said to be instinctive, each one being called an instinct. All living things have an instinctive tendency

[1] *Loc. cit.*

[2] Quoted in Bowen and Mitchell, *op. cit.*, p. 191.

to be active—that is, to exercise all their powers and faculties . . . As soon as he [the child] has acquired certain simple abilities he begins to combine them into more complex performances, all the time being urged on by an instinctive desire to do things and a satisfaction in doing them.[1]

Karl Groos, a Swiss psychologist, published, in 1895 and afterward, two volumes, "The Play of Animals," and "The Play of Man." He held rigidly to the instinctive origin of play but narrowed the doctrine so as to base it largely on imitation, holding that imitation is an instinct. He said: "Animals cannot be said to play because they are frolicsome, but rather they have a period of youth in order to play." He gave a very high place to play and maintained, as we have already pointed out, that it is distinctly preparatory to adult activities such, for example, as playing school, keeping store, tending dolls, and the like.

It is doubtful, however, if there is any play reaction which may properly be interpreted as an instinct. Bernard points out that

. . . there is no one general, all-inclusive act which we can call play. But there are separate play acts which we may call tennis, chess or hide-and-seek. Even these acts are in themselves very complex and involve much variation in their execution under varying conditions. Consider, for example, the complexity of an instinct to play tennis or to play chess. It is said that the number of possible moves in the game of chess is practically infinite. Each of these moves must therefore involve a different hand and eye coördination, to say nothing of numerous other accessory coördinations connected with the perception of how one's opponent is moving or has moved, the present state of the game and the like. When in the history of the human race did man acquire this general instinct of chess playing with all its multifold structural coördinations?

Another complicating factor in this connection also is that these coördinations are made, not automatically as befits a true instinct, but on the basis of careful reasoning or upon the basis of habit which is obviously the result of previous rational processes. Very few chess players have the "instinct" complete, that is, know how to make all the possible moves.[2]

No one ever possesses all of these combinations at the same time. This would seem to dispose effectually of the instinct theory as it has been usually stated, for, after all, every *game*, every organized game, calls for reactions of the type indicated by Bernard in considering chess. There might conceivably be an instinct or instincts to react spontaneously in certain frolicsome ways; but there are no instincts for rules of any kind.

6. The Social-contact Theory.—What we seem to have is (1) a reacting organism. This organism reacts in characteristic ways by reason of what goes on inside it. We have, also, (2) certain patterns of activity being carried out in the environment of this organism. What direction, then, will the activities of the organism take? Will they be

[1] *Cf.* Bowen and Mitchell, *op. cit.*, p. 185.

[2] "Instinct," p. 342.

utterly predetermined from within or from without or from both? The answer would seem to be that, for the most part, the organism will tend to move as a result of these two types of pressures—pressures from within and pressures from without. But, largely, it will take on the activities of its surroundings; its life energies will flow into the channels already dug by the group. Whatever the games of the group, these will become, to a large extent, the games of the organism. At least, the games selected will be not something utterly original and strange but something from the group repertoire. In other words, there is no difference between play and any other sort of activity. If we can make out a good case for the influence of social life in determining *work activities* for youngsters, we can make out an equally good case for the determination of play activities by social contacts. There is an *original nature* to react. The particular, detailed forms of the reactions adopted, after the *fumbling stage* is passed, will be those of the group to which it belongs.

We can thus distinguish three factors in the determination of play—the physical environment, the psychosocial environment, and the organism. The Eskimos do not hurl bananas at each other, nor do the Zulus hurl ice blocks; thus, the play pattern is limited by the physical environment. The games with which the children take up in both of these regions are the games which are already part of the culture pattern, and they are learned from those who are already playing them. The reacting organism modifies them, however, in accordance with its own makeup, a little weakness here introducing a modification in the game and a little excess there making a different modification.

3. The Forms of Play

Of more interest to the sociologist are the numerous *forms* which play has assumed among men and the kinds of associations which have developed. The flowering of the play spirit—and someone has said that it is only the spirit that plays—has been so luxuriant and so various that no satisfactory classification of play activity patterns has ever been made. We find here another jungle upon which no one has ever yet imposed complete intellectual order. The following is an adapted classification from Groos—which may be taken until a better one is found:

Part I. Playful Experimentation.—Under this head is first considered the playful activity of the *sensory apparatus.*

a. Sensations of Contact.—Grasping, touching. Students are sometimes said to think better when they use a sharpened pencil and pass it back and forth through the hands. There are innumerable toying movements, such as rolling crumbs on the table, twisting a button, cracking the finger joints.

b. Sensations of Temperature.—Warming the hands at the fire, sitting in the warm sunshine, taking hot and cold drinks.

c. Sensations of Taste.—Delicious foods of every conceivable kind. And in this region belongs the use of stimulants and narcotics, although their satisfactions are not confined to this area.

d. Sensations of Smell.—Different kinds of odors, the "crisp sea air," the use of incense, smoking, perfumes.

e. Sensations of Hearing.—Pleasant and melodious voices in conversation, the patter of rain on the roof, the quiet or thunderous wash of the waves, the world of music, "both classical and jazzical," as one student phrased it.

f. Sensations of Sight.—What is more pleasing than a glimpse of the sun after stormy weather or the sight of the face of a loved one after absence? The radiance of the morn vies with the luscious glow of evening, the oil painting with the statue, the water color with the etching, the lovely dress with the lovely face, for our appreciation. "I think that I shall never see," said Joyce Kilmer, "a poem lovely as a tree." Within this group are the pleasures of all perceptions of brightness, form, color, and movement.

Part II. Playful Use of the Motor Apparatus.—(*a*) There is first of all the immense satisfaction arising from bodily movements such as swinging the arms, running, jumping, walking, clapping the hands, deep breathing. (*b*) Added satisfactions, moreover, come from manipulating all sorts of things, hustling the work along, breaking fragile objects (when young), building toy houses, painting, playing musical instruments, batting or kicking a ball, catching an animal or a person. Dr. Gulick threw a bottle in the water and then started pelting it with stones. As the people came along, they all joined in the fun, and quite a company gathered.

Part III. Playful Use of the Higher Mental Powers.—(*a*) Thousands of games consist in exercises of the *memory*. We are often confronted with the delightful task of trying to recognize our friends in strange disguises at the masquerade. The exercise of the *imagination* is not neglected. Music, pictures, and æsthetic dancing all appeal to this phase of our life as well as to other phases. Then, there is the world of our dreams, the world of goblins and ghosts and fairies, the world of air castles and future plans, and there is also the pleasure of a whopping fish story. Again, all sorts of games are calculated to hold the *attention*, for example the tricks of jugglers and magicians. There are some games which call for a rather careful use of the *reason*, such as in cross-word puzzles and conundrums—"inside whole; outside full of many holes." There is also the immense delight of making a new discovery in science or seeing some new relation in philosophy; but we mentioned this in noting the aims of science.

b. Of course, an enormous amount of play is the direct expression of the feelings and is calculated to heighten feeling. We may think of

a range, here, from that level indicated by the enjoyment of pain to the most exquisite joys known. A sensitive tooth is frequently visited by the tongue, a stiff neck is often turned for a twinge, a slight wound is often pressed or rubbed. The writer once knew a man who seemed to find pleasure in cramming his mouth full of pepper occasionally and holding it there, while the tears ran copiously. There seems to be some satisfaction in sharp feeling contrasts.

In addition, there is the "luxury of grief." When Kleist finished his "Penthesilea" in the city of Dresden, Germany, he went to his friend Pfuel in tears. "She is dead," he wailed; and yet he was quite aware of the joys of artistic creation. Marie Bashkirtseff wrote in her journal at the age of thirteen:

> Can one believe it? I find everything good and beautiful, even tears and pain. I love to weep, I love to despair, I love to be sad. I love life in spite of all; I wish to live. I must be happy, and am happy to be miserable.[1]

Many seek out surprise. Some look out of doors after dark, hide behind bushes and jump out suddenly at somebody. We like stories and plays which keep us mystified and in suspense until a great climax is reached. This is often closely associated with little, creepy fears which are not exactly annoying. Relief from fear is a great exaltation.

c. Many plays are direct challenges to endurance, to perseverance, to struggle. The aftercosts in such cases are often very great, but they are disregarded in the interests of the immediate exercise. Some people find their greatest enjoyment in hard work year in and year out, in untangling knotty problems, in dealing with the elusive. A hunter will stalk a deer all day, through the wet and the cold, and over an impossible terrain.

Part IV. Playful Exercise of the Impulses. (*a*) *The Fighting Play.*—It is interesting to note the universality of this form. All over the earth are found direct *physical encounters*, such as prizefights, bullfights, cockfights, dog fights, wrestling; *physical rivalry*, such as running, jumping, and other physical contests; *mental contests*, such as debates, spelling bees; *mental rivalries*, such as thinking up words quickly; *teasing*, such as tickling, remarking on private matters; *enjoyment of the comic*, such as cartoons, burlesques, the risqué; *tragedy.*

b. The Love Play.—Much of courtship is play, and much play is courtship; the two seem to be inseparable. One of the most popular themes of the novelists and dramatists is the love affair. After the lovers have won each other, overcoming immense obstacles—it is nearly always an "obstacle race"—we lose interest in them, and the story or play ends; our native impulses call for a contest.

c. Imitative Play.—A vast number of our play activities are directly imitative of the activities of others—throwing as they do, jumping as

[1] Groos, "The Play of Man," p. 161.

they do, building houses, keeping store, playing with tin soldiers and toy guns. There is an enormous amount of mimicry in play.

d. Social Play.—Baldwin suggested this addition to Groos' classification, but there is no clearly differentiated group of plays that we can call *social.* The only point to be stressed here is that much play calls for companions. There are many quiet and private enjoyments, to be sure, such as smoking, resting, daydreaming, reflecting, quiet anticipation of a vacation, and the like. But perhaps most playing calls for the cooperation or opposition of others.[1]

So much for the classification of Groos. Another classification might be made, distinguishing animal play from human, and dividing the latter into three groups—the plays of children, the plays of adults, and the plays of the different sexes. This latter division has already been mentioned, but a word or two further will not be amiss.

For one thing girls are fond of dolls. Dr. Gulick tried to keep dolls away from his daughter, and she was encouraged in outdoor sports. She was not shown dolls in the stores. But on Christmas day, she was asked what gift she wanted more than anything else. She answered: "Oh, if I could only have a doll." She and the three sisters who came later had dolls—and plenty of them. It was discovered some years later that there were thirty-seven members of the doll family in the house—not counting "clothes-pin dolls, spool dolls, paper dolls, dolls made from acorns and the like."[2]

Girls like parties, dressing up, playing house, making clothes, conversation, domestic arts, and are more and more coming to participate in what has hitherto been a male realm—swimming, track meets, baseball, and the like.

Gulick says:

> There are, on the other hand, many plays which are pre-eminently boys' plays and possess relatively small interest for girls. The hunting and fighting plays come under this head. Boys compete more than girls. Competition is an ever-present element in their lives. For this reason they are accustomed to take defeat better than girls. When twenty boys run a race, only one can win. It is a rare boy who is ahead of his fellows most of the time. Boys learn to accept these facts. On the other hand I have seen the most cultivated and mature women lose control of themselves and their tempers over a decision in a game of basketball.[3]

This lack of sportsmanship is sometimes offered by women as an explanation of why they do not get along better in the business world.

[1] GROOS, "The Play of Man," pp. 1–360. *Cf.* BOWEN and MITCHELL, "The Practice of Organized Play," also "The Theory of Organized Play."

[2] "A Philosophy of Play," p. 85.

[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 83.

They allow small things and personal touchiness to figure too largely in their relations with men.[1]

The following differences between boys and girls were noted by Miss Doherty:

> Boys have many muscular plays, wrestling and fighting; girls have social plays, calling and visiting. Boys have the constructive impulse towards large things, such as hut-building; girls like to construct minute things, such as patterns. Boys are more anxious than girls to try new things; they show a love of the grotesque as opposed to the love of the conventional shown by girls. Boys endure dress for utilitarian reasons; girls love to dress for æsthetic reasons. Boys play more often in gangs, girls in pairs. Among boys a quarrel leads to a fight, among girls to pouting and mean remarks. Boys like to shock, or expressing the same instinct in another way, to excite admiration for feats they perform. Girls like to act shocked and to admire.[2]

It is possible, also, to think of plays in terms of the amount of participation called out—an aspect already referred to but needing another word, perhaps. We might divide the whole recreational realm into the *active* and the *passive* fields.

There is, and always has been, an enormous amount of passive or vicarious play. The theater, the circus, baseball and football, the movies, musical occasions and the like call for inactive enjoyment. There is participation, but it is passive. The performers who entertain these throngs are always workers. And many have regarded this apparently increasing willingness to *be* entertained as a rather serious matter.

On the other hand, there is active playing wherein the whole organism is absorbed, as in tennis, volley ball, archery, I-spy, running, jumping, dancing, and the like. In these cases, the participants are lost in the game; they are not only entertained, but also they participate and develop themselves to the full; they are not played to but play. With the development of city life and the consequent limitations of space, with the development of factory life and the acquisition of ready money, there is much more passive play than ever before, although there is more active play as well. Shorter hours of labor and more playgrounds may offset this trend somewhat.[3]

4. Play in History

No complete story, such as we have of the growth of the family or of the state or of religion, has ever been written of play. We have no record that even pretends to carry us back toward the beginnings in any consec-

[1] See Bromley, "Are Women a Success in Business?" *Harpers Magazine*, February, 1928, for some illuminating cases.

[2] Gulick, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

[3] For a mine of information on the arts of pleasure among primitive people, see Sumner and Keller, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 2059 *ff.*

utive way. The limits of this chapter prevent more than a few hints for comparative purposes. And following our usual plan, let us begin where we are.

1. Probably, never during man's life on earth was so much attention devoted to playing and to the organization and promotion of play as now. At the present time, there are more forms of play, and play has become a central rather than a side issue in life. It is not true, of course, but it is suggestive to say that the modern Western world is "crazy" about play. Play is now seen to make a genuine contribution to human happiness and welfare—if not overdone.

2. Looking backward, what do we find? Any one who has read Sir Walter Scott's novels is fairly well informed about jousts and tournaments, characteristic forms of activity in England and Scotland during the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth centuries and also on the Continent. We do not have these in America. No one acquainted with Spanish history can forget the pictures of the numerous magnificent festivals, pageants, and holiday occasions enjoyed in that country. Of course, these affairs were strongly tinged with religious significance, but that did not detract from the fun. We might speak of these forms as characteristic, on a large scale, of the Middle Ages, although countless minor forms were also practiced.

Going back to Roman times, we find much play. In his famous work on the "Antiquities of the Jews," Flavius Josephus says:

> Now at this time came the horse-races [Circensian games] the view of which games was eagerly desired by the people of Rome for they come with great alacrity into the hippodrome [circus] at such times, and petition their emperors in great multitudes, for what they stand in need of.[1]

That they used these occasions to wheedle some relief from heavy taxes and other forms of oppression out of their governors did not detract from their immense enjoyment of the occasions. Then they returned to their monotonous life of the villages and smaller cities wherein the simpler games were played as labor permitted.

Josephus speaks of "the hundred and ninety-second Olympiad" —a significant fact on the historical side—falling on the completion of a great building constructed at the command of Herod.

> There was accordingly a great festival and most sumptuous preparations were made presently, in order to its dedication; for he had appointed a contention in music, and games to be performed naked. He had also gotten ready a great number of those that fight single combats, and beasts for the like purpose; horse races also, and the most chargeable of such sports and shows as used to be exhibited in Rome, and in other places. He consecrated this combat to Caesar, and ordered it to be celebrated every fifth year.[2]

[1] Book XIX, Chap. I, Sec. 4.

[2] *Op. cit.*, Book XVI, Chap. VIII, Sec. 1. *Cf.*, also, Book XV, Chap. VIII, Sec. 1.

Among the ancient Greeks, the interest in public games was no less. We have all heard of the famous Olympic games, the greatest of the national festivals, consisting of athletic contests and races dedicated to Olympian Zeus and held every four years, continuing for five days. Here, again, religion was mixed in, but the satisfaction was none the less for that.

3. There is a virile interest in play among primitive peoples. Of the African Bushmen it is said that they are clever in drawing figures of men and animals in colors, and wherever they can discover an old fiddle in the effects of a European or whenever they can make a rudimentary instrument for themselves out of a gourd and two strings, they extract a tolerable (to them) tone and reproduce such airs as they have heard. There is much dancing, but the sexes dance apart.

With the Hottentots of Africa, dancing is the chief form of amusement. The dance is usually held at the first quarter of the moon and lasts all night. Every signal event in life and every change of abode is the occasion of a feast and a dance. The African Baganda are very fond of simple primitive music, which they know how to make. One of their instruments is a flute made of hollow reeds or sections of bamboo. The drum is a hollow tree trunk covered with a lizard skin. The harp of these people is interesting, because it is identical in form with those preserved in paintings from ancient Egypt. Another instrument closely resembles the xylophone.

The Negroes of the West Coast of Africa delight to rig themselves up in the cast-off finery of foreigners and parade about. The men have a special fondness for women's long white stockings of which they wear many pairs at a time even in hot weather. One Ashanti king is described as wearing a brown velvet coat, white satin trousers, white linen shirt, black beaver hat with a band of silver lace, and a spotted silk sash! This would give us a hint as to where the usual minstrel-show costumes originated.

Best known are the gymnastic dances of the Australians, the corroborries, which have been described in nearly every account of Australian travel, for they are known over the whole continent. The corroborries are always performed at night, generally by moonlight. We do not, however, consider it necessary, for that reason, to regard them as religious ceremonies. Moonlight nights are chosen probably not because they are holy, but because they are clear. The dancers are usually men, while women form the orchestra. Frequently several tribes join in a great dancing festival; four hundred participants have occasionally been counted in Victoria. The largest and most noteworthy festivals apparently take place on the conclusion of a peace; moreover, all the more important events of Australian life are celebrated by dances . . . [1]

[1] Gosse, E., "The Beginnings of Art," p. 207 *ff.*

We might go on at great length about primitive play. The now extinct Tasmanians were fond of daubing themselves with paint and were fond of dancing around the camp fires; the chief amusement of the Melenesians (Black Islanders in the South Pacific) is dancing; horse racing is a favorite past-time among the Tibetans; the Eskimos have few games but find enjoyment in making up poetry and singing of braves; among the Polynesians, the children whip tops, skip with ropes, wrestle, throw spears, and play ball.[1]

From these primitive conditions to our own there seem to be at least three lines of development. (1) There is a vast multiplication of the apparatus of play and a consequent differentiation of play forms; nothing has ever been seen on earth like the luxuriant variety of our modern play. (2) There is almost no change in organization for centuries and then there is a sudden flowering out of organization, the present exhibiting something entirely new on earth. (3) The taboos between the sexes have gradually weakened, and this is especially illustrated in our modern dances—which would have made our ancestors turn over in their graves.

4. Next lowest in the scale of play, perhaps, is the play of subnormal children. A teacher of a subnormal class in Springfield, Mass., divided the group into three grades—the low, middle, and high. She describes them as follows:

I. Low Grade.—In visiting the playrooms of low-grade, feeble-minded children, the dominant impression is that of inactivity. One child among twenty-four has been seen aimlessly piling blocks on one another, one rocking a doll, the rest swaying back and forward, playing with their fingers or feet, looking at each other or staring out of the window.

II. Middle Grade.—In a somewhat higher grade more activity is seen. Blocks are arranged apparently according to some idea in the mind, dolls are dressed and undressed; there is some individualistic play with toys and dolls. When turned loose on the playground, some children show varied play activities, though the majority stand about or run with no apparent object. Occasionally a child is seen swinging and a few are digging in the sand.

III. High Grade.—The highest grade may be seen in groups about the playground. The casual observer may think that some interesting game is in progress, but, upon nearing the group, nothing of the kind will be discovered—simply aimless talking, waiting for an outside stimulus. One more active than the rest may be at the head of a little band whom he is leading as soldiers, but few join the ranks as they march about. A ball nine may be formed, but unless some normal person is present to stimulate and encourage, the game falls flat. Competitive sports seem to be enjoyed only under the direction of an attendant.[2]

[1] *Cf.* HAVEMEYER, "Ethnography," pp. 5, 12, 30, 52, 67, 80, 93, 105, 112, 119, 160, 176, 191, 209, 228, for these and many other examples.

[2] Quoted in GULICK, *op. cit.*, p. 129.

Of course, it is obvious that spontaniety is the characteristic lacking here, and what is play without spontaneity? We notice that teamwork is absent.

5. The feeble-minded use almost no apparatus and have no organization. *Animals* use about as much and have no organization. There are no rules of the game in either case. One example of animal play may be given. Earnest Thompson Seton speaks of foxes as follows:

> They played about, basking in the sun, or wrestling with each other, till a slight sound made them scurry underground. Their alarm was needless, for the cause of it was their mother. She stepped from the bushes, bringing them another hen—number seventeen, as I remember. A low call from her, and the little fellows came tumbling out. They rushed on the hen, and tussled and fought with it and each other, while their mother, keeping a sharp eye out for enemies, looked on with fond delight . . . They early learned to turn to statuettes at any strange sound, and then on hearing it again or finding other cause for fear, to run for shelter.[1]

The young gorilla of which J. Falkenstein gives a most interesting description, "performs so abandoned a dance, falling over himself, whirling about, tumbling from side to side, that the on-looker is forced to believe that in some way he has become intoxicated." Groos, from whom the above example is taken, shows that animal play is often closely connected with love making.[2]

In discussing the play of chimpanzees, Alverdes says: "Playthings, such as jam tins, pieces of wood, stones, rags, etc., were often carried about wedged between the lower part of the stomach and the upper part of the thigh." Hence it would appear that certain animals have something in the nature of apparatus.[3]

5. The Utilities of Play

Playing has often been appraised as a useless if not a wicked waste of energy and time. But a saner view is now maturing. There are priceless gains, both to the individual and to the group, in well-conducted play of certain kinds. We may hurriedly point them out under the following heads; and here we come back again to connect with the theories of play noted in the beginning:

1. Diversional.—Playing solitaire, reading novels, and many amusements of the idle classes, as a relief from the ennui and boredom which they suffer, are instances in point. Many forms of play give relief from the depression fallen into because of the monotonous and wretched existence which the poor have to endure. By playing, these people forget

[1] Quoted in Gulick, *op. cit.*, p. 106.
[2] "The Play of Animals," Chap. III.
[3] "Social Life in the Animal World," p. 115.

their misery and are able to take a more cheerful view of things; they are thus better teamworkers.

2. Cathartic.—When discussing the surplus-energy theory we might have pointed this out. Under the strain of work and responsibility, peoples' emotions seem expanded to the breaking point. Something is needed to drain away this energy in harmless ways. Play does this, and the individual is "purged" of his rebellious impulses.[1]

3. Alleviating.—Speakers and actors have often noted that, while suffering intense pain before performances, they were relieved when once into their parts in earnest; the violent headache or toothache was unnoticed. Play serves all the time in this capacity; it relocates the attention, and thus pain is forgotten. So relieved, people are better performers and better companions.

4. Recuperative.—We have some idea of this sort when we use the term *recreation* which means "re-creation." Something happens to the nervous system and also to the consciousness, so that people feel refreshed for further work, responsibility, and companionableness.

5. Practicing.—The value here alluded to is that of continually keeping habits—socially useful habits—once acquired, but rarely used, in good form. "We get out of practice so easily" is a common saying. Many of the hunting and war dances of primitive peoples serve this end; they keep up physical vigor and skill. The jousts, tournaments, and knightly combats of former times served in this way.

6. Educative.—The previous point leads to this, for education is the maintenance of acquired skill, although it is much else beside. There are, perhaps, three types of utility which should be noted—the growth and development of the body during youth, the organization of the neurones in various associations, and the transmission of certain features of the social heritage. Let us examine these for a moment.

1. It is clear that a given type of work develops the body only in one direction or a few directions, that is, it develops certain muscles and neglects the rest; muscular coordinations correspond; all-round development does not take place. Play helps to exercise other parts of the body, and thus work and play together make the organism fit for almost any situation that arises.

2. Speaking of the second point—organizing the neurones—it may be asserted that the organization effected by work is partial just as the development of the muscles is partial. But play, being so various, so experimental, so full of novelties, calls for the highest organization of the nervous system and thus prepares for emergencies of almost any sort. In other words, play develops, in an all-round fashion, that part of man which is his distinctive glory—the nervous system and the

[1] PATRICK, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

brain—and thus it contributes enormously to his peculiar characteristic, already noted earlier in the book, his *versatility*.

3. With reference to the third point, it may be said that play ties us in with the past in a very large number of ways and at many points. The games which we play are the games in the culture pattern. There is less value in this now, perhaps, that we have so many records of what the heritage is, but among primitives where there are no records this is an indispensable means of education; play is a very important means of handing down the legends, sagas, poetry, dances, and religion of olden times. Of course, on the contrary, play helps to maintain social stagnation by associating happiness with conformity; thus, play has helped to maintain the authority of the "dead hand."

7. Social.—No value of play is greater than that of having the young *learn to do teamwork and enjoy it.* This is a very definite and valuable type of conditioning. When the young grow up with a close mental association *between cooperative effort and fun*, they are better equipped for the struggle for existence. Man has climbed to his present position of mastery over nature largely by means of combining versatility and cooperation; play promotes versatility and cooperation. Another point is this: that play promotes acquaintance. Down through the ages, holidays, festivals, tournaments, contests, and the like have brought strangers together in the best of spirits. Many bloody fights have grown out of such gatherings, it is true; but the social gain has also been large. Exaggerated egotism has been checked to some degree. Such occasions have engendered sympathy, good fellowship, and comradeship. Play also promotes a sense of honor, in that when the rules are violated, the play breaks down and the fun evaporates. People have had to learn to play according to the rules if they would play with others at all. And of course this result has reverberated all through the other institutions to advantage.[1]

In conclusion, we may point out that many students have held to the view that modern civilization is not at all in accord with man's natural impulses. They think that modern factory life and other artificial conditions repress and balk the original outgoings. This produces a large amount of discontent and unhappiness. What can be done about this? Ogburn is of the opinion that outlets for these repressed impulses may be found in the various forms of play. Thus, recreations are devices of great value to society in bringing about an adjustment between original nature and culture.[2]

Of course this matter is closely related to social survival. As Gulick says:

[1] ALLIN, *op. cit.*

[2] *Cf.* OGBURN, "Social Change," Part V; PATRICK, "The Psychology of Relaxation," Introduction

Certain great ideals have always had a place in the human mind. Long before the dawn of history they were bound up in the texture of our nature; they became ingrained facts. In women, one of these ideals was loyalty to the home; in men, loyalty to the tribe. Necessity produced these ideals. They have survival value. The very existence of the race required this double set of loyalty impulses. To a certain extent they have been safeguarded by instinct; to an even greater extent social tradition has become sponsor for them. The deepest disgrace to a woman has always been disloyalty to the home; the deepest disgrace to a man has been disloyalty to his tribe or his country.[1]

This testimony is supported by Giddings:

It is on the playground that boys and girls learn most of the lessons of toleration, sympathy, cooperation, and knowledge of human nature, and have those experiences and the pleasures of association that, in after life, make them both appreciative of the value of society and able to contribute to its defense and perfection.[2]

Questions

1. What was said about "play" in previous chapters? How was it differentiated from work?
2. How can there be any scientific study of the recreational organization? Is recreation organized like the family, say?
3. What folkways can you find in play? What mores?
4. Is religious ritual work or play? Give reasons.
5. Why has play usually followed sex lines in the past? What has religion had to do with it?
6. Consider very carefully the statement on the relation of play to fellowship. Do you agree? Give evidence from your own experience for or against the position taken.
7. Is social unity greater or less in play than in worship? How can you show this?
8. Distinguish carefully between the "recreation" and the "relaxation" theories of play. What are the likenesses and the differences? Which theory appeals to you to be more sound?
9. When Groos outlines the "forms of play," is he considering *play* in the narrow or in the broad sense? Show this.
10. Have you ever experienced "the luxury of grief?" What was the occasion? Explain the phrase.
11. Do you think that sex differences in play are increasing or declining? What is the evidence?
12. Is there much specialization in play? Give examples.
13. Play goes back to animal life. What would you say to the argument that play among men is merely an animal survival and will finally go the way of all survivals?
14. With increasing machinery, work is becoming less arduous. How, then, can people argue soundly for the diversional utilities of play?

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 89.

[2] "Elements of Sociology," Chap. VIII. On the scope and tendencies of the play movement, see CURTIS, *Social Forces*, March, 1927; also, FAUST, "Community Aspects of Recreation Legislation in the United States," *Social Forces*, March, 1927.

15. Show the relation between play organization and education.

16. Do you agree with some that "modern civilization is not at all in accord with man's natural impulses?" What evidence for and against this can you find?

17. Show how playing together develops "toleration, sympathy, cooperation, and knowledge of human nature" as Giddings says.

18. How many people are there on earth?

19. Does the physical environment have any influence on play?

20. To what extent is recreation organized?

CHAPTER XVIII

THE STATE ORGANIZATION

Sumner and Keller say:

The relentless spur of the struggle for existence ever drove men along the road of civilization; but not without an accompanying coercion exerted by the societal organization which gave order and method to the march. Anarchy as a system is a dream; where there is a state of things deserving the name, it is a maladjustment accompanied by human misery, and is speedily resolved into a régime of control—normally the more severe owing to the lapse into unregulation that has preceded. Regulation is one of the very life-necessities of society. As soon as there is any association at all, there must be authority. Although the final and fundamental authority lies in the public opinion that guarantees the mores, that all-powerful regulative force needs agencies for its expression, and these agencies are always forthcoming. The family is an association of authority, and so are the clan and gens; there could never have been a genuine matriarchy, or gynaecocracy—a real rule by women—but there was a patriarchy, or androcracy. Government of some sort has been necessary almost from the outset, and that has meant that power of regulation has been lodged in the hands of certain human beings, generally men.

The basic function of government has been the securing of coördination; of peace and order within the range of its authority. It is readily enough seen that such coördination constitutes an advantage in the struggle for existence; the society possessing it is better adjusted to its life-conditions than the one that has it not. To secure the coördination it is not sufficient, however, to rely upon the natural impulses of group-members, for there is too much variation in them and too many antagonisms between them; the vision of the constituent individuals and groups must be surmounted by a super-vision over them all. Coöperation is too strongly tinged by the element of antagonism to pursue its course in the absence of a coördinating agency. While individuals can see their own interests, or what they take to be such, plainly enough, they do not really appreciate those of others, much less the interests of society as a whole. These will be taken care of in the end by rude and violent selection; but any device which can effect such selection without the need of flying to extremities and fighting it out constitutes an adjustment with high survival-value. It is expedient, that is to say, that a society shall be a peace-group. Here is the prime reason for government. Some individuals are set apart and freed from the ordinary vocations of men which submerge them in the pursuit of petty and personal interests; and these individuals specialize in coördination just as the priests specialize in religion. The ordinary man cannot learn all the religious ritual while pursuing the engrossing task of self-maintenance: nor can he acquire the knowledge or ascend to get

the perspective of individual and factional antagonisms that must be composed in order to secure peace and order.[1]

This statement gives us, in a clear-cut and understandable fashion, and in a short space, the thesis of this chapter; here are most of the points which we shall try to elaborate. But lest some simple minds hastily reach the conclusion that early men sat down together around the camp fire and reasoned out the regulative program which became established, the authors quoted say further:

> The reason that such arrangements embody is the rationality of any product of evolution that represents expedient adjustment; it is analyzed out of the act and after the act, not injected beforehand, any more than in the case of the hive-bee's cell. The man took on authority in the family, not because he was elected after rational reflection over his eligibility but because he was stronger. Strength seized authority, and then it turned out that, with strength in authority, the adjustment of a society to its life-conditions was favored and promoted. The variation survived selection and became traditional. When it had long been an established thing, then, and then only, was its essential reasonableness revealed to reflection. Government is a development out of the mores, attaining its title, as covering a group of mores, just as did marriage or property; and the terms monarchy, aristocracy, and the rest are, just as are monogamy or polytheism, labels covering characteristic sets of mores.[2]

But, proceeding from the familiar to the less familiar, let us rise in our thought from a common experience to the conception of the state and its instrumentalities.

"Wasn't that bully fun? How many windows did you hit?" one youngster inquired of another as the two of them sauntered leisurely away from a house on the edge of the town the windows of which they had riddled with stones. They were equipped physically and impulsively to throw things; there were no hindrances here. There were no visual hindrances—the windows being in plain sight. There were thrills in hearing and seeing the windows crash. There was nothing "in nature" to prevent this "natural" exercise.

As they reached for more stones, a shrill voice from a neighboring yard startled them. "You young devils, quit that and get away." Estimating quickly the distance between them and the challenger, and the obstacles in the way, they called back: "Oh, shut your mouth and mind your own business." But they were somewhat abashed and walked away.

Turning the corner, they were startled to feel a heavy hand on their shoulders and hear a gruff voice say: "Come along with me." They stared upward into the face of a policeman. They did not feel like

[1] SUMNER and KELLER, "The Science of Society," Vol. I, p. 459.

[2] *Loc. cit.*

running; they did not tell him to shut up; the blue uniform impressed them; they went along meekly.

He took them to a place called a *court*. Their parents were called in; and the whole episode was gone into in great detail, the interfering neighbor being called as a *witness*, and a person called a *judge* taking charge. After much argument, the boys were *warned*, and the parents were assessed the damages. Their parents had dominated these boys many times, and the boys had to submit because of superior force. But here was something that dominated both them and their parents. There appeared to be, after all, some hindrances to this stone-throwing propensity. But the damaged windows did not belong to the policeman, nor to the neighbor, nor to their parents, nor to the judge. Why should *they* be concerned? Of course, they were not, these boys, quite so ignorant as we have assumed; they had heard much about laws, lawbreaking, judges, punishments, jails, and the like from gossip. They dimly realized that there was a *power* over them somewhere, a power that could compel them; and they had heard about certain people being hanged, so this power could actually take life. There they were, small, naturally impulsive creatures, restrained by something outside, something remote, something indefinable. The policeman was real; the judge on his bench was real; they could see, hear, and feel these persons. But what was behind them? Where did they get their *right* to interfere? What business of theirs was it, anyway? Had this remote and indefinable power other agents?

Their parents *owned*, they said, some property. They had to pay *taxes* on it, they said. Pay out their own money for taxes! And to whom? Who received the taxes, and what did he do with them? Moreover, the question of how much money they should pay in taxes was not left to them; some one called an *assessor* came around and determined what they should pay, and they had to pay it. How did the assessor get mixed up in their ownership?

At one time, these boys traveled into what was called *another country*, and in preparation, therefore, they had to obtain *passports;* for people without these documents were turned back by officials in the other country, so they had heard. At the *border*, a place along their journey which looked just like any other place and did not seem a bit peculiar, these documents were examined by persons in uniform. Then other persons insisted on looking all through their luggage. The boys thought this the height of "nerve"; but they were told that they would have to go back unless the baggage was examined. Examined for what? Did these persons think that they were carrying something into the other country which was not wanted there? Were these uniformed men in need of something which was in their luggage?

As these boys grew to manhood, they heard about *war;* their country, as it was called, was going to fight another country, and they were wanted to help in the fighting. But they did not want to fight anybody whom they did not know; they did not feel angry toward anybody they had never seen. Nevertheless, uniformed men came along and *drafted* them; the boys found that they had to go whether they wanted to or not.

That which was called *election day* came along, and they were entitled to *vote.* They heard much about primaries, about candidates, about public office, about legislators, about governors, about presidents, about nominees, about ballots, and the like. They heard much about legislatures enacting laws. But when they asked to make some laws, nobody paid any attention to them. Who, then, had the right to make laws? What was the right to make laws? They had *broken* a law, they were sternly informed, when they had broken the windows as youngsters. But then they were confused; they thought that they had broken windows alone. Now the matter was clearer. They realized that when they played baseball with other boys they had to have *rules.* Now it was clear that these laws were the same as rules. But who made the baseball rules? The boys made them themselves, or some other boys whom they imitated. So they began to see that the people choose persons called *representatives* and send them, by means of taxes, to foregather at the state house and make rules. Thus, their parents had made the laws which these boys had broken. Their parents really, then, punished themselves; they punished themselves by voting for the persons who got together and made it unlawful to break windows in houses. Thus, the comprehension of these boys grew day by day until they saw a good many phases of their social life in a new light; they began to understand this large, overlording power not as something mysterious and let down from heaven but as something built up by themselves and their forebears in their efforts to survive and lead happier lives.

In this simple account, we have been using new terminology, terms which we have not employed very much in all of the chapters so far. By means of these terms, we have been *pointing at* some new parts of our life together. We have been taking hold of the familiar and obvious in order to follow it all back to the fountain head and thereby come to have an understanding of another highly important phase of social life. We have really been calling attention to the outward and visible evidences of another system, another institution, another organization of beliefs and activities. Yet, while this system, this organization, is distinct from religion, from the family, from the industrial organization, and from the educational system, it includes them all; it covers them all; they are within it and subject to it. When disputes arise within the family and cannot be settled to the satisfaction of those concerned, this larger organization interferes. The family cannot authoritatively

interfere with the state, but the state can interfere with the family. So where there is a body of people, agreeing with respect to what people must do concerning property, aggressions from within and without, and upon certain other matters, and organized with respect to such interests, we have what is called a *state*. W. W. Willoughby makes the following points:

An aggregate of men living together in a single community and united by mutual interests and relationships we term a Society. When there is created a supreme authority to which all the individuals of this society yield a general obedience, a State is said to exist. The social body becomes, in other words, a Body Politic. The instrumentalities through which this superior authority formulates its will and secures its enforcement is termed a Government; the commands it issues are designated Laws; the persons that administer them, Public Officials, or collectively, a Magistracy; the whole body of individuals, viewed as a political unit, is called a People; and finally the aggregate of rules and maxims, written or unwritten, that define the scope and fix the manner of exercise of the powers of the State, is known as the Constitution. The State itself then is neither the People, the Government, the Magistracy, nor the Constitution. Nor is it indeed the territory over which its authority extends. It is the given community of given individuals, viewed in a certain aspect, namely, as a political unity.[1]

1. Essentials of the State

1. Definitions.—Students of the subject have differed and do differ widely as to the essential characteristics of the state, that is, as to its definition. For example, Bluntschli thought that the state was adequately defined by pointing out seven features: (1) a number of men; (2) a fixed territory; (3) unity; (4) distinction between rulers and subjects; (5) an organic nature; (6) a moral and spiritual organism, a personality; and (7) a masculine gender in contrast with the feminine gender of the church.[2] Since some of the terms here used are themselves much in dispute and in need of definition, this statement is not entirely satisfactory.

From W. F. Willoughby we have another list.

1. First of all is the *desire* of a community to be a body politic. By this is meant that the people composing the community recognize the need of and acquiesce in the establishment of a central authority with power to exercise control in respect to and in behalf of all members of the community. Such an authority is termed a *political authority*, the power exercised is called *political power*, and the community so viewed is a state.

A state owes its existence to the fact that, in the individuals over whom its authority extends, there is a sentiment of unity sufficiently strong to lead them to

[1] "The American Constitutional System," p. 3 *ff.*

[2] "Theory of the State," pp. 15 *ff.*

surrender themselves to the control of a single political power for the sake of realizing the desires to which such a sentiment gives rise. In other words, this subjective condition first comes into being, and when sufficiently powerful, finds objective manifestation in the creation of a political organization.[1]

For the most part, this desire and the consequent acquiescence have created central authorities *unconsciously*. That is, people have felt themselves helpless, in the face of either internal or external foes, and have taken natural steps toward protection; they have banded themselves together under a leader, the leader becoming more or less permanent after a time. In a very few cases has a community, politically unorganized, determined as a matter of deliberate action to constitute itself into a body politic. The most notable case of interest to us is the famous agreement of the Pilgrim Fathers on the *Mayflower*, in 1620. Allegiance to the king of England was reaffirmed, but that was incidental; here was "effective desire" in action.

2. This desire must find actual *expression*. There are many cases where there is desire but no organized expression. The second essential is that the people so desiring actually organize and bring into existence a central authority and agencies to represent them.

3. Then this writer wanders off into analogy and mysticism in attempting to explain the assertion that the state "is an Entity, Indivisible and Immutable." He says:

> It is like the individuality of a person. It is complete in itself; it cannot be shared with any other body; it is incapable of dividing or of undergoing change . . . A state can change its government as often as it desires as an individual changes his clothes (or his tools), without itself undergoing any change. It can make use of one system of authorities for the administration of its affairs, as is done where the system of government adopted is the type known as unitary, or it can make use of two schemes, as is done where what is known as the multiple or federal form of government is established, without affecting in the slightest the character of the state.

4. Another characteristic of the state is the use of force or compulsion in effecting its will, and the inherent and inalienable right to do so. Manifestly, the possession of power without the right to use it would be meaningless. States can use force, they do use force, and they ought to use force, in cases where their absolute supremacy is menaced in any way. If any individual in the state could effectually and continuously defy its will, such a state would be perilously near dissolution. Also, it alone determines what form the compulsion may take and the instrumentalities for carrying it out.

5. Another feature of the state is its law. The state has the right to issue general orders, to utter commands, which are laws; moreover it is

[1] Willoughby, W. W., *op. cit.* p. 6.

the final authority at this as at other points. In modern times, the state is the sole source of law, creates it and remakes it.

6. Also, the state has unlimited and supreme authority. This right is called *sovereignty*. The individual has liberties, but they are *defined* liberties, and the state defines them. Any lesser group, the family, for example, has liberties, but the state defines them. At times, the church has declared itself to be above the state and has refused to obey any authority under God. The debate on this issue has not yet ceased, but when a show-down has come, the state has always won out. There is no such thing as individual rights when the state denies them.

The authority of the state is unlimited. The authority of any given government is limited; but the state is behind the government; the government is its agent. The individual is defended, to some degree, against the government and against encroachments from other quarters. But against the state itself the individual has no defense. There cannot be *two supreme authorities*. Potentially, the state can determine, down to the minutest detail, the conduct of every individual composing it. The fact that states rarely go so far must not blind us to their power to do so. Liberties are the privileges which the state sees fit, as a matter of expediency, to grant to individuals and groups within it.[1]

The conception of the state which we have just outlined is but one of many examples of deification. It simply puts this institution so far out of intellectual reach that nobody can say what it is. This is political mysticism; and we have a parallel which is often entertained in the conception of the church.[2]

A more realistic and comprehensible view has been presented by Sumner, who says, (about 1883):

> During the last ten years I have read a great many books and articles, especially by German writers, in which an attempt has been made to set up "the State" as an entity having conscience, power, and will sublimated above human limitations, and as constituting a tutelary genius over us all. I have never been able to find in history or experience anything to fit this concept. I once lived in Germany for two years, but I certainly saw nothing of it there then. Whether the state which Bismarck is moulding will fit the notion is at best a matter of faith and hope.
>
> My notion of the state has dwindled with growing experience of life. As an abstraction, the State is to me only All-of-us. In practice—that is, when it exercises will or adopts a line of action—it is only a little group of men chosen in a very haphazard way by the majority of us to perform certain services for all of us. The majority do not go about their selection very rationally, and they are almost always disappointed by the results of their own operation. Hence, "the State,"

[1] Willoughby, W. F., "The Government of Modern States," p. 7 *ff*.

[2] *Cf.* Hobhouse, "The Metaphysical Theory of the State," *passim*, Cosentini, "The State as an Expression of Power and the State as an Expression of Justice," *Revue Internationale de Sociologie*, July–August, 1917.

instead of offering resources of wisdom, right reason, and pure moral sense beyond what the average of us possess, generally offers much less of all those things.

Furthermore, it often turns out in practice that "the State" is not even the known and accredited servants of the State, but, as has been well said, is only some obscure clerk, hidden in the recesses of a government bureau, into whose power the chance has fallen for the moment to pull one of the stops which control the Government machine. In former days it often happened that "the State" was a barber, a fiddler, or a bad woman. In our day it often happens that "the State" is a little functionary on whom a big functionary is forced to depend.[1]

The state nowadays is always a party in power and a party always has interests or represents them; it is only a group or a congeries of groups having ends to serve, not an over-ruling, just providence or an upright arbitrator. It is not an "ethical person" but a successful party in the struggle for power which means to use its strength for its own interests against or in indifference to other interests. Once such other interests could not make themselves felt short of a revolution; now the modern system provides for "bloodless revolutions," where ballots count instead of bullets. Thus is an expedient in adjustment presented by which neglected or injured interests may assert themselves. Public opinion has been enfranchised and readjustments rendered speedier and easier. Much is to be gained in understanding an evolutionary product by realizing first its broad inevitability and then the conditions in accordance and only in accordance with which neglected or injured interests can be served.[2]

We have now presented samples of what might be called the *metaphysical* or idealistic and the *realistic* or practical *conceptions* of the state. The first type of definition simply wanders off into cave darkness and leaves the would-be learner on the outside. Believing in the existence of such a state, its subjects are awestruck and fall down in a worshipful mood; and thus their politics and their religion coalesce. It may not be quite so logical, but it is surely more practical, to adopt some less mystical view as a working hypothesis; and the one offered by Sumner may at least be accepted, since it is comprehensible as far as it goes. Then, the state is actually some-of-us performing services of a special kind for all-of-us; and if they are performed impartially and capably, we have the best kind of state anybody knows anything about. As a matter of experience, however, the state is some-of-us performing services for others-of-us and performing these services intelligently and enthusiastically here and stupidly and listlessly there; performing them in such a way that no sane person would ever impute to the state such attributes as omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence—characteristics often ascribed to the Almighty. We shall learn most, then, by abandoning the concept of the deified state to its metaphysical limbo and taking hold of that near and familiar thing the state-in-action, namely, the government.

[1] "What Social Classes Owe to Each Other," p. 9 *ff.*

[2] Sumner and Keller, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 710.

2. Types of Government

1. Location of Sovereignty.—Classified on a basis of the location of sovereignty, that is, on the basis of what particular some-of-us happens to have the authority in its hands for the time being, there are three main types of government—autocratic, oligarchic, and popular.[1] We must examine these briefly.

a. Autocratic Government.—This type of government is the kind wherein the political authority is located in a person who is a supreme ruler. All of the organs and agents of government are the means by which this ruler carries out his purposes. All acts of government are his acts and derive validity from his sanction. All laws are but his commands, even though formulated and promulgated by his agents. As the possessor of sovereignty, his authority is supreme, unlimited, and self-determined, both as to the extent to, and the manner in which, it shall be exercised.

This form of government goes back to very primitive times; and it has always existed somewhere up to the present. It is especially characteristic of oriental peoples, concerning whom we hear a good deal about despotisms. Its most memorable illustration is found in the proud boast of Louis XIV of France, who said: "I am the State." The Stuart kings of England claimed equal prerogatives when they pretended to rule by "divine right." In 1889, Japan decided to modify her system and, after examining the systems of government of Europe and America, adopted the autocratic type. Article I of the constitution reads: "The Empire of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal." By "reigned over and governed," Baron Ito explained that "the Emperor on his throne combines in himself the sovereignty of the state and the government of the country and of his subjects."

Of course, we now understand that in all such cases "the people" have acquiesced or submitted. It is plain to us that no one individual or small group could actually order people about, tax them, send them to war, or do anything else with them unless they agreed to the plan; the physical strength of sovereigns and governmental cliques would make it impossible to achieve such results without not only non-resistance but also actual cooperation on the part of the masses. Even this political arrangement, then, derives its power from the people. But there have been many reasons why the people have assented to such manipulation—their inability to agree on any other plan, being born under such a system, being gullible and superstitious and ignorant, and yet more.

There are two main forms of this autocracy. (1) The first of these is called *absolutism* and is the arrangement where the ruler possesses

[1] For a different classification, *cf.* Jenks, Edward, "The State and the Nation," Chap. XVII.

supreme authority and exercises it in any manner he chooses—the people yielding, of course. (2) The second is called *limited autocracy*, an arrangement where the ruler possesses as much authority as the absolute autocrat but exercises it through regularly constituted organs and in conformity with law. Of course, it is evident that authority which is exercised in this way is not unlimited authority. A change in the location of authority is effected, in this case, by the autocrat's limiting himself voluntarily or by pressure from the people.[1]

b. Oligarchic Government.—In this arrangement, the sovereignty resides not in a supreme ruler but in a *privileged class*. Probably, the government of Venice, during the period of its existence as an independent city-state, furnishes the leading example of this type. The government of England approximated to this type after the revolution of 1688, when the autocratic principle was rejected, and before the development of the popular government of the nineteenth century. Many other cases might be cited.

It should be clearly understood that there is a real distinction between a government by a privileged class and a government controlled by a small but efficient group which has gained control by superior strength and skill. It is true, however, that such a group may turn out in time to be the nucleus of a privileged class. History gives us many examples. A recent writer on Mexico says:

> The Revolution which Francisco I. Madero initiated against President Porfirio Díaz in 1910 was due in part to political and in part to social and economic unrest in Mexico. Political unrest was not general. Some Mexicans, because of their education and natural instincts, desired to participate in the administration of their Government, but were denied any such participation by Díaz and his small group of political advisers and supporters. The Mexican government in 1910 was a closed political corporation, and was becoming more and more closed.[2]

It was in the hands, that is, of a privileged exploiting class; and a bitter contest is going on at the present time to gain relief; also, there is a struggle in England and other countries between labor and capital. It is often said that Wall Street or wealth rules the United States.

c. Popular Government.—The third type exists where the belief prevails and is manifested in political forms, that sovereignty resides with the people as a whole; it is an arrangement where "every man is a king and every woman a queen," as Sumner aptly phrases it. This type goes back at least to early Greek and Roman times and has been spreading throughout the world—with many backslips, to be sure,

[1] See the story of the abdication of Nicholas II. Walsh, "The Fall of the Russian Empire," *Atlantic Monthly*, February, 1928.

[2] Hackett, C. W., "The Mexican Revolution and the United States, 1910–1926," *World Peace Foundation*, Vol. IX, No. 5.

since there are now more dictators in Europe than there were before the War.

The idea received pronounced emphasis in and impetus from the famous book, "The Social Contract," by Jean Jacques Rousseau. At the front of this book were set the flaming words: "Man is born free; and everywhere he is in chains"—both assertions being false but effectual. This idea was at the root or was the foundation principle of the movement of the American colonists to throw off the English yoke. The very essence of the Declaration of Independence is that sovereignty resides with the people. The chartist movement in England was a contention of a similar import.

2. Forms of Government.—In beginning the consideration of types of government, we started a classification based on the location of sovereignty; and we have seen that there are three possibilities—a person, a privileged class, and the people. But "the people" can never *exercise* their sovereignty directly as an individual or as a small group can; it simply cannot be done from the nature of things; the people cannot function *as one* except *through one*—individual or group. Anything else is always that St.-Vitus'-dance-rheumatism disease of the political order—anarchy. But, *believing* that they *are* sovereign, the people are usually satisfied. Having the power in their own hands, however, the problem of *how it is to be exercised* immediately arises. And from this point of view, there can be two forms—the government of authority and the government of law.

a. The government of authority is that political arrangement wherein the sovereign exercises his authority arbitrarily, that is, without prevailing rules or standards of the past or present; it is where the sovereign rules whimsically or intelligently, opportunistically or traditionally, according as mood and emergencies dictate. The only sanction required is the will of the particular ruler at the particular moment. But since, as we have seen, "the people" cannot function as an autocrat, what we are really talking about is a *despotism;* and there have been numerous despotic governments during human development. Usually, however, despots have become intoxicated with their own power and have abused it or have become the victims of designing cliques and have thus dug their own official graves.

b. Government by law is the arrangement wherein those who rule are simply executors of a body of rules. In the government of authority, the only sanction is the will of the ruler; but in the government of law, the sanction is the body of law agreed upon. This means, of course, that a large and detailed body of "rules of the game" must already exist or be enacted, prescribing minutely the form of the governmental machinery, the reach and limitations of the executors, and their several methods of procedure. If it be asked how a people could reach a state of agreement

upon these rules without breaking up, it may be answered that each community is already governed by the folkways and mores and that law is, for the most part, just an extension of these.

3. Exercise of Power.—A further classification of governments *of the popular type* may be made on the basis of *who exercises* the power. A people may, under the guidance of certain leaders who are the real rulers for the time being, decide to try to exercise this sovereign power itself; or it may decide—which is, in itself, a sovereign act—to hand the exercise of this power over to duly accredited agents to carry out in prescribed ways. Consequently, we can have two types of government—looked at from this point of view—democracy and representative government.

a. Democracy.—As a *general* term, *democracy* means a kind of society in which "classes," that is to say, artificial and unworthy distinctions among people, are absent or unimportant. As a *political* term, it means a kind of organization where the people themselves directly and immediately administer the affairs of government. Not that they are all policemen, all auditors, all judges, all governors, all wardens of jails and penitentaries, always and at the same time; that is a human impossibility. But it means that "the people" assemble, determine policies, reach decisions, select and direct officials, make all laws, and thus carry on a program of political life. The New England town (meaning a township) meeting was government of this type. But while this plan may work for a small group of a few hundred, it is not workable for thousands and hundreds of thousands, for they cannot perform the first and most important act of government, namely, assembling. Hence, this type of government inevitably evolves into the next type—providing this tradition remains—namely, representative government.

b. Representative Government.—In this type "the people" whom we may call the *electorate*, steps a little further into the background and, instead of assembling to make decisions and frame policies, elects or appoints some of its own number to do such work; it expresses its will through its representatives. Hence, under this plan, the one sovereign act of the people is the election of its representatives—and criticism. The one indispensable condition of its success is eternal vigilance. The citizen must always vote, and vote discriminatingly, else his government will fall into the hands of aggressive cliques.

Needless to say, this plan does not have some of the insurmountable limitations of the pure democracy. Yet, on the other hand, it rests on the assumption that the masses of the people are ignorant and selfish, that they rarely know what they want or how to get it, and that government is, after all, a *profession* requiring expert training. There are, moreover, the greatest difficulties in selecting competent people for office. But in such an arrangement, the people still possess the sovereignty—in theory,

at least. It is a very nice question, however, whether sovereignty is something that really can be delegated.

The government of England, although a nominal monarchy, is at present the purest example in the world, perhaps, of a truly representative government of any size. The people, after long struggles, have succeeded in gaining the power and have vested it in Parliament. They perform no political act except that of voting. They have political parties, as we do in the United States; but the political parties in England *do not* instruct their agents, who are left free to vote in parliament according to their understanding of the needs of the situation. The government of the United States is representative *in principle* but not in practice. In this country, parties have grown up with programs to push into legislative form, and representatives have little chance of being elected unless they announce a willingness to sponsor these programs. Thus, our arrangement is something of a compromise between the representative and the democratic types of government.[1]

Now, here is organization; here is coordination of human activities; here we have the same people that we have had in mind all the time—workers, parents, religionists, children, old people, educators, fighters, imitators, doctors, and the rest—all bound up into a tolerably systematized life pattern, into a political whole; and each one carries on his own life plan, but within the limitations imposed by this political whole, some of which limitations are imposed from year to year and some of which are handed on down from generation to generation. Some of the relations of these people are defined by this government. But in a very real sense we might say that *usage is the state.*

3. The Functions of Government

Having seen how people organize themselves politically, that is, regulatively with respect to certain matters, we may now turn to consider briefly certain functions or services which this political organization renders through its agents. Broadly speaking, there are *two* kinds of services which governments render—necessary services and optional services—and these are legislative, judicial, and executive in character.

1. Necessary Services. *a. Legislative.*—No group of people can live harmoniously without some rules, without some accepted ways of acting in relation to each other. The card game is a ruled game; the factory is a ruled place of work; the church is a ruled place of worship. The indispensability of rules is shown by the development of folkways and mores. Now, the state or government, being over all and behind all, has to make rules which supplement and stand behind the folkways and mores. The legislature is the ultimate ruling or law-making body of a democratic people. It rules with respect to certain matters when the

[1] *Cf.* Willoughby, W. W., *op. cit.*, Chaps. III, IV, V.

folkways are inadequate; and it fixes penalties for infraction. In an autocracy, the autocrat is legislature, judiciary, and executive—three in one.

b. The judiciary is a group composed of specialists in these rules. When human beings—in town meeting or legislature—after arguments, compromises, dickerings, and deceptions, agree upon the rules and spread them upon the statute books, questions of interpretation always arise because of the familiar and inevitable difficulties of the language; hence, there must be interpreters of the law and appliers of it to specific cases. The rules pushed through, moreover, do not always turn out to be consistent with the fundamental law or the constitution; hence, the question arises often as to whether the law passed in 1916 is harmonious with the original and sacred agreement. It is the business of the judiciary to adjust particular individuals to the existing laws with justice to all and adjust law to law as new laws are passed. Thus, the judiciary is, in a sense, a check upon the legislature.

c. The executives are the persons who discover that laws do not work themselves and, therefore, have to be carried into operation; the taxes have to be collected from some people; certain organizations have to be restrained; lawbreakers have to be punished. Many actual services have to be performed. Executives are, in one sense, supreme because they carry the law into life; they make the law live within the people; they see to it that individuals and groups actually behave in accordance with the intent of the law makers and the judiciary. But they are always the creatures, the servants, of the legislature, that is, of the people—in a democratic society.

So much for a general statement; but we must go a little way into particulars in order to see what comes back to the people for the money they invest in government. There are very many services which governments, through their executive and other branches, are expected to render, and which no other agency can render because no other agency is so inclusive and no other has such power. Among these services we may list the following in so many paragraphs:

Since all people are not perfectly upright and all-wise, somebody has to order the going and the coming of the multitudes. The idealistic anarchists are correct when they say that governments are always restricting people and that restriction usually breeds opposition, therefore governments are objectionable; public opinion would be a sufficient regulator. But the majority now demand government to enforce the rules under which they live. Preserving the social order, then, from attacks from within is one important service.

In a similar manner, somebody must take the lead and be empowered to do so when attack comes from without. The conduct of war, then, is another important governmental service. In this connection, it is well

to point out that in the near future it will hardly be regarded as a *service* to the people when governments, by ineptness if not trickery, drag them into war—as in the past.

The definition of legal relations between contracting parties such as husband and wife, parents and children, partners in business is another service which governments render. The relations between such persons may seem to be purely private affairs, and from one point of view they are; but from another point of view they are of the utmost importance to everybody. No social order can survive a general disregard for contracts, written or verbal. The government is one agency which makes people keep faith.

It is one of the functions of government to regulate the holding, transmission, and interchange of property. Where the private-property system is in vogue, this function is especially important. When we die, we cannot hand our property over to those to whom we wish to give it; we must have some all-powerful instrument to step in and execute our wishes.

Also, governments function to determine liability for debt and crime. A crime is not defined as something which brings down public disapproval; a crime is an act which is contrary to some law and can be defined only in relation to some law. If people elect representatives to make laws, then can they stand idly by and see these laws trampled underfoot? The law may be a freak; but it is still the law and must be obeyed. The method provided, in a democratic country, for the breaking of law is working for its repeal; this is breaking law while keeping within the law; it is legitimate, and no other method is. When laws are broken—and the courts determine this—then there must be some authority somewhere to punish. If "the people" take it upon themselves to punish before the courts decide that a law is broken, then we have mob violence and anarchy.

All kinds of property rights are settled within families, partnerships, churches, and other organizations, and the government does not interfere unless these settlements contravene the fundamental law. But where disputes occur, then the government officials step in as impartial judges and settle the matter.

What part shall the ordinary citizen take in government? What are his duties with respect to the structure already established? What are his rights as a citizen? For instance, how often can he vote? An unnaturalized foreigner in the United States is reported to have urged his friends in the old country to come to America as soon as possible, with this argument: "They not only let you vote over here," he said, "but also they pay you for voting." Could any government endure with this practice made universal? How much taxes should one pay? What matters can be left to the individual to decide for himself? These are matters which governments must handle.

2. Optional Services.—So there are numerous functions which governments *must* perform if the state is to remain intact; these are some of the necessary, in the sense that there is no alternative, functions of governments to keep the state from dissolving into petty rival groups on the one hand, and to keep it from falling into the hands of another state on the other. But there are numerous additional ways in which a people may serve itself through its government; there are many optional services which a government may render. We can do no more than name some of these.

It may regulate industry and trade; it may regulate the hours and conditions of labor; it may legislate and execute with reference to sanitation; it may build schools and conduct education; it may care for the indigent and helpless so that they will not die on the public doorstep; it may prohibit the use of alcoholic beverages and narcotics. Indeed, what may not the government do for its people?

This is a large question, and it has been much discussed by distinguished scholars and public leaders. Some have contended that the state always assumes too much overlordship and its government becomes too meddlesome, taking away private initiative and reducing the masses to slavery; they have said that that government is best which governs least, that we should have less government in business and more business in government; therefore, governments should perform an absolute minimum of services. Here we have the familiar doctrine of *laissez faire*, which means that things should be let alone as much as possible.

On the other hand, the position has been widely maintained that the state is in the logical position to become the cap sheaf of the human cooperative effort which has been growing in the world; therefore, the state might own everything and do everything possible for man. This is socialism in one of its many forms. But we cannot follow the intricacies of these various views; they are mentioned merely as starting points for discussion.[1]

4. The Evolution of the State

We have now described briefly the general features of the state and government and have given a hint or two of the latter's services to man. But the picture will not be rounded out without a statement as to how this institution came into being; and certain rather definite stages of development may be marked, although this part of the social drama is also extremely involved, and the origins are very obscure.

We do not have today so much, perhaps, of what Oppenheimer calls the *freeman's citizenship* as many suppose; and we do not have so much

[1] *Cf.* Blackmar and Gillin, "Outlines of Sociology," p. 186 *ff.*, for an outline of these necessary and optional services. See, also, Cole, G. H. D., "Social Theory," p. 97 *ff.*

of it as we have without a price—rivers of blood and treasure beyond estimate. The struggle for "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" did not begin for the first time with the war for American Independence; it always has been going on and still goes on. The state has taken its present shape, in the various countries, in part *as a result of the struggle to be free and the struggle to suppress this struggle;* thus, the people, aiming at life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, have again and again found themselves at the mercy of exploiters. In the second place, the development of the state has been greatly influenced by the gradual increase in population on the earth and by the conflicts resulting from encroachments and migrations. We might make the general proposition that the state grew out of conflicts precipitated by the food struggle and the lust for power. In other words, part of the cause of the state may be found in the problem of the distribution of wealth already noted.

With these suggestions before us, let us now turn to some of the most striking episodes in the evolution of the political organization and see the contraction from great to small. And as usual, let us begin where we are and follow back to earlier stages.

1. The Democratic State.—We are all familiar in this country with such devices as universal suffrage, regular elections, chosen representatives, balance of powers as between the several branches of government, a basic constitution, and many other indications of the sovereignty of the people. We believe in and try to practice this popular sovereignty. If representatives pass objectionable laws or otherwise fail to represent, then they are soon recalled and others are put in their places without carnage. All of this seems so well established and natural that we sometimes suspect that nothing different ever existed. But every one of these arrangements was bought with a price; and when we ask why the price had to be paid, we come at once to something very different; we come at once to autocracy in one form or another. If we follow the course of our own American history back to the start, we find a ready example of what is meant; and we are all familiar enough with that so that repetition here is unnecessary.

2. The Autocratic State.—If the sovereignty does not reside with and in the people in some way, then it resides in a single autocrat or a privileged class—as we have seen. The democratic movement was developing in England at the time of the American Revolution but had not made entirely satisfactory headway against its opposite. The English king against whom the American colonists rebelled was George III, and he was an autocrat. If he was autocratic with respect to the Americans, we may assume that he was autocratic with respect to the English people; and the evidence supports this assumption.

Many efforts had been made in England, were being made at the time, and continued to be made, to reduce the power of the autocrats

of which George III was but one of a long line; and the struggle was a costly one in many ways. France was ruled by autocrats until 1793. Russia was ruled by autocrats until 1917. And so, also, were other European countries. Hence, if we trace back American history, we come full stop before a long line of autocrats; if we trace back English history, we come full stop before autocrats; if we trace back French, Russian, Hungarian, Italian histories, it is no different. If we go to other countries—Turkey, China, Japan, India—we come face to face *not* with popular elections, not with constitutions drawn up in conventions, not with popularly elected legislatures, not with all of the other familiar democratic devices but with the government of despots, dictators, privileged cliques; and we face beliefs and doctrines which helped to support such arrangements.

For example: It was widely believed 200 years ago that reigning authorities held power by "divine right," the explanation being that at some time in the impenetrable past the Almighty had endowed certain families with this right; the idea was promoted that this right was inalienable; a king might be deposed but he was always "royal." It was accepted, also, that this person could make all laws but need not obey any of them—as the Roman code had it. It was widely held that the autocrat could use all means, fair or foul, to gain his ends, spread his kingdom, and maintain himself in power—an idea vividly expressed by the Italian writer, Machiavelli, in his book "The Prince," published in 1532. But how did it come about that such monstrous beliefs and doctrines prevailed?

The autocrats themselves, of course, promoted these beliefs and doctrines. They had the armies to suppress criticism, and when gunpowder was invented in the fifteenth century, it put more power in their hands; there were many men who were willing to hire themselves out to autocrats, so it was easy to keep an army; the masses were densely ignorant since there were no schools and little knowledge of reading and writing; the traditions were all in favor of autocracy, and conditioning had been of that type for ages; the masses had no skill in organizing; these autocrats often saved the masses from outside attack and thus earned their gratitude; they went to war often and added new territories, practices which helped to enhance their prestige with the people. Thus, these autocrats were able to say that they were the state and to make good on their claims.

These are but a few of the many factors contributing something to the maintenance of autocracy and the prevention of democratic movements—of which there were many.

Monarchs.—How did these autocrats come into existence? How did monarchies come to be established? The autocrats of which we have been speaking were *kings*, for the most part. The twelfth to the

fifteenth centuries in Europe—the Middle Ages—witnessed a marvelous flowering of the national spirit. The various peoples began to recognize their own language in contrast to others and to stress it. The Romans, politically and ecclesiastically, had imposed Latin upon large areas in Europe, and this recognition of and emphasis upon the vernacular was a reaction against Latin. There was a vast development—Chaucer is an illustration—of literature in the various vernaculars. Luther, we will recall, aimed to make the Bible accessible to the common people by having it translated into the common tongue. The crusades brought about a great revival of trade and travel and made the world seem larger.

A strong feeling was organizing itself against the dominance of the Holy Roman Empire idea—politically and religiously—a movement manifesting itself on a large scale in the Protestant Reformation and following national, that is to say language, lines very largely. The Hundred Years' War between England and France had finally expelled the English from France and restricted the monarchs of these countries to their own people and thus made national lines more definite—the hate of other countries growing stronger as the love of one's own developed. Also, there was the gradual reduction of the power of feudal lords and the consolidation of their domains into larger units.

These were some of the factors responsible for the uniting of small groups of people into larger groups and making them conscious of their unity. But whatever unions came about simply exalted the successful leader, and whatever added to the strength of these unions added to the power of their heads. Hence, monarchs flowered out during this period as they had not done before except in the time of the Caesars. In proportion as they were benevolent, intelligent, or skillful or all three and were able to manipulate things so as to subjugate larger and larger areas, tribute increased and their power was enhanced.

But the people, the peasant classes, some of the clergy, and many of the subjugated nobles, were not always happy in these monarchical pyramidings; the peasants were taxed more heavily; military service became more onerous; there were many jealousies among the nobles, since it was impossible to hand out equal perquisites to all, and since some of the feudal lords were now mere subjects whereas they had been petty kings before. Consequently, many movements appeared to place restrictions about the supreme rulers. As a rule, mediæval monarchies were "limited monarchies." Four important checks were established—the right of popular rebellion; the principle of election; certain guarantees of individual rights and privileges such as not raising taxes without the consent of the feudal lords, trial by peers; and, finally, the establishment of parliaments composed of certain clergymen, chief noblemen, knights elected by landholders in certain districts, and burgesses elected by the towns. These parliaments soon broke up into upper and lower

houses familiar to us—in England—as the House of Lords and the House of Commons.[1]

Feudalism.—The autocratic kings, for the most part, came from the nobles; they were nobles who gained the ascendancy over other nobles by means of war, by skillful leadership, by trades, and by other means. If we picture a number of petty rulers over small regions struggling for preeminence and see one or two of them coming out on top, we shall have the situation in hand. Hence, we have to go back to feudalism to account for the existence of these petty lords. Feudal society was an arrangement of the people into distinct classes and ranks—the determining factor being the amount of rights and privileges enjoyed; the several classes were the peasantry at the bottom, then the bourgeoisie, then the clergy, and then the nobles. But to understand this, two lines of development must be noted.

(1) The Merchant Classes.—The maritime towns were built up by pirates, or vikings, as fortresses in which to store their loot—Carthage being a good example. Very naturally, they became centers of trade upon the seas. Very naturally, they became cosmopolitan, that is, populated with all sorts and conditions of men. This made for liberality in outlook. They furnished many heroic leaders. They organized exchange and developed money. These *townspeople* became what we now call the bourgeoisie—the merchant classes.

(2) The Peasantry.—But there were also tillers of the soil—the peasantry—and the great landed estates were really rural organizations, similar to the towns. These peasants, ignorant, superstitious, incapable, paid tribute to certain more active and capable persons for protection from invasion. These lords were first of all the military leaders who organized defense for the simple peasants. As Ross says:

> The taproot of the European nobility was not landholding, but military exploit. One did not lead fighting men because he held a fief; he held a fief because he led fighting men. As the old saw put it, "who would be a gentleman, let him storm a town."[2]

In part, too, they were in the lead because they were the customary legatees of the family estates and prestige. Hereditary wealth, prestige, and military success mutually supplemented each other; and as these leaders succeeded in repelling attacks from abroad, they were accorded more respect at home; and as they received more loyalty at home, they were able to organize greater expeditions for conquest abroad. The subjugated lords, if they were allowed to live, were required to pass on some of the tribute which they received to the enriching treasury of the conquerer; and thus more soldiers could be hired to supplement the

[1] *Cf.* Hayes and Moon, "Modern History," p. 126 *ff.*

[2] "Principles of Sociology," p. 343.

forces composed of loyal subjects. Thus, everything supported everything else and lifted petty princes into kings and elevated them more and more. The pyramiding went on until great nations were formed—the monarchs ascending to higher and higher levels of power and luxury, and the peasants going relatively lower in the scale of poverty and ignorance. We really find, then, the origin of the state in these petty kingdoms—and custom.

(3) Herdsmen and Peasants.—But we have to go back a step or two yet to see the inception of this consolidation process. All over the world may be found tribes of *herdsmen* and loose settlements of *land grubbers*—the nomads living from their cattle, and the land grubbers living from the soil. These latter cannot flee; they have no weapons worth mentioning; they are accustomed to work hard and long; they have only a very loose social organization; they are peaceful in temper. But the nomads are always on the move; they are always well organized under and disciplined by an autocrat; they always take their wealth with them; they find robbing easier than working. And once having made the discovery, as Maeterlinck puts it in his "Life of the Bees" that robbing is easier than working, people are spoiled for work. It has always been easy and thrilling for the disciplined and equipped herdsmen to swoop down on the poorly protected grubbers and enslave them.

Ratzel says:

> It must be remembered that nomads do not always destroy the opposing civilization of the settled folk. This applies not only to tribes, but also to states, even to those of some might. The war-like character of the nomads is a great factor in the creation of states. It finds expression in the immense nations of Asia controlled by nomadic dynasties and nomad armies, such as Persia, ruled by the Turks; China, conquered and governed by the Mongols and Manchus; and in the Mongol and Radjaputa states of India, as well as in the states on the border of the Soudan, where the amalgamation of the formerly hostile elements has not developed so far, although they are joined together by mutual benefit.[1]

Here we have the origin of the state arrangement; it is in the subjugation and exploitation of the peasant folk by the roving herdsmen or by the vikings. When shepherds capture a landed area, they keep the people there and defend them in return for their work. When vikings capture a landed area, they take everything away, using up the stores and selling the people into slavery.

The only problem now remaining is the origin of the shepherd leader—chieftain or king, whatever we wish to call him. And this takes us back to the social organization of primitive tribes under chieftains.[2]

[1] Quoted in Oppenheimer, "The State," p. 54.

[2] See Sumner and Keller, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 459 *ff;* Oppenheimer, "The State," *passim.*

This is one view of the origin of the state. Commons says:

> The state is the coercive institution of society. It is not an ideal entity, superimposed upon society, but is an accumulated series of compromises between social classes, each seeking to secure for themselves control over the institution of private property . . . The state is rather the creature and offspring of private property.[1]

Then the patriarchal family must have played its part in encouraging the development which we have followed, for that is the type of family where private property developed most rapidly and luxuriantly. Moreover, as Wilson points out, that is the institution wherein *kinship* originated; and kinship was the original bond of union and the original sanction for magisterial authority.[2]

Thus far, we have three views of the origin of the state—in kinship, in private property and its recognition and protection, and in the conquest and exploitation of the land grubbers by the herdsmen. In this chapter, we have stressed the latter view, Oppenheimer's view; but it is probably not final. There is truth, probably, in all three views. Lowie thinks that there was no one origin of the state but several; it came, in some cases, out of the military organization and its conquests; in others, out of hereditary classes and castes; in others, out of internal causes such as the accumulation of wealth; in others, out of territorial bonds; in others, out of kinship; in others, out of secret societies, and probably out of several of these at once.[3]

In summing up, we may say that the state, at any time and in any place, is some people exercising authority over other people in a defined territory and according to some kind of standards. It is some people functioning with respect to other people with reference to certain interests in life. It is authoritative interaction centered upon discipline and ownership.

Questions

1. What are the essentials of organization? Of cooperation?
2. How do recreation and the state compare in neatness and compactness of organization?
3. Are there social processes in the state? Name some and illustrate.
4. Under Accommodation we discussed subordination and superordination. Show the position of the church, a fraternity, a political party, a city, with reference to the state.
5. Individuals are not permitted any more to settle their differences by fighting. Why are states permitted? What could stop them? What is the difference?
6. Show that the state is the all-inclusive organization.
7. Show the process by which *you* have discovered that there is such a thing as the state.

[1] "A Sociological View of Sovereignty," *A. J. S.*, Vol. V, p. 683; Vol. VI, p. 88.

[2] "The State," pp. 2, 3, 13.

[3] "The Origin of the State," *passim*.

8. Rank the various characteristics of the state in the order of their importance.
9. What, in the state, illustrates social unity?
10. Give the chief differences between the autocratic and the democratic state. What kind do you prefer? Is this mere prejudice?
11. Do politicians make the state, or does the state make politicians? Discuss.
12. You (Americans) are in a democracy. Do you feel very "royal?" Why not?
13. What is meant by the *electorate?*
14. How does a monarch get power? Connect this with the discussion of heredity already given earlier.
15. What folkways and mores can you discover in the state?
16. Can we find out scientifically whether the government should enlarge or reduce its functions?
17. Name some services which you think governments should leave alone. Why?
18. Was there any "democracy" in the world before the founding of the American republic? Give examples.
19. Describe feudalism. What grew out of it?
20. Of the three or four theories of the "origin of the state," which do you think is the most scientific? Why?

CHAPTER XIX

THE FACT OF EVOLUTION

We have now made a superficial survey of some social processes and institutions—just a few of the many. And we have been thinking of them mostly as now existing; we have been thinking of them as present actualities without a past. Exceptions were made in a few cases—the family, the state, recreation, religion—that the pictures might be rounded out then and that facts might be presented for purposes which we now have in mind.

But the tree is not entirely understood by merely examining what now is; part of it is underground. We, ourselves, are not understood by merely taking us as we are today; we lived yesterday and the day before and last year; we have had a past. A social process or organization is not understood by the most complete and meticulous analysis of it as we find it; there is always a history in each case to be looked into before the whole story is out. The whole complicated interactional system which confronts us and amidst which we live had antecedents; it existed in earlier stages and forms.

Hence, our study of society will not be complete unless we take up the question of how what we now find about us and in us came about. These may be commonplaces, no doubt, for many who have looked into this matter and have made up their minds. But even the well-known commonplaces can always be resurveyed to advantage; and besides, there are those who have not reflected much upon this matter or who have decided opinions of a conflicting character. The present has been in our thought, for the most part; but now we must look into this present's *past*.

There are many difficulties encountered in examining the present, but there are more difficulties in penetrating the past. It is hard to overcome remoteness in space, but it is harder to overcome remoteness in time; it is harder to go back and look around than it is to go out and look around. Present phenomena are—present. But past phenomena are utterly out of reach unless they are also present *in some sense*. What we have to do, then, is to find out what of the past is present, how it is present, and what it reveals about the parts of the past which are not present. In other words, we have to face the problem of *social continuity*.

A term sometimes applied to the past is *history;* but properly speaking, history is simply a record of the past. A term frequently applied to the continuousness of the past into the present is *evolution*, especially as

descriptive of how the past has survived into the present. It is often said that what we now find about us has evolved or unrolled; but this is not exactly a notion of common sense, at least it was not a notion of common sense until lately. In earlier times, it was generally supposed that what people found about them was created outright.

1. Divisions of the Subject

There seem to be three main problems confronting us at this point. (1) There is the problem of the *actuality* or the fact of evolution as against other views which have been maintained and expounded; the physical world, men, and institutions have evolved, some say, but have they? (2) There is the very perplexing problem of *how* they evolved, or what the method was. Modern thinkers are very generally agreed in their answer to the first question, but they disagree widely in their answers to the second. (3) There is the problem of *origins* or the sources of all that we find about us. There are swarms of subsidiary questions growing out of all of these, but we must keep to the main issues as far as possible. We shall take up the first problem in this chapter, the second problem in the next chapter, and the third problem in the chapter following that.

These are all tremendously complicated and difficult problems; first, because of the elusiveness or the absence of evidence; there is much of the past which undoubtedly has not survived in any recognizable form; there are many "missing links," as people have often said; there are serious difficulties of scientific technique. But there are even greater difficulties, for the beginner, at any rate, because of established and contrary views, because of prejudices. As soon as we begin to look back and ask questions, we are face to face with non-evolutionary explanations. *Evolution* has been a horrendous idea to the great majority because it is a theory which conflicts violently with a theory already held, with a view of things already old and well established; its use awakens within many people feelings of repulsion and disgust similar to those aroused by the sight of something foul. On the other hand, many have found this conception to be a truer symbol of the realities examined than some others which have been proposed.

With so few maintaining and so many protesting, therefore, the question is always pertinent: What is the meaning of the term and what is the reality which it is used to describe? Or, more fundamental yet: Did what we now find about us come by creation or by evolution? It is well to keep in mind that creationism has been maintained because of a certain kind of supposed evidence and because evolutionism has been regarded as insulting to man. We do not readily change over from believing that man descended from the gods to believing that man ascended from the animals; and the theory of evolution has been excoriated especially because of its implications with regard to man. Before considering

evolution, however, we must examine the views which held sway before it was propounded and elaborated.

2. Some Prescientific Views

The conclusion was reached very early in human history, as we are now ready to see, that the spirit world was prior to man and more important than the other environments amidst which he lived. The Bible opens with a declaration of this point of view. "In the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth." Thus, we have "God" or the spirit world first, then the heavens, then the earth, then man. This was the ancient Hebrew theory. But the same notion, variously stated, may be found all over the world. It is a far cry from the ancient Hebrews to the Guiana Indians and the Labrador Eskimos of the twentieth century;[1] yet this same idea is found there, and it can be found among the Hindus, the Chinese, and the most backward peoples. Spirit beings exist; they were prior to man; they are more powerful than he; they are concerned with man's doings on earth; they are whimsical and changeable—these are some of the essential features of this almost universal belief pattern. We have some knowledge of this already from our study of religion.

It has been quite universally assumed—for there is not, and there was not when these beliefs grew up, any scientific evidence to support them—that these powers existed. It has been assumed that when we start explaining things, we always run back into these beings. They created the world and man. Anyway, how else could the earth and man have come into existence? These believers have never contended that they were eye witnesses of beginnings. Adam and Eve, to take the Biblical tradition again, since it is more familiar to Westerners, were not eye witnesses to their own creation; they did not actually observe God at work upon them. Adam, it will be recalled, was asleep when Eve was formed; Eve, of course, was not alive when Adam was formed; there were no others present according to the story. How, then, is one to know the truth about such matters?

The story originated in some unknown manner, got into circulation, and became a part of the Hebrew oral and, later, written traditions. It has been preserved and has come down to our own time and is literally accepted and stoutly defended by millions. These millions see, of course, that there is nothing in the record to prove the presence of eyewitnesses. When challenged about this matter and about the truthfulness of the account, they have hauled out the *theory of inspiration;* they have said that "holy men of old spake as they were moved" by some divine agency. This was not an inconsistent doctrine but a

[1] *Cf. Thirtieth Ann. Rept.* Bur. Amer. Ethnology, p. 141 *ff.* Also, Hawkes, "The Labrador Eskimo," p. 152.

perfectly logical one, in the light of early and continued belief in "possession." But at any rate, the writers of this account of creation were just as good as or better than eye witnesses because they were inspired and, therefore, made an infallible record. In other words, it was revealed to man by the Creator that He was a Creator; and this idea also became part of the traditions and has come down to our own time and is accepted and defended by millions. This special and startling quality of inspiration was imputed, moreover, to all of the writings in the Bible, and thus whatever it has had to say about beginnings of any kind, about happenings to people, about the nature of man, about the mysteries of life has been held by its devotees to be the absolute and ultimate truth about these matters. The Scriptures say that "with God all things are possible." We may profitably take up some of these beliefs and their derivatives as illustrations of prescientific views.

1. The early Christian fathers were divided in opinion as to the nature of the heavenly bodies, but all agreed that they were spiritual, that is, of the very essence of their Maker. When doubts arose in anyone's mind, he was silenced by scriptural texts—properly interpreted. When Job, amidst his many misfortunes, was in a somewhat rebellious mood,

> Then Jehovah answered Job out of the whirlwind and said:
> "Who is this that darkeneth counsel
> By words without knowledge?
> Gird up thy loins like a man;
> For I will demand of thee and declare thou unto me,
> Where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the earth?
> Declare if thou hast understanding
> Who determined the measures thereof, if thou knowest?
> Or who stretched the line upon it?
> Whereupon were the foundations thereof fastened?
> Or who laid the corner-stone thereof,
> When the morning stars sang together,
> And all the sons of God shouted for joy?"[1]

Note the last two lines. These lines convinced Origen, an early churchman of influence, that the stars were living beings possessed of souls. Others regarded them as the abiding places of the angels and as moved about by angels. The gnostics thought that the stars were spiritual beings governed by angels and appointed not to cause earthly events but to indicate them. The prevailing view in the early Church was that the sky was a solid vault, a firmament, extended above the earth, and the heavenly bodies simply lights hung within it. Saint Philastrius pronounced it a heresy to deny that God brought out the stars from his treasure house and hung them in the sky every evening.

[1] *Job*, xxxviii: 1 *ff.*

In the seventh century, St. Isadore, a distinguished leader of orthodox thought, affirmed that since and because of the fall of man, the sun and the moon shine with a feebler light but would shine to the full when man was redeemed. These views were old; they were backed up by scripture; they were forced on the people; they were widely respected and defended. But when they are examined in more detail than we can include here, they are found to be derived from heathen lore and, therefore, apparently were not divine implantations within the Biblical writers; such elements as the doctrine of the spheres, the Hindu mystic number three, and numerous other elements have been shown by the comparative study of religion not to be peculiar to the Hebrews. So much for the world beyond the earth.

2. As to the earth, it was held in ancient Chaldæa and by the Hebrew writers and by people generally until the time of Columbus that the earth was a flat disk resting upon the waters. Within it was the realm of the dead. Above it was the solid firmament dome coming down to the edges of the disk and resting upon foundations laid in the waters. In this dome, east and west, were doors through which the sun came and went; and above the dome were more waters—the source of rain. The Egyptians held essentially the same notions. There are dozens of scriptural passages which seem to take these notions for granted.

While many of the Greek scholars and some of the Christian fathers believed that the earth was round and that there were, therefore, *antipodes,* many others stoutly opposed this. Lactantius said:

> Is there any one so senseless as to believe that there are men whose footsteps are higher than their heads?—that the crops and the trees grow downward?—that the rains and the snow and hail fall upward toward the earth?—I am at a loss what to say to those who, when they have once erred, steadily persevere in their folly and defend one vain thing by another.

One writer proved conclusively from a passage in Luke that antipodes are impossible. This view was held by St. Augustine, Procopius of Gaza, St. Isadore of Seville, and St. Boniface, one of the greatest and noblest of early men. Procopius had a tremendous argument against the existence of antipodes. If there are men on the other side of the earth, he said, then Christ must have gone there and have suffered a second time to save them, and, therefore, there must have taken place in those regions as necessary preliminaries to His coming, a duplicate Eden, a duplicate Adam, a serpent, and a deluge. Of course, this was ridiculous. A famous astronomer, Cecco d'Ascoli, was burned alive in Florence, in 1327, for holding that the earth was round. The Spanish theologian, Tastatus, as late as 1500, squelched the doctrine of antipodes thus: The apostles were commanded to go into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature. They did not go to any such part of the

earth as the antipodes. There are, therefore, no antipodes. Thus, we have everything thrown into the deductive form, and the major premises are always the traditions.

3. As to man, the points of most interest to us are the time of his origin and the theory of his nature. These early men refused to study man directly and as they found him but tended to rely on the traditions. They held, for the most part, that he was, as the Scriptures said, formed by the Almighty out of the dust of the earth and had the breath of life put in him; he was, therefore, dual—and this point we have noticed before.

The reasoning by which such men as Origen, Eusebius, Lactantius, Clement of Alexandria, and others reached the conclusion that the earth and man were created about 6000 B. C. was this: Just as the seven candlesticks of the Apocalypse had long been held to prove the existence of the seven heavenly bodies revolving about the earth, so it was evident that the six days of creation prefigured 6,000 years that the earth was to endure in its present form. Some held to 4,000 years and had a chronology that was full, consecutive, and definite, worked out from Adam to Christ. The simplicity of some of these fathers, with respect to this chronology, is especially evident in the tables of Eusebius. He has Moses, Joshua, Bacchus, Deborah, Orpheus, the Amazons, Abimelech, the Sphinx, and Œdipus appearing together as personages equally real and with chronological positions equally well ascertained. The origin of man somewhere between 6000 and 4000 B. C. was reiterated by St. Isadore in the seventh century A. D., by The Venerable Bede in the eighth, by Rabbi Moses Maimonides in the twelfth, by Luther and Melanchthon in the fifteenth, and by Bishop Usher, who settled the matter at 4004.

Of course, along with the geocentric theory already suggested went the anthropocentric theory; and the latter was elaborated in many directions to show that man was not only the crowning creation but also that all other things were created for him.

Here we have a few hints about a world view, a view prevailing in the stream of culture which ends in us and holding sway for thousands of years. If we now connect up what has been said in a previous chapter about religion, we can understand what we have presented here rather better. This view and all of its corollaries may be characterized as follows: It was almost wholly speculative guesswork; it was based on unproved and unprovable assumptions; it was excessively dogmatic and full of arbitrary dicta; it was religiously sanctioned, and those who denied its soundness were driven out and often killed; the reasoning was largely by deduction and analogy; it was, as we now think, quite fantastic and absurd, for the most part. The method of arriving at this view was incorrect as we look at it. More than that, the leading exponents of this view

were determined to impose it on the people. There was little attempt to try to be open-minded.[1]

3. Sources of Information

Let us imagine ourselves utterly cut loose from *any* views about the origin of the world and of man but eager to know about these things. What recourse have we? Broadly speaking, and if we believe in the existence of a spirit world, we have two possibilities—inspiration and search; that is, we may become informed by divine implantations of truth, or we may dig it out for ourselves. As far as we can see, these are the only possibilities. Since it is generally admitted, however, even by the stoutest contenders for the inspiration of the Bible, that we do not have divine implantations any more, it would seem that this recourse is denied us; verbal inspiration ceased, it is claimed, with the completion of the Bible. It is held in many quarters, however, that if we want to know about these matters we can still go to the Bible which contains all that we need to know. We sometimes speak of "poetic inspiration," but we never assume that the Almighty tells modern poets what to say and how to say it. *We* live in an uninspired age—save as we have the Bible. Our only sources of information about the origin of the world, man, and society, then, are the Bible and our own search.

1. What, then, about the Bible as a reliable source of information on these matters? Is the Bible inspired in the sense that it is an utterly peculiar book? If so, then how could any mortal understand it? Is it inspired in the sense that it is an infallible record on historical matters—the matters of chief interest to us? We simply cannot take inspiration—whatever it means—for granted in this critical age. But even if we assume inspiration in the sense of superhuman implantations of truth and fact, it would seem reasonable to ask that some tests of truth and fact be applied; and one of these tests might very well be accuracy of historical statement and fact. Certainly, we would not be inclined to think of incorrect statements as being inspired—at least from above. How do we modern people know that this book is inspired? The only way in which we can know is by tradition or by discovering some exceptional quality within the book itself.

2. But to raise and try to answer such questions is at once to fall back on the second method of gaining knowledge indicated above, namely, to dig it out for ourselves; *we have to search*. In conducting this search, we come upon two very different types of materials—the lore of man as it is preserved in oral and written form and the physical world amidst which we all live. We cannot know one single thing about what happened before our own birth except as some record of it is left in the lore of man or in the physical world; we cannot know a single thing except

[1] White, "The Warfare between Science and Theology," Vol. I.

as this lore brings it to us or we can trace connections in the physical world back to it. These are the *only ways* in which we can know anything about Lincoln, Napoleon, the Roman conquest of Gaul, the Sphinx, Noah's flood, the creation.

Now, we may and we do make the scientific approach to these two types of records of the past; that is, we search; we research. In searching everywhere, we come without fail upon many things, many records of one kind and another—a story, a book, a stone tablet, a monument, some bones, some implements, geological formations; we come upon these things. And for fear that we may miss some source of information, we must and we do examine everything examinable; we cannot neglect anything; our search must be thorough.

(*a*) Among other things, we come upon the Bible. It is a real book in a real world. We examine it and find that it contains a brief account of the origins of the earth and man. This is what we are looking for; we are all enthusiasm. But, as careful searchers, we are critical. What about the validity of this account? There were times when the very raising of such a question would have flung us into the Inquisition. But in these days, we are more free to raise questions—some questions. Yet some still tell us that the Bible is inspired in every part and that therefore this account of creation is true in every detail. But is it?

We need not be governed in our thinking at this point by the famous lecture on "The Mistakes of Moses" by Robert Ingersoll, some four decades back; he was not a competent Biblical scholar. We can go to the most devout and careful scholars, those who would be immensely relieved and gratified if they could prove that the Bible was all that has been claimed for it; we can go to those who are *prejudiced in its favor* and not those who are prejudiced against it. And if we can find that those who are prejudiced in its favor discover fallibilities in its record, then we are fairly safe in discounting the information it pretends to contain about matters of great interest to us.

Competent Old Testament scholars are now very generally agreed that there are many old oral traditions—traditions which no one would ever claim to be inspired—incorporated in the Bible. Israel had a rich heritage in oral traditions.[1] There is much evidence that most of the books of the Bible are not homogeneous productions but compilations of previously existing material. "The very recognition," says Smith, "of different strata in an historical book implies that some parts are more reliable than others."[2] Even

. . . those books in the Old Testament—which are in historical form—are not historical in the sense in which we now use the term. The first aim of the authors was not to set forth the actual course of events but to set events in such a light as to

[1] KENT, "Beginnings of Hebrew History," Chaps. I, II.

[2] SMITH, H. P., "Old Testament History," pp. 1–34.

point a moral. The books of the Old Testament are books of devotion, or books of edification; the purpose of the authors is didactic and hortative.

Thus, the writers used great freedom in selecting and organizing their materials. The books of Kings and Chronicles cover the same ground practically but with very different purposes in mind and from different points of view. The story of the Fall of Man was for the purpose of accounting for the toilsome lot of the laborer; the story of the Tower of Babel and the confusion of tongues was to account for the variety of languages existing when the writer was living; there are two accounts of creation with different emphases and conceptions. In II Samuel it is recorded that David gathered 30,000 warriors of Israel, but in I Chronicles it is stated that he gathered over 300,000; the account of the marriage of the Sons of God with the daughters of men in the sixth chapter of Genesis is an evident bit of surviving mythology. The Chaldæan account of creation allows 168 myriad years for the process, and it is at least an interesting coincidence that the Bible account allows 168 hours—seven days.

In addition to the weaknesses effected by the incorporation of early, uninspired oral traditions and the historical inaccuracies, there are the many accounts of miracles. We find many stories of happenings which are utterly unfamiliar to us today. We cannot raise the dead today; we do not receive food from heaven when we are on the point of starving; we do not make axes float; we do not cause the sun to stand still—and so on. These occurrences seem to us to contravene what we call *natural law;* at least, we moderns have no experiences that would enable us to understand and accept these miracles.

Here, then, are at least three types of fallibilities in the Bible—the mythological and early traditional elements, the historical inaccuracies because the aim was other than historical, and, finally, the many accounts of deviations from what we choose to call *natural law.* How must we rate it, then, in relation to our problem? Is there reliable information here as to how the world and man came into existence? The answer has already been given; the Bible is the *literature* of the Hebrews; it contains drama, poetry, prophecy, every kind of writing that a people produces. Much of it is literature of a high order; but we cannot depend on it for scientific knowledge; it is not a source book in geology, astronomy, anthropology, political science, economics, or any other field. We do not have to go to the avowed enemies of the Bible for these admissions; we can go to some of the greatest and most devout Biblical scholars who have ever lived.

(*b*) Making this discovery, what is our position? We are thrown back utterly upon our own resources. If we do not have, even in the Bible, divine revelations as to the origin of the world and man, there is no other recourse but to carry on our own search as best we can. If

the Bible is not infallible, then we cannot accept its doctrine of a sudden *creation* of what is out of nothing unless we can show the soundness of such a theory by our own researches. But there is not a bit of evidence for this theory in what we can do; man can create nothing; the theory is utterly at variance with all our experience.

Thus, we have grown skeptical of ancient lore because we have repeatedly found it to be unreliable. The constant checking on each other of modern investigators, their relentless and merciless practices of verification, their meticulous care in all that they undertake—these ways have revealed many errors in tradition. Not that every bit of information that comes down to us is proved to be unreliable; far from it. But we have learned not to swallow every story without examination, without comparison. Thus, we are face to face with the necessity of digging out knowledge for ourselves if we desire to know. There is no evidence of a sudden creation outside the Bible. If the Biblical evidence is questionable—well, we shall simply have to examine the materials we have available and see what theory they suggest.

4. The Meaning of Evolution

We have to point out now that there are only two theories possible as to how what we find about us came to be—creation and evolution. We have now come to the conclusion that there is no satisfactory evidence to support the former theory. Thus, we are forced to the second view. It is possible to say, as many have done, that while the Bible asserts the creational *fact*, it gives us nothing as to the creational *method*. We can, if we wish, accept the creational fact but still raise questions about the method. We might go so far as to say that evolution *is* the creational method. But what do we mean by *evolution?*

Evolution is the theory that what *is* came out of what *was* according to what are termed *natural* in contradistinction to *supernatural* processes. The supporters of the evolutionary theory insist that, in trying to account for what is, it is not necessary to postulate a miraculous and god-invented beginning, although the possibility of such a beginning cannot be conclusively denied. The facts are that a "beginning" of the totality of which we are a part, is unthinkable. We may try to speculate about it, but we do not go anywhere unless we take hold of what we find about us and follow back as far as we can go. It is not necessary for us to assume the existence of the Almighty; all we need to assume is that *we can study*. If He exists and made the world and man, then hard study of the world and man should disclose Him—sometime. There are many able scholars, however, who find no contradiction between belief in evolution and belief in the existence of God. They are theistic evolutionists and believe that the way to know God is to study His *works*. There are many atheistic naturalists, however, who claim to

have banished from their minds all ideas of the supernatural in every form. But a debate on this question is beside the issue for us. What do we mean by the term *evolution?*

1. First of All, We Mean Change.—Certainly there is no evolution without *change*, without something different, something other. And this is a most familiar but inexplicable phenomenon. The boy is small today, but in ten years he has changed; the germ is microscopic today, but in a few months it is an animal; the grass is here today and gone tomorrow; the river was low yesterday but is high today; we continually move about from place to place; chemicals are separated and recombined to make different substances. We are all familiar with ceaseless change. But change is not peculiar to evolution; creation is also a theory of change. This feature, then, is not a distinguishing mark of evolution; but evolution is unthinkable without change.

2. In the Second Place, We Mean Continuity.—The point here to be made is that the changes noted above are in some way or ways *continuous* with each other; they are but different states or forms of an unbroken process. The seconds, the minutes, the hours, the days, the weeks, the years, the milleniums of time merge into each other so that time is continuous, is a perpetual flowing, an eternal going on. And so with space; it is also continuous and boundless. The inches, the feet, the yards, the rods and miles are but arbitrary divisions for human convenience; but space is not broken up. The mountain separates the plains on either side of it, but at the same time it joins them; the plain flows into the mountain, and the mountain flows again into the plain. Likewise with our mental experiences. One experience stands out often and seems not to have any relation with other experiences; but it is related and is but a stage in a total ongoing; what went before it merges with it and flows on into something else. Once we thought dreams had no relation to the realities of our waking life, but now they are thought to be but manifestations of a continuous mental process.

When we talk of the evolution of organisms or the earth or society, we mean that there is continuity in the everlasting change. And this point may be emphasized because it is just here that the antievolutionists have started up the greatest furor. Evolutionists, seeing that there is continuity at so many points in nature, have seen no reason to believe that man is an exception; they have seen no reason to believe that man is not continuous with all organic life—on the physical side—and, hence, they have derived him from some so-called *lower form* of animal life. This derivation has been like a red flag to the creationists. But the facts are piling in to connect up man with the lower orders; and the investigators are simply finding what they are finding and trying to interpret it.

In other words, the evolutionists are simply finding law and order in this world of ceaseless change; they are finding that there are regulari-

ties and dependabilities in change because of the ever present connectedness of everything with everything else. And this is why they have cast out creationism. They say that the creationists believed in a disorderly and disconnected, a fantastic and incredible, a vagrant and unpredictable world, for, if we have had one huge creation, who knows when we shall have another? Who knows when a whimsical deity may take it into his head to blot out everything and start all over again—as at the Flood?

Evolutionists do not yet say that they have uncovered all of the connections, the links, that exist in the area in which they happen to be working. Again take the case of man. Anthropologists have uncovered a few "missing links," as they think; but there are many gaps yet; the continuity between the lower animals and man is not yet absolutely established. But what is the situation in this case? It is simply this: that for evolution they have some evidence, whereas for creation they have none. Scientists, however, usually go the way of evidence. As far as it goes, this evidence spells out —unless scientists are quite insane— continuity.[1]

3. In the Third Place, We Mean Identity.—There are many things in the world which appear to be unique, that is, appear to have no discoverable connections with anything else; these things or events or persons seem to be quite exceptional and unclassifiable. The cases of the miracles and of Jesus have often been referred to in this connection. It is not our business to debate these special cases here but rather to insist that the more evidence we have of the world the more conclusive is the theory of continuity and the more evident is another point, namely, the *identity* of everything with everything else to some extent. What we are saying is that in various ways and in different degrees the *past remains on in the present.* We are not thinking of such things as vestigial organs, although they are facts pointing this way. We are thinking of anything that anyone may care to name—vestigial organs, habits, institutions, mountains, stars. Evolution means that in the process of change something out of the former state always carries over and abides in the new state; this means that something out of the past always remains in the present.

We often remark that "the child looks like his father"; and of course he does, for his father is a part of him, is in him inescapably. It is literally true that the son is "a chip off the old block." Nothing else is more true than this. Thus, parents abide in their children; grandparents abide in grandchildren; primitive people abide in modern people—to some degree. Thus, "like father like son"; thus, "history repeats itself"; thus, "this is the same house his grandfather occupied," despite the fact that it has been made over.

[1] *Cf.* DE LAGUNA, "The Factors of Social Evolution," p. 71 *ff.*

Our world and our life seem to be a curious blend of identity and change. These seem to be contradictory terms, but they are not. Anything we care to examine—our emotions, our thoughts, our bodies, our activities, our houses, our government, our religion—exhibits the mixture of these two features. No one ever had an unfathered thought, that is to say, an absolutely original thought; no one ever had a thought without antecedents; and no one ever had a thought that was not colored in some way and to some degree by these antecedents. Our own religion—Methodism, Mohammedanism, Judaism—is sometimes affirmed to be totally different from any other religion; but it cannot be, unless it germinated and developed in a vacuum and has always remained in a vacuum—an idea which we would not care to maintain. Our religions are all tied in with earlier religions, and those with still earlier ones—back further than we can ever go.[1]

4. Besides Change, Continuity, and Identity, Evolution Also Means the Non-miraculous.—It has often been supposed that something could come from nothing; and by making such an assumption, people have supposed that they were actually accounting for objects, persons, institutions, by means of miracle. Here we get into the greatest of difficulties and become involved in the warmest of arguments. Many have scorned evolution because it seemed to ignore and deny the miraculous, that is, the unnaturally caused. And it does ignore and deny the unnaturally caused.

This assumption of miracles came out of at least two weaknesses in the thinking of human beings. First, there was ignorance as to just what a *cause* is and ignorance with respect to the continuity and identity about which we have talked. For milleniums and milleniums, people did not know how a baby was caused; they did not know that there was any connection between copulation, conception, and birth. How could they know? They did not have microscopes. Ignorance is always a very severe handicap to thinking.

But worse than ignorance were the fixed prejudgments, the ready assumptions, the beliefs about the existence and power of spirits, gnomes, men of the mountains, elves, and the rest, agencies which furnished people with handy and easy explanations of whatever happened. It was easier to say that the devil caused the forest fire or the storm than to hunt out the real causes; it was easier and handier to locate some poor old woman, call her a witch, and blame her for the death of the baby or the cat; it was easier and handier to say that the sick person was possessed of a demon than to locate typhoid-fever germs within the organism.

When ignorance and prejudgment are combined, we can understand how the people wallowed for countless generations in wild imaginings about the ordinary events of life. We can now see how they were

[1] *Cf.* DE LAGUNA, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

involved in a vicious circle—their prejudgments preventing them from getting evidence, and the lack of evidence preventing them from correcting their prejudgments; their preference for spirits preventing them from inquiring about other causes. Their world, therefore, was quite fantastic, largely irregular; nothing was impossible in it.

The doctrine of evolution came along as simply one phase of a developing science, as one of the hypotheses growing out of a determination on the part of many to break the vicious circle and become informed about the world and life, as one of the by-products of critical inquiry. These inquirers soon found that they were on the trail of order in the world and life and could explain things better by tracing them back to antecedents *of their own kind* than by tracing them back to gnomes, elves, devils, and gods. It soon became evident that this latter type of explanation was no explanation at all, since these spirit beings were really more mysterious and inexplicable than the phenomena to be explained.

When these investigators came to the study of man and society and announced that man was not miraculous any more than anything else, then the battle grew fierce; it has remained rather fierce to the present day. But the investigators insisted on the right of free inquiry; they kept on inquiring; larger and larger numbers of them engaged in the work in an ever increasing variety of fields—astronomy, chemistry, archæology, geology, palæontology, electricity—each science reenforcing the main discoveries and principles of the other until scientists reached the general conclusion that everything came out of everything else in a perfectly natural and orderly way. Their unceasing labors, especially in the field of the fossil remains of man, led them to the conclusions that man was no exception to the general principle. Their unceasing labors among primitive peoples led to the conclusion that the human race was not a "fallen" species. And thus, bit by bit, vestigial organs, lower skeletal types, suppressed desires, all sorts of strange practices, curious beliefs and all sorts of hitherto inexplicable phenomena have taken their place within a grand process of continuous evolution. Evolution, then, means unceasing, connected, orderly change.

5. The Fact of Evolution

As long as men believed that the phenomena of this tangible world were not issuing in an orderly and calculable way from previous phenomena of a similar sort but were the manifestations of the antics of invisible, inscrutable, and whimsical agencies, what was the result? Three results may be noted. (1) Men fell to delving into the nature of these agencies and neglected the commonplace realities which were nearest to them; hence, mysticism. But trying to follow these incalculable powers in their eccentricities produced intellectual despair. (2) Men grew fearful of these powers and lived amidst a stultifying fear continually. What

would these whimsical powers do next? What calamity was next to come upon the people? And our modern psychology shows us what a fear complex means when acquired early. It is easily understood, from our point of view, why it was that human progress was so slow for millenniums. (3) Men fell to placating these beings and exhausted their goods and their energies in so doing. We have seen something of this already in the chapter on religion. But human beings were led into the wildest and most senseless extravagances—childish prayers, meaningless chants, frightful religious rites, cruel and costly sacrifices. Thus, they caused incalculable damage to themselves materially and mentally. These people lived in a truly anarchistic world.

With the development of science and the recognition of orderly development in the world and life, man began to repudiate these mysterious and whimsical agencies and achieve his freedom. Whereas he had been in a vicious circle before, he was now breaking over into another circle—more knowledge, then more freedom; more freedom, then more investigation and more knowledge. As the first circle was cumulative in its enthrallment, so the second circle was cumulative in its releasement. As the evidence came in, investigators and those waiting upon their investigations became more and more certain as to the reality of evolution. For more than a generation, this theory has been accepted as sound by almost all reputable thinkers; it has come to be regarded as a mental picture of an immense fact. That we are more and more adopting the evolutionary idea—is a fact. That this idea corresponds more and more to the realities of the world—is also a fact. But what is the evidence for this latter point?

1. There is an Ever Increasing Amount of Organic Evidence.—It is a commonplace that we all were once much smaller than we are now; it is a commonplace that we were once small enough to be born from our mothers. In past times, many believed that some people did not have mothers. Pallas Athena, we will recall, sprang full-grown from the head of Zeus. But we have no evidence for such phenomena; we know of no people who did not have mothers; we know that *we* had mothers—unless our parents or somebody lied to us. So much for observation and testimony. In following the matter further, we shall have to rely upon testimony alone—unless we are biologists. The biologists tell us that we were once a single cell, that this cell was fertilized—a complicated process which never could be understood before the microscope was invented—by another cell. These cells, one male and one female, came from cell-producing organs in the bodies of our parents. Where did these generating organs come from? They came along with their containing bodies from cells—and so on back and back—and back, an incalculable series.

Now these are commonplace facts for every modern high-school student. But what do they mean? What is the interpretation of them?

The interpretation is that we have here a *typical* case of this evolutionary process. A cell is nothing at all like a man; there is nothing about a human cell by which anybody could know that it would grow into a man. The simplest thing, the basic unit, in the organic world is a cell; there is no smaller unit. But this smallest of organic units *becomes*, under our very observation, the most complicated of organic units—a man. The whole stretch—cell to man—is covered; relative organic simplicity becomes relative organic complexity. This, as we have said, is a commonplace fact.

After fertilization, this cell begins to grow in size, and various features of the later organism begin to appear; parts of it produce bones, parts of it muscles, parts of it a circulatory system, parts of it a nervous system; all of these grow and differentiate more and more until the complete and complex organism appears. We do not yet know *how* it all comes about, but *that* it all comes about we know well. And all of this—from the simplest organic unit to the most complex—takes place in a few years.

Is it so astonishing, then, so impossible, that living cells should have been at the beginning of living things on this earth and have differentiated and specialized, becoming amœba, amphibians, reptilia, carnivora, and all the rest? If a simple cell can, under the proper conditions, become a man, are we ready to say that it could not become, under the proper conditions, something less complex? What the evolutionists see is a process beginning with simple cells—how cells began nobody knows—a stream of protoplasm, branching and spreading in various directions and finishing in the various species and varieties that we know. "When the toad first emerges from the egg," says Schmucker," it is amazingly like a fish. It has gills at the side of its neck, and swims by the movement of its tail." The chick, during the first thirty-six hours of its development, passes through a stage not unlike that of the fish or the earlier steps of the turtle. Within a few days, it becomes evident that this creature is to be a bird, though it is much larger before it is clearly a chick.[1]

We might pile in evidence of this sort to the end of many long volumes, showing close similarity, at certain stages of development, among organic forms. Once we are acquainted with this evidence, there is nothing improbable in organic development's finally producing man; there is nothing illogical in tracing man's descent back to some lower forms of life. If the simplest of structures becomes the most complex of structures in a few years, what might have happened in many millions of years? The case is not closed, let us freely admit; but the probability grows all the time as new evidence comes along and as contrary evidence is not found.

[1] Schmucker, "The Meaning of Evolution," p. 201 *ff.*

2. Fossil Evidence Continues to Come Along.—Investigators have found many so-called *transitional forms* that do not seem to belong anywhere and have no meaning at all unless they are transitional forms. Here is that odd creature called the *Archæopteryx*, a creature mainly suggesting a bird having feathers and wings; but it also has teeth and claws. What can we make of it? The bones of it—two of it in fact—were found some years ago in Europe. It is a document to be deciphered just as were the papyri from which our Bible was translated; it cannot be wiped away and forgotten; it must be considered by honest people. Evolutionists have made the humble guess that it was a transitional form. Here is another fossil creature—a horse *with claws*, called *Moropus*. What can be done with it? We have never seen a horse with claws; but we cannot now say that such creatures never existed.[1] It is another document to be deciphered. Here, again are bones which seem to trace the evolution of the horse from a small five-toed animal about eleven inches high, through a four-toed and taller animal, through a three-toed but still higher animal, up to the one-toed noble creature that we admire so much. What can we make of these documents? The great Huxley, who was at first bitterly opposed to the theory of evolution, was converted when he saw these bones—a set of them being in the Peabody Museum at Yale University and one of the most impressive pedigrees yet discovered.

Many bones of what appear to be human beings have been discovered during the last three quarters of a century—the Java ape man, the Heidelberg jaw, the Neanderthal remains, the Piltdown skull, and many others. They are documents to be deciphered. Scholars disagree at many points as to what they mean; but they are in entire agreement that they are missing links connecting present-day man with some lower form of animal life.[2] We simply cannot escape the conclusion that man has not always been as he is today. And we might continue to pile up evidence of this sort into volumes. Besides these bones of man we have a vast amount of evidence of what man did—the flints, the bones, the charred wood, the paintings, et cetera, which all help to establish the major conclusion and in nowise contradict it.

3. There is Some Geologic Evidence.—The facts which we have been considering have to do with the lineage of living things and of man. The geologic evidence is in line with the major conclusion, but it has something to say about the antiquity of living things and of man. There are two points here—the geological evidence of evolution and the geologic evidence of the antiquity of life. Let us look at these a little.

[1] See *Scientific American*, Jan. 26, 1918.

[2] Lull and others, "The Evolution of Man," Chap. I; Osborn, "Men of the Old Stone Age."

Is there continuous change in the earth? If we go to Niagara Falls on our honeymoon, we may be alert enough to note that the falls is wearing away the rock all the time; the rate at which it wears the rock away has been estimated; the falls was once down toward Lake Ontario where the bluff now is. The distance between where the falls started and where it is now is seven miles. It has been calculated that it has taken the water over 10,000 years to eat away this channel. At any rate, here is change. The most familiar and commonplace facts belong here; the falling of river banks into the water, the changes in river courses, the eruption of volcanoes, the elevation or subsidence of land areas, the splitting apart of cracked rocks by frosts, and many more. Our earth is changing all the time, and part is connected with part. Nothing is more familiar. These are certainly natural processes if there are any.

Now, fossil bones have been found in various strata of the earth, and we must conclude that the age of these fossils is a geological problem. The anthropologist is dependent, at this point, upon the geologist; he must accept the geologist's estimate of the age of the strata in which the remains have been found. In Kent's Hole, England, there are numerous stalagmite deposits on the floor. These are formed by dripping from the ceiling. It has been estimated that they form at the rate of about one inch in 5,000 years. Now some of these deposits are seventeen feet high. If we multiply the number of inches in seventeen feet by 5,000 years, we get a total of over 1,000,000 years. Then, if some fossils happened to be discovered under some of these stalagmites, we might have a guess as to their age. Geologists have gone ahead and have independently computed the ages of the various strata. Anthropologists, archæologists, palæontologists have come along and have discovered various organic remains in these strata. If these remains were laid down before the strata in question, then their age is determinable in as far as geological science is sound. Some remains have actually been buried by opponents of evolution to fool these scientists. But the Java ape man was not buried, the Neanderthal men were not buried, the Piltdown skull was not buried; there are plenty of fossil remains of man which were certainly not buried for the purpose of fooling the scientists. And so the evidence accumulates. Very little, proportionately, of the geological record has been examined as yet. We may be sure that as more of it is read, the story will be the same and the evidence yet to come will make an ever firmer base for evolution.

4. Cosmic Evolution.—If our earth is changing all the time, we might reason that the bodies of our universe are also changing; and such seems to be the case. We have to appeal to the astronomers, physicists, and chemists now. The astronomers make four points which may be summarily presented.

1. There is evidence of the birth, growth, and decay of heavenly bodies, that is, of their appearance, their enlargement, and their disappearance.

2. There is evidence of change in relative position, that is, of the continual rearrangements of parts in the solar system.

3. There is evidence of differences in the volume of heat and light emanating from these bodies, as shown, in part, by changes in color.

4. There is evidence of changes in chemical composition.

The familiar yet none-too-clear phenomena of meteorites may be taken as all of a piece with what has just been said. Meteorites frequently fall upon the earth. They are not part of the earth, yet they are composed of substances of the kind found in the earth. Also, they are composed of substances which the spectroscope proves to be found in some of the sidereal bodies. Thus, the earth is not a unique globe but simply part of a larger whole.

But we need not labor this point more. What do we now have, to sum up? We have faithful and careful astronomers, physicists, metallurgists finding out the nature of the universe to which we belong and telling us that our earth is a part of it. We have faithful and careful geologists examining our earth and assuring us that it is undergoing perpetual change. We have anthropologists, archæologists, palæontologists ransacking the earth and telling us that life has been on it for millions of years, that human life has been on it perhaps a million years. We have zoologists and botanists ransacking the earth and assuring us that living things are everywhere related in many and complicated ways. We have embryologists following the tiny productive cells and assuring us what these cells can do and mapping out for us how they grow from simple substances to complex forms. We have ethnographers and sociologists who are ransacking the earth and showing us how other peoples live and how much like them we all are in the fundamentals of living. We have philologists who are examining all of the languages of earth and tracing out the close connections between them and the essential similarity of their forms. And all of these investigators have hit upon the theory of evolution in their respective fields; almost without exception, the outstanding scientists in these various fields are evolutionists. This is what we have. Here is a vast and steadily accumulating mass of evidence in favor of evolution. There is not a shred of evidence in favor of any other theory. What are we to do? We may conclude, then, that the *facts* of evolution make for the establishment of the *fact* of evolution. The theory is not ultimately proved as yet, but no other theory is anywhere nearly so well established.

But the theory of evolution is better established by considering the method. How does evolution work? What are the factors responsible for producing this continuous change about which we have talked? We

must now turn to the second question—the method of evolution. And we must keep more nearly within our field—society.

Questions

1. What social processes have we now examined? How long have they been going on? How do you know this?
2. We have now studied what organizations? How long have these been in existence? How do you know?
3. If you had never been taught any theory as to how what we have all about us came to be, and you had just started out to explore the world, what theory would you develop do you suppose?
4. What are the three problems under consideration in this discussion on evolution? Can you think of others?
5. Are the "prescientific notions" given merely prejudices, or do they rest on something solid? By the way, how did we define *prejudice?*
6. What are the two types of evidence offered on the origin of man? Are there other types? Can there be other types?
7. Is it true that we moderns "live in an uninspired age?" Discuss.
8. Do you know of any cases where devout Biblical scholars doubt the scientific accuracy of the Bible records?
9. In all of this discussion, we are thrown back finally upon what resource? Do those who argue for the infallibility of the Bible use this resource?
10. Why is the idea of evolution so objectionable to many people? Is this mere prejudice?
11. Give some examples of social continuity. For instance, what has been handed down in your own family?
12. In what sense are you identical with your parents?
13. How would you define a miracle? Do we have miracles today?
14. What statement was made about a "fact" in the first chapter? Is fiction the opposite of fact?
15. What is meant by the *fact of evolution?*
16. If you are an antievolutionist, have you ever carefully reviewed the evidence in favor of your position? That is, do you really know why you are an antievolutionist?
17. What organization has been most opposed to the doctrine of evolution? Why?
18. If you are an evolutionist, have you ever tried to give honest consideration to the arguments on the other side? What evidence do you have for your position?
19. If *organic* evolution can be proved, would that prove social evolution?
20. What difference does it make, evolution or creation?

CHAPTER XX

THE METHOD OF EVOLUTION

It was stated in the previous chapter that reputable scholars are no longer in disagreement over the reality of evolution; to them this matter is now beyond controversy. But the battle still rages over the method, over the *how* of the process. The great question is: What are the essential and effective factors in the process, and what are their respective weights? Or, to put the problem in another way, how does the world order change in an orderly way?

The battle over the method has been confined largely to the organic field. People have not been so excited over the evolution of the stars or the earth, perhaps, as they have been over the question of human and social evolution. And this is probably because so many have bitterly resented the so-called *inference* of scientists that men are descended from monkeys—a suggestion that reputable scholars have never made. These antievolutionists have been taught (that is, they have been biased with) the notion that they came from "above" and not from "below." Hence, they have contested every advance made by evolutionists and have compelled them to be more and more sure of their ground—which is as it should be. "If man came from some lower form of life," the antievolutionists have challenged, "how did he come? Show us the details of the process. Reveal the continuities. Give us full information." And the evolutionists have worked steadily, faithfully, and discriminatingly to do these things. Since the dialectical battle has centered largely about man's nature, we shall find it helpful to restate some of the views on organic evolution as a preparation for a study of the method of social evolution.

1. The Factors in Organic Evolution

We have already considered the astonishing—when you come to reflect on it—fact of a simple cell's developing into a man; that is a fact which nobody any more denies. Now what are the factors which are responsible for that remarkable transformation? We cannot go into the detail which the biologist would call for here but can give only the broadest outlines of the various answers which have been proposed; and in reviewing these answers, we may be more clear that there is wide disagreement.

1. Environmental Pressures.—The French naturalist Lamarck, 1744 to 1829, proposed the answer that it is the environment which causes the transformation of which we have spoken and especially "use and disuse." He said:

> In animals and in plants, whenever the condition of habitat, exposure, climate, nutrition, mode of life, etc., are modified, the characters of size, shape, relations between parts, coloration, consistency and, in animals, agility and industry are modified proportionately.[1]

This proposition may be boiled down to say that while changes in nutrition produce changes in plant structures, changes in habits produce changes in animal structure. The detailed way in which these results are brought about for animals—man included—is by use and disuse.

For example, moles at some point in their history began to live underground; they had no need of eyes in such a habitat; therefore, their eyes disappeared. The anteater acquired the habit of swallowing without mastication; it ceased to use its teeth; therefore, the teeth disappeared. Snakes acquired the habit of gliding over the ground; therefore, their legs disappeared. They acquired the habit of concealing themselves in the long grass and slipping through small openings; therefore, their bodies became elongated and small in circumference. Some birds had to learn to get their food from the water; they had, therefore, to learn to swim; therefore, they developed webs between their toes. The giraffe had to learn to live in a niggardly environment and to get its food from tall shrubs and trees; therefore, its forelegs and neck were stretched. Thus, the environment was the adequate cause of the modifications indicated.

This, of course, is the familiar theory of the "inheritance of acquired characters" which was accepted by many noted men. For the mole, having lost its eyes, transmitted the defect, and it is a fact that young moles have no eyes; the giraffe, having stretched its foreparts, transmitted this character, and it is a fact that young giraffes are born with elongated foreparts; it is a fact that snakes are long and thin when hatched. But were these creatures ever otherwise? It is much easier for those without a scientific conscience or knowledge on these matters to assume that these creatures were simply created in this form.

But the question never would down: How were these acquired modifications transmitted? Weismann cut off the tails of twenty generations of mice, but this modification was not transmitted. The Chinese bound the feet of their women for centuries, but the babies of these women were born with normal feet. The Jews practiced circumcision for generations but—they always had to practice it. All over the world, people cut and scarify their bodies, but the young are never born

[1] "Philosophie Zoologique," Vol. I, p. 227.

with these marks. The Flathead Indians of one of the northwest states like their foreheads flat and the rear part of their heads elongated and high. They apply boards to the heads of the young to have them remade; but the babies always have to be treated; Flathead mothers never give birth to flatheaded children.

It is admitted that modifications occur in the lifetime of the individual from various environmental sources; but how have these modifications become fixed in the young so that as they grow they achieve these characteristics themselves? That has been a puzzler to many. Despite the formidable objections raised by Weismann and others, the Lamarckian theory has continued to find supporters and exponents. At the present time, there is, in France and England, a growing tendency, possibly, to emphasize environmental influences. This tendency is evident in the efforts to trace environmental influences through the soma or body cells into the germ cells. Some even speak of wireless telegraphy and induced electricity; some speak of chemical substances being poured into the blood and bathing the germ or embryo.

The recently developed "glandular theory" belongs in this latter group. Says Sir Arthur Keith, eminent anatomist, physiologist, and anthropologist:

> Hid away in various parts of the human frame, is a series of more or less obscure bodies or glands, five in number, which in recent times, we have come to recognize as parts of the machinery which regulates the growth of the body. They form merely a fraction of the body—not more than $\frac{1}{180}$ part of it; a man might pack the entire series in his watch-pocket. The modern medical student is familiar with each of them—the pituitary body, about the size of a ripe cherry, attached to the base of the brain and cradled in the floor of the skull; the pineal gland, also situated in the brain, and in point of size but little larger than a wheat-grain; the thyroid in the neck, set astride the windpipe, forms a more bulky mass; the two suprarenal bodies situated in the belly, capping the kidneys, and the interstitial glands embedded within the substance of the testicle and ovary, complete the list . . . The pituitary is part of the mechanism which regulates our stature, and stature is a racial characteristic . . . We come now to deal with the thyroid gland, which, from an anthropological point of view, must be regarded as the most important of all the organs or glands of internal secretion . . .[1]

Here we have the kernel of a recent theory of structural modification; and since we are thinking of "environment" as anything outside the germ-cell contents or outside the specific determiners within the nucleus of the germ cell, we have this view correctly placed as an environmentalist theory. These glands are said to produce substances which are poured into the blood and cause changes in the growth of the organism, either by

[1] Quoted in Case, *op. cit.*, p. 202 *ff.* *Cf.* Bourne, "British Association for the Advancement of Science", 1910.

way of arrestment or acceleration or otherwise. But do these modifications become permanent? That is a question which remains unsolved.

The Russian writer, Kropotkin, held the view that the intraspecific struggle was not so severe as the struggle between organisms and their environment. Nature's attacks were more ferocious and destructive, he thought, than those of other species. He held that *mutual aid* was a factor in preserving many organisms which would otherwise have disappeared—their progeny going with them. Mutual aid, then, is a kind of favorable soil. Luther Burbank is quoted as saying that "it is invariably rich soil and favorable conditions which determine the appearance of new variations, whereas underfertilized or overfertilized ground induces reversion." It is not, therefore, the fittest which survive, as Darwin and others contended, but those who occupy the most favorable position.

Darwin faced the fact of modification and was very greatly concerned with the *how* of the process. Taking a hint from Malthus' theory of population, he said that *natural selection* answered the question. He studied pigeons intensively for years and secured evidence that all modern varieties have come down from the European rock pigeon through breeding by man. He concluded that nature worked this way all the time and on all species. He thought that the struggle with the environment caused the preservation and transmission of two kinds of characters: (1) those of direct adaptation, like a long bill or skin color, and (2) inward fortuitious variations. And here we have something new—"inward fortuitious variations." He felt that these were appearing all the time, but he could not account for them. He toyed with his theory of pangenesis—really, genesis in all directions—but was never satisfied with it. He took variations in all directions for granted. Then, if the environment played on these, he thought useful variations would be preserved and the others would lose out. But he was puzzled by the thought that, since all germinal variations are useless at the start, none of them would be preserved. And we can see that usefulness is an appraised result and not a promise of a result; the fit could not be fit in their inception.

The famous chart of Alfred Russell Wallace was an attempt to work out the inevitable logic of evolution as follows:

Facts	Consequences
A. Rapid increase of numbers *B.* Total numbers stationary	Struggle for existence
C. Struggle for existence *D.* Variation with heredity	Survival of the fitter
E. Survival of the fitter *F.* Changes in environment	Structural modifications

But a brief examination of this apparently sound reasoning discloses the fact that the central problem is glossed over and that nothing is solved. "Structural modifications"—his ultimate conclusion—are

obvious. How do they come? We go back a step to "variation with heredity." But what are these? Of course, if a structural modification *is* permanently fixed and transmitted, that *is* heredity. But what is the *how* of heredity? When the progeny are different from their parents —that *is* variation. But what is the *how* of variation? Why is it that, in some respects, the progeny are like their parents while in others they are unlike? What determines the particulars in which the progeny are like the parents and the species and also at the same time determines the particulars in which they are different? The struggle for existence? But, as we have seen, all of these born variations are always minute and useless at the start; no baby, no matter what determiners for being a genius it carried, could live without care; all young have to be protected, either within the mother's body or in some shell in a nest or in the ground or in some other way, as with the larva of bees; and these might be called *favorable environments.*

De Vries, the Dutch botanist of Amsterdam, found that his primroses, at times, modified suddenly and decisively; and that these modifications were transmitted. These sudden and radical changes have been called *mutations.* It is interesting to know of these happenings, but no explanation of these phenomena has been forthcoming. For, after all, mutations are variations—not the minute variations of Darwin to be sure, but still, departures from the parental norm, which is what is meant by *variation.*

2. Heredity.—The Neo-Darwinians, headed by Weismann, thought that natural selection *adequately interpreted* was sufficient to explain everything, even variations. The great microscopist had a very profound knowledge of the cell structure. He accepted the theory of modification by environmental pressures but, at the same time, asserted that there was no inheritance of acquired characters—as we have seen. He advanced two propositions: (1) Transmissible variations cannot be caused by the external environment and (2) transmissible variations are caused by the mixing of determiners in the germ plasm. This helps us, he thought, to understand why children are like their parents; but it does not help us to understand why they are not exactly like them. He thought that new characters—transmissible ones—were due to combinations of invisible but real representatives of those characters in the germ plasm; and that because the characters of the higher organism are exceedingly numerous, the possibilities of recombination of these representatives are almost infinite.

Thus, the struggle for existence was pushed into the germ-plasm system. It was held that there was a struggle among cells, so that those in a favored position in the sex glands were better nourished and some were fertilized where others failed. Millions of sperm cells surround the egg cell at the time of fertilization. Which one of these millions

will gain access to the egg cell and pour its contents in? But in considering such matters, we are still thinking largely in environmental terms.

Much has been done to reveal the structure and function of the reproductive cell. This work shows that there is within the cell a mechanism by means of which the contents of the egg and the sperm are mingled. Chromosomes pass over from one nucleus to the other. These chromosomes are supposed to carry "determiners" from side to side. If each character of the organism is represented by a determiner, then we can understand how the various characters can be combined and recombined. Nobody knows, however, that there *are* such determiners or what they are; this is a hypothesis which helps us to understand some facts but does not explain everything. The work of Mendel and his successors in the field gives the theory considerable plausibility.[1] Many characters seem, in reproduction, to behave as unit characters and retain their individuality throughout; others seem to break up and recombine. But we do not yet understand how it is that certain combinations of parental characters appear in the offspring; we do not yet know why the determiners combine as they do. Of course, we can understand how, if characters are opposites, we can have only one of them.

And so we might go on elaborating theories at great length. But we have gone far enough for our purposes. We have gone far enough to refresh our memories upon the terminology. We have gone far enough, also, to see that the factors of organic evolution are really three in number, speaking broadly—the organism with its mechanism for variation and heredity; the environment, however we may conceive it; and the interaction between the organism and its environment. Most of the investigators have emphasized the importance of one of these three. Darwin recognized them all and came nearer than any one else of his time, perhaps, to seeing the whole process. But much has been discovered since Darwin's day and Darwinism *in toto* is not accepted by reputable biologists today. With this terminology in mind, we may now turn to the main interest of the chapter.

2. The Method of Social Evolution

Some important features of the social-evolution process have already been considered in other connections; this was unavoidable, and points there made must be remembered in this relationship. In an earlier chapter, something was said of the relationship of the *physical environment* to social life; we recall that the stage is part determiner of the play. Something was also said of *numbers;* and social evolution is governed to

[1] See Punnett, "Mendelism," *passim.*

some extent by the numbers of people involved. Something was also said about *contact;* and there could be no social evolution without contact. *Minds* are involved, or at least those reactions which we have been accustomed to name *mental;* but since it is the business of the psychologist to deal with that subject, nothing more may be said of it here. All of these and other factors are indispensable in the ongoings of society; they are assumed here; they must not be forgotten.

As to *sources* of information relative to the evolution of society and satisfactorily supporting the fact of social evolution, much might be said. Thousands of accounts have been written of the changes which have taken place in human society, continuous changes; and the connections between earlier and later stages have been adequately pointed out. Our *histories* have come more and more to be descriptions of social evolution. Any one can think of descriptions of the development of the United States, of that of England, France, of that of religion, of industry, of dress, of cooking, of science, of automobiles, and the like. There is an ever growing interest—and an accumulation of description results—in the numerous social processes of contemporary or modern civilizations.

Accounts of social life among primitive peoples, moreover, have multiplied enormously within the last fifty years. Most of us have heard of, and some of us have read about, the head hunters of Borneo, the Zulus of Africa, the Riffs in Morocco, the Queensland aboriginees in Australia, the Hopi Indians in the United States, and the like. Beyond these we have multiplying records of prehistoric man, what he was like physically, what he did in worship, what he did in industry, how he lived, and so on. And the broad outlines of human civilization, from "before Adam" until the present, are now fairly well made out. We have accounts of what we choose to call *progress.* We have accounts of what we choose to call *decline.* There is plenty of evidence to show that social organization, social life, has been changing; to show that no given civilization was suddenly created at a given date.

Professor Keller has pointed out[1] that the human species exhibits *four* very striking and exceptional series of phenomena.

1. There is first of all the widest possible distribution of man over the earth and into every variety of climate. No other living species shows anything like such wide dispersal.

2. There is such thoroughgoing homogeneity, on the physical side, within the human species that scientists have found it impossible adequately and finally to distinguish fixed and immutable varieties. We talk about different *races;* but nobody really knows what a race is and how any one race is finally differentiated from all others.

3. It is not possible to discover radical racial diversity back over the ages. Ancient Egyptian remains show the human form to be much

[1] "Societal Evolution," Chap. I.

the same as it is at present. Fossils rescued from diluvial strata unite in proclaiming the absence of this decisive racial diversity. So we have, as a fact, the widest possible distribution together with the narrowest similarity of structure. This spells out a fourth point.

4. Man has hit upon a new mode of adjustment. There are slight and inconsequential differences in structure, yet man lives and survives in the most diverse environments. When an animal species moves into a new environment, or a new environment moves against an adjusted animal species, very decided structural modifications begin to appear. But man does not so change. He changes *culturally;* he changes his arts, his beliefs, his standards, his tools, and so forth. Some actual brain changes may be behind these; but they are invisible and unmeasurable. The visible and measurable changes are in his culture, in his social life. Man's adaptation, therefore, is not physical but *mental.* And it is also *social,* because it is not the work of any one man but of the generations in interaction.

But we have already addressed ourselves to the task of examining the nature of this culture, this mental, this social, content. We have been talking about nothing else in these pages. Society, social processes, social institutions, social organizations, all of these are man's method of survival, of adaptation. But what we did in former pages was to strike out bold outlines through society and consider special fields and aspects; we considered social life, as it were, statically; we held imitation, the family, competition, religion, the state, and other contents before us as examples of "still life." But we gave the wrong impression if we left the inference that these were not dynamic, not on the march, not alive and throbbing and changing. Now, however, at any rate, we have to see parts and the whole changing partially and changing wholly. But we have to see the method mainly, the *how* of it all. We have to uncover those timeless and universal aspects of the method by which people cohere through numberless ages and generations when, as a fact, they die off within threescore years and ten. So if we ask: What evolves? the answer is that the psychosocial environment evolves; the culture evolves; man's mode of response evolves; his relations to his fellows evolve; his ideas evolve.

Attacking, now, the problem of method, we find that there are probably *three* fundamental processes at bottom. These three are variation, selection, and transmission; and it will be our aim to explain and illustrate these in the following pages. But first of all, we must fasten our attention upon something in society which is relatively *fixed* and *permanent.* Let us think, for example, of a given *law* or a code of laws—the Mosaic code. Let us think of a given organization such as the monogamic family, the autocratic state, a capitalistic industrial organization. Let us think of a given world view such as existed prior to the develop-

ment of science. Any more or less fixed and permanent *standard* will do. Each one may choose what he likes; but the fixity, the permanency, the unchangeableness of the thing is the aspect of it that our attention must be focused upon for the moment.

1. Variation.—Having taken some standard, we may now think of our own personal relationship toward it as being one of two possible kinds; we may approve or disapprove it, agree or disagree with it, reproduce or depart from it. If we take the law, Thou shalt not kill, we may refrain from killing and thus conform, or we may kill and thus depart from it. Whatever the standard, these are the possibilities. And any departure from this standard—is variation. We do not need to concern ourselves here with the amount or degree of variation; a little is as good as a great deal for our purposes.

a. The Fact of Variation.—Now the question arises: Is there any such thing as variation from standard in social matters? If there was a standard family form at the beginning, as the book of Genesis seems to imply, there has been an enormous amount of departure from that norm. The chapter on the family provides us with the evidence; for there we found examples of many kinds of family form, and all of the kinds were not given. The theory of evolution itself was a variation, for we saw in the previous chapter something of the world view prior to the time when the idea of evolution began to take hold of scholars. All new inventions have been variations—the automobile, the steam engine, the cotton gin, gunpowder, and so on. Keller says:

> Anyone can see, on brief reflection, that no two human groups—whether family, club, sect, secret society, township, state, or nation—have the same code of mores. Even the code of personal conduct shows its variations and, by virtue of selection among them, is altered from time to time . . . Variation in the folkways is practically self-evident.[1]

If there is no variation in society, then there could be no such endless diversity of customs and institutions as we find everywhere about us. A London, England, news despatch of May 7, 1912, says: "The body of the Right Rev. Dr. Stubbs, the Bishop of Truro, was cremated today. This was the first time on record that a Bishop's body has been incinerated." This is an incontrovertible example.

b. Kinds of Variation.—Classified from the standpoint of the amount of reflection involved, variations are of two chief kinds—unconscious and conscious. These kinds are well illustrated in our everyday life. There is the accidental and unintentional variation in social practice which comes, first of all, out of imitation. We saw in a former chapter that the most faithful imitation always results in change. The most earnest attempts to preserve standards end in changing them. They

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 43.

are changed little or much, as the case may be, but they *are* changed—that is our point. Thus, as successive generations try to reproduce the reproductions exactly, there is an ever increasing amount of change introduced which, after a time, amounts to a genuine social movement—all unintended. This is a true picture of what goes on all about us all the time, of what we ourselves do although we try not to have such a thing come about.

Our lives, moreover, are filled with accidents, sudden and unexpected and undesired dislocations of thought movements and activity patterns because of the changes taking place in nature. "The best-laid schemes of mice and men gang aft agley" all the time because of nature's convulsions—earthquakes, floods, and the rest. Social life does not and cannot go on just the same after these upheavals, no matter how faithfully we may try to copy the old.

Then, people are being born all the while; they come with their new equipment and cannot help starting new movements. The old are dropping out all the time, and certain phases of their work must cease. People also migrate, and this makes change in social patterns. Here are many sources of unconscious variation.

Let us take a concrete case. Consider accidental variations in speech. It is our common experience to hear new expressions, struck off accidentally, all the time. Purists in language make slips as well as others. There are streams of new terms and combinations of them originating without intention as writing and speaking increases in quantity. The student who used the phrase "classical and jazzical music" in one of the writer's classes was not trying to originate something; the expression was too spontaneous.

And we might study fashions, religion, politics, industry, recreation, and any phase of our life together and find numerous examples of this spontaneous, unintentional variation. There is a vast deal of it wherever we look.

Turning to conscious variation, much may be said. Every group and every age extrudes individuals who, for not entirely clear reasons as yet, refuse to try to copy or reproduce the accepted standards and thus vary "on purpose." They do it, as they sometimes say when they are older, "on principle." They deliberately criticize the old ways and try to organize antagonism to them.

One immediately calls to mind the world's great leaders. One thinks of Jesus, who condemned the meticulous care with which devout Jews tithed "mint and anise" and left undone "the weightier matters of the law"; one thinks of Mohammed and his new religious code; one thinks of Luther, who insisted on the enlightenment of the people; one thinks of the hardy "fathers of our Country" who threw off the "English yoke" and endeavored to establish a "free people"; one thinks of Darwin

and the bomb he placed under the old-world view; one thinks of Bell, of Edison, of Ford. These persons deliberately set out to change things, and they succeeded; social life has been very different because of the efforts of these men.

We might think, also, of the countless and indescribable changes effected by little groups of ordinary men getting together around some idea and trying to spread it. The parole system, the probation system, popular education, sanitary systems, and the like came from devoted groups who were determined to work out changes.

A fruitful topic, which we cannot do more than mention, is to what extent these conscious and unconscious departures turn out to be good or bad or indifferent. But these were changes, no matter how we may judge them from this standpoint.

c. Stability of Variations.—An observant person cannot fail to notice that some variations are accepted at once; they "catch on," as we sometimes say. The realm of fashion provides us with unlimited examples. But it often happens that these variations go almost as quickly as they come. On the other hand, there are variants in idea and practice which come very slowly, that is to say, spread very slowly and are found to have really entered into the warp and woof of society only after years or decades.

With respect to this matter, much depends upon the social conditions obtaining. If there is urgent need, as in the case of the telephone, the automobile, antitoxins, labor-saving devices, then the variation has a better chance of surviving than if there is no great need. Need, acceptability, cost, and other factors enter here and complicate the matter indefinitely. When one considers how quickly the automobile "took" and how slowly the evolutionary theory has been accepted, one understands that there are decided differences in the impact which a new variation makes.

The Patent Office in Washington illustrates the fact that there are thousands of inventions, well intended, thoughtful, needful it may be, which have turned out to be useless and have failed to catch on. And we see another point here, namely, that we can never get a complete history of the evolutionary process because so many variations lose out and disappear. There is competition and conflict among variations.

d. Rapidity of Variation.—In comparison with the human process, the subhuman is very slow; in the subhuman realm, modifications take time—several generations, perhaps. In the human social sphere, sometimes variations come with astonishing rapidity. Social variations, being mental, can come as fast as single minds or group minds can work. It is often the case that they come more rapidly than they can be accepted, that is, paid for, used, understood. But in the human realm, a generation

may experience an almost complete right-about-face. We see this in industry; we see it in religion; we see it in politics.

Rapidity depends upon many conditions—readiness of the population for a given routine or idea, intelligence to grasp its meaning, the need of it, how well and in what sort of coin the inventor is paid, whether or not the foundations for it have already been laid.

We observe, also, that rapidity is conditioned by the general stage of culture. Primitive peoples advance so little and so slowly because they put a premium upon conformity, and that stifles invention—and inventors. Coming up the scale of civilization, the rate is faster and faster until we come to the present when new ideas and new patterns of action come so quickly and by so many channels and with such dazzling or seductive appeals that assimilative power is overtaxed and glutted. We have infinitely more new suggestions than we can even notice let alone properly appraise. One has to deal not only with the particular new idea or activity pattern proposed but also with an incalculable number of others dependent upon and arising out of it. This is one of the reasons for the widespread fear of new things, namely, the incalculable consequences. Oftentimes when the innovation itself is most acceptable, it is rejected because people cannot foresee the correlated results.

e. Limits of Variation.—The last point in the previous paragraph has introduced us already to this point. Variations always have to face the ignorance, the inattention, the preoccupation, the stupidity of the people for whom they are proposed. This is sterile soil; it is discouraging to variations.

A more severe limitation is found in the inability really to conceive what is new. Professor de Laguna writes of this difficulty as follows:

> We seem not to be capable of inventing even a really new game. Basketball, as compared with hockey and association football, or the original bridge, as compared with whist, are fair illustrations of the utmost degree of novelty that is to be found. An old story has it that chess was invented by the sage Palamedes as a pastime for the Greek chieftains who took part on the long siege of Troy. If chess had, indeed, ever been invented, it must have sprung from the brain of Athena herself rather than from that of the most ingenious of mortals. But it was never invented; it grew. In early modern times the power of the chess bishop was not what it is now. And even after all the rules of the game were fixed as at present, the game could still develop; and in the course of the nineteenth century the development was extraordinary, as remarkable in its way as that which was undergone by the sciences of chemistry and geology.[1]

Of course, de Laguna is discussing that peculiar type of variation to which the name *invention* is usually applied. He is thinking primarily of useful and needed variations. And we must admit that, even in our fertile age, there is all too little of inventive genius, too little of the

[1] "The Factors of Social Evolution," p. 64.

strikingly original, too little of the notably creative. Musicians are just now, as we write, bemoaning in the public press the lack of outstanding musical geniuses such as former times and other countries produced.

f. Conditions Favorable to Variation.—It has been shown—and we have given examples of the same—by some biologists that wholesome nutrition in appropriate quantities is favorable to variation in organic structure. Working by analogy, we might say that social variation is favored by ample suggestions from a great many sources. Biologists have also indicated that cross-fertilization makes for variation. Similarly, cross-fertilization of cultures makes for variation in social life.

In society, wealth makes for ample nutrition and frees people from the degrading grind of making a living in some monotonous way. This seems to be favorable to variation, although many waste their wealth and become far less thoughtful. We also have cross-fertilization in the shape of continuous diffusion of culture patterns by means of immigration and other forms of social movement over the earth, by means of conquest, and by means of the extensions of the numerous communicational devices. From this angle, conditions have never been so favorable to variation.

Crises of all sorts are favorable to variation. We have already called attention to the influences of earthquakes, floods, and other natural upheavals. A severe drought forces attention to the provision of adequate water supplies. The invasion of the corn borer challenges farmers and all who can be persuaded to help them to invent ways of counteracting this pest.

The appearance of great men is another factor. The appearance of geniuses produces something of a crisis. If they launch new ideas, they place contradictions before the people and compel a choice. When they have ideas and courage, they have to be reckoned with; and they rarely lack followers and imitators, no matter what they propose. Great men are both born *and* made; but it matters not from our standpoint here how they come. Our point is that their coming produces a new situation, and that calls for a redefinition—which is variation.

Young men in official positions make for variation. They have their reputations to make and not to stand on; they are more receptive to the new because they have no past with which they must be consistent; they are less experienced and consequently less afraid; they foresee less of the consequences of variation and are more courageous.

2. Selection.—Let us keep in mind our norm, our standard, whatever it may be, and let us again recall that there are two possible attitudes which we can take toward it: We can accept it or reject it. If we reject it, that is variation. Now, with respect to *this* variation, also, there are two possible attitudes: We can accept it or reject it. And this is

what we mean by *selection* in this connection. We mean that the variation in mind is either adopted and followed or is disapproved and not adopted. Either case is a case of selection. Rejection is one kind of selection. A young man asks a young woman to marry him. It is usually assumed that the choice lies with the young man. Actually, it lies with the woman; she has the last word. If she accepts, she selects; if she refuses, she selects. And the situation is not different with any new idea or routine that comes under our notice. Such new idea or routine plays the role of suitor; we play the role of the maiden; if we accept, we select, and if we reject, we still select. This is a brief statement of the general situation.

But our selection is always determined, in part, by our relations with the standard routine or idea from which the particular variation is a departure. If we are blindly loyal adherents to the former; if we have made up our minds that nothing new can be superior; if we have already decided that the old is good enough; if we are afraid of venturing; if we hold that venturing is sinful; if we are preoccupied and wish not to be compelled to appraise the new—then the variation makes little impression upon us; it is rejected "on principle." If we are not stout conservatives but plastic and "liberal," as we sometimes say, then the situation is very different. We may not actually be looking for modifications and yet hold our minds hospitable to them; we may show at least a willingness to consider and appraise them. A third possibility is that where we are more or less disgusted with the old, feel cramped and thwarted by it, have become dissillusioned, and are really in search of something different. Needless to say, selection will be different in all of these cases. In the first case, variations or proposals of variations, fall on stony ground, and the yield of the new crop is—nil. In the second case, the seed falls on somewhat more fertile soil, but it has to compete there with much other seed, and the yield is—uncertain. In the third case, the seed variations fall on very fertile soil, and the crop, at its worst, or in its most pronounced form, is—a conversion or a revolution. What we are saying, of course, to put the matter in psychological terms, is that the reception of the new is conditioned by the old and by the thoroughness of that conditioning.

This argument leads us to note that there are really two main types of selection. Professor Keller has named them *automatic* and *rational*. It will be worth our while to explain and illustrate these terms.

a. Automatic Selection.—"It is a commonplace of history," says Keller, "that customs and institutions arise, attain strength and vogue, finally yield to other ways of procedure and disappear."[1] And we might substitute the term *variations* for "customs and institutions" in the above statement. Now, looked at in the large, individuals do not do the

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 54.

selecting and rejecting in such cases. The individuals who brought on the American Revolution—all of them, we mean—can never be named; a few outstanding names only are familiar. What brought the revolution was something which, for want of a better name, we call a *mass movement.* The particular leaders so often named were not causes but instruments; they voiced a general feeling or drift on the part of the colonists away from England. Many of these colonists were doubtless almost unconscious of the way they were moving and would not have admitted, perhaps, that their allegiance to the old country was languishing. But bit by bit, subtly and imperceptibly, loyalty did decline in many bosoms until gradually something like a mass drift was created. Then leaders appeared to make this movement conscious and to organize it. We can see the same thing in connection with religion today.

This large-scale and wholesale process of selection, unconsidered, undesigned, unforeseen, is produced by many exigencies. Births and deaths change the character and attitudes of the population imperceptibly. The new are coming on all the time, and the old are going out. Two points are worthy of notice here. One is that this disappearance of the old vitally affects the texture of the population in incalculable directions and has a great deal to do with the general drift; the authority and power of old people wane after they are dead.

In the second place, of course, the new people coming on make similar differences. The new can never occupy the identical places of the old whom they supplant—in the church, in the political party, in industry, in the home. A larger, a smaller, or a wholly different place is occupied. "Natural" selection, then, makes its impact continually on "social" selection in this way. It has been said by some that the *decline* of the birth rate among native Americans has started a drift toward the handing over of affairs more and more to the old and thus is speeding up the movement toward crystallization and conservatism. A decline of male births gives a preponderant influence into the hands of women.

Again, selection is automatic when it is largely the result of the outreachings of native impulses, urges, and passions of the masses of people. We know that they reason little and narrowly. The dynamic of their life is the immediate want. If the want happens to be the same for a large number, then a drift sets in, a mass movement is already under way; but it is a mass movement which has no prevision of where it will end. Skillful leaders, by advertising and propaganda, that is, by subtle suggestion, can pretend to locate the place where they suppose the end is, and satisfaction may be found. Then what happens is what happens among animals—a pushing, a struggling, a teeming, tumultuous, spasmodic tidal movement in that direction—if the leaders "take."

Selection is certainly automatic when it is furious; and innovations have, times without number, made the masses furious. The announce-

ment of the theory of evolution is a case in point. The masses of the people, when they heard of this doctrine, stopped their ears, lashed themselves up into a frenzy, fumed, fretted, condemned, and thus selected this notion—for speedy death, as they thought. They were angry "clear through" and, therefore, entirely incapable of making any other kind of selection. The frenzied agitation of many toward the Russian experiment is also a case in point.

Possibly no example is more fully illustrative of this idea than war. A war, of course, can never be prosecuted by generals and diplomats alone. They can fight only by means of the populace. And they can send the populace into the carnage only when the people are angry, are "worked up." A recent writer describes the change in attitude which took place in Berlin.

> In great sadness, day by day, we had watched this bitterness of spirit grow. Hitherto we had found the Berliner so "lustig, so gemütlich," that it distressed us to see the change. Whatever charge you might lay against the Berliner, you could not say that he nursed a grudge for any length of time. They were an attractive, genial, forgiving lot, with an inextinguishable sense of humor . . .
>
> Now they had grown like creatures of the wild, beasts of ravenous instincts. The doctrines they advocated were appalling. From a fairly liberal interpretation of the Golden Rule they suddenly narrowed to "Do what I say and in such a way as I please." The whole world must bend to their will; and in the effort to enforce that will they would wreck the whole world. Treitschke's motto, "German every fibre," became the catchword. They had coarsened, brutalized.[1]

But a parallel statement might be made for certain sections of all the populations engaged in the World War. And certainly these sections drove through to destroy and eliminate, and thus to select, dominated by a protean energy as ruthless and indiscriminating as a volcano or a flood. An energy which pounds to pieces the priceless treasures of a Louvain or a Rhiems can hardly be thought of as other than automatic.

The inevitable competition and conflict of life, of course, are really selective processes. The old standards—ideas and routines—are perpetually subjected to strain, as the winds test the skyscrapers. The new, moreover is subjected in like manner. An example may be taken from the business world. A study was made some years back of 4,619 concerns covering a 30-year period. The average length of life of retail stores was found to be 7.1 years. The following list gives the average length of life of the several kinds: groceries, 7.1 years; hardware stores, 7.9 years; paint and wall-paper stores, 6.7 years; drugs, 7.8 years; book and stationery stores, 6.9 years; jewelry, 7.2 years; drygoods stores, 6.9 years; clothing, 6.4 years; boots and shoes, 7.4 years; furniture, 6.8 years.[2]

[1] Phillips, "The Decline of the Berliner," *World Wide*, Jan. 12, 1918.

[2] *Rural Manhood*, January, 1918.

The wholesale and automatic character of this selective process is revealed in the fact that many excellent merchandizing methods were lost out, many excellent merchants were ruined, competition was heightened for other stores by the forced sale at lower prices of the stocks, and the waste was very great. One cannot detect much of reason in this, looking at the process as a whole.

b. Rational Selection.—The irrationality of the former type of selection is evident mostly in the incalculable and unwarranted results of the process; it may, in certain cases, be likened to the smashing up of a china shop in an effort to kill a fly. But what is rational selection and how does it work?

First of all, it is important to note that rational selection has to start with the variations offered; that is one limitation. Furthermore, it is somewhat restricted by reason of certain lines of development already well established; a variation in the direction of more private murder and theft could not be preserved because the whole drift is the other way; a variation in the direction of freer sex relations between the unmarried could not make much headway because of the high and ancient walls of taboo guarding this series of relationships. Rational selection is selection *within the possibilities;* it is discriminating selection.

Rational selection is that kind of selection which visualizes ends and the means to them. But more than this, it chooses ends which we sometimes call *moral,* which have to do with human welfare, which are *constructive* in the best sense of the term.

Rational selection, as we now see, is based on knowledge, based on an extensive and thorough acquaintance with the facts of life and the ultimate demands of man. The possession of knowledge does not always guarantee that the selection will be rational; but the absence of knowledge always guarantees that the selection will be irrational—unless we think of imitating a leader as rational.

Perhaps the best example we have of rational selection is found in modern science and philosophy. Let us say that new variations are presented constantly—as they are—to scientists and philosophers. How do these persons behave in such situations? For one thing, they try to control their emotions so as not to be stampeded; they try to take an attitude as impersonal and detached as possible; they try to see this particular variation as in operation universally and estimate its results. Then they experiment as much as possible and try to verify as far as they can. They employ all of the methods of investigation and reasoning that are known and remain as loyal as possible to the logic of the facts.

Thus, the knowing class is the rational selector in any society or group. And they succeed by means of authority, in which awe is no small ingredient; by means of imitation, in which, although there is

much that is lost, something is gained; by means of positive teaching. But we shall speak of these points somewhat later.

The special difficulties of rational selection, that is, of taking the scientific attitude, in society, have already been alluded to in the opening chapter of this book. It was there pointed out that there are great hindrances—the difficulties of getting at the facts, and the biases. We have pointed out a very serious difficulty not so far back—the stupidity, the ignorance, the emotionalism of the masses. The masses are often satisfied to "stew in their own juice" and so drive out and kill innovators who might at the same time be rational selectors for them; who might serve them as skilled physicians serve their patients.

An illustration or two of this last difficulty: Edith Wharton, in her story, "The Fruit of the Tree," presents a situation in which a nurse, in order to spare a dying patient needless suffering, helps her to die. The fact, however, becomes known, and society wreaks its vengeance for the variation from the traditional code. Dr. Osler called forth a storm of protest by suggesting, some years ago, that all people should be chloroformed at sixty. A doctor in Chicago, a few years ago, allowed a repulsively defective baby to die; and the reaction was violent in its manifestation. In these cases, the variations proposed ran counter to the cherished beliefs and feelings of the masses; they were promptly repudiated. Verification cannot work here satisfactorily, because the masses are trained to find good in what, from a purely objective viewpoint, seems to be wholly bad. The law of anticipation works against it. That is, an automobile, a brand of face cream, an idea *is* satisfactory because it has already been presented as warranted to satisfy; the recipients are already partially hypnotized; already established belief prepares fertile soil in the minds of the recipients, and verification is nullified by that fact.

Consider, however, the differences in the willingness to employ the methods of verification in the different areas of culture. Consider the average farmer confronted with a new religious idea and a new plow. He may give the plow a test and adopt it if it meets the test. Is he so receptive to the new religious idea? Usually not. For one thing, he is specialized to verify as to plows; he understands the technique of the process. But he is not specialized to test a religious idea; he has no satisfactory technique. And yet he might, if he would, proceed in the same way with the religious idea as with the plow. But in the one case he is committed, perhaps, to a policy of receiving the new (plow); whereas in the other case he is generally committed to the opposite policy.

From this, Keller believes that verification proceeds all the while in those realms where it is most easily used and where the results are desirable and obvious—the effort of making a living, industry. Innovations are considered and tested here. Then through those numerous and subtle

influences whereby changes made in any part affect other parts of a living whole, the rest of society is gradually modified and brought into harmony.[1] And so, some trace modern liberalism to the changes enforced by the Industrial Revolution in the eighteenth century. That the *method* of science is now tolerated in the field of Biblical study shows that very great changes in attitude have taken place.

What we have tried to say is that *experimentation* is ever more widely used and is ever more approved. The guardians of very few realms now dare to deny its value and refuse to use it. And, of course, the results of experimentation, if adequately checked and verified by dispassionate workers, are the ungainsayable residuum; they represent the truth as we now have it; they represent finality for the present.

3. Transmission.—When any new variation—idea or routine—has been tested to the best of the best ability of the times and comes to be the truth or the good as at present understood, it forms a new standard—idea or routine. We are, then, in our reasoning, just where we were in beginning the study of the methods of evolution. It will be recalled that we began with something relatively fixed, something satisfactorily normal; and then we noted variations from that. We studied the processes of variation and then those of selection; from which we come back to standards again. And so we live in an endless cycle of movement from standards to standards.

The processes of variation and selection are going on all the time—perpetually. The cycle may be completed in any given generation. But the further question obtrudes itself: How do standards or variations become transmitted from one generation to the next? How is it that one generation finds itself imprisoned in the standards of the past or seduced by the vagaries of the present? How are the generations tied together so that we have the identity and continuity already described? What, in other words, is the method of transmission?

The basis we have to assume, first of all, is communication. That is the large category of reality which underlies what is now to be set forth. There could be no social variation, no social selection, without communication, not even within any given generation, much less across the generations. Communication is the substance of the bond which everywhere and under all circumstances ties human beings together. Communication is the essential time binder and space binder among men. If there can be no social variation without communication, and no selection without communication, much less can there be any transmission without communication.

The nature of transmission would be very different, doubtless, if any given generation died off all at once, say, and a new one took its

[1] *Op. cit.*, Chap. V.

place. Suppose that all the people in the United States were sixty years of age right now. And suppose that they were all to die tomorrow. And suppose that a new crop of people came on. Liken the situation to a field producing wheat. The crop of one season is utterly cleaned off. A new crop comes next year to take its place. How would the dead generation make its impress on the new generation? How would it get across with its experience, its standards, its achievements?

Fortunately, we do not have to face such a problem in reality. For there are no *generations*, literally speaking. We each speak of our "contemporaries." But who are they? They are people exactly of our age, people slightly younger and older, people much younger and older, and so on. There are no dividing lines between the generations. One generation merges with the next, and that with the next, and that with the next, all woven together into a stream that is separable into distinct parts as much as a stream of water is—which is not at all. And so, the simple fact of transmission is found in this: that we tell our children and neighbors; these tell their children and neighbors; these tell theirs—on indefinitely. Thus are variations and standards transmitted. But this simple process is, in reality, most complex; and there are two aspects of it which deserve special treatment here.

a. Imitation.—The natural outreachings of the organism are relied upon to pass over some of the culture—from parents to children, from teacher to pupil, from leader to follower, from race to race. We have studied imitation, and we have already seen how it functions. We commented upon the fact that imitation does not reproduce *exactly;* but we also pointed out that it reproduces *partly.* This is the aspect of the matter that engages our attention here—the partial reproductions. For in these partial reproductions of past ideas and routines, the past gets itself preserved into the future, with individual imitators as the carriers, to a large extent quite unconsciously. John swings an axe much as his father did. Jenny bakes bread much as her mother baked it. Jim's religious ideas are derived from the minister. Kate's notion of how people are to be married comes from seeing the weddings enacted in the neighboring church. And so it goes—for innumerable examples.

In our search for copies for bodily movements and thought patterns, the first soil examined is always our immediate surroundings—our family. And the family life pattern always makes an indelible impression and embodies itself in us, even in spite of ourselves. If we had, at an early age, the capacity utterly to ignore immediate stimuli—home copies—and direct our search in foreign parts, we should be very different people. Even then, imitation would play an immense role with us. But not having such capacity, we are soft putty in the hands of the giant potter—our immediate surroundings. We are in search—by original

nature—for copies. Copies are, so to speak, in search of carriers. Thus, the two fit together.

Of course, not everything out of the past, not every copy, is transmitted. We find that we cannot assimilate all that the past would crowd upon us. We select. We reject. And thus, much is left behind. But we have an astonishing capacity for inventing means whereby all that we can possibly lug forward is preserved. Books, museums, victrola records, safe-deposit vaults, and the like are examples. And so culture "accumulates."

b. Inculcation.—As youngsters or novices entering the cultural play, we are prone to copy what we will; prone to take a little here and select a little there; prone to work according to our native likes and dislikes. But we do not and cannot select wisely, let us say. Imitation, then, is found to be entirely inadequate; there are grave limitations to its transporting capacity. Being for the most part very undiscriminating, as we must be when young, we would as often as not reject the wisdom of the ages and swallow its froth. What then? The past begins to apply pressure; the elders inculcate; they teach. And so throughout the ages has been built up what we now call the *educational system,* which is a methodical way of applying pressure to the young as they seep into the main stream of culture all the while. Mother does not leave the bread-baking art entirely to imitation; she gives positive instructions; she sees to it that the whole art, not simply those parts which interest the novice, is understood, that is, transmitted. Father does not leave the axe-swinging art to the vacillating attention of nearby John; he points and talks and insists and so applies pressure. He thus makes sure that the whole pattern is understood and is faithfully reproduced—as he thinks.

There has never been a time when the young were left free to follow their native inclinations in this matter. As far back as we can go in human history, we find unofficial and official instructors—inculcators. Sometimes it is the father, sometimes the mother, sometimes both, sometimes the priest, sometimes the witch doctor, sometimes the politician. There have always been innumerable inculcators. There are more now than ever. They are increasing in number rapidly. They are, moreover, steadily becoming more skillful. In addition, they begin earlier. Furthermore, they work more pertinaciously and longer. The pressure has always been very heavy; it is now heavier than ever. The determination of the past to preserve itself into the present and on into the future is now more deep seated and vigorous than it has ever been.[1]

Our preceptors and other authorities who apply this pressure disclaim any intention of making the past live on through the present and into the

[1] *Cf.* the chapter on education.

future—of course. They say that they are preparing the young for the future. But their pretense is very hollow, and it is exposed in a sentence: They do not understand the future themselves and have only the vaguest notions as to what kind of people ought to be in it. Again, the future has no resources for them to draw on in furnishing the young to meet it; the only resources available are in the past—immediate and remote—and therefore they have to use what the past has found out.

What is actually done, then, is to inculcate out of the past in the hope that what the past has learned will be of value in the future. Sometimes this hope is fulfilled, and sometimes it is not. But there is a difference here between those who inculcate out of the past with an eye on the future and those who inculcate out of the past with an eye on the past. Not long ago, District Attorney Foley of Boston declared before the Catholic Total Abstinence Union that, "so long as I am District Attorney the standards of decency, purity, and morality set up by past generations in this country will be maintained by me."[1] Which way was the district attorney looking?

So it occurs that when any given standard is transmitted as exactly as the authorities can cause it to be, with the aid of docile carriers, it becomes a point of reference; it becomes a generating place for new variations. Some of these are acted upon by selective agents and transmitted.[2] Then they, in turn, become standards, and so on.

A question may be raised at this point: In using terms employed in describing organic evolution, are we not falling into the pit of the "biological analogy" and thus vitiating the argument? Is social evolution, after all, only *like* organic evolution? Professor Keller says:

> I shall be charged, doubtless, with "reasoning from analogy," but I do not feel that the charge is deserved. I find a something in the social field which *is* variation, whether or not it may be *like* what is called variation in the organic field; similarly social selection *is* selection and not merely *like* it. In the social field, also, there is a means of transmission having the essential attributes of heredity in nature; and adaptation occurs in one range of phenomena as in the other.[3]

A rather better answer to the charge of "reasoning from analogy" we think would be that these terms were used in common speech and had reference to social phenomena long before they were taken over and especially applied in the organic field. People read history and heard the traditions of their tribe or people long before they knew anything of organic evolution. They arrived at the idea that there was progress—one kind of social evolution—in society before they knew that organisms came from lower forms.

[1] Davis, "Boston," *Harpers Magazine*, January, 1928, p. 144.

[2] Keller, *op. cit.*, Chap. VII.

[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 15.

Thus, social evolution was really discovered first. The Encyclopædists and Physiocrats of the eighteenth century advanced a doctrine of progress of humanity. The Industrial Revolution in England in the eighteenth century, growing out of the inventions of Watt, Arkwright, Stephenson, Wheatstone, and others, demonstrated within a single generation the plasticity of society and the possibilities of radical changes. All of this happened before Darwin. Indeed, Darwin derived his basic hint from Malthus, who wrote about the human population.

Hence, if any charges are to be made, the sociologists might appropriately charge the biologists with "reasoning from analogy." For the idea of evolution arose in human minds from the contemplation of *human affairs* about as soon as it arose from the study of the organic world. Then, as with Darwin, this terminology—long in common use in ordinary intercourse—was taken over and applied to organic phenomena. Dealing as the biologists did with more concrete data and being freer to investigate and trusting more to the experimental method, the results far outshone anything the social evolutionists produced. So organic evolution forged ahead and took the center of the scientific stage for a long time. And that is why it now seems to some people, when social scientists are trying to make investigation more scientific, that they are reasoning from analogy. But the social scientists surely ought to be pardoned for using their own terminology.

Questions

1. Review carefully what was said in discussing competition and conflict in a previous chapter.
2. Are we sure that we are trying to be open minded? Do we have the scientist's passion for truth?
3. Does the inanimate physical environment have anything to do with organic evolution? If so, what?
4. If you were told that "variation" is the crux of the problem of all evolution, what would you say?
5. Why is the discussion of the "glands" introduced in this connection? Do you see any connection?
6. What might be, and has been, contrasted with natural selection?
7. Criticize Wallace's chart.
8. What do you mean by *heredity?* Give some illustrations.
9. Is heredity opposed to environment? Explain.
10. Give some examples of social variation which are familiar to you. What is the opposite of variation?
11. The scientist tries to discover uniformities. How, then, can he consider variations?
12. In society, what does the selecting of the variations offered? Are you a selector in any sense?
13. Do you select rationally at any time? What?
14. Are people selecting more rationally or less so now as compared to the time of Christ? Give reasons.

15. What is the relation of imitation to change? By the way, how did we define *imitation?*

16. Is the school the only or the main inculcator? Show this.

17. Make a list of what has been transmitted to you.

18. Is social evolution more or less rapid than organic evolution? Give evidence.

19. What changes that you recall have taken place in your family, say, during one generation? Is this evolution?

20. What is the difference in meaning between *change* and *evolution?*

CHAPTER XXI

SOCIAL ORIGINS

On first thought, because of our training, a neat creation theory is handiest when one faces the problem of social origins. When and how did dress start? How and when did sex taboos become established? Who started language, and what was its original form? It is most satisfying to some to be able to point out, in answer, a name and a date. There is little difference if the originators be men or gods; men and gods are definite and locatable—or so it would seem to many. Before science arose, our ancestors used this method of accounting for the numerous elements and complexities found in human and other affairs. Says de Laguna:

> They attributed them to the inventive genius of wise men of old, or, in cases that seemed to them sufficiently remarkable, to a superhuman being. Thus the common law of the land was due to a semi-mythical Moses or Lycurgus or Numa, assisted by the counsels of a friendly deity. The art of agriculture had been taught by Saturn, and the culture of the vine by Bacchus. The alphabet had been invented by Cadmus. The manufacture and use of metal tools was the gift to humanity of the great Prometheus.[1]

When men first began to raise questions of origins, they had no carefully worked-out technique of investigation; they could not find origins. But, believing in the existence of powers able to originate all that they found about them, they had a ready explanation. It was quite natural—logical—that they should reach the conclusion they did reach. What else were they to do?

de Laguna continues:

> We are familiar with this type of story and have learned to be very contemptuous of it. And yet there was a powerful reason which led men to cling to such stories persistently. How can a complex organization come into existence gradually? The mutual dependence of the parts is such that, generally speaking, no one of them could subsist without all or some of the rest. Consider, for example, the raising of wheat, and assume the position of the ignorant savage hunter. If he is to begin to raise wheat, what shall he set about first? The preparation of the ground? The sowing? The harvesting? The threshing? The saving of seed for another year? We have here a series of operations stretching over a long period of time, no one of which would have any considerable value without all the rest. If we consider the further processes to which the raising

[1] "The Factors of Social Evolution," p. 60.

of wheat is subsidiary—those involved in the making of bread—the difficulty of conceiving agriculture as the outcome of a slow evolution is increased. Is it not more reasonable to think of the industry as planned and set going as a whole by some one? And if no man could have sufficient foresight, must not a god be assumed in order to account for the facts?[1]

Nevertheless, we have in our day, for the most part, reached the conclusion that the hypothesis of supernatural agency operating in unpredictable, because whimsical, ways to produce what we find about us is untenable and unnecessary; and we hold this way even though we thereby put the matter of origins much "up in the air." Precision, as to person, place, and time, is usually lacking even after the most exhaustive researches many times; and this is disappointing and depressing to many. After elaborating a theory as to the origins of the folkways and mores—but there are no names or dates here—Sumner justifies himself thus:

> No objection can lie against this postulate about the way in which folkways began, on account of the element of inference in it. All origins are lost in mystery, and it seems vain to hope that from any origin the veil of mystery will ever be raised. We go up the stream of history to the utmost point for which we have evidence of its course. Then we are forced to reach out into the darkness upon the line of direction marked by the remotest course of the historic stream. This is the way in which we have to act in regard to the origin of capital, language, the family, the state, religion and rights. Use and wont are products and results. They had antecedents. We can never find or see the first member of the series. It is only by analysis and inference that we can form any conception of the "beginning" which we are always so eager to find.[2]

And Thomas says:

> I think we must frankly despair of ever reconstructing the past history of man in a complete and particularistic fashion. Whether certain incidents transpired as is set down in the records or handed down in tradition we can never know. The folk-mind is highly imaginative and anecdotal. It has always possessed the appetite for the sensational, the morbid, and the marvelous which is at present so successfully catered to by the yellow section of the daily press. It has created many picturesque situations, but it is not an organ of scientific observation.[3]

Thus, the difficulties of the evolutionary hypothesis are very, very great; that is admitted by all evolutionists. How have they been overcome, as far as they have been, and how is it that scholars believe in evolution? We have already given some reasons. de Laguna adds the further thought that they have been overcome

> by means of a clearer conception of what is involved in an evolutionary origin. To account for the beginnings of agriculture, we do not have to show how all the

[1] *Loc. cit.*

[2] "Folkways," p. 7.

[3] "Social Origins," Introduction, p. 12.

different operations, *as now carried on*, were first conceived and practiced separately and then united into a complex whole. Evolution is not an assembling of parts that had already existed either in imagination or in actual practice. What evolves is from first to last an organized whole. Thus agriculture has been from the first a complete process, that is to say, a useful industry. It happens that we now have, by a comparison of the survivals of early methods to be found in different parts of the world, a tolerably complete history of the matter, from the use of the digging-stick to the use of the power-driven cultivator and harvester. We have even learned that such expressions as "the first" are not to be strictly taken. The boundary between the gathering of the fruits of the earth and the cultivation of them, like the boundary between the hunting of animals and the care and breeding of them, is exceedingly unclear.[1]

We must look for, therefore, and expect to find not genuine "beginnings" but only earlier stages of what we have about us. We cannot even conceive of "beginnings." So far as we can learn, there never was *the* beginning. There were simply earlier stages and simpler forms. And so when we come to consider origins, we simply set out to dip our intellectual ladles into the social stream at points as remote as possible, take out a sample, and describe it. "He who sees things grow from their beginnings," said Aristotle, "will have the finest view of them." If we leave out the term "beginnings" in this wise observation and simply say: He who sees things *grow* will have the finest view of them, we shall have suggested the most modern, the soundest, theory and the idea of this chapter. If we can learn to see all things as growing, we take thereby the evolutionary point of view; and we thereby dismiss from our minds the notion of cataclysmic and finished creations of something out of nothing.

1. Stages of Evolution

Many investigators in this field have endeavored to mark out what they have regarded as distinct stages of social development; that is, they have gone into the jungles of *growth* and have imposed order on them—hence, stages. Now, there is nothing harmful in this procedure so long as these stages are taken as merely tools of research. The trouble comes when they are taken as accurate descriptions of *necessary steps* in social change. For example, Comte thought that *thinking*, from the earliest times, had passed through three stages—the theological, the metaphysical, and the positive or scientific. Now, this is a helpful suggestion by itself. The evil comes in assuming that all thinking—say, of an African tribe—*must* pass through these stages, that this tribe cannot develop in any other way. That is to say, many peoples have passed through these stages, have developed in this way, but it is an unproved and misleading assumption to say that all *must* do so.

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 63.

With this qualification and reservation, we can now proceed to consider some suggested stages.

But the question naturally arises: What criteria can be used in marking out stages? We have seen that Comte used *thought;* and this is very important, no doubt. But it is not the only one. Taking the whole societal system and keeping it in mind, we can think of others. We might display the stages in political development; we might take the religious criterion; we might look at the family; we might think of recreation. And all of these criteria would be legitimate and important. But the question is always pertinent: What criteria are most characteristic? Since we have to be brief, what is the most illuminating approach? It has been suggested that possibly the best way to characterize social evolution is by means of *industrial* criteria; and that is the kind we shall use here—fully recognizing all the time that there are others. And let us start where we are and go back.

1. Manufacturing.—A familiar sight for city people is a factory, which is a building or series of buildings in which tools, workers, managers, and raw materials are assembled and organized for the purpose of transforming the latter into finished products. Factories *manufacture,* as we say. But this term is a survival; it means "hand-making." The correct term here is *machinofacture;* and because so much of what is produced and used in our time comes out of this process, and because this process is so dominant within our society, we might properly think of ourselves as in the machinofacture age or stage.

Before the Industrial Revolution—say, 150 years ago—there were hardly any machines in the sense in which we know them. Then goods were made by hand. Thus, the age of manufacture extends from the Industrial Revolution on back to the remotest times, with skill and quantity irregularly diminishing as we go back. Before the revolution mentioned, there was "cottage industry," and the factory was the home, where each person started and finished a piece of work; thus, there was far less specialization. We have said that skill diminishes as we go back. We might say that skill increases as we go back, since each one made a complete article, and since so many of our workers are but machine tenders and possess no skill. At any rate, the transformation of raw materials into finished products by machinery is a dominant feature of our time in the Western world.

2. Agriculture.—By agriculture we mean the widespread practice of forcing the soil to furnish materials necessary for man in larger quantities than it otherwise would do. Literally, it is a complex, including field culture, horticulture, cattle raising, and numerous additional activities. It exists alongside of machinofacture and plays a dominant role in the rural districts, as manufacture does in the towns. Whereas manufacture is a secondary type, agriculture is a primary industry. In our times, it is

carried on in a more scientific way all the time. But as we go back up the stream of history, we see less specialization, less production, less variety in production, and less skill.

Agriculture is artifice applied to the natural organic growths of the land, just as machinofacture is artifice applied largely to the inorganic resources. Ordinarily, the land will produce weeds and other wild things; good farmers make it grow wheat, oats, barley, cotton, fruits and vegetables—all of these at some remote time coming out of the wild state. When machinofacture is dominant, people live more and more in cities. When agriculture is dominant, people live in rural districts—out on the land in scattered fashion, among us; but clustered in villages for protection, among the peasants of Europe. In modern times, these arts are largely in the hands of men; but as we go back, we find that women were the main cultivators of the soil. Soil coercion is very effective in modern times, but it is less and less effective as we go back to the earliest stages of man. Man is the only creature on this earth which practices soil coercion.

The agricultural stage was initiated by the domestication of plants and depended for its advancement beyond mere hoe culture upon the domestication of animals. These achievements—the domestication of plants and animals—represented momentous advances in the arts of life with a corresponding effect upon numbers of the population and the form of the social drama. The food supply became more abundant, more regular, better in quality, and more variegated. The plant is an excellent teacher of foresight.[1]

3. Nomadism.—Not infrequently, a tramp comes to our door and asks for a "hand-out." If we are reflective, the question immediately arises: Why does he need a hand-out? Why doesn't he work as we do? The tramp interests us because he is a survival of a past and prevalent mode of production to which we may give the name *nomadism*. At some remote period, and nobody knows how remote, man began to save the lives of some of the wild animals which he captured and reshape these creatures by breeding according to his own fancy. From this early work came all of our domestic animals, with a few exceptions. Now we have farms for animals and keep them for sale in the market. But in earlier days, before farms were delimited and fenced in as they are now, animals were kept in the "commons" or communal lands. In some countries, the land has never been very productive, and the animals have had to be taken about from place to place, according to the season, and according to where pasturage might be found. We, therefore, have a stage of production called the *pastoral* stage. The people lived from their animals. They had to move about almost continuously, and, hence, there was almost nothing of agriculture, manufacture, towns, permanent homes, and

[1] *Cf.* SUMNER and KELLER, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 58.

hundreds of other things so common to us. The people had to live in houses which could be easily carried along; hence, tents.

In addition, they had to live in small groups because the ground could support only so many cattle, and so many cattle could support only so many people. We have already given some figures to show this. As small groups, they were more or less isolated and, therefore, culturally inbred. Such peoples are usually fairly well disciplined. The men tend the animals; the women look after the children in the tents. The ancient Hebrews were on this stage before they entered Palestine and advanced a stage to agriculture. There are many peoples now in existence who live almost solely by their cattle. "The Todas (of Southern India) are a purely pastoral people, limiting their activities almost entirely to the care of their buffaloes and to the complicated ritual which has grown up in association with these animals."[1]

4. Hunting and Fishing.—We are all well acquainted with persons who ache to be off for a fish or a hunt. But these activities are now regarded as play. Yet they are mere survivals of what was once the chief or whole-time occupation of people. When man acquired control over animals, he had a permanent and highly satisfactory source of life necessities. But what did he do before he had domestic animals? He did regularly just what many now do very irregularly. The main acquisition that put him on this stage was weapons—sticks, bows and arrows, spears, hooks, nets, and the like. These things widened his reach into and his control over the natural environment; they gave him a more or less regular *meat diet;* and this was a great boon, since meat tasted better than roots and nuts. If he had the use of fire, meat was especially good. Cooked meat digested better than raw meat, moreover, and better than other elements in the dietary. Cooked meat was a substitute for mother's milk and probably helped to shorten the nursing period and thus affected the rate of population growth.

But continual traveling was necessary; man had to wander to secure game and fish. Consequently, the population was less dense than among nomads. Houses had to be very temporary structures, and there was no furniture worth mentioning. Thus, this type of production affected men's relations to each other in a variety of ways. How long members of the human race lived upon this stage nobody knows, but probably for many milleniums.

5. The Collection Stage.—Before man had any tools of any kind, how did he gain a living? Well, he lived just as other creatures do—without them. He took *what nature offered* that he could grasp; he took nuts, fruits, roots, grubs, anything edible within reach; his only tools were his hands and teeth. At the beginning of human history, man was just like any animal fighting his way among other animals and handicapped

[1] SUMNER and KELLER, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 59.

in some ways, although advantaged in others. He ate what he could find by continual wandering; he slept where he could find shelter. In this stage, he was fireless, toolless, animalless—destitute.

This is a hypothetical stage of human production evolution, for no people on earth now is quite so low down in the scale and so destitute as this description suggests. But it would seem that this stage is a necessary link between what we now find of primitive industry and the life which animals lead.

We have traced sketchily our industrial development back up the stream to its source. Now let us return. Man began producing just as other animals did. Then he gained control over some *tools;* and these have been multiplying in number and in efficiency until the present time, and we do not know what the possibilities are for the future. Man acquired control over *fire;* this helped the development of tools, freed him from the most erratic strokes of climatic changes, and let loose numerous other changes in his midst. He domesticated *animals;* and that achievement had outreachings and influences of many kinds. All the while, he was taking possession of *land* and using it to better advantage by means of tools and domestic animals.

Thus, to summarize, modern man retains everything that primitive man found out in his painfully long upward climb. The history of man, on the productive side, is a story of acquisitions, of accumulations, of complications. Tools have increased and become more effective; fire serves man better all the time; animals have been used to greater advantage; land has been made to yield much larger returns; the population has increased; the social drama has grown complicated.

2. Early Man

It will now pay us to draw a picture of early man by way of contrast and as a setting for a few hints as to origins. We do not have very satisfactory evidence for prehistoric times, and the description soon to be given is admittedly somewhat imaginary. But from the reports of a very large number of investigators,[1] who have carefully drawn out the implications of the various fossil remains of man, just as a detective follows a clue in a murder case, and who have compared their conclusions with evidence from extant tribes, the following brief account is pieced out:

Let us imagine an untouched stream, lake, or spring, with its surroundings of bush or forest—both containing the necessities of life. Since man

[1] See Lang, Andrew, "Social Origins," Atkinson, J. J., "Primal Law;" Smith, Worthington, "Man the Primeval Savage," Sollas, W. J., "Ancient Hunters;" Webster, Hutton, "Primitive Secret Societies;" Osborne, "Men of the Old Stone Age."

had no water containers of any kind at this early stage, he had to locate himself near this necessity; and, of course, we have something very primitive when we have no water containers. Let us also imagine a flint ridge near at hand from which the raw materials for crude implements might be taken.

The most meager resources—natural resources—provided for, now let us imagine a squatting place near the lake, stream, or spring. This squatting place is possibly a sheltered place behind some rocks, behind the semicircular barrier of earth made by an overturned tree, under a ledge of rocks, or beside a crude artificial windbreak. Says Sollas:

> The ancient Tasmanians had no houses, nor any fixed abode; they wandered perpetually from place to place in search of food, and their only protection from wind and weather, in climate sometimes bitingly cold, was a rude screen made by fixing strips of bark against wooden stakes.[1]

At this early stage, man probably had the use of fire but doubtless was much perplexed when it went out on him. How he acquired its use in the first place is not known, and how he was able to relight it can only be surmised. He could not learn anything from animals on this matter, for no other creature used fire. But if we allow the knowledge of fire among the people we are describing, then we are picturing conditions a long way down from the earliest stages.

A squatting place near water and natural resources of other kinds; the use of skins; skins about, hardly tanned and reeking with filth; a litter of ferns, moss, bones, and other materials; no furniture; no cooking utensils; no metal of any sort; a mere windbreak of crude construction or natural occurrence—this is home. "Home, Sweet Home." Who is at home?

As we observe carefully, we may see some human-like beings at home but not very many; perhaps, eight, ten, fifteen, or twenty. What are they like? In general outline, they are like what we see about us every day—minus refinements. But in numerous and important details, they are different. Speaking of them on the physical side, Lull says:

> Homo neandertalensis was of low stature, hardly exceeding five feet three inches for the males and less for the females. The posture was not fully erect, as shown by the curved thigh bones, the absence of the cervical flexure of the spine, and the position of the foramen magnum of the skull. The head was borne on the immensely muscular neck in such a way that the face was thrust forward in an ape-like manner, thus lacking the delicate poise which it would possess were the carriage fully erect.

[1] "Ancient Hunters," p. 87.

The skeleton of Neandertal man is peculiar, not alone in the lack of the fourth flexure of the vertebral column and in the presence of a curvature in the thigh, but in the enlarged articulation of the limbs, with knee and hip joints somewhat bent, and in the peculiarly rounded ribs, all of which point to a clumsy, shuffling, loose-jointed being of great muscular power . . .

The skull is large—1,600 cubic centimeters as against a modern cubic content of 1,400 cubic centimeters. It is long; it has a low vault; with heavy supra-orbital ridges; the nasal bridge is depressed; the upper jaw very deep, indicating a long upper lip; the lower jaw heavy; the teeth taurodont in character.

The brain of this man was not yet sufficiently advanced to learn to substitute other and more effective devices for various needs, so that the jaws had varied uses in contrast with their more restricted function to-day.

The brain itself shows a certain specialization in its size, but the relative development of those parts wherein lay the higher mental functions was not great. Nevertheless, Neandertal man was a skilled worker in flints, had harnessed fire, and by the reverential burial of the dead surrounded by beautifully wrought objects whose surrender implied a very real sacrifice on the part of survivors, together with apparent food, had in greatest probability a belief of some sort in immortality.[1]

Note the suggestions of importance to us in the above description—"posture not fully erect," "immensely muscular neck," "clumsy, shuffling, loose-jointed being of great muscular power," "potential speech is less developed," "coarse vegetative diet," "development of those parts [of the brain] wherein lay the higher mental functions is not great," "a skilled worker in flints," "harnessed fire," "beautifully wrought objects," and others. We have nothing left of this ancient race except a few skeletons, some charred remains, and a few wrought pieces. Out of these dead things can we make living things? By means of careful research, by means of verification, by means of the constructive imagination, we can. And we have for comparison and checking the remains of the extinct Tasmanians who were about on the same level of culture and social life.

We can see these rough, probably hairy, mostly naked, rather fierce-looking creatures, a small group of them, at home and around their fire. The group consists of a number of children, a few young people of various ages, several women, and one Old Man; the latter is the only adult or fully matured male.[2] He is not very old from our point of view, say forty or fifty; but he is old nevertheless, for his teeth are worn down from grinding the hard and coarse fare. These people

[1] Lull and others, "The Antiquity of Man," p. 24 *ff.*

[2] This, of course, implies a polygamous family, and this conclusion has been doubted by some scholars.

are all dressed, as far as they are dressed at all, in skins—untanned, untrimmed, foul smelling.

The Old Man chips away at his flints, chunks of which have been brought to him by the women or young people. The young watch him and gain some knowledge of how it is done. Occasionally, he goes off to hunt some animal and, after killing it, probably leaves it in place for the women to cut up and drag home, to place before the family in its raw state or after being roasted on a spit or on the coals.

This Old Man is an autocrat. He is peaceful most of the time but hesitates not at all to grab a youngster or anyone else and administer a good drubbing when annoyed. The women hunt for flint blocks, wood for the fire, grubs, nuts, and roots, prepare the skins, nurse the young—sometimes up to three or four years, sleep, fight vermin and insects, and so pass the time. Each able-bodied member of the group wanders about at will when hungry and lives largely as a separate individual. He eats what he finds, sleeps when he pleases, works a little now and then. Each one is free to go and come as impulses dictate. The obligations are very few.

As the young men grow up and begin to feel the sex urge, they endeavor to consort, so it has been surmised, with some of the women. The Old Man resents this and sometimes drives them away from the group or kills them. If they wander off, they are lost; or some of the women go with them, and thus new homes are established. Sometimes the young men grow strong enough to conquer the Old Man and drive him out or kill him, whereupon a new autocrat is in power.

This is all very interesting from one point of view, but our main concern is with the *interactions* among these people. How were *meanings* circulated? There must have been the most limited vocabulary, and a good deal of dependence must have been placed upon gestures, grunts, and emotional cries. What was the nature of their group life? They lived in proximity primarily because they were born there and felt more comfortable with their companions. We have no reason to suppose that they were drawn together for reasons other than those drawing animals together. If this may pass as a rough picture of early man, we may now make some more specific inquiries into the nature of the relations of these people and try to get a hint or two as to the early stages of some developments in which we are more interested in this connection. But one thing we must keep in mind. Man at this time and on this stage was *not* a degraded animal, for he had never been higher. He was, therefore, an exalted animal, and, low as we esteem him now, he yet represented the highest stage of development then reached; and we today owe him far more than we can compute or pay for his patience, his perseverance, his adventures, and his sacrifices. His fumblings about made more rapid developments possible later.

3. Communication

How did these people communicate with each other? Were there any things that one member of the group wished another to do, then how did he succeed in conveying the idea without the use of force? Suppose the Old Man wanted some more flint blocks, how did he proceed to have the women bring them? Suppose the Old Man succeeded in killing an animal out in the forest, how did he tell his women about it and have them go to bring it? These questions prepare the way for something on the evolution of language.

We must note that language is always an acquisition; it is not produced by organic evolution, although the prerequisite organs are provided in this manner. Language is not today and never has been an inborn gift. It had to be started and developed. And looking back on our language today, with its marvelous construction, its adaptability, and all of its accessories, we are prone to think that some person must have designed it in the remote past. But language is a folkway, and it has developed just as other folkways have developed—out of use and wont. Let us see if we can reconstruct the main steps in its development.

1. Intelligible Organic Reactions.—When a horse or a cow in the pasture makes a dive at another animal, this animal seems to be able to grasp what is going on and move out of the way. What goes on inside the latter, what sort of picture it has, we do not know. But it moves away with expedition and thus gives the appearance of acting intelligently. When the mother hen clucks in a certain way, the chicks run to her; when she clucks in another way, they run to cover. When a horse neighs or a cow bawls, their neighbors of the same kind often neigh or bawl in reply; but the cow never neighs to the horse, nor does the horse bawl to the cow; there seems to be little recognition across species lines. The bleating of the lost calf awakens one sort of response in the sneaking wolf and another in the mother. If some sheep start to run, then others take up and go along. If a number of pigeons are feeding together, the sudden flapping of the wings of one will start the whole bevy flying.

Speaking on this matter, Hayes says:

> Flight proclaims terror, spreads panic, invites pursuit. Slinking, fawning, love-making, and threatening convey their meanings within the group or between enemies. None of us knows just how extensively or how subtly beasts and birds thus communicate; doubtless more than we see though less than we can imagine. That their sociable hearts thus get some degree of comfort and guidance there is no doubt. These means of communication never cease to play a part in the intercourse of human beings; they are not readily made deceitful; they have much to do with liking and dislike and with degrees of influence and mastery among men.[1]

[1] "Introduction to the Study of Sociology," p. 508.

Now, these organic reactions must have played a large role among these early people that we have described. When the Old Man lunged at one of the young men, the latter was able to interpret the movement. When one of them found some food and set up a cry, the others were able to gather its significance and hurry to the spot. When one slunk back behind a log as if frightened by an animal, the others were able to interpret the sign and hide, also. Thus, we are permitted to assume that these early people had an equipment at least as good as the lower animals by which to carry on intercommunication and exchange meanings.

But Hayes thinks that we are still on the level of organic evolution and have not yet reached the social level. Mere organic reactions

> . . . cease to be mere organic reactions as soon as they are done on purpose. If a dog barks not merely as a physiological result of a state of excitation but in order to let its master know the presence of an intruder we have at least a step toward speech. Some animals and the lowest men do discover that their spontaneous cries and movements are understood and thereafter they cease at times to be mere spontaneous reactions. And when some individuals begin the intentional use of these as media of communication and other individuals are stimulated by their example to similar intentional use of natural cries and gestures we have a true social phenomenon.[1]

What we have to remember is that early man was endowed with organs of speech, that he had a flexible face, and that he had the free use of his hands. All of these taken together gave him an immense advantage in developing language. He had the resources for a wide and refined repertoire of communicational symbols. He undoubtedly used these resources crudely and much after the fashion of animals for milleniums. But gradually, ever so gradually, he advanced beyond this stage. Now what was called for in making this advance?

2. Mimicry.—Hayes says:

> What one can mimic he may thereby make known to another. The ideomotor tendency to imitate is strong in children, apes, monkeys, and in many birds. The imitator, like the parrot, may have no understanding of that which he imitates and even when there is understanding, it is not communication in our meaning of the term, so long as the imitation is purely ideomotor, but only when it is intended for the purpose of being understood. "Bow-wow" and "choo-choo" are not language so long as they are mere ideomotor responses to external stimulation, but only when they are prompted by an inner desire to attract comprehending attention from an associate.[1]

Now, the use of mimicry was one way, at least, in which advance took place. Mimicry is largely of bodily movements, although it may be of sounds as well; that is the easier way. And as a matter of fact, primitive peoples make large use of signs in their efforts at communication

[1] *Loc. cit.*

The writer once heard Professor Bowman of Yale tell of a near-tragedy to himself among the Machiganga Indians of South America. Of course, they were unable to speak any English, and he was unable to speak their language; but he found it necessary to explain that his foot was broken and that he was unable to get out of the boat at every rapids as was the custom. To get this idea over to one of the guides, he drew a picture of a foot and gave it to the guide pointing, "Your foot." Then he drew another, and pointed to his own foot, "My foot." Then he drew bones in each and afterward erased the whole bones in his own picture and made broken ones. Then he pointed to these broken bones and at the same time to the swelling in his foot. The Indian, who was very angry at first with his refusal to leave the boat, understood, and all went along well thereafter.[1]

It has been said that an ordinary Indian and a deaf mute could readily understand each other because of the existence of a world sign language which differs among primitives only as dialects of one speech differ. We can, therefore, imagine these people of whom we have been speaking as depending a good deal upon mimicry for conveying to each other whatever they wished. The mother mimics the growl of a bear, shows signs of fright, and thus keeps the child from wandering into danger. As one member hears the bark of a wolf—if wolves existed then—and rushes toward the shelter making a similar bark, all others rush to shelter accordingly and thus protect themselves. And centuries and centuries must have passed with but very slow improvements.

Although we have developed a most efficient sound language and the supplementary art of writing, we still find it necessary to use signs in our communications. For example, there are some experiences which cannot yet be named; they have to be conveyed by signs. Sometimes it takes too long to explain things in speech and so we resort to signs, the most complete example of which is a "laboratory demonstration." We still have plenty of people who talk with their hands and countenances as much as with their mouths.

3. The Association of Gestures and Sounds with Experiences.—In the experience of Bowman, already recorded, we have something which carries us a step farther. He endeavored to convey to the Indian guide that his foot had been broken; and he used gestures. Now his success presupposes that the Indian had an acquaintance with wounded feet, that he had suffered himself or had entered sympathetically into the sufferings of others. Had this not been the case, it is very hard to conceive how he would have gained anything from the signs; we cannot see how the swelling on the foot, the grimaces made when it was touched or employed, could have meant anything to him. Hence, an association had been built up in the memory, an association of signs (in this case, swollen foot

[1] Anthropology Club, Jan. 23, 1912.

and grimaces) and feelings of pain, and this would help communication thereafter. Now, let us imagine a gradual growth of association in the memory of gestures and emotions relative to numerous experiences in life—the boy finds some food and dances about for joy; the woman "looks daggers" at the man; the man gives a friendly pat, and so on. After years and years of experiences, these gestures were associated so intimately with the emotions that they could serve to evoke them regularly. Thus, a grimace came to mean pain; a loud laugh, joy; a vicious look, anger; dancing about, ecstasy—uniformly.

On the sound side, the same development must have taken place. Sounds gradually became associated with experiences in the memory; and the uttering of particular sounds recalled past experiences to mind. The sounds: "I feel pain," were, after unimaginable effort, linked up with similar experiences on the part of others and so became interpretative. Darwin tells us that his grandchild, having been excited by a visit to a duck pond, thereafter called all birds "quack," money on which there was an eagle "quack," and water "quack." The calling of the ducks "quack" was mimetic, but the calling of money and water "quack" was indicatory of the association of sounds and ideas in the memory.[1] Thereafter, anybody who knew of this connection would understand what she meant when they heard her utter the word "quack."

Now we just have to imagine this sort of thing as enlarging as the ages pass; we have to imagine an increase in the number and variety of experiences; and we have to imagine a corresponding increase in the number and variety of gestures and sounds regularly associated with them; we have to see use and wont at work here as elsewhere in human affairs. Thus were additional foundations of communication placed.

But these three steps in the development of communication were possible to human beings who had not advanced any farther intellectually than our own children of two years of age. Garner used a phonograph with apes and was able to catch distinct sounds which were regularly associated with the desire for food, drink, and possibly for special kinds of food; and when these sounds were uttered, other apes seemed to understand. But man has outdistanced these creatures, largely because of better organs of articulation.[2]

4. Generalizing Gestures and Sounds.—A remarkable advance came with the ability to *generalize* the gestures and sounds which had been accumulating. It is one thing to symbolize, in the ways already noted, a duck or a wounded foot. But it is quite another thing to symbolize the "idea" of the duck or wounded foot. Young children are continually symbolizing a mental content by a gesture or a vocable, and we may assume that these primitive people were continually doing this.

[1] See HAYES, *op. cit.*, p. 510.

[2] See HAYES, *op. cit.*, p. 511.

But the point we are making is that there was a development from the use of a specific sound for a specific thing or experience to the use of a specific sound or gesture for a *generality;* thus, there is a difference between the sound "quack" meaning a particular duck and the sound "quack" meaning ducks; thus, there is a difference between a grimace meaning "my particular pain here and now" and a grimace meaning "pain anywhere and universal." When this development began, language grew apace in the continual interactions of people—increasing interactions enriching language, and an enriched language facilitating interactions.

Now, we can see the origination of *root* sounds as expressive of these generalities. And then we can see these roots modified in combination and by the use of prefixes and suffixes—a development which has been going on for untold milleniums, and still goes on. It is asserted by some philologists that 500 roots, with their modifications and combinations, are sufficient for a language such as the English. Professor Müller has presented a list of 121 root concepts with which, as he maintained, every thought that ever occupied the mind of the people of India, as far as it is known to us through the literature, has been expressed. A vast extension has come in the *figurative* use of language. If we were to go back through these pages, we should find many examples of this. When we say we "understand," we are using a term in a figurative sense. When we say a person's face "shines," we are doing the same. We are doing this when we speak of a "heavy" responsibility, a "cutting" wind, a "clean" record, a "splendid" idea, and so on. But in discussing this aspect of language, we are probably far beyond the abilities of our Neanderthal horde.

5. Grammar.—Primitive words stood for complete ideas. Our terms, on the other hand, are so highly specialized that they stand for fragments of ideas. We have adverbs, nouns, adjectives, verbs, pronouns, which are highly differentiated organs of speech. Thus, in the early stages, gestures and sounds had to go together to make meanings intelligible. It has been said that certain African languages are so poor in specialties that the users employ a great deal of pantomime and really cannot communicate in the dark. It seems clear, then, that gestures made up that element in primitive language which is made up in ours by various connectives, adverbs, prefixes, and the like. In the Sanskrit, a laborer is a "digging he," a spade is a "digging it," labor is "digging here," and "digging there" means a hole. This is inflection in its beginnings.[1]

Language is said originally to have consisted mainly of only two elements: first, the names of objects and actions; second, demonstrative or pronominal sounds. These two classes of roots are the only elements of language; there are no others and all tongues are the result of their different combinations, either

[1] See HAYES, *op. cit.*, p. 512.

(1) by simple juxtaposition of unaltered syllables, as in Chinese; (2) by agglutination of several syllables, as in the case of all the languages called agglutinative, which the polysyllabic speech of the American Indian illustrates; or (3) fusing and contracting into a single whole the central and subordinate syllables, as in all the inflected languages.[1]

Grammar, then, is a name for the relations which the parts of speech have come to have, for the modifications which they have undergone. for that subtle thing called *structure* in language.

This whole development is well summed up by Giddings:

> The signs that constitute language, whether they are gestures, tones, or articulate sounds, acquire depth of meaning as they are successively made to express sensations, perceptions, simple ideas, recepts, and concepts. As graded by Romanes, they are: first, indicative, when they are merely expressive of a mental state, as when the parrot puts down its head to be scratched, or when the dog begs for a bone; second, denotative, when they mark or designate but do not in strictness name particular objects, qualities, or actions, as when the parrot learns to call a particular dog Jack, thereby associating a verbal mark with an object, but without deliberately naming it; third, connotative, when they are extended by association (but still without deliberate naming) to many objects in a class, as when the parrot, having learned to call one dog Jack, afterwards calls any dog Jack, or as when the child, having learned to say star, calls a candle, a gas light, or any shining object, a star; fourth, denominative, when the connotative sign is deliberately bestowed as a name, the sign itself having become an object of contemplation; fifth, predicative, when two denominative terms are brought into conceptual apposition, with the perfectly conscious intention to connote something of the one by means of the other. The predicative use of articulate signs is speech.
>
> By means of these distinctions the line between the lower animals and man can be drawn with some approach to exactness. Animals use gesture, grimace, tone, utterance, and, to a slight extent, articulation, indicatively and denotatively; occasionally the most intelligent animals use vocal or other signs connotatively. They do not use signs of any kind denominatively, because they have not acquired the mental power to separate signs from the objects signified. Therefore they cannot use signs as movable types; they cannot use them predicatively. They can use the logic of recepts, but not the logic of concepts. They have language, but not speech.[2]

4. Writing, Measuring, Counting

How has it come about that these ink marks on this paper mean anything, stand for anything, point at anything, to the reader? Well,

[1] Hayes, quoting Le Fèvre, "Race and Language," p. 49.

[2] "Principles of Sociology," p. 223. For a brief review of the theories of the origin of language, see Blackmar, "History of Human Society," p. 121 *ff.*: also, Chapin, "Introduction to the Study of Social Evolution," p. 112 *ff.*

in much the same way that sounds and gestures have come to mean anything—by use and wont; by association in the memory. Then there was a time in human history when there were no such signs. The primitive horde that we described earlier in this chapter had nothing of the sort. Writing came along at a much later time. It has been of such immense consequences, however, in the development of human association—in addition to gestures and sounds—that it will not be amiss to say something of it and its associated and complementary devices, measuring and counting. These three devices are expressive of the enormous refinement which has taken place in human communication throughout its development.

1. At first, there were only reminders of a simple kind, reminders of ideas already known.

> A South American Indian leaving his aged parents gave them a string in which he had tied a number of knots and took with him a string having the same number of knots. Parents and son agreed to untie a knot each day; when the parents reached the last knot they expected their son, and when he reached the last knot he knew that the time for his promised return had come.[1]

This is an example of signs detached from the body and embodied in other things. Hostile tribes have been known to keep track of their losses and their revenge by preserving bundles of sticks to which one was added for each death.

2. The earliest stages of genuine writing were pictographic in form. We have already given an example in the case of Bowman's communication with the Indian guide. The drawings were not exactly accurate but were sufficiently accurate to carry the meaning. Any one could read a document written in this language if he had any familiarity with the objects represented. Concrete examples of this sort of communication are preserved to our time on the ancient monuments where the moon is represented by a crescent and a king by the drawing of a man wearing a crown. Since this kind of writing represented ideas and not sounds, there was no special relation between the sounds ordinarily used and these visual forms.

3. An advance is seen where these crude pictographic forms have been reduced in complexity to the simplest possible lines. But this reduction came along only as rapidly as the readers were growingly able to fill in from memory what was lacking. All that came to be used was a mark that would *suggest* what the writer had in mind. In other words, the drawing came to be purely symbolic. Thus, to represent the number in the army of an enemy, some straight lines, instead of manly forms, were sufficient, provided it was made clear that this representation referred to the army of the enemy. For, of course, a straight line can be

[1] HAYES, *op. cit.*, p. 517.

made to stand for anything—a hostile fighter, a sheep, a stone in the brook, a bird, and so on.

4. A further advance came when these marks came to stand for words and ideas instead of merely objects. Thus, a wavy line might stand for water—the "thing" water—but it might also stand for the "word" water; and this is what is meant by ideographic writing. And it is clear that in this development we have a coalescence of writing and speech. When the written symbol first came to be related to the sound symbol, there was, of course, a loose and irregular relation. The ancient Egyptians seem to have made this connection. Our modern rebus puzzles are examples of this sort of thing.

5. Phonetic writing is where each symbol stands not for a complete word, as in the above case, but for only a part of a word—a syllable, as among the Japanese and some ancient peoples (phonetic writing), or a smaller vocal element (alphabetic writing). This term *alphabet* came from the Semitic Phœnicians. The first three letters of the Hebrew alphabet are named, respectively, *aleph* meaning "ox," *beth* meaning "house," and *gimmel* meaning "camel"—three highly important features of Hebrew life. The Phœnicians have generally been credited with the invention of the forms which we now use, and their contribution has been of incalculable value.

The great advantage of alphabetic writing is found at two points: (1) Since there are many more words than syllables, a syllabic language can represent the same number of words by a much smaller number of signs. The ideographic writing uses as many signs as there are words. (2) Since there are vastly more words than there are elementary sounds, an alphabetic writing represents thousands of words by twenty-six or less letters. Thus, there is a vast economy of time and space; and it is possible that we shall see a further reduction in the future as shorthand develops.

Judd says:

> The ideational associations which appear in developed language could never have reached the elaborate form which they have at present if there had not been social co-operation. The tendency of the individual when left to himself is to drop back into the direct adjustments which are appropriate to his own life. He might possibly develop articulation to a certain extent for his own sake, but the chief impulse to the development of language comes through intercourse with others. As we have seen, the development of the simplest forms of communication, as in animals, is a matter of social imitation. Writing is also an outgrowth of social relations. It is extremely doubtful whether even a child of civilized parents would ever have any sufficient motive for the development of writing, if it were not for the social encouragement which it receives.[1]

[1] Quoted in PARK and BURGESS, *op. cit.*, p. 384. See, also, HAYES, *op. cit.*, p. 517.

Hayes says:

Primitive units of measurement are largely those found ready at hand An inch was originally a thumb's width. The "hand" still survives among us as a measure of the height of horses. The span is practically obsolete among us save among boys. The foot, however, is our most usual standard. The ell was originally the same as the cubit and equal to the length of the forearm and hand. The fathom is equal to the reach of the expanded arms. The original meaning of the term yard is a walking-stick or a goad, and the similar origin of the rod is suggested by its name.

The general practice of counting on the fingers almost certainly gave us the decimal system. The universal method of counting large numbers is to repeat groups of ten or of some other denomination. That many people count by threes and not by tens is not a reason for saying that they have no conception of numbers above three, any more (as Bleek and Ratzel remark) than the fact that the French say "dix-sept" and "quatre-vingts" is evidence that they cannot count beyond ten or twenty.

The simplest subdivisions are halves and quarters and eighths, and to this fact it is doubtless due that our week is of seven days, being one-fourth part of the lunar month. The practice of observing one rest day in each seven rose before the Hebrews became a distinct nation. It originated in Mesopotamia. As soon as gangs of men were kept regularly at severe toil it became manifest that to conserve their power and to secure the greatest amount of work the slaves must be given periodic rest.[1]

In considering "social origins," we might have given much attention to the earliest stages of agriculture and the economic life, of tools and mechanical devices, of warfare, of transportation on land and sea, of marriage and the family, of decoration and adornment, of music, of painting, of sculpture, of clothing, of dancing, of the theater, of government, of secret societies, and of any number of other human acquisitions; and a vast amount has been written on these subjects, and it is all intensely interesting.[2] It all shows what we tried to portray in the chapter on Folkways and Mores, namely, the universality and inescapability of use and wont.

We have given attention especially to the origin and development of language because that has been so fundamental in human relations from the beginning. Indeed, we can almost say that communication has been and is the very stuff of human relations. A boy is "kin" to his father; but that fact has no particular social significance—whatever other significance it may have—without the communication that goes along with it. Hence, as we see primitives uniting in families, families uniting in tribes, tribes uniting in federations and states, the central and foundational feature is communication, is the exchange of meanings and their enrichment by exchange.

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 518.

[2] See THOMAS, "Source Book for Social Origins," *passim;* and MASON, "The Origins of Inventions," *passim.*

Questions

1. The two opposing theories of origins are what? What does *origin* mean?
2. What fundamental scientific law does the theory of creation contradict? Why?
3. When two people meet for the first time and discuss a problem for the first time, is anything new created? Consider this.
4. How far back do historical records take us? How long a time is this period as compared to the prehistoric period? (See DAVIS and BARNES, "Introduction to Sociology," p. 7.)
5. The various "stages" of evolution given in the chapter illustrate mainly the evolution of what organization? Could we find similar so-called *stages* for other organizations? Has the religious organization evolved? Prove it.
6. If scholars (Sumner and Thomas) are so hopeless about finding origins, why do scholars keep trying?
7. Would "nomadism" have any influence on (1) the family, (2) recreation, (3) religion? If so, what?
8. What kind of evidence do we have for constructing a picture of early man? Is this good evidence?
9. In what respects was early man (1) like and (2) unlike the manlike apes?
10. Would you modify the picture of early man given in any way?
11. Describe in more detail (1) the family life, (2) the recreational life, and (3) the religious life of early man.
12. Can you see why communication is considered in this connection? Can there be any social life without it?
13. How did these primitive people communicate? What is the relation of communication to social unity?
14. Can we find any clues to the origin of language among animals and babies? What, for example?
15. What is meant by saying that animals "have language but not speech?" What is the difference?
16. In the chapter on Contact and Interaction, something was said about *symbols*. What was it?
17. Does the problem of the origin of speech resolve itself into the beginnings of the use of symbols? Why?
18. What is the relation of speaking, writing, and counting to folkways?
19. Do we still use any pictographs? Give examples.
20. Would Hudson (the chapter on Isolation) have lost his language if he had remained permanently alone in Patagonia?

CHAPTER XXII

SOCIAL PROGRESS

In the last chapter, we left man in a bad way; we left him at an earlier stage in his development; we left him in cultural and social destitution. It now seems necessary *not* to trace out the outlines of his development from this early condition to the present but to raise some questions pertaining to this achievement. The development from these early stages to the present is an accomplished fact; we can not gainsay that. What man has done, he has done. But just what is it that he has done? Again, just what does what he has done mean? What is its significance? What is life for, anyway? What good is civilization? Where are we all going now that we have come this far on the journey? What is most worth while in life?

These are a few of the countless questions which human beings have been asking themselves and others for centuries. And the answers have been more numerous than the questions. It may be taken as an indication of progress that people, in ever larger numbers, have been asking such questions. But the answers, for the most part, while seeming to be definite and satisfying, have amounted in the last analysis to about this: "We do not know where we are going, but we are on the way." There is much profound philosophy behind that slang admission.

This seems like a cruel, because a disillusioning, statement or admission. But here we come at once to the core of the problem of social progress, namely, to find out exactly what the situation is and face it—which implies some peculiar qualities in human beings. Animals, so far as can find out, never raise such questions. Primitive man never persisted in asking them or, at least, did not try to define and picture what he might be. He might be said to be well along on the way to a solution of some of these problems when he was able to perceive and conceive the points at issue and frame intelligent questions about them. If to ask them, however, is to be disillusioned, then what is the advantage? But let us take things in order. A famous teacher was once accustomed to challenge his students with these questions concerning any project—especially a report: "What is it?" "How do you know it?" "What of it?" In the pages of this book so far we have given much attention to the first two questions. In this chapter and a later one, we shall consider the third.

1. Evolution and Progress

In the three preceding chapters we have considered the matter of evolution. It was there pointed out that evolution is continuous, connected change in any direction. Progress is a narrower concept. While evolution is change in *any* direction, progress is change in a *desired direction*. Evolution is the more inclusive term; progress is a subordinate category; it is evolution directed as to means and ends; it is a particular and wanted kind of evolution. When we talk of evolution, the standard of reference is not necessarily man; but when we talk of progress, the standard of reference is always man. Hobhouse says:

> By evolution I mean any sort of growth: by social progress, the growth of social life in respect of those qualities to which human beings can attach or can rationally attach value. Social progress, then, is only one among many possibilities of social evolution. At least it is not to be assumed that any and every form of social evolution is also a form or a stage in social progress. For example, a caste system is a product of social evolution, and the more rigid and narrow the caste, the more complex the hierarchy, the more completely has the caste system evolved. In proportion, that is, as a loose and incipient caste system hardens into an extreme and rigid caste system, there is a distinct process of social evolution going forward; but most of us would question very strongly whether it could be considered in any sense as a phase of social progress. Judged from the standpoint of human values, it looks more like retrogression, or perhaps still more like divergence into a side track, from which there is no exit save by going back over a good deal of the ground traveled . . . The fact that a thing is evolving is no proof that it is good, the fact that society has evolved is no proof that it has progressed. The point is important because under the influence of biological conceptions the two ideas are often confused, and the fact that human beings have evolved under certain conditions is treated as evidence of the value of those conditions, or perhaps as proving the futility of ethical ideas which run counter to the evolutionary process . . . Evolution and progress are not the same thing. They may be opposed. They might even be so fundamentally opposed that progress would be impossible.[1]

There are two questions here which may be distinguished as follows.

We have, to begin with, a clear idea that the "object of social effort is the realization of ends to which human beings can reasonably attach value, that is to say, the realization of ethical ends." Then progress is any step or steps leading to such ends. If it be said—and our discussion of the family, industry, religion, the state, et cetera shows this—that human valuations are confused and contradictory, then the implication is that we need some sort of synthesis to reduce them to a rational order. *What* the rational judgment would or should approve is another question. Without its approval of *something*, however, there can be no intelligible talk of progress. It is apparent, also, that it is inconsistent

[1] Quoted in Case, *op. cit.*, p. 930 *ff.*

to hold up certain processes as good and desirable and at the same time to scorn the principle of approval. It is not a question of whether or not these steps of progress conform to or are opposed to the "naked struggle for existence;" that is not a human criterion, and we stake all on a rational, which means a human, criterion.[1]

It has often been said that the end of the evolutionary process is adaptation—so far as living things are concerned. But below man, organisms have no initiative except for the immediate and no aim beyond the present; they play no masterful part in determining what the nature of the adaptation shall be. Besides, adaptation turns out to be but a base from which evolution starts again; animals and plants reach conditions of adjustment only to be confronted with changed conditions which demand a new adjustment, and so on indefinitely. Man is not utterly free from this process; but he is not utterly confined within it. That is to say, he greatly changes the character of it.

For example, "nature" has always been and still is what human beings call ruthless and wasteful in her methods. But man has been trying and still tries to reduce this waste or prevent it altogether. Nature cares only for the species if she cares at all. Man has been careful both for the species and the individual. Man values himself apparently more than nature does. Of course, this does not mean that man is divine in the sense of being extranatural. He belongs to the natural order all right; he is a product of evolution. But it means that the evolutionary process has extruded a creature who has come to turn about, face the evolutionary process squarely, pass judgment on it, and then discriminate its parts, and try to circumvent those phases which he does not like. If this characteristic way of behaving is what we mean by divinity, then we know what we mean by *divinity;* it is a usable term.

But with this power where does man want to go? How does he want to use it? From the earliest times he has been jointly turning this matter over and proposing answers. It is now worth while to examine some of these answers.

2. Conceptions of Progress

Professors Bury and Faris have both pointed out that the notion of "progress" is a modern idea. The ancients did not reach up to it, and of course the primitives did not. Speaking very generally, first of all, we may note the types of view preceding and succeeding this conception.

1. General Views.—Faris has pointed out the development in ideas pertaining to this subject, and we may note them under several heads.

a. Cosmic Anarchy.—This is a term to represent the state of mind of primitive people. To them the world is

[1] *Cf.* Hobhouse, *loc. cit.*

. . . a world of chaos, without meaning, and without purpose. There is no direction in which human life is thought of as developing. Death and misfortune are for the most part due to witchcraft and the evil designs of enemies; good luck and bad luck are the forces which make a rational existence hopeless.

b. Cycles.—The ancient Greeks were at the stage in their thinking where they viewed the cosmic process as proceeding in cycles.

The golden age of the Greeks lay in the past, the universe was considered to be following a set course, and the whole round of human existence was governed and controlled by an inexorable fate that was totally indifferent to human wishes. The formula which finally arose to meet the situation was "conformity to nature," a submission to the iron laws of the world which it was vain to attempt to change.

Also, everything went about in cycles; what had been would come again some time. People were involved in this eternal round and never could escape.

c. Providence:

This idea was succeeded in mediæval Europe by the idea of providence, in which the world was thought of as a theater on which the drama of human redemption was enacted. God has created man free, but man was corrupted by the fall, given an opportunity to be redeemed by the gospel, and the world was soon to know the final triumph and happiness of the saved. Most of the early church fathers expected the end of the world very soon, many of them in their own lifetime.

And therefore:

. . . all life had meaning to them, for the evil in the world was but God's way to accomplish his good purposes. It was man's duty to submit, but submission was to take the form of faith in an all-wise and beneficent and perfect power, who was governing the world and who would make everything for the best.

There was an aim, an end; but it was in the mind of God, and He could allow it to seep out to man only as man could grasp it. It was God's plan, though, and not man's.

d. Progress.—As this providentially parental notion began to wane, the notion of progress took its place.

In the fourteenth century, progress did not mean merely the satisfaction of all human desires either individual or collective. The idea meant far more than that. It was the conviction that the world as a whole was proceeding onward indefinitely to greater and greater perfection. The atmosphere of progress was congenial to the construction of utopias and schemes of perfection which were believed to be in harmony with the nature of the world itself. The atmosphere of progress produced also optimists who were quite sure everything was in the long run to be for the best, and that every temporary evil was sure to be overcome by an ultimate good . . .

It was not so much that God, in his infinite wisdom, was to bring all things out well as that there was a striving towards the good in the very nature of things; and man was striving hardest of all.

e. Control.—But this idea, from occupying the center of the stage, has drawn back to the edge in recent years, and we now seem to be in a transition stage with a new notion emerging—the notion of control.

> Each problem whether personal or social is thought of as a separate enterprise. Poverty, disease, crime, vice, intemperance, or war, these are definite situations which challenge human effort and human ingenuity. Many problems are unsolved; many failures are recorded. The future is a challenge to creative intelligence and collective herosim. The future is thought of as still to be made. And there is no assurance that progress will take place. On the contrary, there is every reason to believe that progress will not take place unless men are able by their skill and devotion to find solutions for their present problems, and for the newer ones that shall arise.
>
> The modern man finds this idea quite as stimulating to him as the idea of progress was to his ancestor of the Renaissance or the idea of providence to his mediæval forbears . . . The idea of providence was not merely a generalization on life, it was a force that inspired hope. The idea of progress was likewise not merely a concept, it was also an energizing influence in a time of great intellectual activity. The idea that the forces of nature can be controlled in the service of man differs from the others, but it is also a dynamic potency that seems to be equally well adapted to the twentieth century.[1]

2. Specific Views.—So much for the broad sweep in the development of ideas. We now have the setting of the idea of progress; let us look at some of the specific notions, some of the detailed views connected with it. Todd[2] has placed all students under a large debt by examining and digesting these notions. He thinks of these theories as being classifiable in four groups—the materialistic, the biological, the institutional, and the ideological. In other words, he points out that when "the prophets of progress" have undertaken to state their views as to what progress is and what produces it, they have done so *with the emphasis* almost wholly in the directions indicated by the above terms. But while the *term progress* is usually employed, we must become aware of the fact that the *meaning* assigned often overlaps with the meaning assigned by Faris to terms like *providence* and *control.* But these four categories prove handy focal points for a brief consideration of the theories of progress in more detail.

a. The Materialistic Group.—There have been innumerable philosophers and scientists who have insisted that a favorable climate, good soil, satisfactory topography, and other physical features, caused and guaranteed social progress. In other words, they have largely ignored

[1] FARIS, quoted in PARK and BURGESS, *op. cit.*, p. 960. *Cf.* FINNEY, "The Problem of Social Evolution," *Social Forces*, December, 1927, p. 205.

[2] "Theories of Social Progress," p. 151 *ff.*

"man as a geographic agent" and have thought of him mainly as wrought upon. Ellsworth Huntington has claimed that in Japan a certain type of mind has been selected and preserved by reason of the stormy climate. Miss Semple has said that "Everywhere a cold climate puts a steadying hand on the human heart and brain." Montesquieu contended that goodness of soil led to slavish dependence, in answering Buckle who held the contrary notion. "Place determines work and work determines social organization," said Le Play. And so these affirmations have gone and go.

As many of these writers have viewed the matter, man has progressed only as the physical environment has forced him. They have studiously ignored man's own reactions upon the environment save as indicated in the preceding sentence. The patent fact that backward peoples sometimes live in favorable environments and progressive peoples in unfavorable environments seems to have been overlooked. It is only partially true to say that "man is a piece of the earth"; it is equally true to say that a piece of the earth is man—and there is a difference.

b. The Biologic Group.—Some have insisted that human progress has been caused by, and must be stated in terms of, natural selection. Man acquired his brains, his agility, his marvelous hands, and all else that makes him man in that way; he did nothing to himself, the selection process did it all; and that is what makes man "fit." But nobody knows what we mean by *fit* or *the fittest*, except in relation to given situations—the physical environment being only one of them. Again, there have been and are plenty of people to contend that social selection or eugenics is the sole way of progress. They have never agreed on the details of the method, but all of one accord have insisted that the one salvatory device for the human race is intelligent mating. And yet, the details of the method are part of the major problem; we cannot go ahead and mate intelligently without knowing whom to select and why.

Another group of biologists and pseudobiologists has clarioned to the world the disconcerting news—disconcerting to others—that the only way to progress is the Nordic way, the Nordic domination way. Let the races fight and fight and then continue to fight until the Nordics win out—as they surely will in the view of these prophets—that will be the same as progress, no matter what happens to the "Sudics."

Of necessity, this racialist view has been accompanied or intertwined with an emphasis on militarism. If progress must come solely out of race wars, then "To arms!" Nobody could conceive it otherwise. And these advocates have insisted that peace was simply an interlude, very deadening and uninteresting, of course, between wars and that wars brought out and necessarily preserved all of the virtues of the surviving race, in other words, caused progress.

c. The Institutionalists.—In this group, Professor Todd gathers the advocates who define progress in terms of property, in terms of the

family, in terms of certain forms of government, in terms of good laws, in terms of a cleansed public opinion, in terms of great men—although this last category overlaps with the next one. And probably this group is more familiar to us than some others, considering everyday conversation.

Evidently, there is plenty of talk these days about progress in terms of the accumulation of property. So prevalent and insistent is this notion that when a choice has to be made between a man and some property, say a wage earner and some big factory, the man gets the worst of it. There are innumerable persons who assert that man was made to accumulate property—for others. And their one repeated strain is that we are making unparalleled progress in this twentieth century because we are piling up billions of wealth and making it safe by laws and other devices, that is to say, turning it into property.

But equally insistent are those who state progress in terms of laws—the more the better; man is by nature a lawless creature, they say, and he must be fenced in by numerous statutes. There are plenty who want a more efficient social organization and thus express themselves as to the nature of progress. Give us a good form of government, efficient industrial organization, a rigid religious formalism, and all else desirable will inevitably follow. In other words, progress and better institutional structures are synonymous. There are all degrees of approval here, and all shades of emphasis, but by and large, these prophets of progress set their hearts upon the essential value of social institutions. They tend to reverse the scriptural assertion that "the Sabbath was made for man and not man for the Sabbath."

d. The Ideologists.—Of the views of the fourth group much more ought to be said than can be said here. The *theologians*, backed by their dualistic assumptions, have generally held that progress can be stated only in terms of what God or Providence wants done among men and men's ready conformance to this requirement. God was real, they said; He was before all things; all things had significance only in relation to Him; He had his plans for the universe and for men; beside these plans, man's puny schemes were worse than nothing; He revealed these plans as rapidly and as fully as man could comprehend them; progress consists in comprehension and conformance; "the substance of His rule, the execution of His plan, is the world's history;" if men do not conform, they will suffer and be eliminated; the plan will be carried out anyway.

There were many other idealists, however, besides the theologians. Lessing, Herder, and Kant, each in his own way, voiced somewhat similar notions to the above but "stripped of their most repellent theological trappings." Lessing thought that there was a law in history, a drive, similar to the then-conceived law of gravitation. In conformance

with this necessity, mankind passed through three stages—childhood, youth and maturity—and was vouchsafed a revelation correspondingly which would ultimately bring things to perfection.

In Herder we run against a curious compound of mysticism and physical science. Man is a summary of all that went before (inorganic, plant, animal); he is the last link in the earth-organization and the first link in a progressively higher order of created beings; *i.e.*, the connecting link between two opposing orders of creation, the physical and the spiritual. This accounts for the manifest dualism of our natures. The divine process step by step purifies and refines the material and strips it away to make room for the spiritual, to allow the buds of man's spiritual nature to burst into full bloom.[1]

Kant thought that the spectacle of the human race oscillating up and down, back and forth, forever, and never getting anywhere, would tire even God; for what is at first a moving tragedy, when prolonged indefinitely becomes a farce. Man had not always progressed, it was true; but progress depends upon what "human nature as such will do in and with us, to compel us to move in a track into which we would not readily have taken ourselves." Indefinite spaces of time are necessary. At bottom, it is really Providence who accomplishes this saving work, for he is the sole author of "human nature." And, of course, man moved irresistibly toward the Absolute.

Others—Hegel, Schiller, Von Humboldt—while not entirely eschewing religious speculation, attenuated it a good deal. Roughly speaking, they held that progress could be stated alone in terms of the working out of the *idea*, the world idea, or world soul, mystic, superworldly, divine, within the framework of this material world, and expressing itself through human history. There it was, a germ sprouting, growing, branching, and taking man whither it would. One of these branches was the idea of freedom. Mental and spiritual freedom is the final goal. Another dominating idea was that of the moral order. After all, ideas rule the world.

While, for the theologians, reason had no value except as a colorless and tinctureless medium through which the divine will became active among men, the *intellectualists* held that reason had value on its own account. Progress could be stated only in terms of its activities as they led to the accumulation of knowledge. The great question with them was, as Todd phrases it: "How can society assure itself of an increasing reservoir of this vital knowledge?" These interpreters of progress cast away, or tried to cast away, all mysticism. The reason was fully trustworthy, they said, and all social advance depends upon the extent to which knowledge is acquired and diffused to all classes of society. If men universally knew enough, they would spontaneously do what was right. They generally wrought wrongly because they were

[1] Todd, *op. cit.*, p. 446.

ignorant. Sound thinking had a power for human advance second to none. And, of course, this is an emphasis upon the value of science.

A third group, the artists, has endeavored to define progress in terms of beauty, of harmony, of music, of the progressive elimination of the ugly from life and society. This view expresses itself through literature, through music, through painting, through architecture, and is even carried through into social intercourse and politics. These advocates think that we make progress only in so far as we strive to make our bodies, our activities, our physical surroundings, our social structures beautiful. And some of them have pointed out that we have made little progress since we raise so little outcry against our filthy dump heaps, or billboard-beplastered highways, our smoke-hidden alleys, our teeming poverty and misery, our murderous wars and befuddling rumors of wars, our wastes and extravagances, our terrible persecutions, our tawdry show and display—all of which are utterly ugly and repulsive. But wherever one does a kindly act, writes an excellent book, makes a cheerful garden, dresses in good taste, speaks with well-modulated voice and the appropriate word, harmonizes and coordinates activities with others, that one is contributing much to human progress; and there is no other kind of life that is progress.

Thus, inadequately enough, may the various conceptions of progress be summarized. But now, what may be said of them all? It is of the first importance to observe that they are all *partial;* they do not cover the whole field; they define and affirm as if there were no other aspects to life than the ones stressed, as if man lived in a vacuum except for the one air connection hinted at by the writer. Again, as far as these views are comprehensible at all, they are too *simple;* and this follows from their one-sidedness; they make a case by neglecting utterly important phases of the matter. In many cases, they are too *mystical;* they lead off into an infinity where nobody can follow and thus become useless as guides to life; they amount to little more than tiny explosions against the Empyrean.

On the other hand, it is certainly safe to say that most of these interpreters have stressed important truths. A broad view of the problem deepens the impression that all of the matters emphasized *must* be remembered in the making of that grander synthesis—yet to come sometime in the future—of that total reality which *is* social progress. In the future, when great thinkers make up their minds what social progress is and state it, they will not have overlooked the ideas noted in all of these views. Man cannot, it would seem, make progress *without* the physical environment, without his reason, without social institutions, without beauty in the world, and possibly without divine aid; that is true. But that is very different from asserting that progress is the same as any one or two of these things.

But now we are prepared for a jolt. There are many, and there have been many, able thinkers who have denied that man has made any progress whatsoever; and they do not lack for evidence, either. The question as to what *criteria* are available for settling the issue takes the center of the stage. Faris says:

> The difficulty in demonstrating the fact of progress has become very real as the problem has been presented to modern minds. It is possible to prove that the world has become more complex. It is hardly possible to prove that it has become better, and quite impossible to prove that it will continue to do so. From the standpoint of the Mohammedan Turks, the last two hundred years of the world's history have not been years of marked progress; from the standpoint of their enemies, the reverse statement is obviously true.[1]

This last suggestion, the "obviousness" of progress, presents great difficulty. Observed carelessly and superficially, progress seems obvious; it does not seem to require proof; "we" do not have to prove to "ourselves" that there has been progress; we cannot avoid flattering ourselves. But what does the intelligent Chinaman or Hindu say about "our" progress? In other words, how is a man inside a ship to know that he is moving toward port? How is the human race to know where it is going when the only points of reference and bases of comparison are *some other parts of itself?* Can external and objective points of reference be found? Men have searched long and diligently for something of the sort. When men said "God is the same yesterday, today, and forever," they supposed that they had a satisfactory, external, and fixed point of reference. One must either go outside the human movement altogether or find something within which is reliable. Suppose that we look at some efforts of the latter type.

3. The Criteria of Progress

1. The Population Test.—There are those who affirm that one satisfactory internal point of reference is the direction tendency of the population. If the population is increasing, we are making progress; if it is declining, then we are regressing. The infallible criterion is a certain degree of human fertility. What shall we say of this?

It is plain, first of all, that no sane person regards movement toward extinction as progress. No sane person regards mere survival as progress. Using the population test, then, there must be a minimum below which it would be regress to fall. What is that minimum? How is it determined? Nobody has satisfactorily answered these questions as yet—for any particular community, for any state, or for the globe. In the same way, we find difficulties in the other direction. It is possible—and it has happened many times—that numbers should increase far beyond the

[1] *Loc. cit.*

available necessities, to say nothing of the luxuries, of life and then suffer horrible decimation. No sane person would advocate that numbers should continuously outrun supplies like that. Thus, there must be a maximum. But how is that maximum to be defined? Selectionists argue that it ought to be large enough so that a healthy struggle would ensue and eliminate the unfit. But how large is that? Nobody can yet say for any given area, let alone the globe.

Besides, this criterion is suspect, oftentimes, because of its source. Todd does well to point out that the advocates of the population test as a satisfactory criterion give prejudiced testimony because of their alliances; the selectionists want a large population so that the fit can be born; the industrialists want a large population so that there will always be a surplus of workers and wages can go down and profits up; the militarists want a large population so that there will be plenty of imperialistic expansion, plenty of wars and an adequate supply of soldiers; the religionists want a large population so that there may always be a supply of converts and so that as many "souls" as possible may get bodies in which to live—and escape damnation; the sentimentalists want a large population for reasons similar to those of the religionists.

Space forbids a fuller catalogue of objections to this test. We have the notion, however, that a criterion which is open to such ready criticism is hardly final.

2. Health and Longevity.—A scholarly representative of the medical profession recently asserted that

> . . . the average length of life is the one and only sure index of whether the world is growing better; it is the unemotional but inexorable measuring-rod of real social progress that can be told in figures. Other standards of measurement there are, but they are mostly vague, and founded largely on faith and hope. Here is one that is based on definite statistical facts.[1]

This is fine. We appear to be somewhere down near "brass tacks" now. There is fairly reliable evidence—statistical evidence—that the span of human life is slowly lengthening, in certain parts of the world at least. At least, this is what the figures, being interpreted properly, indicate.

But we have some misgivings. The sentence above—"that can be told in figures"—is disturbing. Is that a disappointing limitation with respect to the criteria of progress? Can there be no satisfactory statement of a criterion except in figures? And are figures always quite unemotional and inexorable? If the figures are, how about the figurers?

A greater difficulty, however, is this: If people live longer but live more miserably, is that progress? Is not a short, intense, heroic life much

[1] Todd, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

to be preferred to a long, agonizing, threadbare existence? "A pasteurized, sanitized society," as Todd points out, "is not necessarily progressive nor dynamic." So we cannot quite agree with our medical authority that this is the pearl of great price for which we should give up all other tests.

3. Wealth.—The throng gathers about to uphold this criterion as the infallible test of progress. But we must discriminate between the holdings of private individuals and the total capital goods of the human race. If the wealth test is valid and if wealth is taken in the latter sense, then we certainly have made vast progress; statistics can be amassed to prove the increase of wealth. But in this sense, the test is almost worthless, for we do not have any use whatsoever for "the total wealth of the world." This does not mean a single thing to a single one of us. Why does it not?

The best and most complete answer ever framed was that given many years ago by Charles Dickens in his inimitable story, "Hard Times." He put his criticism of this theory into the mouth of an innocent and orphaned girl, Sissy Jupe, when she replied to the pompous, conceited, stereotyped schoolmaster, Mr. M'Choakumchild, during a course of instruction in "political economy." They were discussing national prosperity in class. Sissy tells the story.

"And he said, 'Now this schoolroom is a Nation. And in this nation, there are fifty millions of money. Isn't this a prosperous nation? Girl number twenty [Sissy], isn't this a prosperous nation, and a'n't you in a thriving state?'"

"What did you say?" asked Louisa.

"Miss Louisa, I said I didn't know. I thought I couldn't know whether it was a prosperous nation or not, and whether I was in a thriving state or not, *unless I knew who had got the money, and whether any of it was mine* . . . "[1]

Whether or not, then, wealth, capital goods, tools of production, accumulations of conveniences, the whole material culture, is the long-sought and infallible criterion depends not on the total accumulated but on its *distribution*, on who has it. Certainly a condition where wealth steadily flows up toward, and concentrates in the hands of, a few who have no need of so much and do not know how to use it cannot be regarded as a condition of progress—at least by those who are deprived. It is possible for a comparatively wealthy man or woman to be more miserable, by comparison with those who are twice as well off, than if he were less rich but as rich as any. It is possible for people to *be* materially better off and to *feel* worse off.

4. The Moral Test.—The theologians and the moralists rally here. They assert that the only infallible test or criterion of progress must be in terms of morality; they insist that movement toward the "good life" or the "holy life" and the attainment of such is the last word in the

[1] "Everyman's Library," p. 51. Italics ours.

human epic. They argue for purity, for the right, for unselfishness, for honor, as the poles around which the whole human creation must come to swing and by which the worth of life must ultimately be judged. These things, they say, are permanent, fixed, reliable points for comparison.

But here, again, questions troop forward. If all of the people on earth were in agreement about *the* moral law, about what was honorable, about what was pure, about what was unselfish, and the like, then we might agree with these apologists. But there is utter disagreement in both theory and practice all along the line. The head hunter of Borneo holds that it is honorable and moral to take home the heads of his enemies—when he can get them. Certain Americans hold that such practices, and the theories back of them, are utterly abhorrent and immoral. Who is right? Where is the standard for comparison? How shall we decide in such cases? Shall we refer the cases to a German or a Turk? In other words, morality is not so fixed and permanent as some have supposed.

We either go back, as the theologians do, to a standard set by the Almighty or, as the sociologists do, to a standard set by a given society. But in the first case, there has been the greatest amount of uncertainty as to what the Almighty revealed by way of a standard. If the Bible is taken as the expression of that revelation, many do not approve, for the Bible depicts many examples of what many folk now hold to be immorality. If the conscience is taken as the medium of this revelation, there are still great difficulties, because we all know that the conscience changes, now approving this and now condemning that. If the voice of God reaches man only through man's conscience, there is no conclusion possible but that God changes His mind frequently and unreasonably.

In the second case, where society is referred to as furnishing the standard, there are as many standards, as many tests, as there are human groups with rules and traditions; and when one group asserts its standards of morality, other groups contest them. Besides, every group thinks, and presents arguments to show, that *it* is moral—and thus begs the whole question.

If morals change—as the history of any individual or group shows—probably we shall have to include them within the *total which makes progress*, which means that we abandon them as outside, objective, permanent points of reference. So included, the whole question is left unsettled. Is man more moral now than he was 10,000 years ago? How can we know? There are many clear-thinking persons who insist that he is not. And there is no sure way of solving the problem until we can decide on what we mean by being moral. The best that we can say now is that being moral is conformance to the mores. We can add a little, we think, by saying that morality is spontaneous conformance

to the standards of the group. We can add a little more by insisting that morality is intelligent conformance. We can add more yet by saying that morality is sometimes intelligent rupture and reconstruction of group standards.

Thus, the criteria of progress, the proposed permanent, objective points of reference turn out not to be so permanent nor so objective nor so pointed as we could wish. Indeed, such absolutism is uncongenial to the mental climate of our times. Modern thinking has humbled us and made us less certain of ultimates, the ultimates readily accepted one hundred years ago. Things are *relative* to us; and this makes a vast difference in our notion of what constitutes progress. To realize that the criteria of progress are relative is very disappointing from one point of view. But it is most satisfactory from another; it leaves the *way open ahead indefinitely;* it leaves the way open for us to define progress for ourselves. But these and other points need some elaboration.[1]

4. A Modern View of Progress

We can and we do take our stand upon the solid ground of change—endless change. For our purposes, we need not inquire whether this change is perpetual mechanical recombination of fixed elements in social life or the work of a Personal Creator. It would be satisfying to know which of these conceptions is the sounder; but we do not have to know in order to gain a foothold upon our problem. There is in either case *enough freedom* for each individual to exercise his influence, since he is now doing it. This "enough present freedom" may be an illusion—in the last analysis. But, appearance or reality, we can get a starting point here.

1. The Conditions of Social Progress.—One of the first and most essential conditions of social progress is a robust conviction with respect to this freedom to work, to modify, to create. The absence of it, as plenty of ethnography and personal experience shows, is conducive to inertia. Where struggle is prejudged to be ineffectual, progress is almost imperceptible.

1. But it will be found, on analysis, that this freedom, that is, the attainment of it, is one of the features of progress. And so we always have—to make a generalization just here—*conditions* of progress merging with, and taking a place among, the *elements* of progress or becoming progress. But what is the source of this freedom? One source is in change, eternal change, for man is not unaffected by the atmosphere which surrounds him; but changes mean joints or breaks; and these joints or breaks are man's opportunity. Besides, he is compelled to readjust to live.

[1] *Cf.* Lowie, "Primitive Society," p. 438 *ff.*

This naturally generated freedom, however, has always been restrained and curtailed in various ways. One of the characteristics of primitive societies is their inflexibility. The old want things always to go on in the same way, so they impose the prevailing system upon the young as meticulously and as implacably as possible. Thus, there is little freedom there; the young soon come to be slaves of the old; the old are slaves to custom and tradition; custom and tradition originate with ancestors who are now spirits and the invisible overlords of the people.

But during the course of human evolution, man has everlastingly pressed against these restraints and widened his area of activities—traveling, hoarding, free speech, recreation, laws, et cetera, being familiar examples. Never was man more free than at present to adventure, to experiment, to try himself against the unknown. And this is progress by any definition that a human being would give. Man may not be satisfied with this freedom in the future, but he has rarely been satisfied without it in the past.

2. Another condition is the conviction that *progress is possible.* As long as men are sure that progress is *not* possible, when they believe in cycles and inevitable cataclysms, they will not exert themselves; any progress will come from behind—evolution—and not from within; they will voice the slogan *safety first* and will not venture; the deadly routine of primitive life shows this; for there the only outlook is the backward look; there is no future.

But in our day, the future has come to occupy the center of the stage of consciousness; it has come to contradict and compete with the past and its absolutism. Now, more than ever, people believe that the future can be different—and be better—and they are making their lives back up this conviction.

3. Thirdly, a conviction is blossoming out to the effect that progress *is not inevitable.* At certain times and places, as we have seen, the conviction obtained that progress was inevitable; and the people said to themselves: Why sweat, why suffer, why sacrifice, why worry? Progress will be made, anyway. They reasoned: If a cosmic force will do the work anyway, why should we do it? If there is "a power, not ourselves, that makes for righteousness," why should we make for righteousness when it will cost us something? And it happens that men are so constituted that if a "cosmic George" can be found to do their work, they will not, with a few exceptions, undertake it. But this notion is fading; the job of making righteousness is now seen to be clearly "up to" us; and this is incalculable gain; it is progress.

4. A fourth condition is the complete elimination of *fear* from the minds of all men, especially the fear of offending the spirits by experimentation. The weight of that fear in the past has never been, and

could not be, computed by any mathematics. That it has been terrific and paralyzing, all descriptions of early life show. And now, we are happy to point out, there is much less of it; the spirits have gone, the devil has gone, the stern, cold, terrifying Almighty has gone; disease is now better understood, misfortune is better understood and guarded against, there is more experimentation. Through the centuries, intrepid and restless souls have continually affronted these supposedly existing powers and have, as we say, "gotten away with it." Fear is vanishing. And the opposite of fear is, of course, courage.

5. A fifth condition—and also an element—is the accumulation of sufficient *material goods* to furnish a broad base for progress. This accumulation is proceeding apace. Inventions have helped immensely. There is yet an inconceivable amount of poverty in the world; but there is now, as never before, some prospect of banishing poverty utterly; the conviction is now widening and firming that this can be done; there are increasing numbers who declare that it shall be done. Committees are everywhere after the loafers, the wasters, the spendthrifts, and all the tribes of social parasites, which survive because we are still ignorant of how to divert the gains of life to the real contributors, and because we are still overly sentimental.

6. A sixth condition of progress is universal educational opportunity for those who can profit by it and the earlier turning of all others into channels of useful vocation. Universal public education is a step in this direction. Higher university education, provided at small cost to the individual by the state, is another.

7. A seventh condition is the arrival on this earth of continually decreasing numbers of hereditary defectives. Eugenics and euthenics are programs of progress because they have such ends in view. It is largely a case of trial and error as yet, but it *is* trial—if often error—and that is incalculable gain.

8. An eighth condition of progress is the accessibility of the world. This is really a part of freedom, but a point or two must be made in addition to what has already been said. How can man experiment, try out, adventure, when he is shut away from the materials out of which progress is to be made? In past ages, man was kept in bondage of tribe, or country, or language, or party, or family, by taboos, by loyalty, by lack of facilities for traveling, by the inadequacy of wealth, and for many other reasons. Men could not understand disease before the microscope came, nor could they cure it before *materia medica* came; they could not examine the nature of the earth and the seas before chemistry, geology, and physics came; they could not confidently and fruitfully explore the heavens before the telescope and the spectroscope came; they could not know much of their own minds before psychology came. Even if men had felt themselves free centuries ago—which they did not, with few

exceptions—they could have done little with their freedom; the world was not available. But a grand release came with the gradual accumulation of these advantages.

2. Elements of Social Progress.—All of these gains that we have mentioned are both conditions and elements of progress. And the picture that we have to carry away is that of conditions affecting and awakening elements and these elements reacting back on conditions and themselves turning into conditions and affecting new elements—forever; action and reaction, ceaseless, incalculably fertile, the hope of man.

It is clear, then, that the writers and advocates to whom reference was made in the earlier part of this chapter made a mistake in attempting to take the part for the whole and in insisting that progress could be stated in terms of any one or two of its factors or elements.

But we now see that progress must be stated in *all* of these terms. Social progress is now held to be a complex, a whole, a massive super-organic movement of man to make the most, for himself and for all generations to come, of the earth which is his erstwhile home. These partial views before mentioned can be tolerated only as long as they are admitted to be partial and as long as they are admitted to be but the necessary abstractions of science. But no one must run away with the idea that the thing is simple, or that he has swallowed more than a small notion when he seizes upon soil, an institution, eugencis, or any other of the ideas enumerated.

3. What is Social Progress?—After saying what we have said, it would seem like manifesting the "nerve" of a book agent to raise such a question, let alone attempting an answer. But it must be said that this is not an attempted answer; it is simply an attempt to gather up what appear to be the essentials into a formula which can be remembered, carried away, and mulled over. Stated negatively first, progress is the absence of ill health, of infertility, of fear, of ignorance, of poverty, of overreliance on cosmic powers. Stated positively, social progress is an accelerating human movement toward cooperative conquest of the resources of our physical world and a universal sharing of the goods gained, together with all that this necessarily implies by way of skill, enterprise, sympathy, imagination, and intelligence.

Stated in terms of *means*, progress is enlightenment; it is education, in the best known sense, made universal. Especially, it is the kind of education that enlarges the imagination. Bertrand Russell says:

> To know something of great literature, something of world history, something of music and painting and architecture, is essential if the life of imagination is to be fully developed. And it is only through imagination that men become aware of what the world might be; without it, "progress" would become mechanical and trivial.[1]

[1] "Education and the Good Life," p. 29.

But science, also, can stimulate the imagination.

We can grasp fairly well the value of the imagination when a dear friend suffers some misfortune; we can feel the loss ourselves and enter sympathetically into the feelings of the sufferer. But can we grasp the meaning of misfortune diffused through the population? It hurts us when our neighbor's child is crushed to death under an automobile; does it hurt us any when we learn that a thousand children have perished in some disaster? Do we sense that? Does that come home to us with poignancy? We can take in a little of the horror of concentrated death in a mine disaster, a railway wreck, or a battle. But can we comprehend the meaning of distributed death as the day-by-day totals pile up? Can we lay hold of the outlines of the secondary and tertiary effects of such? The inexcusable waste of a neighboring family shocks us. Can we rise on the tiptoe of imagination to comprehend the waste of a city? Of a nation? Does that also shock us?

Professor Todd writes:

> If I were asked to state in two words the mark of a socially valuable "self," I should say without hesitation *efficient imagination*. For without imagination we can have no broad and abiding sympathy; without it we are mere clansmen or tribesmen, or narrow members of a guild, trades-union or profession; or we lock ourselves in by our own firesides as momentary patterns of domestic virtue and like Meredith's Egoist chant to our lovely bride, "You and I and the world outside." But to attain that Olympian sort of sympathy which will overleap the boundaries of craft or class or country and create new worlds out of old requires vigorous responsive imagination. I believe we have not utilized a tithe of the possibilities of developing an imaginative self. Social reformers, teachers, preachers, capture the imagination for social service, and behold the new world.[1]

But efficient imagination, strictly speaking, is not necessarily *moral* imagination. And by this we mean the imagination which values highly more harmonious relations among human beings, at the same time sensing the terrible costs of the absence of such relations. But there is another imagination, namely, the *constructive*, by which we mean the kind which can build what it wants. So we might put all of these ideas together and speak of the means of progress as *education toward the universal development of an imagination which is constructive, efficient, and moral.*

But what of the *end?* Is the development of a constructive, efficient, and moral imagination the end? One test of progress is the ridding of our minds of the idea of *the end.* We are gradually learning that there is no necessary or predetermined end toward which the human family must move. Rather, there are *ends*, plenty of them. Progress is more and more seen to be a movement *in search of* worthwhile ends, of ends which will not cloy and disappoint.

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 60.

McCabe asks:

What is the end of life? It is whatever we men may choose to make it; and since we live in social groups, and a man's actions depend upon and influence his neighbours, it is what we choose to make it *collectively*. There is no doubt today about our choice. We are going to develop what is most clearly worth developing in us: intelligence, refinement, character, health. We are going to eliminate pain, unhappiness, ignorance, coarseness, violence, and poverty, as far as possible.[1]

The question of ends is simply the question: Where do we want to go? The future is pregnant with many possibilities. What ones of these do we desire to have realized? How can we pool our intelligence, as a human species, and decide where we want to go and how to get there? History is a record of human failures as much as anything; it is a record of *where not to go*. Can we learn anything from history?

Checked by fruitless strayings in the past, we set out toward the future. The Hebrews were going toward their "promised land." People are always moving toward a land of promise—or trying to do so. And from this angle, progress is essentially experimentation; it is adventure. We may not know where we are going. But we are going to try to find out where we want to go—and then go there. And we are going to do this more and more by the pooling of the best ideas of the whole world, that is, by cooperation.[2]

Questions

1. How important are the senses for communication? Discuss.
2. What is the difference between *evolution* and *progress?*
3. Does the Bible support or deny the idea of progress?
4. What evidence can you find to support Faris' view that the "idea of Providence" is being superseded?
5. Is belief in progress a prejudice? Why?
6. Can it be shown that we might have regress along with more money, more machinery, and more organization? Illustrate.
7. What is meant by *criteria?* Give some examples.
8. Can you think of other criteria of progress besides those given?
9. Is progress the same as efficiency? Why?
10. Is progress the same as securing what we want? Discuss.
11. Do we need as good physiques if we have more efficient machinery and social organization? Give reasons.
12. What is the relation of the mores to progress?
13. What are the limits to what people can want?
14. If we had less conflict and more cooperation, would that be progress?
15. Are increasing divorces (are divorces increasing?) a sign of degeneration? In what ways?
16. Are the rich getting richer and the poor poorer in the United States? Give evidence.

[1] "The Evolution of Civilization," p. 137.

[2] See Priestly, "A Mistake about the Future," *Harpers Magazine*, June, 1927; Bernard, "Scientific Method and Social Progress," *A. J. S.*, July, 1925.

17. Is a rising standard of living a proof of progress? Is the standard rising? By the way, what is a standard of living?

18. Give your conception of what would be social progress. If everybody had your standards, would that make progress?

19. Is it possible to be scientific about this matter? Why?

20. In the discussion on man's relation to nature (can you find it?), were we really talking about social progress? Consider.

CHAPTER XXIII

SOCIAL CONTROL

In the last chapter we made a hurried survey of certain notions about progress. Attention was called to the fact that a newer idea seems to be emerging, namely, the idea of social control. It is fitting, therefore, that we should examine this matter a little in drawing to the end of our long discussion. What is meant by social control?

Any group, as we have seen, is a smaller or larger number of people interacting with each other in a more or less routine fashion and in approximate accord with certain standards. The family is such a group, and there are the standards of sympathy, chastity, obedience, parental care, et cetera. The church is such a group, and there are the standards of orthodoxy such as the creed, generosity, devotion to good works, compliance with the ritual. The state is such a group, and there are the standards of obedience to the law, public service, integrity in office, loyalty. Standards everywhere, both traditional and ideational.

As each group develops in size and grows older, its standards tend to harden and become more fixed, integrated, consistent, so that the thoughts, feelings, and activities of the members flow more easily because they flow in clearer and smoother paths. Habit becomes identified with usage as the young grow up within these groups, and thus elements of fixity and rigidity are introduced, the old always imposing the established ways upon the young, as we have seen. Thus, unconsciously, for the most part, but also consciously and purposefully, each group—according to its age and the centrality of the interests with which it is identified—comes to have a social structure, a linked series of usages, a form, an individuality. We have studied some of these individualities in the foregoing chapters.

Now, there are *two* meanings of the term *social control* which we must distinguish before going on and in order to tie in this chapter with what has preceded.

1. We pointed out in the last chapter, when considering the general notions of progress, that the ideas of cosmic anarchy, cycles, providence, and social progress have been slipping quietly into limbo and that the idea of social control is now emerging as a way of conceiving social progress. What, therefore, do we mean by social control?

We mean the actual, increasing, intelligent collaboration of all men everywhere in the enterprise of defining what they want and then

consolidating their energies toward its realization. Let us use an illustration. A horse sees some grass in another field and is drawn thither. Now, the eyes do not go toward the grass, the ears in some other direction, the feet in still another, and the tail in another way yet. The *whole* animal goes toward the grass—of necessity, of course. How can the whole human race knit itself up into an effective whole for the definition of what it wants? How can its activities be coordinated in the efforts to gain what it decides it wants? How can it do this without waste, without destroying any of its parts, without harm to any individual? Conceived in one way, social control is efficient, universal coordination of energy. And so conceived, social control is synonymous with social progress.[1]

2. Social control is whatever is done by one individual either as a private person or as an official of a group to have any other individual or group conform to the standards which are accepted. Or we may say that it is whatever is done to keep individuals from varying or to make them vary as the case may be. Thou shalt not steal. This is standard for most of us; most people are pressed to behave in harmony with this standard. In Borneo, on the contrary, it is standard to take the heads of members of other tribes when possible, and the young are brought up to obey this rule. In short, social control is whatever any individual or group does to have any other individual or group do something.

We are all familiar with the fact that, for various reasons, some people in all groups are always disagreeing with and breaking these standards. There are always the lawbreakers; there are always the unchaste people; there are always the religious heretics; there are always the "poor sports"; there are always those who are sent to college but who refuse to study. Wherever there are standards—there are variants. What is done or attempted under the circumstances? What can be done? These are the problems for this chapter. What is done to maintain as much social order as we have, to say nothing of gathering ourselves up into an effective whole for going where we wish to go?

1. The Social Order

Any social order—family, church, factory, army, or what not—is a combination and coordination of various elements. We must set out some of these.

1. People.—No social order can exist without people—human social order, we mean. We have to start always with individuals. No people, no factory; no people, no church; no people, no family.

If people were all alike and inactive, like the bricks in a house or the rocks in the field, then the maintenance of a social order would be no problem. But we are never alike; and we are almost never inactive.

[1] See Kern, "The Supervision of the Social Order," *A. J. S.*, November, 1918.

We have already called attention to these matters; but they are matters of easy observation.

2. Routine.—No social order can exist without different people doing routine things. The perfection of disorder and anarchy would be different people always doing things in a different way, that is, never doing anything twice in the same way. With everybody behaving in this fashion, the next moment would be utterly incalculable—if the landlady never had meals twice at the same time, if the grocer did not regularly restock his store, if the farmer did not grow something every season, if the tailor never remembered how he made the last suit, if the milkman never went to the same house twice, if the government presses never turned out two bills alike, if a word never meant the same thing twice in succession. We could never adjust ourselves to such chaos. Any social order *is*, at bottom, an amount of this repetition.

3. Arrangement.—But any social order is also a series of routines and repetitions; it is a composite of activities cleverly fitted together so that they are instrumental to something; it is people and activities placed in rows and succession so that they mutually support and supplement each other. We say that the furniture is arranged, and we mean by this that we know where the various pieces are, what their relations are to each other, and how to use them. We say that the books are arranged on the shelves, and we mean by this that they conform to some system and that we can find them when they are needed. Arrangement means a plan, a system, a pattern.

4. Relationship.—A social order is always the activities of people related in such a way that they mutually reenforce each other, complete each other, and thus constitute something of a whole. A pile of stones is not a whole because the various stones do not have any significant relationship to each other; the pile would be just as good if some of the stones were absent or a few more were added. But in a social order, the parts "work together" in harmonious ways.

With these characteristics, a social order is predictable; it is something that we can rely on; it is something that we can depend on to carry along in the same way; it is not utterly eccentric and whimsical. All of this we had in mind when talking of groups and their folkways and mores. And the social order in the family, in the educational organization, in the church, in the state, in the factory is a connected, mutually supplementary, series of routines upon which the participants come to rely, and by means of which they live. It is something human beings cannot get along without. It is a delicately articulated structure. And being so fundamental, it is no wonder that those who are preserved by it are loath to have it tampered with very much.

The picture, then, of the social order at any given time and in any given place, that we have to take along with us, is that of a structure

composed of people and their routines related in more or less reliable ways—always being worried by innovators. Hence, any given order is never absolutely fixed and final. We might better say that it is orderly change; and some parts change more rapidly than other parts.[1]

2. Disrupting Factors

No social arrangement, no matter how loyal and mechanical its adherents may be, remains unchanged. What makes it change? We have already pointed out many causes in the preceding chapters. We may now gather up some of these for a final summation.

1. Physical Factors.—Any order is an arrangement erected within a physical environment. If this physical environment never changed, there might be a slight hope that some day a fairly finished social structure might be set up. But the environment is always changing; and since the social order is always, in part, a means to adjustment to the physical world, this order has to change accordingly.

There are slow changes which are typified by the glacial movements over North America, changes which are in process over long centuries and are hardly noticed by anybody until careful records are kept from generation to generation. There are changes such as the desiccation or drying up of large areas like those in Asia and, possibly, our western plains. The gradual subsidence or elevation of immense land areas are other examples.

Then there are more rapid, and even sudden, changes taking place all the time. The city of Pompeii was an orderly social structure until Vesuvius erupted and spoiled the program. The city of Tokyo was a structure of some solidity until the tidal wave and earthquake disarranged it some years ago. And we might enumerate at great length the disrupting effects of fires, floods, storms, cold, heat, and the like. The harmoniously connected routines of man are all the while being shattered by natural assaults.

2. Within the Individual.—There is always "original nature," in certain of its parts, to be tamed. Within this original nature are resources for order—to be sure—but there is always refractory stuff that resists mechanization. Individuals, left to grow naturally as we saw when discussing feral man, do not yield easily to the routinizing pressures of given groups. The reflexes and instincts, such as biting, scratching, grabbing, anger, jealousy, and the like take on a routine form of manifestation—it is true—but they are not routines which are easily fitted together to make well-coordinated and harmonious wholes.[2]

Equally disrupting in effect are the numerous defects to which human beings seem subject. Examples of these are insanity, feeble-mindedness,

[1] See Ogburn, "Social Change," Chaps. III, IV.

[2] See Ross, "Social Control," Chaps. II, III, IV, V.

and numerous physical deformities such as blindness, crooked limbs, and absence of limbs.

Very disturbing to any given order also is ignorance, ignorance of what role in life is expected, ignorance of how to coordinate with others, ignorance of any skill or accomplishment that would enable one to work with others. A very good summary under this head is made by Goddard. He says:

> First; there are masses of people who do not understand the situation; who have never had it explained to them why they should give up what they consider their individual rights and conform to the mandates of the group. And second; there is a very considerable proportion of people who have not sufficient intelligence to understand the situation. And another group who, while they have a good degree of intelligence, are suffering from mental sickness, and cannot reason clearly or cannot control their own impulses.[1]

In addition, there are inventors who bring out new devices and thus create unfollowable changes all through the social system. The most familiar example of this is the Industrial Revolution in England, effected by certain inventions, about 1750. The changes were so great that the movement was called a *revolution*—ominous word. We have, in our own time, almost a parallel in the introduction of the automobile. What vast rearrangements have had to be worked out to adjust social life to this invention! Or the radio! What businesses have gone out gasping and sputtering as a result of these inventions!

But there are new ideas which do not embody themselves in such neat material forms. Says Charles G. D. Roberts:

> In the heart of a man,
> Is a thought upfurled;
> Reached its full span,
> It will shake a world.

Poets are not supposed to be scientific. But sometimes they clearly see things and processes which others miss. Almost the most disturbing things in the world are new ideas; and that is one reason why there are so few of them. Think what trepidations have pulsed through the minds of conservative men during and since the Russian innovation! How some people shudder at the idea of "free love!" How mob-minded we become over the radicals who deal only in ideas!

But changes come about through the decline in health of certain social structures. It is a commonplace of history that nations rise, reach maturity, and then decline; that they have a life cycle similar to our own. Whether there is any *necessity* in this or not has not yet been made out.

[1] Hoag, "Crime, Abnormal Minds and the Law," Introduction, p. XI.

But we have many facts; nations so far have always gone through this cycle—Babylonia, Egypt, Israel, Greece, Rome. Certain vast drifts set in at unknown points, proceed in undiscoverable directions, and issue in unpredictable places—such has been the way of the past. An increase in the birth rate, for some unknown reason, makes a vast difference. A decrease in the death rate sends impulses through the social system in many directions. And so changes go.

Some of these disrupting factors are beyond control—as yet. The glaciers—and they may come again—cannot be controlled; the cooling off of the earth—if it is going on—cannot be stopped; the desiccation of a region has no cure yet known to man, except, possibly, irrigation. But there are numerous disruptive factors, once thought to be beyond the control of man, now definitely and speedily manageable. Epidemics of disease can be managed; buildings can be constructed so as to withstand earthquakes; strong barriers can be erected in the face of tidal waves; levees can be thrown up to control floods. So much for managing nature.

The greatest problem for the future has to do with the management or control of the various members of society. What can be done about the "mentally sick," as Dr. Goddard so aptly names them? What can be done with the ignorant? Numerous proposals are already in with respect to these, and they could be handled if the need were widely recognized.

But what can be done with criminals? What can be done with radicals? These are two disturbing issues for the future, and until the causes are analyzed, nothing very satisfactory in the way of a cure can come out.

It is not our business here, however, to say what can be done or what ought to be done. Our business here is to describe what has been done and what is yet being done to control the innovators, whether the élite or the mentally sick. Groups have always had to face this problem, and so, through human history, they have from time to time invented devices for dealing with these persons and groups. Two points will interest us from now on—the agencies and agents of control and the methods used.

3. The Agencies of Control

No group, with a neat little routine and satisfactory standards, has ever enjoyed the caperings of variants—radicals. No father and mother have ever enjoyed, after years of hard work and saving to erect a home and fix the furniture in a harmonious and comfortable way, the smashing and disarranging enterprises of their children. No church board, after having established the ritual and fixed the creed, has ever been happy to have critics and "atheists" descend upon the order and turn it upside down. No governmental machine, after having set its house in order, passed its laws, fixed its policies, and the like, has found exquisite pleasure

in the attacks of criminals, the onslaughts of radicals and the propaganda of enemies. There has never been any fun in this—for the guardians of order, for the "elders." And so, from time immemorial, groups have had agencies and agents for the purpose of maintaining the *status quo*.

1. Agencies.—The agencies have been really the groups themselves. In small groups, such as the family, the agency and the agents have been one and the same—the parents. But in all other and larger groups, power has had to be delegated, so that it is proper to make a distinction between agencies and agents. The family is an agent of the community. The community—neighborhood or city—is an agent of the state. And the large groups function and impinge upon the individual by means of the constituent smaller groups. The great Methodist church controls the individual Methodist, John Smith, by means of the local church which is its agency.

In fact, it is hard to see what other purpose groups serve, oftentimes, except as the instruments of some more inclusive group with reference to this matter of managing individuals and keeping them in the "straight and narrow path." Of course, if this were the only service rendered, there would be more eruptions than actually take place. It is true that individuals find pleasure in companionship, and they readily submit to rule in exchange for the pleasures and profits of fellowship. There are services, then, besides those of control which group life renders. But one of the functions of any smaller group is always that of serving the larger group by disciplining its members.

2. Agents.—The agents are the various officials, clothed with authority for this purpose. They are the leaders. In the family are found the parents with authority to deal with their young as they see fit, within limits set by the state. In the school are the teachers, the principals, the superintendents, and the school boards. In the church are the teachers, the ministers, and the boards of elders and trustees. In the state are the policemen, the judges, the prosecutors, the wardens, and many others. In the factory are the bosses, managers, and owners.

These persons are agents; they are instruments; they are channels of influence from the higher powers down to the last person in society. As long as everybody obeys the rules of the game in a given group, these agents are inconspicuous. But when there has been a deviation, these agents rush to the scene as firemen to a fire. Obedience to routine is taken for granted just as the absence of fires is taken for granted. The agents of order, as the firemen, are always ready nevertheless, because past experience has shown that they are frequently needed.

Think of the government of the United States trying to control the innovator, John Doe, without the use of policemen, judges, wardens, tax collectors, or any other officials. How could it be accomplished? Would not that complicated structure called the *government of the United*

States melt down and gradually vanish without these agents? Whether or not such dire consequences would follow, it is *assumed* that they would, and so the government has its agents clothed with authority. But how do these agents make their impact upon the entity known as *John Doe?* We turn now to list some methods—not of governments particularly, but of any agents anywhere and under all sorts of circumstances.

4. Methods of Control

Countless human beings have, throughout the course of social development, been most fertile in devising ways or methods of control. We cannot do more than make a beginning at listing them. In proceeding, let us think of certain types of persons, or persons in the following moods: (1) anxious to conform but ignorant, (2) well-informed as to the rules but not wishing to conform, (3) indifferent, (4) somewhat rebellious, (5) vicious and desperate. Here are five familiar attitudes; we have all had some of them. We have now to see what methods the guardians of the social order have been in the habit of using from time immemorial. Speaking very broadly and inclusively, there have been just *two* methods used—physical force and the human symbol.

1. Physical Force.—Many times human beings appear to have been manageable only as logs and stones are manageable. To move a stone, one has to apply physical force in some form. To move a wounded man, often one has to work in the same way. To have a recalcitrant child go to bed, the parent often has to carry it there and tuck it in. To restrain an ugly person, physical pressure is often needed. So there are many cases in human relations where physical force is needed; and the various forms it takes are pushing, pulling, lifting, holding, dragging, shoving, and others.

Now, imagine a society where nothing but physical force is available. Suppose that we wish to have the door closed. Of course, we can close it ourselves. But suppose that we wish to have some other person do it—what can we do? The only way we could get it closed would be to take hold of the other party and push him or pull him about and use him as an extension of our own body in closing the door. But that would be more taxing than to close it ourselves. Suppose that we wanted a man to pay his taxes and we had only physical force to use. The only way would be to go out, grab the man, take the money from him, and carry it to the tax office or take him along and relieve him of his money. What would things be like in a society with only physical force available? It is all unimaginable, because we have an infinitely handier method, a more efficient method—the human-symbol way.

2. The Human-symbol Method.—Instead of dragging, shoving, lifting another person to the door or to the tax collector's office, we

can make a series of sounds or signs; we can *say:* "Please shut the door" or "Go and pay your taxes." These sounds are folkways, and they are indicative to those to whom they are addressed. They are symbols in that they stand for something else. We must recall, at this point, what was said earlier in the book about this matter, about the exchange of meanings; symbols are carriers of meanings; they are gestures, sounds, objects which stand for and point to other things. There is nothing in the *sound* "Shut the door" to affect the door; but this sound has the effect of moving another person in the desired way—as a rule.[1]

When we wish others to behave in a certain way, then, we have an extensive repertoire of symbol forms which we can use; and these artifices distinguish man from the lower animals. Not that animals do not have these at all; they do. But we have such a vast number and for such a variety of uses.

These symbols are roughly divisible into four *groups*—gestures, sounds, writing and printing, and material objects. Examples of these are everywhere about us. Living things had only physical force at first. Then they started the development of symbols—which still goes on. Mental telepathy may some day be possible on a grand scale and become a substitute for these symbols; but it is very unreliable as yet.[2]

It is important to note that we are born amidst a certain set of these symbols, a very rich arsenal of them; we live with them all our lives; and they become second nature or "human nature" to us. It is important to notice, also, that each large group has either a particular set throughout or some special ones for special purposes; the fraternity has its special insignia, handclasp, yell, and the like, and its members use what is common to all others in this country at the same time. But an African tribe has a totally different set—with the possible exception of some gestures or the universal sign language; it has no writing or printing.

And the *meaning*, that is, the direction, of these symbols always has to be learned by the young; and by means of such acquisition they become members in the group. Any person who does not know what symbols are used and what they mean is isolated to that extent.

Further, specialization in these symbols has been going on for ages. This means that they are steadily becoming more precise and delimited in what they indicate. This means that they are developing so as to meet and handle as many of the increasingly various situations in life as possible. One of the marks of an advanced civilization is the precision of its symbols.

We shall now take up a number of these symbol systems and show how they work in the process of having others do as we wish, how they work when some people wish to impose their will on others.

[1] LUMLEY, "Means of Social Control," p. 15 *ff.*

[2] See VANDERCOOK, however, "Voodoo: The Case for African Magic Science," *Harpers Magazine*, February, 1928.

5. Instruction

This is a very complicated but necessary device in innumerable situations in life. Since we are not born with a full knowledge or any knowledge of the rules or standards of life, we have to learn what they are before we can conform our activities to them. Suppose that the standard at issue is tipping the hat to the ladies. That activity is not transmitted by physical heredity; it has to be acquired, which means that it has to be learned. Now, if nobody ever instructed us by sounds and gestures, how would we ever learn it? We might learn it by imitation; that would be one way; but it is not a sure way; it works only when there is eagerness to learn. And when there is eagerness to learn, the setting of a good copy is all that is needed.

But instruction implies that pressure is applied to the learner to see to it that all of the details of this hat-tipping activity are learned and adopted. Instruction implies that the learning process is not left entirely with the learner. But it also implies that there are numerous situations in life where a good copy cannot be set and where, therefore, imitation fails utterly. Suppose a motorist at a place where the roads fork. What then? If another motorist passes and takes one of the roads, it is not safe to imitate, because the two motorists may not be going to the same place. What is needed is instruction, positive, factual information, as to which road leads to the desired destination. And that is all that is needed, for the eagerness of the motorist when conjoined with the necessary information does the work.

Life's road has numerous forks. We are all in a quandary countless times as to what is right or best to do, all the while wanting to do it. What we need, under such circumstances, is light; we want information. We are eager to invest our money safely and profitably; we are eager to learn to be an engineer or a teacher; we want to know how to choose a mate; we want to take a sane attitude toward Russia. These are but a few of the hundreds of cases where light is needed.

And so the instruction begins as soon as we are born. The agents of the family, church, government and playground soon begin to apply pressure the instruction way, to see to it that we go the way they wish. If we recall what was said in the chapter on education, we can clearly see what is meant here. The school system is an ever more highly organized system of instruction ways. It has always been and is a tool for the ordering and "fixing" of the habit reactions of the young by the process of giving information. Characteristic manifestations are: "This is the way to hold the pen," "This is the way to spell w-o-r-d," "This is the incorrect way," "This hat is out of style," "These are the facts in the case," "This is the logic of the situation," and so on—gestures, sounds, writing and printing, and material objects all being used more

expertly to have the inquirer see the situation as it is and know what to do.

The hundreds of arts which are organized in the school and out of it for the purpose of enabling the young correctly to "size up" the various situations in life cannot be enumerated here. But it is important to know that education is an immensely complicated process, and now only the instructed can hope to work at it efficiently. This is the method for those who are eager to know.

6. Rewards

Let us suppose that the young are not particularly enthusiastic about learning to tip the hat or to do anything else that they are wanted to do; let us suppose that the motorist is not overly eager to reach any particular destination; let us suppose that the people are not determined by a desire to conform; or let us say that people are listless, unambitious, lethargic, or not doing their best, or "going strong," as we sometimes say. What then? Well, the guardians of the social order, the agencies and agents, have always had such people to deal with; these types have always been in the world. And devices have been invented for dealing with them and overcoming the listlessness, firing the ambition, dissolving the lethargy, and quickening the speed. One of these devices—a dozen or more devices in one—has been rewards. Instruction is inadequate here, for the listless, the unambitious, and the rest may know full well what is to be done and yet be slow in doing it. Instruction would be beside the point; it would glance off as water from a duck's back. Something else is needed.

We are very familiar with this method as it is used among us today. Johnny goes to the store for his mother much more rapidly if he is given a cookie or a nickel. Students work harder—as a rule—if the grades are good. The workman does better and faster work if he has a chance of a raise in wages. The government official serves best—occasionally—if there is a prospect of promotion. Industries develop most rapidly where the profits are large. We can hardly go anywhere any more without almost ruining ourselves by tipping. The loyal worshiper could hardly or would hardly endure without the hope of eternal bliss.

But *praise* enters this category. For praise is a kind of reward. Oftentimes that is all that is needed. If Johnny is assured that he can run faster than any other boy and that no boy could do an errand for his mother more expeditiously, that word is often more inspiring than the cookie or the nickel. Students have been made over from poor workers to good workers by being told that they had unusual ability, that they were attractive persons and that attractive persons should not be ignoramuses. The Almighty has been turned about in his purposes—so many have believed—by having hymns of praise addressed

to him and being called high-sounding names. Few people are unaffected by compliments. And compliments do not make us angry—ever.

Whereas praise usually flows from superiors to inferiors, *flattery* flows the other way. The slave flatters his master and wheedles certain privileges out of him. The child, with looks and sounds, flatters the parent and dissolves anger or averts the threatening rod. Any one who reads the story of Lord Nelson and Lady Hamilton soon has much information relative to the effects of flattery.

By way of definition, we may say that

> . . . a reward is something from a limited supply, or hard to obtain, not contracted for, and that may fail, coming to us in addition to the usual and expected compensations of life. These features require some explanation. First, rewards come from a limited supply. This means that unless the goods of life are quantitatively limited, nobody regards them as prizes; if such goods are accessible to everybody, they are not held in high esteem, and hence are not exceptionally attractive. Second, they are hard to obtain because they are limited or because heroic effort must be expended to secure them, whence it follows that a legacy is not a reward in the sense here used. Third, rewards are not compensations contracted for. If gifts are made as the result of a contract, they are but due returns, they are a *quid pro quo*, they are wages. Fourth, there is an element of uncertainty in rewards in that, not being contracted for, they may fail to come; we may not measure up to the standard set by the donor; we may not fulfil the conditions which we had no part in making. Finally, rewards are something *in addition* to the regular and expected compensations of life; they are *extras* in that they cannot always be anticipated, and if not anticipated then they are not regularly expected, and if not regularly expected, then they do not fall to the level of wages, of an agreed-upon return for effort. Rewards must not be regarded by the recipient as fully merited, for then they fall to the level of wages, simply a just return. To keep them at the level of rewards, the extra gifts of life must be regarded as unusual and exceptional, as something really given, never as a wholly deserved compensation.[1]

7. Persuasion

Suppose we say that not only is there listlessness and lack of ambition but also that there is a deliberate denial of the value of the hat-tipping custom or that there is a positive disinclination to go farther on the part of the motorist. Then what? Rewards may help some. But if these are ineffectual, then what?

Under certain circumstances, and by some people, persuasion is used to meet such situations. This is a very ancient art; but few of us are yet skilled in its use; many are too impatient or domineering to use it. Consequently, there are several levels of persuasion.

The lowest level is the appeal to some petty or selfish interest. The controller may tell the non-hat-tipper that he will be outcasted. This

[1] Lumley, "Means of Social Control," p. 31.

may be instruction, but it is more, depending upon the situation. If the person is fond of the company of women, he may be convinced thereby that he had better conform.

The controller often gains a point by an appeal to some deep-seated prejudice. We recall the prejudices mentioned in the first chapter. They constitute resources to which appeals can be made. Possibly, this hat tipper has a mental set that can be worked in this connection, and the clever persuader will find it out. The hesitant motorist may be told that he has always had a reputation for decision and knowing what he was doing.

Our loyalties are often awakened by persuasionists as a means of winning us over. "You ought to fight the Mexicans because you love the United States." That seems sound argument; it appears to be reasonable. There is a show of reasonableness.

The highest level of persuasion is found in an unbiased, objective, and critical presentation of the facts in the case. Perhaps the best known case is that of a scientific demonstration. Here the reasoner or persuader is in the background, and the facts and their logic are in the foreground. The appeal is not to the emotions, not to self-interest, but to the intelligence. All sides are considered. Objections are raised and answered as far as possible. No facts are ignored. And thus the persuader is merely a medium for the facts and their logic; the variant or non-conformer really persuades himself.

This type of control is the most effective in the long run with certain types of persons. It has the incalculable advantage of gaining over the whole person of the variant. He does not have any ill feeling from having been coerced. A person is not, in this highest type, "convinced against his will," as the saying goes. He is not convinced by any *person;* he is convinced by the evidence and by nothing else. He does not yield because the persuader would be happier; he yields because the facts and their logic are irresistible and incontrovertible. Thus, persuasion on the highest level is quite impersonal.

Persuasion takes a great profusion of forms. We have all heard of argumentations, of debates, of discussion groups, of wrangles, of "pleadings" in court, of evidence, of facts, of demonstrations, and there are many others. Any one of these has its varieties with respect to the amount of emotion, of personal appeal, of fallacious reasoning, of appeal to prejudice and the like, in it. One debate can contain appeals to emotion, to prejudice, to facts, to logic, to intelligence.

Under the head of persuasion, we should note at least three types of pressure which are very common today—advertising, slogans, and propaganda. These methods of control are so prevalent, so effectual, and so insidious that they cannot be overlooked.

Advertising, as now carried on, amounts almost to hypnotism. It contains every kind of appeal known to man—from the lowest to the highest. It contains lies; it contains generalities; it contains drives upon every human weakness and foible; it takes on every sense form; it is omnipresent; it contains information; it is the seller of goods par excellence today. It extinguishes old wants; it creates new wants in their place. Nothing like it has ever before been seen upon the earth. The cost of it, which ultimately comes out of the consumers' pockets, is enormous. A given article may be sold cheaper as a result of the enlarged market made by advertising. But one has always to think, in this connection, of the useless articles, the unnecessary articles, "put across" by this method.

The slogan is a neat device. It is a captivating summation or statement of a supposedly important truth. It is assumedly a "much in little." But it is deceptive, for when analysis starts, people always disagree as to what the thing means or intends to say. Take a case. Take the slogan launched in President Harding's regime: "Back to normalcy." That sounded good to war-weary people. But what did it mean? What is "normalcy" anyway? Nobody has ever been able to find out. Any slogan has this defect—that its essential meaning escapes on analysis.

Any slogan has the advantage, however, of being short and easily remembered. It is often in rhythmic form. It often has alliteration and frequently makes a class appeal.

Slogans appear wherever there is struggle. Countless numbers have come from war; countless numbers have come from political strife; any number have come from religious controversy; it would be impossible to count the ones which have been born in class strife; advertising makes liberal use of them.

The name *propaganda* came from the Catholic Church, and a college was established in Rome by Gregory XV, in 1622, for the training of propagandists. But these propagandists were propagators of "the faith;" they were priests who went to the uttermost parts of the earth to carry the "good news" of the Christian gospel; they were missionaries. And practically all preaching has been and yet is propaganda—in this sense.

During the World War, a new meaning came into this term to compete with the old meaning. During that time, the various governments engaged in the conflict undertook campaigns of publicity to get their own ideas before friends and enemies. Since censorships had been set up by enemies, these ideas had to be carried across by trickery. This trickery was a mixture of hundreds of devices, so that now, after the war is past, this term *propaganda* is disliked and usually means something questionable. It is, as Agnes Repplier says, "a good word gone wrong."

Propaganda now usually means a campaign of *so-called* enlightenment carried on by an individual or a group in *his* or *its* own interest and by devious methods. It does not go directly and frankly to the people with unquestioned and full information; only partial information is given; the antagonistic prejudices are skillfully evaded; it professes to be something that it is not.[1]

8. Punishment

We have noted cases of resistance; and there are many degrees and kinds; there are many areas of our social life in which resistance takes place. But what is to be done when all of the methods thus far mentioned fail—if they are tried? Another recourse of a very complex nature is punishment. Perhaps in no field has man's ingenuity been exercised with more devilish fertility than in devising forms of punishment. But there has been little sense of proportion, the most desperate resistances often calling forth trivial punishments, or the most trivial disobediences often calling forth the most vicious inflictions.

Punishments may be grouped under two heads relative to the nature of the resistance, that is to say, *legal* and *extralegal* forms. But there are no permanent and infallible rules to help determine which form to use; many times, indeed usually, both forms are used if the legal form is employed. Legal forms are imprisonment, whippings, fines, torture, and death. But these are often used extralegally, also. Legal forms are used to deal with those who violate the law.

Before proceeding, however, we must note that the more violent forms of punishment—whippings, tortures, mutilations, death—are *not* the same as the physical-force method of control already discussed. When a mother spanks her child, physical force is applied; but it is only an impressive gesture; it symbolizes the mother's anger; it causes pain that the idea may be remembered. The mother may drag, push, or in some other way force the child to do what is wanted; but the spanking is an entirely different thing. When a man is electrocuted, is that not a case of the physical-force method? Partly. It eliminates the man; that is physical force. But it does not undo the crime. One of the largest functions of this procedure is to warn all others and deter them from similar acts; that part is all symbolism. Hence, we must be careful to understand that, while talking about applications of physical pressure, we are still talking, for the most part, of symbolic procedures. Man has found out that the making of pain is a corrector; but the making of pain is not a method of getting done what the pain makers want done, except as it conveys a message, *i.e.*, is symbolic.

Turning, now, to a consideration of some of the main forms of punishment, we may enumerate them roughly in the order of their severity

[1] Lasswell, H. D., "Propaganda Technique in the World War," various chapters.

and brutality, especially the latter. We say "roughly," for satire is more severe for some people than physical torture for others; laughter hurts some people worse than a whipping does others. But bearing in mind this qualification we may note that, as a general rule, satire, laughter, ridicule, invective threats, cursing, fining, whipping, torturing, and death represent a sliding scale of brutality.

1. Satire and Laughter.—These are very similar at some points and very dissimilar at others. They are both correctives, however. They are correctives mainly because people rarely like to be satirized or laughed at. But most people like to laugh at others and like to satirize them as much as they are able. They are correctives in that they are ever on tap, ever ready to flow, ever ready to sting their objects.

Satire works, for the most part, by exaggeration. The cartoon in the daily paper is an excellent illustration. The cartoonist takes a person or an incident and enlarges the objectionable tendency so that it assumes an ugly or a laughable shape; the cartoonist shows the logic of the present tendency so that the performers will spontaneously draw back.

On the other hand, satire works also by being scrupulously and terribly realistic. The satirist tears away masks and varnish and shows the person or the affair as he or it really is. Thus, pretension, sham, affectation, vanity, prestige and the like melt away, and the often pitiful remainder is displayed for what it is—a pitiful remainder. That, of course, is restraining to most people. These two forms of satire are sometimes called the *realistic* and the *romantic*.

Laughter is a force which few people can stand out against. One has to be very stupid or "thick-skinned," as we say, not to be moved by it. We may speak of it in two senses—the loud guffaw or "ha-ha" of the ordinary intercourse and that whole but indefinable realm of the comic which plays such an immense part in our lives. The latter is not easy to distinguish from satire on one side.

Why we laugh has been debated by philosophers and psychologists since debate was invented. But nobody has the answer yet. Laughter, or the comic, is a very real fact in our lives, however, and it plays an immense role in social restraint; we are kept in bounds, kept loyal to certain routines and standards, all the time by it.

Laughter and satire are both directed not at the serious departures from the norms of life but at the more or less accidental and trivial departures; we do not laugh at or satirize murder or treason, but we do laugh at and satirize affectation in speech, slips of good form at table, extravagance in dress, the doing of unusual things which are not particularly serious in their consequences. Satire and laughter are not intrinsically cruel, but they wither us up, just the same. They are directed at the minor sins of life which are on the way to becoming

major, that is, unless affectation, vanity, pretense, and shams are really major evils.

2. Threats and Warnings.—Taking the latter first, we may say that laughter and satire are warnings comparable to the bark of the dog or the hiss of the snake; they are signs—symbols—of worse things to follow unless people restrain themselves. People may laugh at a slip first; but if the slip is repeated and a tendency toward permanence is revealed, then they may grow severe and shout out a warning or make a threat. Warnings are attention getters, that the guilty may know exactly what they are doing, reflect on the situation, and turn over a new leaf. Warnings are helps in the appraisement of situations. "Your house is on fire." That is a warning; in other words, it is a vigorous and hurried statement of a fact which the house owner is anxious to have, and by which he can profit; the house owner knows the logic of fire; and it is enough to know that.

But there is a more urgent kind of warning, namely, a more earnest and desperate announcement of the sure consequences of a certain course of action. "If you do that, you will be caught and punished." In this case, not only is the present situation depicted but also the future situation as well, if the course of action is further pursued. Warnings operate and apply *before* the consequences begin to unfold, before the affair is far advanced, while there is still plenty of time and opportunity to escape.

Threats, on the other hand, operate and apply later in the unfolding of the situation and when there are much less time and opportunity to escape. Threats operate when the opportunities for escape are very limited. Threats are almost last resorts before the calamity breaks.

By way of definition, we may say that a threat is a promise of injury, definite injury, if the course of action is persisted in. "If you continue to tease me, I will punch your face." This discloses the nature of threats. For, on analysis, it is clear that the development of affairs has come to such a pass that there are just *two* possibilities open ahead—stop teasing *or* have your head punched. Threats couple possibilities. Threats make pairs. After a warning, one is free to do any one of a great many things; the house owner could stay in the burning structure and burn up if he cared to; he could jump out of the window and run away; he could start to flood the place. But in threats, action is decidedly limited; the threatened has come to a place where it is "either this *or* that." Nothing else is open. The choice, however, between these two possibilities is left with the threatened. In the more cruel forms of punishment—later to be noted—this choice is denied; there is no choice at all; all freedom has departed.

Threats and warnings are not used, except as satire and laughter may be considered under this head, for securing restraint in the absurd and

more or less trivial departures of life. They are evidences of greater seriousness. They have to do with conditions where patience is exhausted, where the culmination of the process is near. They are drives upon those who are committing serious offenses but not yet doing things which are illegal.

3. Punishment.—We said, above, that all choice was gone when punishment begins; and that is literally true. No one chooses punishment; it always has to be forced upon one. Consequently, when one is past the "either-or" stage and is being punished, there is no choice left but to endure the pain. One may come out of the punishment chastened and reformed; but one is not usually let off from punishment by reason of a change of heart; at any rate, one is not let off from punishment for major crimes by a change of heart. All murderers doubtless say to themselves and to others that they "will never do it again." But that does not avert the blow.

Realizing, therefore, that many wrongs are committed for which repentance and promises to walk straight hereafter are accepted by the authorities as substitutes for punishment, we confine ourselves to the noting of some legal punishments, some cases in which there is an inflexible rule to be followed. In other words, we now come to what *organized society* does with offenders against its requirements.

A fine is a method of punishment which pains the offender without seriously harming him. Fining is a method of inflicting pain by way of one's possessions, not one's body. But the pain is conditioned partly by the amount of one's possessions, partly by the love that one has for them, partly by the disgrace attached, partly by how much the possessions cost in the first place, and by other factors.

Torture, such as whipping, stretching, imprisonment, deprivations of food, ducking, inquisitions, banishments, and the like comes closer home; in torture, one strikes not at the possessions but at the self—the physical self, and then the mental self; in torture, the punisher goes as directly and as painfully as possible right to "headquarters." And so nothing more terrible, more unspeakable, more insufferable, has ever been invented by man for the correction of his fellows. The history of torture has been one of the sorriest stories of the human record.

Death is the end; it is the end of suffering and trouble for the trouble maker. It is not always the end of the matter for the punisher; he can dream. This fact is to stand out first of all: By punishment, the victim is given added reasons or excuses for doing wrong; he, therefore, becomes more dangerous. The only solution, many have said, to that situation is death—absolute elimination. And so the death penalty has been in existence from prehistoric times.

And the methods of inflicting death—they have been legion; no device has been overlooked. The record here is black and terrifying. Recal-

citrants have been buried alive, they have been boiled in oil, they have been impaled on stakes, they have been torn apart, they have been hung, they have been shot, they have been poisoned, and so on. And all of this is to show that no person or small group can vary from the accepted code without being noticed; and no individual or small group can defy the rest of the population successfully. A single despot may work more quickly for the destruction of foes, but a democratic people can become angrier and do more damage.[1]

In conclusion, we wish to say that we have people interacting in uniform ways and making groups which are parts of larger groups and still larger ones; there are ephemeral groups like committees; there are small groups like families; there are hundreds and hundreds of groups and uniformity routines all interlinked and interlocked into a system of systems. This is what we mean by *society*. This society is preserved from disintegration mainly by *two* sets of influences: (1) There is the conditioning process that goes on every day as the young grow up and by which they are made at home with and in the web of life amidst which they are born. (2) There are these numerous methods of control which we have just discussed. But it would be possible to say that there is really only *one* set of influences—the latter; for this is the way in which the young are conditioned.[2]

Questions

1. According to statements in the last chapter, what idea has come to take the place of the idea of progress? Would this change be evolution or progress or neither?
2. What major social organization is devoted mainly to the work of social control? Show this.
3. Discuss education in relation to social control.
4. What is meant by *social order?* Does our social order include groups, folkways, processes, organizations? Show this.
5. What do you understand by *agencies of control?* Name some.
6. Could there be such a social condition as absolute anarchy? Why?
7. Show the advantages of symbol control over force control.
8. In what connections have we already talked about symbols? By the way, what is a *symbol?*
9. Give several examples of the use of instruction.
10. In going to school, do you work for knowledge or some other rewards? What, for example?
11. What is the difference between *instruction* and *persuasion?*
12. Has your family managed you mostly by instruction, rewards, persuasion, or punishments? Give examples.
13. List all of the forms of punishment with which you are familiar. What forms are most brutal and why?
14. Show that whipping is symbolic.

[1] For a different list of means of control, see Ross, "Social Control," Chaps. X–XXIV.

[2] There is a mine of information on this subject in *Pub. Amer. Sociological Soc.*, Vol. XII.

15. In the industrial organization, what control devices are used most? What least?
16. What ones are most used in religion?
17. Show the relation between the folkways and these control devices.
18. Does social control have any connection with social unity? If so, trace it out.
19. Show how social control is a series of interactions.
20. What control devices do you use most in having your way with others? Are you successful?

CHAPTER XXIV

SOCIAL VALUES

After this long survey of social life, we may advert again to a question which was approached in the chapter on Groups and which we hope has remained in the reader's thinking as we have gone on. This question is fundamental, and it is this: Why do human beings do all of these things that we have described—engage in science, form groups, establish mores, compete, fight, specialize, imitate, organize, and raise questions about questions? Why do we all behave in these numerous and complicated ways? Speaking very broadly, there are two kinds of answers given.

First, there is what we shall call the *material-mechanical answer*, which says that human beings do all of these things because they are an integral part of the material-mechanical universe or multiverse; they do all of these things for the same reason that the earth revolves on its axis and goes around the sun, that ice melts, that iron is hard, that snakes shed their skins, that fires burn, that winds blow; they do all of these things because they are made of the same stuff as the vast energy system of which they are a part; they do all of these things because they are integral with the inconceivably vast mechanical "movement continuum" which is the universe. Man is a piece of the earth—and nothing more. We shall not, therefore, know why human beings do all of these things until we understand the riddle of the universe. Indeed, this answer says, there is no sense at all in asking Why?[1]

Second, there is the *human-purpose answer* which says that while human beings are related to and, in certain aspects, part of the material world, they are also peculiar creatures in that they have purposes; this answer is that all men, but some more than others, aspire, hope, dream; it is that all men, but some more than others, compare, discriminate, and select; it is that the corporeal and mechanical conceptions of materialism are inapplicable to those phenomena which are, on the face of it, neither mechanical nor corporeal; it is that man is more than a piece of the earth; man looks out and ahead; he projects.

And certainly man is a most peculiar creature. Animals have peace among themselves, but they do not organize peace societies and try to promote peace; bees have routine in their hives, but they do not hold conferences and work out programs of efficiency; birds build nests, but they never build factories to build nests; beavers work, but they

[1] See PERRY, "The Present Conflict of Ideals," p. 24 *ff.*

never set up standards of workmanship; squirrels hoard food, but they never organize forces of police to protect it; some animals are beautiful, but they never try to improve their appearance and keep it in fashion; fish swim, but they never organize swimming contests. Man is everlastingly criticising his performance and trying to improve it. Man often behaves in what we choose to call a *purposeful* manner. Man prepares for "a rainy day."

The human-purpose answer may have no firmer ground to rest on than illusion; that is yet admitted. But many are yet convinced that there is some solid ground here; and, hence, they approach the problem of human enterprise from the purposeful point of view. It seems clear enough to common sense that some people consciously set at work to form new groups, to found families, to build states, to establish schools, to work and to play, to worship, to be musicians, and so on. It seems clear enough to common sense that some people "picture" themselves as having certain qualities or as achieving certain results and then set at work to accomplish these things—to be a gentleman, to write a play. Some people dream and then make their dreams come true. This is the way the thing looks on the surface.

But purposes are meaningless by themselves. What complete purposes are *values*. Man is distinguished by his versatility, as we have seen. But he is also distinguished by his capacity to learn, his use of language and tools. But he is more distinguished by his values. Man is growingly and jointly a seeker after values. Our discussion in this book, then, would be left hanging in the air without some comment on social values.

1. Definition of Values

In an earlier chapter, we said something about social forces, and under that head we said something about desires and wishes. Recalling these comments to mind, we can the better understand the statement by Thomas that "anything capable of being appreciated [wished for] is a 'value.'" When the present writer was a boy, he "wished for" a watch; indeed, he ached for one. The watch, therefore—which was not in existence so far as he knew—was a valued object of endeavor; and one of the most exalted moments of his life came when his mother returned from the city one evening, came up unexpectedly from behind, held something to his ear, and then told him that it was his "very own." The watch had enormous value to him; but the thrill of that announcement had value, also, and he would like to repeat it. This is all to say that countless *things* and *services* and *experiences* have value.

But values do not inhere in detached things and services. "Value is not a property of a thing itself," says Folsom, "but is its relation to

some aim or purpose."[1] Which is to say that we cannot consider values apart from a purposeful being. Suppose that one owned a house which could not be lived in, rented, sold, given away, or torn down. What would be its value? On the other hand, a house is instrumental to something which the occupants aspire to realize—protection, comfort, beauty, hospitality, and the like; there are many values in a house *in relation to* human aims and purposes. Values exist because human beings desire what they do not have and strive to relate themselves to objects which they do not have; values exist because human beings take certain attitudes. The flag has no value unless there are people to love it and defend it and thus relate themselves to it; our team has no value unless it is realized that it is, in some sense, "our team."

John Stuart Mill defined an *object* or any reality as a permanent possibility of sensations. This definition has been roundly criticised from several points of view; but it is not our purpose further to consider it. We introduce it merely to make more meaningful Bouglé's definition of *value* as "a permanent possibility of satisfactions." He says:

> Values exist only in relation to desires. We do not mean by this that they are nothing more than so many shadows dancing on the wall, forms variable as our desires, themselves. The expression *judgments of value* shows that clearly. Far from leaving tastes and colors matters of individual opinion, we believe that we are able, even in this question of value, to formulate constant relations. Judgments of value are *attributive* and *appreciative* at the same time. This means that we assign to an object—whether ideal or material matters little for the moment—a worth independent of our momentary impressions, capable of opposing resistance to our impulses, of dominating our individual preferences and, thus, assuming for us a sort of reality . . .
>
> I perceive, in my study, a table, books, a fire, a picture on the wall. These are so many sensations which vanish if I pass into the adjoining room, but I can reawaken them by reëntering the door. That is why I localize them in ensembles of properties from which I compose objects . . . To table and books, to picture and fire, I attribute not only an existence, but also a value, when I remember and when I anticipate the various pleasures I owe to them. It goes without saying that this sort of judgment is applicable to the immaterial as well as the material, to ideas as well as things, to a method of work, to a rule of conduct, to a rite, to a principle. Wherever found, a value is a *permanent possibility of satisfactions*.[2]

We may take this, then, as a usable definition.

2. Are Values Real?

Our common, everyday talk is charged with such statements as the following: "The road is here," "The automobile is a beauty," "The

[1] "Culture and Social Progress," p. 193.

[2] Sellars, "Bouglé's Evolution of Values," p. 18. I am indebted to this volume for many of the ideas here.

carpenters are on strike," "The boy was drowned yesterday," "The season is very backward," "The day was glorious," "The meeting broke up," "The couple eloped," and so on. Everyday patter! And these we may call *judgments of reality;* they assign properties and directions; they affirm actualities without taking into account the *wishes* of the talkers; feelings are left in the background. Such judgments aim at what we call *objectivity, detachment, impersonalness.* We are all familiar with such statements, and we all make them continually. We might call them *folkways;* or we might say that the habit of making them is universal.

But we are also accustomed to say: "We do not like rough roads," "The automobile cost us a good deal," "The carpenters on strike are my enemies because they left my house unfinished," "I felt it keenly when the boy was drowned," "The backward season will cause great loss to the farmers and make higher the prices we have to pay for food," "The eloping couple disappointed us," and many more. In such cases, we not only assume the existence of "roads," "automobiles," "carpenters," "the boy," "farmers," and the rest, but also we acknowledge *relations* between these realities and ourselves; we express something of our interest in these things and admit that they affect us. In other words, by making such statements, we indicate *human attitudes;* we reveal our likes and dislikes; we tie ourselves in with these things. Thus, we make *judgments of value.*

Now, if only one lone individual in all the world were in the habit of making such statements, of evaluating in these ways, we might say that they simply translated his own peculiar state of mind and that he was suffering from illusions or hallucinations; we might say that his mind was disordered; we might say, therefore, that his so-called *values* were unreal. But what shall we say when we remember that *we are all accustomed* to make such statements? Does any significance attach to the universality of this practice? Does this practice mean that objects have value as well as that they exist?

"Money exists." That is a judgment of reality. "We like money." That is a judgment of value. And we can find so many people admitting that they like money that we may speak of this as a widespread relation. This is not a relation of a single individual or of a few; it is a relation of the many. And one of the lines of evidence employed at all times in establishing the reality of anything—say a tree, a rock, a death, Jerusalem, an idea—is to show that many people accept it as real. This is not a sure way, but it is a help. We recall that science comes to certainty by numerous scientists checking on each other all the time and coming to agreement. Where there is a mass of concordant, critical counsel – there is reality. All people like and seek food; they admit it; therefore, the value of food is a reality.

Further, these valuations do not arise within us only; they are forced on us, often, from outside. As we grow from childhood, we are taught many prejudices—as we have said—and these are evaluating attitudes. We like or dislike Methodists, Catholics, foreigners, Republicans. That is, what our groups value, *we* learn to value; we are created in the image of our groups—as this long story has plainly shown.

Again, if an object or a thing, that is, reality, is not so much what we can see and touch as it is, as Simiand pertinently remarks, "that which offers resistance to our personal initiative," then values are things or objects as real as any. We have all found out that we could not change "prices" to suit our pocketbooks. Many a financier has found to his sorrow that he could not manipulate the "market" as he wished. Some of us have "standards" which refuse to give on occasion. Deserters in war often discover that there are "demands" which they cannot modify. We cannot make over the ideas of "justice," "liberty," "democracy," and the like without much effort. Liquor is valued by many, and, hence, the "effort" required to eliminate it. We might say that there are values wherever there is resistance. For the French sociologist, Durkheim, values are objective because they are imperative, and they are imperative because they are collective. Or, turning it around, what majorities in groups want, that is, value, they force minorities to want or value; this calls for effort and arouses resistance; thus, values are real.

3. The World of Values

Economists are continually discussing values; they try to be scientific; and they have no doubt about the reality which they consider. They talk of the *value* of the securities which are stowed away in the safety boxes; they talk of the *value* of the dollar, the mark, or the franc; they speak of the *worth* of the wheat crop. One of the very difficult words in their terminology is the term *price*, and they would like to know for sure how a *price* is established in a *market*. A market is a set of relationships among people for the exchange of goods and services and the definition of prices. In the course of economists' reasonings, they distinguish between *use value* and *exchange value* and thus help to illuminate the experience which we all have when we try to sell our old automobile and find that we have thought more highly of it than the dealer does.

A good deal is being said these days, moreover, about "waste in industry," which means that there is an awareness that raw materials, productive instruments, and other essentials of the industrial organization—which have value—are being lost; which means that values are being lost. The very existence of the discussion is a testimony to the reality of the values involved. Values are real to the economist and the industrialist.

But are there no values over and above those which economists and industrialists consider? Illuminating as all of these discussions are, they do not begin to exhaust the subject. In the French language, the term *valeur* means both "value" and "valor," for we find the saying, "Such value [meaning valor][1] a knight must have." In old English, there is the same dual meaning, as is illustrated in the line, "Therfor the duke him dight as a man of grete value," meaning valor. In Italian, we find the same thing. The Latin root *valere* means to be strong, to have worth. Thus, this term *value* was originally applied to activities other than those of buying and selling. It has had to do with *giving*, also, that is, with an attitude toward life. The giving of oneself for country or some other great cause has always been ranked at the very top of the hierarchy of values.[2] What is the value of a *life*—taken or lived? And we say that this term has always signified something more than what the economist talks of despite the fact that we nearly always try to state all values in terms of the market place. In order to have our minds filled with this larger meaning, let us review the subjects considered in the chapters which have preceded.

We began the book with a discussion of science. Scientific endeavor seems to have greater value all the time. There have been periods in human development when there was not much value attached to careful, prolonged, objective research. But see what we have now! More time is devoted to scientific investigation; more workers are engaged; more money is supplied; there is vastly more apparatus and more costly apparatus; more honors are heaped upon those who achieve certain results; the standards of research are more exacting. Also, prejudices, which are unscientific attitudes, are more and more disesteemed; they are of less value. It appears that there is more and more value in striving faithfully to unfold the truth about life and the world.

And groups! There are more people than ever before in groups. There are larger groups than ever before. Part of this is unconscious drift, let us admit. But more and more people see values in relating themselves to others and purposefully form groups to realize values. Isolation is now seen more and more to be detrimental; association is now seen to make the person. And folkways and mores! What about them? Are they worth anything to us? Do we not defend them and try to perpetuate them with determination? When some one advocates the abolition of monogamy, of private property, of religion, of chastity, and so on, is there not a reaction? Do not many people come to the defense of these ways just as they try to rescue a dollar out of the gutter or a house from fire?

[1] The parenthetical phrase is mine.—Author.

[2] SELLARS, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

People engage in competitive enterprises—industry, sports—and insist that there are enormous values in them. They engage in all sorts of conflicts and justify themselves by saying that their "honor" or their "flag" or their "home" is at stake. There is value in specialization of all kinds and not merely labor specialization. There are many values in suggestion-imitation. There are countless values in cooperation. So much for the *social processes* which we considered for several chapters.

But what about *organizations*—industry, the family, religion, school, recreation, the state? We defined an institution as an idea with a structure for making it effective. We might just as well have defined an institution as a value or a nest of values protected by and realized through a structure. The industrial organization is a nest of economic values protected by and enlarged through a structure; the family is a nest of kinship values protected by and realized through a structure; the church is a nest of aspirational values protected by and realized through a structure—and so on. Why educate the young if no values are involved? Why establish a state and pay taxes if there are no values to protect? In other words, what else are these structures for? If they had no value—like the house which could not be lived in, rented, sold, given away, or torn down—would they survive? All purposeful organizational strivings are toward values.

We commonly talk of the *value* of a poem, a play, a picture, a strain of music, a gift to some one, not in terms of cost in money but in terms of the delight, the exhilaration, the inward refreshment which we derive from it. Mercenary thoughts never appear as we read Joyce Kilmer's poem "Trees," observe the unfolding of the tragedy in Ibsen's "The Doll's House," gaze in rapture at the "Sistine Madonna" in the Dresden gallery, or sit enthralled under the spell of some great singer.

The Danish philosopher, Höffding, in his book on religion, makes the assertion that religion is first and foremost the "guardian of values." And this is clear to us when we begin to realize that whatever, *whatever*, has been prized highly by masses of the people, at any time and in any place, has usually come to have religious sanction—from the life-giving cattle of the primitive Todas of southern India all the way up to the "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" of modern Americans. When we talk of changing any of the fundamental mores of life anywhere on earth, we always have to face defense reactions on the part of religionists. So single-mindedly absorbed does one generation become in the preservation of past and present values that it fails often to recognize new values floating in upon it—as values; and, hence, the struggle inevitably following. The struggle ends, however, when the new values are recognized as values. When a value comes to be incorporated into religion, it is sure testimony that the said value ranks at the top for those people.

Thus, we may say, in all confidence, that there is a *world of values*, or a large number of such worlds—economic, political, familial, religious, artistic, educational. There are countless "goods" in all of these realms. And so we can make a universal category—the category of values. Everywhere human beings strive after values, and the more human they are the more they strive. They do not always strive very intelligently, that is, with a clear perception of the relation between means and ends or of the nature of the means and the ends. Yet they strive—and there is some value in the very striving.

Men have not often been entirely clear as to what would satisfy them. Yet training, or, as the psychologists say, "conditioning," has ever made them ready to find satisfaction in what usage, long usage, has made prevail; great numbers of the young have grown up to find satisfaction in what satisfied their groups—else there must have been indescribable anarchy. And this is why we can speak of values as *social*. There are individual peculiarities in values, no doubt; but the great majority of us seek the same things. We made the same point a few pages back in pointing out that many values are forced on us.

4. The Creation of Values

1. Permanence.—With these matters in mind, we may now proceed to indicate some ways in which values are built up. First, it is not necessarily true, but it is usual that values increase with permanence. One of the reasons why a steel bridge is more valuable than a wooden bridge is that it will last longer. One of the reasons why modern houses are more valuable than earlier ones is that they are more permanent. An idea is not deemed of much value if it can be exploded by the first critic. A skill which lasts only a few weeks is of less worth than one which lasts a lifetime.

Yet we do not forget that one single heavenly thrill is often regarded as of more value than a succession of mere passing sensations. Intensity is sometimes held better than extensity. A short, intense life is occasionally valued more highly than a long barely conscious existence. But by and large, the characteristic of permanency is not to be left out of account when thinking of how values are created.

2. Labor.—Again, there is the element of *labor* in it. Karl Marx thought that the value of a bushel of wheat could be measured by the amount of labor involved in producing it—and by nothing else—and he thought this way despite the fact that it takes more labor in some regions than in others, yet the bushels from these different places are sold for the same price. Yet he directed men's thoughts to an unquestionable source of values, namely, the effort that goes into the making of what is valued. The cathedrals of Europe are valuable in part because they are permanent; but they are valuable also because of the

vast amount of human energy which has gone into their construction. The same holds true with a poem, a play, a piece of music, a skill, a principle of life. When these things have cost us heavily in anxiety, in perspiration, in brain cells, in foregoing other activities, they are valuable. The course of study in college that has cost us little in devotion, in application, in exhaustion, in close thinking, in discipline, is not usually prized very much by the student—or anybody else—afterward. The difficulties of acquiring the goods of life, the constant fear of losing them, the everlasting struggle to preserve them and increase them—these help to accentuate values. And this would be true for any lone individual on earth.

3. Numbers.—But we are not alone. Our fellows are all about us and striving for the same things. We soon come to realize that our fellows are often interspersed between us and the objects of our endeavors. Thus, a third feature going into the creation of values is the numbers of people wanting the same things. We want oriental rugs, fur coats, glorious hats, places beside the notable, gorgeous dinners, and so on; but so do others. As the circle of bidders widens, prices soar. Some of us become discouraged and cease to bid at a certain point. But others are stimulated by the competition and struggle all the more energetically—which makes prices go up further. The baby plays on the floor with its various toys. We have seen it ignore certain toys until another baby came along and began to play with some of them. Then the first baby suddenly found out that it had to have the particular toys which the other baby had selected. There is something like this in all of us. We generally become aware that we want what others want.

4. Precedents.—Again, values begin and increase when we realize not only what given goods have cost us or others of our contemporaries but also *what* they have cost—and *that* they have cost much to—an indefinite host of *ancestors;* when we realize that a vast concourse of precedents has collaborated in their making. Says Bouglé:

> Let the effort of our contemporaries but be added to that of our ancestors, let the host of collaborators conjured up but take the aspect of a procession of generations whose origin is lost in the past, then the product of this collective, anonymous and secular work readily takes on something of a sacred character: to let this heritage be lost would seem not merely a fault but a sin. Is not this the principal origin of the veneration in which we hold our native land, the land of our forebears? By all that it has drunk of sweat, of tears, of blood, it is, as it were, impregnated with august value.[1]

Is not this the source of that value which we attach to certain great principles democracy, liberty, free speech, justice, belief in God, brotherhood of man? These have been bought with an incalculable price by an incalculable number of ancestors. That is to say, these

[1] SELLARS, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

goods are *price-less;* they are beyond price, beyond anything else; there is nothing with which to equate them.

5. Prospectives.—But once more, there is not only the heritage aspect of values but also the *prospective aspect.* Our native land is not only the land of our fathers, courageous and sacrificial, but also the land of our children, bright and promising. And if the procession runs back without end, it also runs forward without end. We glorify our native land, says Bouglé "not only for the past which it incorporates but also for the future it prepares." If all of these goods which have been bought with a price and which we are protecting and increasing have been and are valuable, can it be that they will have no future significance? We cannot believe it. Values attach, as we have said, where there are *possibilities* of satisfactions; and this applies to the future as well as to the present and the past. Our children will need what we have preserved or created if only for a platform from which to rise to new levels; they will need what we have if only to transcend it.

5. Values and Social Control

In the previous chapter and, indeed, in all of the chapters, we considered the *social order* and the numerous devices by which it is kept intact. We are now prepared to see that the social order at any time, in any place, of whatever sort, is a value or a linked series of values which the incorporated individuals generally endeavor to preserve by the use of the means indicated and others; and these means are all values for the preservation of values. Thus, when considering social control, we were really paving the way for a consideration of values.

The house is in order, chastity is regarded as a virtue, hard work is acclaimed, genius is lauded, free speech is desired. These are social arrangements. When young people marry, they make a contract, and a contract is highly regarded by most of the people of our time. It is the rule that young people shall go to school; and this is a social arrangement. Strong folk must protect the weak, both young and old; this is a social arrangement. We have a vast web of these arrangements which we call the *social order.* Thus, there are countless values to be protected from those who would break down these arrangements. There is a fairly stable and solid social order to be preserved.

But there is always something more. There are always values yet to be realized. There are better, that is, more valuable social arrangements of human relations to be set up. And people are always struggling on to modify what we have in order that something better may be. As the social-control devices enumerated in the last chapter are used to preserve what is, they are also our only means of making what is to come. Breaks in social arrangements at any point may be made by the selfish and ignorant few; or they may be made by the unselfish and intelligent.

The eggshell breaks when the chick comes forth into a larger life. Some social arrangements must give way when new kinds of values are realized. But the same devices are always used. Social control is always operative in the preservation of old values and the realization of new ones.[1]

6. Scales of Values

The consideration of "old" and "new" values suggests that the numerous values of life are ranked and rated differently. Iron has one value, copper has a higher value, silver a still higher value, and gold a higher yet. This is a matter in our folkways and mores. The same thing may be seen in precious stones—with the diamond, perhaps, at the top with us. Silk cloth is more valuable for dressing purposes than cotton cloth. Wherever we go in the world, we find groups and individuals attaching more value to some things, some relations, some ideals, than to others. In the United States, we think that liberty is better than slavery; we think that democracy is better than monarchy; we think that religious toleration is better than intolerance, and so on.

That is to say, human groups have carried on a process of selection during their long evolution. The American revolutionists had a number of forms of government to select from when they founded the American republic, and some of them favored the republican form; they ranked the various possibilities and put the republican form at the top. We cannot say that there was similar deliberation and intention in the founding of the monogamic family, in the setting up of competitive industry, in the organization of public instruction. There has, indeed, been unconscious drift for the most part in the past with the Fates doing the selecting. But there are signs that we are becoming more deliberative with respect to the evolution of values, and we are more disposed to pass by valueless things and principles for those which appear to hold out greater promise. Each individual and each group discriminates and makes a tentative scale of values.

In industry, more value is placed on efficiency than on inefficiency, on thrift as against waste, on quantity production as against individual workmanship. The worker has been regarded through the ages as secondary; but there are some signs that he is soon to be regarded first. In the school, the outstanding value in the past has been the thorough incorporation of the young into the static routine of the society and time. But now there are signs that the child and its potentialities are more highly valued. In religion, it has long been held that the individual had to be saved in the one and only way understood by the denomination, and people were to be saved, not for life, but for death. Now there is a trend to make religion a value for this life no matter what comes afterward. And so we might prolong it. But this is simply to point

[1] See Ross, "Social Control," Chap. XXIV.

out that, whether we are considering groups or individuals, there are always hierarchies of values; there are always some things which are prized less or more than others.

7. The Person as the Ultimate Value

But the end beyond all ends, the good above all goods, the value above all values, the value to which all other values of whatsoever sort are tributary and in relation to which they come to have value—is the person. And this is not wishful thinking; it is not day dreaming; it is sober fact. We are still describing actualities not unrealities. We have endeavored to say that the human species is somewhat peculiar on this earth. And one of the many ways in which it is peculiar is in attaching more and more value to itself and making everything else tributary. This may turn out to be the most colossal example of egotism that this earth has ever known. Be that as it may, the human species is mightily concerned about itself; and apart from it, earth, water, air, gold, crops, folkways, institutions, and all other values would not exist as values. Values imply a valuator; and that valuator in the last analysis is the person. But what is a person? We made a beginning of analysis in trying to distinguish in an earlier chapter between "original nature" and "human nature." Now we must say a further word or two. There is a distinction, perhaps, between "person" and "personality," but we shall not try to maintain it here.

Some writers tend to "give up" the problem of saying what a person or a personality is, as in the following: Personality is "an indefinable complex of traits—dress, voice, bearing, sense of humor, courtesy, physical 'clean-cut-ness,' symmetry of features, poise and self-possession —which we like in people."[1] And many students of psychology have attempted to list the essential traits of outstanding personalities. Sometimes we have to fill out personality blanks for students who apply for positions. From the literature of the subject, there would seem to be at least three main approaches to the problem of what is a person and a personality.

1. The person is sometimes described mainly in *biological* terms. So considered, it is the organism functioning in more or less definable ways. Ribot says:

> The organism, and the brain, as its highest representation, constitute the real personality, containing in itself all that we have been, and the possibility of all that we shall be. The complete individual character is inscribed there with all its active and passive aptitudes, sympathies, and antipathies; its genius, talents, or stupidity; its virtues, vices, torpor, or activity. Of all these, what emerges and actually reaches consciousness is only a small item as compared with

[1] Bain in *Social Forces*, September, 1926, p. 68 *ff.*

what remains buried below, albeit still active. Conscious personality is always but a feeble portion of physical personality.[1]

In this view, the person and his personality is largely a matter of physical resources—energy, strength, health, organic radiance, coordination of parts, eye depth, good looks, activity, and many other qualities beside; at least, it is some of these. We do not usually speak of persons characterized by lethargy, ill-health, lack of magnetism, ugliness, and other objectionable features as having personality. A pathetic victim of St. Vitus' dance—to take an extreme case—does not usually impress us as much of a person or as having much personality, as parts of him seem to want to go where other parts do not want to go and he sways, sallies, backs up, gesticulates, and lumbers along. On the other hand, we have all known of dogs, cats, monkeys, horses, and birds which appeared to be quite individual in their ways and to have personality. But, manifestly, this organic view is satisfactory only as a starting point for further analysis. We should not care to be a dog with personality.

2. Again, the person and his personality is most often described in *psychological* terms. From this point of view, the person is, first of all, an experience complex and a response complex. This particular theory holds that all experiences—being at a party, reading a thrilling book, being stung by the splendor of a new idea, losing a dear friend, securing a better position, getting married, traveling abroad—leave significant traces within people and that some of these experiences form nuclei around which all further experiences that are assimilable tend to organize. Thus, we are all a number of systems of experience, and these are the bases from which our activities pour forth. For example, let us take the following revelation by Edward Bok, for a long time editor of the *Ladies' Home Journal.* He says:

> When the virile figure of Theodore Roosevelt swung down the national highway, Bok was one of thousands of young men who felt strongly the attraction of his personality. Colonel Roosevelt was only five years the senior of the editor; he spoke, therefore, as one of his own years. The energy with which he said and did things appealed to Bok. He made Americanism something more real, more stirring than Bok had ever felt it; he explained national questions in a way that caught Bok's fancy and came within his comprehension. Bok's lines had been cast with many of the great men of the day, but he felt that there was something distinctive about the personality of this man; his method of doing things and his way of saying things. Bok observed everything Colonel Roosevelt did and read everything he wrote.
>
> The editor now sought an opportunity to know personally the man he admired. It came at a dinner at the University Club, and Colonel Roosevelt suggested that they meet there the following day for a "talkfest." For three hours the two talked together . . . "We must work for the same ends," said the colonel, "you in your way, I in mine. But our lines are bound to cross. You and I can

[1] Quoted in PARK and BURGESS, *op. cit.*, p. 111.

each become good Americans by giving our best to make America better. With the Dutch stock there is in both of us, there's no limit to what we can do. Let's go to it." Naturally that talk left the two firm friends . . . A talk with Colonel Roosevelt always left him feeling as if mountains were the easiest things in the world to move.[1]

This vivid and memorable experience with Roosevelt made a nucleus about which the remainder of the life of Bok was built. It is so with all of us. Experiences become linked together into a system and tend to make a dominant life direction toward achievement, conquest, power. Experiences of failure, criticism, opprobrious names, sickness, and the like tend to become organized into a system and make a dominant life direction toward defeat and misanthropy. Wherever we find in ourselves a general or a predominant trend, we can go back to a system of experiences. Our lives tend, for the most part, to revolve about a few central and memorable experiences which we are glad to remember, if they have been pleasant, and to which new experiences become assimilated.

Then, a notable person might be defined in terms of the number, kind, intensity, and memorableness of his experience systems and the way he relates himself, therefore, to his social situation. Luther had a grand awakening, and that experience dominated the rest of his life. We may recall the story of Pink Baker in a previous chapter and of the drunk who came to see Moody. Thus, a dominant experience system and its resultant reaction system, *when it is admirable*, is what we usually mean by a *personality*.

Says Conklin:

> Most psychologists today think of the term personality as the most comprehensive applicable to the behavior of a single individual. It designates the sum total of the neuropsychic organization, and thus includes intelligence, instinct, sentiment, motor control, all sets or patterns or determining tendencies, all habits, all memories, all that which from within the organism is consciously or unconsciously governing or conditioning its behavior. Normally all this is organized into one more or less highly integrated whole or personality.[2]

Now, putting the idea of dominant trends or admirable experience and reaction systems along with the idea of an integrated whole, we come to recognize that each individual is a great variety within some sort of unity. We might express this by saying that each individual is a whole society of "selves"; and now we are one self, now another, now a third, a fourth, and so on. Take your father: He is a father-self; he is a husband-self; he is a business-self; he is a political-self; he is a religious-self; he is an artistic-self. Indeed, he is as many selves or different kinds of

[1] Bok, "The Americanization of Edward Bok," p. 266 *ff.*

[2] "Principles of Abnormal Psychology," p. 179.

persons as the company he keeps, the kind of weather prevailing, the conditions of health and business fortune.[1]

We must beware of confusing this society of selves with what has come to be known among psychologists as the *multiple personality*. The conditions which we have sketched above are normal conditions, while the multiple personality is abnormal. In the former case, the father knows that he is these various selves, and there are innumerable memory connections among them all. The father knows that he is a father-self, a husband-self, a business-self, a political-self, and so on, and there is some sort of harmonization of these various selves and numerous memory relations. In the strictly multiple personality, the memory of one self does not carry over to the other; the selves are as far apart and as unknown to each other as if they resided in utterly different and strange bodies. Take the famous picture drawn by Robert Louis Stevenson in "Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde." The same organism was the helpful and skillful physician by day and the skulking thief by night—each unknown to the other. Or take an actual case studied by Dr. Goddard and described in "Two Souls in One Body?"—a female of twenty years part of the time, and again a little girl of three years, each person having no knowledge of the other. And there have been other cases. But Conklin says that there are not more than fifty cases of actual multiple personality known.[2]

3. A *sociological* view of personality is also possible. Park has made a most illuminating suggestion in the following:

> The person is an individual who has status. We come into the world as individuals. We acquire status and become persons. Status means position in society. The individual inevitably has some status in every social group of which he is a member. In a given group the status of every member is determined by his relation to every other member of that group. The individual's self-consciousness—his conception of his rôle in society, his "self," in short—is based on his status in the social group or groups of which he is a member. The individual whose conception of himself does not conform to his status is an isolated individual. The completely isolated individual, whose conception of himself is in no sense an adequate reflection of his status, is probably insane.
>
> It follows from what has been said that an individual may have many "selves" according to the groups to which he belongs and the extent to which each of these groups is isolated from the others. It is true, also, that the individual is influenced in differing degrees and in a specific manner, by the different types of groups of which he is a member. This indicates the manner in which the personality of the individual may be studied sociologically.[3]

[1] See Todd, "Theories of Social Progress," p. 10 *ff.* Park and Burgess, *op. cit.*, p. 113, quoting Prince.

[2] *Op. cit.*, Chap. IX.

[3] Park and Burgess, *op. cit.*, p. 55. See, also, Burgess, "The Family as a Unit of Interacting Personalities," *The Family*, March, 1926.

The "person" is an organism in a role—that is a fertile clue. And a role implies a play. Here we return to the suggestion made in the first chapter. In so far as we are in society at all, we are all "actors" playing "parts." On the limited stage, actors sometimes are "the whole show"; but in the Great Society, no one has ever succeeded to such eminence. The limited stage is none the less an epitome of society. Indeed, we might now describe society as a vast organization of roles or parts. The names which we give to people and their performances show this to be our conception of the matter. This organism is a *teacher;* this is the name for a role and consequently indicates something of his status. This organism is a *spy;* this is the name which we give to a different role and a way of indicating where the individual is in social space. If the organism is a teacher and also a spy, then two roles are being played. And so with thousands and thousands of names for parts and for status—child, youth, "mutt," citizen, minister, mechanic, husband, poet, shopkeeper, student, president, jeweler, alien, pauper, criminal, and the like, without end. These terms, if properly applied, indicate *that* individuals are functioning and *how* they are functioning. And the large number of parts played by some is evidenced in the number of names we have to apply to them in order to characterize them. "Father" is an "investment banker," a "Rotarian," an "Episcopalian," a "Republican," a "Mason," a "member of the Bankers' Association," a "public-spirited citizen," a "backer of Grand Opera," a "philanthropist," an "exemplary citizen," a "member of the school board," and so on. Most of us can be described in fewer terms. The great men of all time can hardly be described at all, because they have played so many, such distinctive and expert, parts in the Great Society.[1]

In understanding this notion, a helpful hint may be found in the etymology of the term *personality.* It is derived from the Latin, *persona,* which means a mask worn in earlier times by actors when playing their parts. Thus, the personality is not, in the sociological sense, so much what we actually are, conceived as isolated individuals, as it is the part or parts we are playing in the social drama *and* what others think we are and how they receive us. As the early actor was hidden behind his mask of paper or cloth or whatever it was, so we are all hidden behind or within a "part." To the reader of this book, the author is here in the role of a *writer;* this is what the reader perceives—this author role; and little else. What other parts the author plays the reader does not know—unless by other presentations in other ways.

Thus, the person is an inward framework of experience systems but much more an "appearance," a phenomenon, a representation, to others. Cooley points out that

[1] Odum, H. W., "Man's Quest for Social Guidance, Chap. VI.

. . . the reflected or looking-glass self seems to have three principal elements: the imagination of our appearance to the other person; the imagination of his judgment of that appearance; and some sort of self-feeling, such as pride or mortification.[1]

For example, the applicant for a job imagines how he looks to the boss; he tries to see himself through and with the eyes of the boss and thus measure up to what the boss requires. Then he tries to imagine what the judgment of the boss will be as to his appearance—probably wishing for a favorable judgment if he wants the position. Then he thrills or suffers according as he imagines that the boss wants him badly or is disgusted.

Now, this "self" which the applicant presents to the boss is not the *whole* self; it is certainly not those other selves—liar, cheat, bungler, and so on, which are as real as any but which he imagines the boss would not care to hire. These are left in the background. As we say, he "puts his best foot (self) forward." And thus he *plays a part*, just as actors do on the stage; he plays the part known as *applicant for a job* just as E. H. Sothern used to play the part known as *Hamlet*. And if, in playing this part, he does it, as we say, artistically and admirably in the opinion of the boss—he has personality. In the sociological sense, personality is a part or a coordination of parts played artistically and admirably from the standpoint of those who are interested and observe.

This is *playing*, because it is really a partial and, therefore, a false presentation, since the boss would not under any circumstances have a liar, a cheat, a sloven in his establishment. This is a *part* because what this individual would do in the establishment, what any individual does in the great society, is only a very small bit of the whole performance. The whole factory or the great society is a vast network of parts played with more or less skill and success. There is a vast difference, too, in how the individual conceives the part he is playing and how others conceive it. And the final judgment rests with the *others* and not with us. The great personalities of the world have been and are those who are conceived by many others to be playing major roles in the great social drama. Jesus played a major role; Plato played a major role; Luther played a major role; Washington, Lincoln, Edison, Darwin, et cetera, played major roles. The rest of us play rather insignificant roles, and it would matter little if we dropped out of the play altogether. Social roles are scaled in value.

It is now clear how the social play makes the actor and his personality. If we have no opportunity to act ever more prominent parts before the surveying eyes of ever more people, we are not growing in personality. But if we have some individual resources—energy, resourcefulness, ambition, health, and the like, we are in a better position to be offered

[1] "Human Nature and the Social Order," p. 152.

more prominent parts and then to make one the stepping stone to another.

In almost any segment of the social play—politics, religion, education, Africa, Asia, America—the parts are already quite well defined for us when we arrive on the stage. The existence and use of these numerous names for parts shows this. These roles are all defined in the folkways, mores, and institutions of the time and place. In America, we cannot play the head-hunting role; but that is an honorable part in Borneo. In America, we cannot play the polygamist role; but that is a well-defined and approved role in Africa. Wherever we are born, there are many parts to "try out." And we are accustomed to say that the more parts there are and the better they are played the richer the civilization.

But within the parts defined for us, there are many possibilities for variation and improvement. Many actors have played Hamlet, and each one has made his own interpretation—within limits—and has worked out something distinctive. It is the same on the world stage. Each individual releases his own resources into the part offered—helping mother, getting lessons in grade school, feeding the cattle, keeping the store clean, being on the debating team, teaching Sunday school, waiting on table, preaching, legislating, researching, and all the rest—and makes it just a little different and better. And then we have something really distinctive, noticeable, useful, commanding, admirable; *we have a leader*. A leader is a bundle of physical and intellectual energy thrust into a part of the social play already defined, playing it artistically, remaking it during the play, and being remade by it; and leaders often create utterly new parts.

And here we come to the summit of social values—*leader personalities*. This is the pearl of great price for which all other things are sold. The social play is the soil out of which leaders grow and without which they cannot get born. And that is what it is all for. As was said long ago: "The Sabbath was made for man, not man for the Sabbath." The institutions are for the making of man, not man for the making of institutions. Yet this last is true, also, for unless men make institutions, they cannot make themselves into men. Thus, throughout the countless centuries, human beings have been emerging more and more fully because past men have devoted themselves to the creation of the soil necessary for their appearance and nourishment. Better institutions; better men. Better men; better institutions. Both are cause; both are effect.

Thus, in a dynamic society, there are always numerous possibilities for the appearance of better fathers, better poets, better politicians, better students, better teachers, better citizens, and all the rest within the roles already defined. But we may suppose that there are millions of roles or parts yet undreamed of by anybody, which will be thought of

and enacted as time goes on. We might describe *social progress* as those social conditions where there are ever better players and more parts to play.[1]

Questions

1. We have considered science, prejudice, the physical environment, people, groups, folkways, contacts, processes, and organizations. Are any of these of no value? Illustrate.
2. Of all things in the world, what ones are valueless?
3. Can anything be of value in and of itself, or must it always be valuable *to* and *for* some person? Show this.
4. Do you agree that man is, in some sense, a peculiar creature on this earth? If so, in what sense?
5. What definition of *values* do you like best and why?
6. Distinguish carefully between *judgments of reality* and *judgments of value.* Are not judgments of value also judgments of reality?
7. The argument under the caption, The World of Values, is intended to show what?
8. What values have you helped to create? Be specific.
9. Do values evolve? If so, consider this in connection with the chapter on The Method of Evolution.
10. What is the chief value of the American Constitution, the flag, the Church, money, an education?
11. Is it true that value always increases with demand? Why?
12. Would it be correct to say that the main function of social control is the protection and enlargement of values? Can this be shown scientifically?
13. If there were no people on earth, would there be any values? Are there any values to animals?
14. Then the highest of all values is man—is that correct? And some men more than others—is that correct? Then where do you come in?
15. In what ways are some people more valuable than others?
16. What is the difference between the "individual" and the "person?" Are you a person? How could you prove it?
17. Does a person come by physical or social heredity?
18. What is the connection between this discussion of The Person and the one on A Modern View of Progress?
19. What roles do you play in society? Name them.
20. Can we study values scientifically?

[1] See Ross, "Social Control," Chap. XXVI; Hughes, "Personality Types and the Division of Labor," *A. J. S.*, March, 1928; Neely, "The Sources of Political Power: A Contribution to the Sociology of Leadership," *A. J. S.*, March, 1928; Hayner, "Hotel Life and Personality," *A. J. S.*, March, 1928; Giddings, "Principles of Sociology," pp. 148, 244, 262, 389 *ff*; Ellwood, "The Psychology of Human Society;" pp. 46, 105, 219, 234, 335 *ff*.

CHAPTER XXV

THE NATURE OF SOCIOLOGY

What is sociology? The first and most general answer to this question must be found in what has been written in this book up to this point; we have—so the writer has assumed—been studying sociology. Trying as faithfully as possible to adopt the scientific attitude, as described in the first chapter, we have examined the physical environment in its relations to man; we have looked at the human population and the characteristics of the individuals who compose it; we have reviewed the more conspicuous of the human processes, groups, and institutions; we have inquired into the nature of the evolutionary process in relation to these processes, groups, and institutions; we have endeavored to understand what we mean by social progress; we have said something about the nature of the social order and its control; and we have finally included something on social values.

And we have been thinking of all of these phenomena in a timeless and spaceless sense as far as possible, save as we selected illustrative cases from particular times and lands. We have wished to know "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth" with respect to this Great Mother of us all, this "nursery of human nature," this builder of personality. We have been trying to analyze, in a careful and dispassionate manner, our social surroundings. It has been taken for granted that we have been studying sociology.

It now remains, however, to chisel out something more precise in the way of a compact definition, to see something of the development of this discipline, to distinguish sociology from other social sciences with which it is frequently confused, and to see if we can understand what is meant by a "social problem," as a preparation for more advanced work. We are not studying sociology just for fun, although there is fun in the study of it. But more than this, there is a real sense in which every intelligent citizen must become a sociologist, a systematic and careful inquirer into the nature of his social medium.

1. Historical

As a neat, compact, and finished discipline, like chemistry or physics, sociology has yet to be born. That it is being born slowly but surely many of us have no doubts. As a movement, as a wish, as a hope, as a fumbling method, sociology has long existed. So far as we can find

out, there never was a time when it did not exist. What seems to be necessary here, however, is to note some of its more formal expressions and to follow this movement as it developed into what we have today.

Did primitive man reflect systematically and objectively, as we have done, upon his relations with the physical environment and with other men? Judging by reports from primitive peoples now existing, he did so very little. Individual problems such as disease, famine, accidents, drought were tackled one by one as they came and with what ingenuity was available. There was little systematized investigation, apart from that of the medicine men and priests, looking toward amelioration of conditions. But we can point out here, as other historians of science have done, that the origins of sociology were in the unorganized and casual reflections of practical people confronted with practical problems. Sociology, as a movement, roots back in the medicine man and the priest.

More systematic and prolonged speculation about social matters appeared among the Greeks of the Golden Age and after. Plato's "Republic" was a theory of society and its possibilities. Socrates wished to see how an ideal commonwealth would work out. Plato, in the "Critias," undertook to tell him. Aristotle was more practical; he did not abandon himself to the world of ideas; he made a study of some 158 state constitutions; he was mainly concerned with what we have later learned to call *political science.* The scientific feature of his work was the analysis of these constitutions; the idealistic feature was his advice to legislators. Lycurgus, a half-mythical or all-mythical solon of Sparta, under the inspiration of the Delphic oracle, made some significant changes in the relations existing among the people; he might be spoken of as a practical sociologist.

Thus, we have always had at least three impulses within that development which we now call *sociology*—the idealistic, the scientific, the practical. These correspond roughly to the three attitudes toward life mentioned in the opening chapter of this book.

1. The idealists, with the emphasis upon speculation as a method, have always been with us. The Hebrew prophets were men of this type; they saw conditions among men getting worse, as they thought; they wanted them to be better; they speculated and advised. The primitive Christians were men of this type; they found, as they believed a "new Way." A similar note is sounded in the teachings of Buddha in India and Confucius in China. This idealistic urge found expression in a series of Utopias or "Nowheres" beginning in this early period and continuing to the present—Augustine's "City of God," Dante's "De Monarchia," Sir Thomas More's "Utopia," Campanella's "The City of the Sun," Bacon's "Atlantis," Harrington's "Oceana," Cabet's "Icaria" (a place in Iowa), Hertzka's "Freeland," Edward Bellamy's

"Looking Backward," H. G. Wells', "The Sleeper Awakes," and dozens more. Even our safety-razor king, Gillette, has proposed "The People's Corporation," as a solution of many of the evils which beset our time.

Of these utopias Walter Lippmann writes:

> They are strangely alike. Generally Utopia is located in Peru, or a mythical island, or in the year two thousand, or centuries back, or nowhere. Life is fixed; the notion of change is rare, for men do not easily associate perfection with movement. Moreover, the citizens of these utopias are the disciplined servants of the community. They are vigorously planned types with sharply defined careers laid out for them from birth to death. A real man would regard this ideal life as an unmitigated tyranny. But why are the utopias tyrannical? I imagine it is because the dreamer's notion of perfection is a place where everything and everybody is a puppet of his will. In a happy dream the dreamer is omnipotent; that is why it is a happy dream . . . There is no democracy in Utopia . . . no willingness to allow intractable human beings the pleasure of going to the devil in their own way. Even in Utopias which pretend to be democratic, that is, where the citizens vote, the assumption always exists that the citizens vote as the dreamer would have them vote. He simply calls his will the will of the people.[1]

2. In like manner, the practical reformers have always been with us, to find fault with existing conditions, propose corrective measures, and try them out if possible; hence, social science had roots here also. It is permissible to assume that most reformers have done some reflecting upon social situations and that they have made some actual inquiries. They have not, in most cases, perhaps, written their thought in books; they have tried to write it in institutions; hence, what they have done is of some interest to the sociologist.

The Mosaic code, as we now know it from the Bible, the laws of Hammurabi, the laws of Lycurgus, the laws of Solon, the military organization of Servius Tullius, the educational enterprises of Charlemagne, the Long Parliament, the French Revolution, Toynbee Hall, the Shakers' communities, and the like without end were works of social modification on an effectual scale. All of these and hundreds of others, which we cannot even mention here, left some results in human formations and also in the way of systematic knowledge of human society. Very familiar modern names belong roughly to this group—Charles Kingsley, F. D. Maurice, John Ruskin, and socialists too numerous to name. As a result of some of these efforts to remake society, it became clear to the more scientific that an unending turmoil would result *unless reform was preceded by analysis.* So while one root of sociology is traceable to that unquenchable idealism ever bubbling up and forming Jack-o'-lanterns for the unsuspecting, another root is traceable to that feverish determination, so universally found, to banish something hideous out of the human world and substitute something better in its place. For we are

[1] "Drift and Mastery," p. 318.

not sure yet that unenlightened reforms do not but add to the total confusion and misery of man.

What frightened thinkers most was the fact that some of these agitations did actually contribute dynamite to the various revolutions which came along from time to time. The Industrial Revolution in England played such havoc with the old domestic order and left such incalculable misery among men that many thoughtful people saw the need of a science of society as a guide to rational change. The same was true of the French Revolution. The same has been true of modern industrial depressions and cycles. These phenomena challenged men to learn something about social life.

3. But along came the scientific movement itself. Out of astrology came astronomy; out of alchemy came chemistry; out of the unspeakable doings of the medicine men came surgery and medicine. Francis Bacon turned away from the classical method of learning by deduction and emphasized a "new organ," namely, induction. A hundred forces conspired together to push the scientific, the analytical, the research, method to the fore as against the speculative. This fever seized men everywhere. It was soon seen that no field could be neglected. Human society, human relations, came in for their share of consideration much later than other areas of investigation; but they came.

Says Boucke:

> We must never forget that the birth of social science is due to a once ardent faith in a parallel between the laws of physics and the principles of human behaviour. The Newtonian system, it was held, had a counterpart in the sphere of social relations. Laws were to be stated for the latter which should closely resemble those of the former. Regularity of individual events or groups of events was an assumption which men started out with before launching upon their journey of discovery.[1]

This point is well illustrated from the attempt of the Frenchman, Auguste Comte, the first to use the term *sociology*, 1836, to establish a science of "social physics." That was what we were ultimately to have —a physics of society.

Mistaken conceptions of the nature of science were adopted, of course, by the early sociologists, as we have seen in the case of Comte. And so from the beginning, sociology has been hampered by wrong preconceptions. Comte was going to interpret all social phenomena in terms of the then-growing natural sciences. Herbert Spencer was hypnotized by the "biological analogy," which was an organicist fallacy. Limited by one philosophy or another, the social scientists have struggled along, afraid to look at social life squarely, doubtful of what they saw when they saw it, unable to state what they saw except in terms of something else—until the present.

[1] "The Limits of Social Science," *A. J. S.*, November, 1922, p. 302.

Professor Small has traced for us the beginnings of sociology as a distinct discipline back to the "continuity" theory of Savigny, (1779–1861); to the "complexity" theory of Eichhorn, (1781–1854); to the "criticism" theory of Niebuhr, (1776–1831); and to Von Ranke's "verification-of-documents" theory, (1795–1886). All of these theories were criticisms of the prevailing views of history.[1] And here we come to a special cause for the appearance of sociology. In the beginning, history was hardly more than a chronicling, tale-telling, event-recording, date-indicating, event-depicting art. But gradually, scholars began to see that there was infinitely more to social life than wars, dates, great men, specific events. They began, moreover, to understand that many spurious documents were afloat by which one could prove anything. Historical criticism was childish. The human drama, in its intricate complexity, was hardly sensed; there was no wide understanding that society "flows." But here we have come already to the relationship between sociology and the other social sciences.

2. Relations of Sociology and Other Social Sciences

Prior to 1922, The American Economic Association, the American Historical Association, the American Sociological Society, the American Political Science Association, the National Council of Geography Teachers, and the Association of Collegiate Schools of Business each appointed two members to form the Joint Commission on the Presentation of Social Studies in the Schools. After much labor, this commission presented some "formulations" concerning the *distinctive contribution of each field of study*. Our minds will be clarified if we review some of these formulations and thus understand the relations between the social sciences somewhat better.

1. History.—The *old* history, as we have hinted, consisted largely of "empty catalogues and inconsequential gossip." Herbert Spencer, one of the earliest social philosophers, condemned the school histories of 1860 and before as follows:

> The biographies of monarchs (and our children commonly learn little else) throw scarcely any light upon the science of society. Familiarity with court intrigues, plots, usurpations, or the like, and with all the personalities accompanying them, aids very little in elucidating the principles on which our national welfare depends. We read of some squabble for power, that led to a pitched battle; that such and such were the names of the generals and their leading subordinates; that they had each so many thousand infantry and cavalry, and so many cannon; that they arranged their forces in this and that order; that they manœuvred, attacked and fell back in certain ways; that at this part of the day such disasters were sustained, and at that such advantages gained; that in one particular movement some leading officer fell, while in another a certain regiments was decimated;

[1] "Origins of Sociology," Chaps. II–V.

that after all the changing fortunes of the fight, the victory was gained by this or that army; and that so many were killed and wounded on each side, and so many captured by the conquerors. And now, out of the accumulated details which make up the narrative, say which it is that helps you in deciding on your conduct as a citizen. Supposing even that you had diligently read, not only "The Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World," but accounts of all other battles that history mentions; how much more judicious would your vote be at the next election?[1]

So much for the old history.

The *new* history was to be very different. Spencer said:

That which constitutes History, properly so called, is in great part omitted from works on the subject. Only of late years have historians commenced giving us, in any considerable quantity, the truly valuable information. As in past ages the king was everything and the people nothing; so in past histories the doings of the king fill the entire picture, to which the national life forms but an obscure background. While only now, when the welfare of nations rather than of rulers is becoming the dominant idea, are historians beginning to occupy themselves with the phenomena of social progress. That which it really concerns us to know is the natural history of society. We want all the facts which help us to understand how a nation has grown and organized itself.

Spencer wanted to know as much as possible about the structure of government, about principles, methods, prejudices, corruptions, national and local; he wanted to know as much as possible about ceremonies, creeds, and religious ideas; he wanted to know about classes and their controls; he wanted to know about the relations of the sexes and of parents and children; he wanted to know about the development and organization of industry; he wanted to know about education, art, and morals.

Such alone is the kind of information respecting past times, which can be of service to the citizen for the regulation of his conduct. The only history that is of practical value, is what may be called Descriptive Sociology.

Such was the demand of a scholar seventy years ago.

In his widely quoted essay on "The New History," Professor Robinson presents abundant evidence to show that the traditional catalogue of military and political events was still parading itself as history seventy years after Spencer exposed its social worthlessness.[2]

Robinson criticises the old history for (*a*) a careless inclusion of mere names which do not stimulate thought but rather depress the reader's spirit, (*b*) a penchant for political events to the neglect of others, (*c*) a habit of narrating extraordinary episodes, not because they illustrate

[1] "Education: Intellectual, Moral, and Physical," p. 64 *ff.* *Cf.*, also SPENCER, "The Study of Sociology," *passim.*

[2] CASE, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

the general trend, but because they are more or less conspicuous in the annals of the past. This sort of thing has resulted in a ludicrous disregard of perspective which assigns more importance to a demented journalist like Marat than to so influential a writer as Erasmus.

According to the joint commission:

> The distinctive contribution of history to the social studies is to portray human events and activities as they actually occurred; its guiding principles are continuity and development. Therefore these events and activities are not regarded as isolated and unrelated or as of equal importance. Every condition or event is conceived to be related to something that went before or to something that comes after. Conditions and events are deemed important in so far as they serve to throw light upon some course of development. More briefly, then, the special and peculiar function of history is to trace development.
>
> History places, and helps to explain, successive stages in the development of mankind. It constantly extends backward the memory of living men and gives them a sense of perspective to aid them in forming their judgments on contemporary affairs.

Thus, history shows how our most valued social possessions are rooted in the past and reveals the activities, decisions, and achievements which lie behind our present-day problems and institutions.

> History collects the concrete and vivid and interprets the unique. Sociology, working from hypotheses, classifies and arranges data in categories in an attempt to discover and formulate the typical.[1]

2. Political Science.—Thirty years ago, Professor Seeley of Cambridge gave a lucid statement of the nature of political science.

> We start of course from the fact that man is a social or gregarious animal, but we deal, not with the sociability of man simply, but with one peculiar phenomenon connected with it. For the sociability of man has many aspects, and brings into existence several sciences; for example, the science of language and economic science. The phenomenon in question is this. As a matter of course human beings, like other animals, are united together in families, and we might be prepared to find the family tie stronger and the family organization somewhat more developed in them than in inferior animals. But we observe something more, something which when we think philosophically,—that is, when we contemplate it as if we had not been familiar with it all our lives,—is very surprising and unexpected. We find that men have another bond of union beyond that of the family, and another higher organization.
>
> In nature there is seldom a breach of continuity, and so this higher organization is seldom quite distinct from the family, and sometimes might be explained away as if it were not distinct at all. Usually, however, it is tolerably distinct. Almost in any place, in any circumstances where a human being might be found, if you questioned him you would find that he considered himself to belong to

[1] See Case, *op. cit.*, p. 14; McLaughlin, "History and Sociology," *A. J. S.*, November, 1926; "What is History?" *London Times, Literary Supplement*, Dec. 16, 1926; Hertzler, "The Sociological Uses of History," *A. J. S.*, Vol. XXXI, p. 173.

some large corporation which imposed duties and conferred rights upon him. Each man has a name which belongs to himself alone, and another name which he has in common with all other members of his family; but if you would describe him and class him sufficiently you must learn a further fact about him, you must know to what state he belongs. State? But what is a state?

When I say "I am an Englishman," what do I mean? Does it refer to my parentage or family? Well! I cannot absolutely say that it does not. I regard myself as being in some sort of kin to other Englishmen, as though we were all alike descended from some primitive Angelus. I feel this very strongly in the presence of foreigners, for I find that they speak a different language and seem both mentally and bodily of a somewhat different type. But whether it really is so is after all of no practical importance. I am an Englishman, and should be so just as much if my ancestors were Frenchmen. And yet that I am an Englishman and not a Frenchman is all-important to me.

After pointing out that human beings fall into many classes according to the observer's point of view—anthropologists, ethnologists, et cetera —Professor Seeley continues:

The division of mankind into states is of vast importance, first, because of its universality; secondly, because of its intensity and the momentous consequences it has had. When I speak of its universality I admit that I stretch considerably the meaning commonly given to the word state . . . But we want some word to denote the large corporation, larger than the family yet usually connected with the family, whatever form it may assume, and the word state is the only word which can be made to serve this purpose. Sometimes it would be better called a tribe or clan, sometimes a church or religion, but whatever we call it the phenomenon is very universal. Almost everywhere men conceive themselves as belonging to some large corporation. They conceive themselves too as belonging to it for life and death; they conceive that in case of need this corporation may make unlimited demands upon them; they conceive that they are bound, if called upon, to die for it.

Hence most interesting and memorable results follow from the existence of these great corporations. In the first place, the growth and development of the corporations themselves, the various forms they assume, the various phases they pass through; then the interaction of these corporations upon each other, the wars they wage, the treaties they conclude, all of the phenomena of conquest and federation; then again the infinite effects produced upon the individual by belonging to such a corporation, those infinite effects which we sum up in the single expressive word civilization; here, you see, is a field of speculation almost boundless, for it includes almost all that is memorable in the history of mankind, and yet it is all directly produced by the fact that human beings almost everywhere belong to states.[1]

Supplementing this, the joint commission formulated as follows:

Political science is the study of the state, a term which includes all forms of political organization. It deals with the life of men as organized under govern-

[1] Quoted in CASE, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

ment and law. As its distinctive contribution to the social studies, it gives an understanding of social control by means of law and of the promotion of general welfare by means of governmental action.

Political science includes a study of the organization and the activities of states, and of the principles and ideals which underlie political organization and activities. It deals with the relations among men which are controlled by the state, with the relations of men to the state itself, and with those aspects of international life that come under political control. It considers the problems of adjusting political authority to individual liberty, and of determining the distribution of governing power among the agencies through which the state's will is formed, expressed and executed.

Political science seeks to develop in individuals a sense of their rights and responsibilities as members of the state, and a realization of the significance of law. It substitutes accurate information and intelligent opinion for emotions and prejudices as a basis for forming judgments in politics and world affairs.[1]

3. Economics.—Since the beginnings of this study, such rapid and decisive shifts in view have taken place that it is risky to say what economics is. Professor Marshall says that it is

. . . a study of mankind in the ordinary business of life; it examines that part of individual and social action which is most closely connected with the attainment and with the use of the material requisites of wellbeing.

Thus it is on the one side a study of wealth, and on the other, and more important side, a part of the study of man. For man's character has been moulded by his every-day work, and the material resources which he thereby procures, more than by any other influence unless it be that of his religious ideals; and the two great forming agencies of the world's history have been the religious and the economic . . .

Economics is a study of men as they live and move and think in the ordinary business of life. But it concerns itself chiefly with those motives which affect, most powerfully and most steadily, man's conduct in the business part of his life. Every one who is worth anything carries his higher nature with him into business; and, there as elsewhere, he is influenced by his personal affections, by his conceptions of duty and his reverence for high ideals . . . But, for all that, the steadiest motive to ordinary business work is the desire for the pay which is the material reward of work . . . But the motive is supplied by a definite amount of money; and it is this definite and exact money measurement of the steadiest motives in business life, which has enabled economics far to outrun every other branch of the study of man.[1]

The joint commission says:

The distinctive contribution of economics to the social studies is the understanding it gives of the processes by which men get a living. A very large part of human activity is devoted to the process of getting a living. One of the most

[1] Quoted in CASE, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

significant things about our world is the fact that nature does not gratuitously supply all, or even many, of the commodities and services desired. In consequence we "struggle" to get a living; we learn to "economize" (in the broadest sense of that term) in the selection and utilization of effective means of gaining desired ends. These activities are *our economic activities*. They are carried on largely in group life and, even when most individual, are affected by group life. Economics, then, promotes a realization of what it means to live together and an understanding of the conditions essential to living together well, because it helps to explain the organization and functioning of an evolving society from the point of view of the social processes of making a living.

Economics sets forth, for example, certain aspects of our specialization, our interdependence, our associative effort, our technological struggle with nature, our pecuniary organization of the production and sharing of goods, our utilization of labor under the wage system, our market exchange, our international economic relations, our scheme of private property and competitive effort—all of which have become vital parts of our present social organization—and it shows how all of these function in enabling us to work and to live together. Concerning these economic processes certain generalizations or laws have been worked out and they are available as standards or guides for individuals and for groups.[1]

4. Sociology.—The joint commission again says:

The distinctive contribution of sociology to the social studies is to show that, however much may be allowed for individual initiative and for natural environment, human life has been conditioned more by its social setting than by any other cause. Understanding of the social setting results from study of society as a composite unity made up of many interrelated groups and carrying on many independent activities all of which are conditioned by certain ever present types of causation. The multitudinous and repetitious manifestations of these types of causation are more or less subject to statistical treatment and make up those trends of social change a full statement of which would be social laws. Sociology studies the various forms of causal relations between the activities of individuals that are always occurring in homes, schools, neighborhoods, crowds, publics and wherever human beings meet, and that give rise to public opinion, customs and institutions.

Sociology also studies the problems of population as affecting all types of social activity, the effects of small and large numbers, of sparse and dense distribution, of differences in the quality of the individuals who compose the population, both their inborn traits as determined by racial and family heredity, and the acquired traits which result from the prevalent vices, diseases, occupations and mode of life. This branch of sociology includes certain aspects of the problems of immigration, eugenics and public health.

It studies the causes, prevention, and treatment of poverty and crime. It makes a comparative study of different societies, including the most primitive, which reveals the social origins and the method of progress. This comparative study shows that nothing is too repugnant to us to have been customary somewhere and that we must be slow to think that anything is too ideal to be possible

[1] Quoted in CASE, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

sometime, for customs and institutions are as variable as the states of mind and feeling which issue from social causation.

The study of sociology tends to dissolve the prejudices and bigotries which are the chief obstacles to social co-operation by showing that such prejudices are mostly formed at an age when rational judgment on fundamental problems is impossible, and that in the overwhelming majority of instances those who differ from each other most radically would hold similar opinions and sentiments if they had been moulded by similar influences.

Sociology affords a clear view of the aims of education for it shows that distinctively human nature is second nature socially acquired and that if from birth one could be excluded from all social contacts he would remain a naked savage and a dumb brute. It illuminates the methods of education by its study of the effects of social contacts, and it supplies materials for moral instruction in the schools by its study of the relations between society and the individual and of the interdependence of groups. Such study presents in its full light the fact that all social life is team-work. It tends to evoke the spirit of co-operation. It reveals grounds for ethical requirements and sources of ethical incentive.[1]

A very large number of *special* social sciences have become differentiated. Within each of the fields mentioned above have developed such specialties as historiography, the science of business organization, the science of social geography, the science of human ecology, archæology, anthropology, ethnology, ethnography, social technology, and dozens more. And no wonder; the field of human association and its consequences is so large.[2]

As a consequence, the position of sociology has been held by some to be rather precarious. Some have argued that the thing for which sociology came into existence has been realized by the rapid development of these specialties. Some have said that sociology might well go out of existence as a special discipline. Some have held that it is only a special discipline and might very well confine itself to a study of the family. On the other hand, some have maintained that sociology is the most general and inclusive of all the social sciences, that it might very well be the name of all the social sciences and generalize from these specialties; in other words, that it is like biology.

The rapidly growing and intense interest in social matters, however, is obvious. There will not be less social science in the future but much more. What happens to a name or to any particular discipline is of no great consequence. "The new history" is largely sociology, in so far as it softens its emphasis upon the peculiar and incidental and begins to emphasize the recurrent, the regular, the uniform trends in social life.[3]

[1] Quoted in Case, *op. cit.*, p. 23. On the relation of sociology to psychology, see Leuba, *A. J. S.*, November, 1913, p. 323.

[2] On the relation of sociology to ethnology, see Rivers, "Helps for Students of History," No. 48 (1922).

[3] See Park, "Sociology and the Social Sciences," *A. J. S.*, September, 1921.

3. Scientific Method in Sociology

The social scientist uses what he can of the natural-science methods, a hint of which was given in the first chapter. He tries to approach his subject matter in the same spirit and with the same purpose. He collects facts; he observes; he measures; he compares; he records; he classifies; he reasons—deductively and inductively. He does not experiment so much as natural scientists; but the world is his laboratory.

There are *four* methods, however, which sociologists—and other social scientists as well—are coming to use more and more, and which seem to be more valuable the more they are tested out. They are not in any sense discoveries of social scientists. They are not entirely distinct. But they have separate names now and may be pointed out to advantage. They are called the *statistical*, the *case*, the *ethnographical*, and the *survey* methods.

1. The Statistical Method.—The statistical method may be illustrated by reference to the several tabular calculations of death rates, birth rates, divorces and immigrants used in an earlier chapter. At bottom, this is a process of *counting units*. This particular birth is a unit; that birth is a unit; the other birth is a unit; thus, there are *three* units. The same for deaths, divorces, and immigrants. And when what is called a *fair sample* has been counted, a total is computed which is said to reveal a trend; the birth rate is 15 per 1,000 inhabitants; the death rate is 12 per 1,000 inhabitants. Then a correlation is made between the birth rate and the death rate or between the birth rate and marriage or between marriage and divorce. The results of these comparisons of rates are formulations of trends.

This method has the value of *accuracy*—if enough units for a sufficient sample have been used. It is infinitely better than guessing—to which all ordinary folk resort when considering such matters—for exact programs can be laid out with reference thereto. One man says: "The divorce rate is frightfully large; the family is going to pieces." Now, this is very indefinite; nobody could lay out a program of improvement on the basis of such knowledge. Exactly what is the divorce rate? Is it one divorce for every two marriages (as in one county in Indiana a decade ago) or one for three or one for four or what is it? We need to know as precisely as figures can tell us; and so with other phenomena.

The trouble often lies, however, in *defining the unit* to be counted. We count one birth, two births, three births, et cetera. But what *is* this we are talking about? What is a birth? We count a divorce—one, two, three, four, and so on. But what is a divorce? Here is a set of extremely complex phenomena—the dissolution of a family. Is it a divorce or isn't it? The question is: Does this thing belong surely in that class of phenomena to which we give the name *divorce?* After one is sure that it belongs within the class, then it may properly be

counted; but not before. Now, statistics may help and often do help in locating the thing within its proper class; that is to say, measurement helps. But there is not very much about a given family breakup, for example, or a birth, or a death, that can be measured; the parts of it are too obscure and subtle; one simply cannot apply any accepted measurement standard to them. How can we measure hate? or love? or loyalty? or a sick family? or levels of sympathy? or cooperation? or imitation? Yet as far as we can use this method—and we are using it in ways undreamed of some decades back—we must use it because it gives us the most precise view of things.

2. The Case Method.—The employer of the case method takes great pains with these so-called *units*. He takes exceptional care to make sure that any object, event, person, phenomenon, et cetera, belongs to a given class. Hence, he examines the object, event, person, phenomenon, minutely. Then he goes into the antecedents of what is present and on the surface—all of this to make sure that he has a *usable unit of a certain kind*. For example, he often prepares what is called a *schedule* or a *questionnaire* as an outline of the information that he wants and then proceeds to have it filled in. Here is the *case* of John F., aged 12, of the white race, and with a birthplace in a particular town in Massachusetts. The sources of this information are the boy himself, the mother, the father, the school principal, the policeman who caught the boy, the court record, the neighbors, and others—all directed to the understanding of this boy and, especially, certain activities of this boy.

I. History of the Family:
   A. Medical—nothing abnormal or unusual found.
   B. Social—Father, who is a successful physician, has for some years lived with a nurse to whom he is not married. He maintains his wife and family in comfort but lives in another apartment with the nurse. His wife seems well satisfied with the arrangement, as she has all the money she needs. Mother spends most of her time shopping, playing bridge, etc.
   C. Educational—Mother is a high school graduate; father college and medical school training.
   D. Economic—Mother is a society woman; father a very successful physician.

II. History of the Individual:
   A. Medical—Developed more rapidly than normal. Talked at 1 year, walked at 11 months.
   B. Social—Has always stolen things. Has systematically practiced picking pockets and opening locks. He never does any kind of rough work for fear he will destroy the sensitiveness of his touch. Is suspected of juvenile sex experiences.
   C. Educational—Does excellent work in school; has always stood at the top of his class. Is anxious to get a good education. Is well behaved but somewhat "slick" in school.

D. Economic—Nothing.

III. History of the Present Crisis:

A. Medical—Nothing.

B. Social—Was caught in an attempt to pick a man's watch from his pocket. A policeman saw him do it; the owner had not noticed the loss. Was entirely possessed in court. Said he intends to become a gentleman pickpocket—a sort of "Raffles."

C. Educational—Nothing.

D. Economic—Nothing.

IV. Present Condition:

. . . . et cetera[1]

All of this prolonged, extensive, and painstaking inquiry represents an attempt to understand this "case" and to know what "class" he belongs to. In other words, this represents an attempt to define a complicated unit. A birth, a divorce, a marriage, et cetera, is a complicated unit also; but each is rather clearly defined. This boy's thievery, however, is not so obvious as to its causes. The investigator might have *assumed* or *guessed* at all of this information; but that would not help much in scientific treatment. Perhaps the most difficult part of this type of investigation is in knowing what to look for, that is, in making out the schedule of inquiries at the start.[2]

3. The Ethnographical Method.—This method is also directed to a study of units and represents an attempt to locate them within certain classes. But, whereas the former "case" was a *person*, this case is a *usage*. In his monumental work, "Folkways," Sumner borrows from hundreds of investigators who employed this method. They went out and lived among the peoples of the world and took careful notes on their numerous usages. Then these usages were classified under appropriate heads, and thus an attempt was made to impose some kind of order on what appeared to be a veritable jungle. Let us study the following brief passage from the "Folkways."

Food Taboos in Ethnography.—Some Micronesians eat no fowl. Wild Veddahs reject fowl. Tuaregs eat no fish, birds, or eggs. In eastern Africa many tribes loathe eggs and fowl as food. They are as much disgusted to see a white man eat eggs as a white man is to see savages eat offal. Some Australians will not eat pork. Nagas and their neighbors think roast dog a great delicacy. They will eat anything, even an elephant which has been three days buried, but they abominate milk, and find the smell of tinned lobster too strong. Negroes in the French Congo "have a perfect horror of the idea of drinking milk."[3]

[1] PRESSEY, "Mental Abnormality," p. 97 *ff.* See, also, RUBINOW, *Social Forces*, December, 1925, p. 286. VAN WATERS, *Survey*, Feb. 1, 1927.

[2] See LUNDBERG, "Case Work and Statistical Method," *Social Forces*, September, 1926, p. 61.

[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 339.

Thus, a usage—an activity-routine unit—is found among the Zulus, the Hottentots, the Botocudos, the Patagonians, the Jews, the Chinese, and others, let us say. This means a uniformity, a social regularity, a degree of repetitiousness which can be relied on; this uniformity in human affairs has the same meaning, although perhaps not the same validity, as uniformity among stars and atoms. But by this method one is able to find order in human affairs and then to know better how to get along. These discovered uniformities, when generalized, become laws.

4. The Survey Method.—This is a method devised to gain a preliminary and general view of a situation preparatory to more thorough study. For example, in 1920, the Interchurch World Movement of North America published the results of a *world survey* which had been going on for some time previously. Two volumes were published, one on America and the other on foreign fields. The latter included some general information on areas, populations, governments, daily bread, health, education, literature, women, children, religion, for many regions; and this information was gathered up, digested, and presented by charts and graphs as well as in the explanatory word. After reading these volumes, one has a large picture of the world situation. Perhaps our large world maps may be taken as a good example of this method.

The survey method includes the use of the statistical method, in some cases; it may also include the use of the ethnographical; it may also include the use of the case method. Indeed, it may include the use of every device known to man to serve in the making of a picture of wholes. And it is applicable to wholes of any size and character. We might have a crime survey in the world, in America, in Ohio, in Franklin County, in a particular block in the city; we might have a survey of a certain kind of crimes. We might have surveys of illegitimacy, of poverty, of illiteracy, of taboos, of fashions, of institutions. The survey is just what its name implies—an "overlook."

Ellwood thinks that the chief methods of study are: (1) the anthropological or comparative, (2) the historical, (3) the survey, (4) deduction from biological and psychological data, and (5) philosophical assumption.[1]

Again, Chapin has proposed three methods: (1) historical, (2) statistical, and (3) field-work observation.[2] In addition, Hart has suggested five possibilities: (1) the common sense method, which means generalizing from the data which happen to come to hand—the average man's method—(2) the historical method, which uses documents for its data, (3) the museum or census method, which has classification as its objective and is used extensively in surveys and governmental investigations, (4)

[1] *J. Social Forces*, March, 1924.

[2] *Scientific Monthly*, October, 1924.

the laboratory or experimental method—somewhat limited—and (5) the statistical method.[1]

Thus, it will be clear that this newer discipline called *sociology* does not yet have one thoroughly acceptable and exclusive method; there is not entire agreement among its followers as to just what are the most important methods. Doubtless, all of these proposed methods have their uses and values, and doubtless other methods will be discovered. A very important part of the work in this study is to work out satisfactory methods.

4. What is Sociology?

It is necessary now to give something more in the way of a formal definition, although definitions in this field are not easy to make—as we saw at the beginning. The statement of the joint commission, already given, is excellent and covers the field. But how, in a sentence or two, have sociologists defined their subject?

Generally, sociologists, instead of giving a formal definition of sociology, have entered upon an extended discussion of its nature. Some, however, have used a colorless definition like "Sociology is the science of society" or "the scientific study of society," or "the science of social phenomena." Others, using more words, add but little, as, for example, "Sociology is the name applied to a somewhat inchoate mass of materials which embodies our knowledge about society." Other definitions somewhat more definite, yet unsatisfactory in many ways, are, "the science of social process" and "the science of social relations." Better than these are, "Sociology is the study of men considered as affecting and as affected by association," or "the study of human association, including whatever conduces to it or modifies it."

Of the formal definitions that have been given by scientific men, none is more comprehensive than that of Professor Giddings, which follows: "Sociology is an attempt to account for the origin, growth, structure and activities of society by the operation of physical, vital, and psychical causes working together in a process of evolution." While it is difficult to give a brief comprehensive definition of sociology that will prove entirely satisfactory through all the changes of a developing science, Professor Giddings' definition is of great service to one who wishes a clear understanding and a precise view of the nature and purposes of the science. An adequate knowledge of the true nature and import of sociology, however, may better be obtained by a careful consideration of the underlying principles of the science, than by an attempt to follow any carefully formulated definition. *Sociology treats of the phenomena of society arising from the association of mankind.* It includes a body of classified knowledge relating to society and a

[1] "Science and Sociology," *A. J. S.*, November, 1921. See also Burgess, "The Social Survey," *A. J. S.*, January, 1916; Mess, "The Social Survey of Tyneside," *A. J. S.*, November, 1927; Lindeman, "Social Discovery," pp. 3 *ff.*; Elmer, *Social Forces*, December, 1925; Park, "Methods of Race Survey," *J. Applied Sociology*, May–June, 1926; Bain, "The Scientific Viewpoint in Sociology," *J. Applied Sociology*, September–October, 1926.

number of principles and laws. It investigates causes and effects, discovers social forces, and formulates laws of control, or rules of action.[1]

Sumner, one of the earliest and most outstanding sociologists of America, has formulated his definition as follows:

Sociology is the science of life in society. It investigates the forces which come into action whenever a human society exists. It studies the structure and functions of the organs of human society, and its aim is to find out the laws in subordination to which human society takes its various forms and social institutions grow and change. Its practical utility consists in deriving rules of right social living from the facts and laws which prevail by nature of the constitution and functions of society. It must, without doubt, come into collision with all other theories of right living which are founded on authority, tradition, arbitrary invention, or poetic imagination.

Sociology is perhaps the most complicated of all the sciences, yet there is no domain of human interest the details of which are treated ordinarily with greater facility.[2]

Almost all sciences are divided into what are known as the *pure* and the *applied* fields. There is pure chemistry and applied chemistry, pure mechanics and applied mechanics, and so on. Sociology has the same divisions; there is pure sociology and applied sociology. Says Fairchild:

The first department is that which is called theoretic or pure science. Its function is to study phenomena, ascertain facts, and establish laws and principles. It has no object in view beyond the acquirement of knowledge. The second department is the practical or applied science. This division has much of the nature of an art, its purpose being to take the facts, principles, and laws worked out by pure science, and devise methods of utilizing them to serve some human purpose.[3]

This second division, or part of it, is sometimes called *social technology*.

5. What is a Social Problem?

In modern sociological literature and in popular discussion, no term is used more frequently, perhaps, than the term *problem*. We have all heard of many different social problems—the problem of crime, the problem of insanity, the problem of divorce, the problem of prostitution,

[1] Blackmar and Gillin, "Outlines of Sociology," p. 13. See Chapin, *Scientific Monthly*, September, 1918.

[2] "War and Other Essays," pp. 167, 173. For Bouglé's view, see Messenger, "Célestin Bouglé," *Social Forces*, September, 1926, p. 8 *ff*; also, see Ginsberg, "The Scope of Sociology," *Economica*, Vol. XX, p. 135; Widgery, "Sociology: Its Nature and Scope, Aims and Methods," *Indian J. Sociology*, January, 1920.

[3] "Applied Sociology," p. 4. *Cf.* Howerth, "What Are Principles of Sociology?" *A. J. S.*, Vol. XXXI, p. 474; Swinny, "Sociology: Its Successes and Failures," *Sociological Review*, Spring, 1919.

the problem of municipal government, the problem of poverty, of international debts, of disease, of illiteracy, and so on without end. Writers and speakers seem to find a keen relish in listing as many problems as possible—often for others to solve. And, as if we did not have enough real problems to keep us all busy for a long time, the novelists and playwrights are busy day and night to face us with imaginary problems of all sorts; hence, the "problem play" and the "problem novel." These are tense "problem" days.

Now what is apt to happen to a term when it is used by so many people and in such a glib fashion? It usually degenerates into a catchall. It is employed by larger and larger numbers of people with greater diversities of experience to cover wider and wider areas of life. It gains in extensity but loses in intensity. Hence, coming to mean everything in general, it comes to mean nothing in particular. When two persons discuss "the problem of crime," we can rarely be sure that they are talking about the same thing. People are more and more appalled by the enlarging catalogue of problems in this country and the world without knowing precisely what they are appalled about. The constant use of the term gives the impression to a bystander that something is wrong somewhere. But how can the average man know a social problem when he meets it? Is all of this uproar about social problems just talk, or are there terrible realities behind the talk? Is there always some fire behind smoke? What is a problem?

The teacher says to the pupil, "Two times two?" That question makes a situation—dramatic, at times—for the pupil. It is a situation in which something is demanded of the pupil; it is a challenge. Whereas the situation was without pressure before, without a challenge, now it is new and demanding. Why is this? Because two people are involved—the teacher and the pupil—and because the teacher has power to deal with the pupil, to affect his welfare from this time on. It might seem that the pupil could ignore the challenge and pay no attention to it; but this is not the case; the teacher can whip the child, can make it stay in at recess, can deprive it of privileges, can insult it, can send it home, can do many things to affect the comfort and happiness and destiny of the child. Hence, the pupil cannot ignore the challenge—if there is any concern at all for future welfare. In this situation, two sorts of response are called for and cannot be evaded. One is mental, and the other is physical.

Speaking of the mental response first, we may say that the pupil is called upon to make a mental calculation and arrive at the answer: "Two times two are four." These two factors, "two times two" and "four," must be connected. The pupil cannot relieve the situation and meet the challenge by concluding: "Two times two are five." That would complicate the situation further. What is called for is a mental process

which will take hold of what is offered and carry it through to its logical and necessary conclusion. That is part of the challenge.

Then, there is the physical aspect of the challenge. The pupil is called upon to express, externalize, reveal the results of the mental process in such a form that the teacher will know that the work has been done correctly. Thus, the pupil "thinks a moment"—if this conclusion has not become automatic—and then *says* or goes to the board and *writes:* "Two times two are four." The situation would not be met if the pupil said or wrote: "Two times two are five." That would but complicate the situation. Nor would it do to say or write: "Joruslip e aypzxkst." Certain symbols have to be used in making this revelation of what goes on in the head. Thus, there are two kinds of skills called for in this particular situation—thinking skill and expressional or manipulatory skill. Thus, there are, from this standpoint, two kinds of problems.

The central feature of the *thinking* problem is that of mentally seeing things together or whole, that is, of being logical. This has to do with the facts of life and their meaning. Our social problems are such because we do not know what the facts are; we do not see clearly ahead; our thinking, as it reaches out ahead, faces dark places, chasms, obscurities. For example, crime is a problem because we do not know how many criminals there are, who are becoming criminals, what crimes they are planning, how these crimes will affect us personally. These criminals, with their acting, present us with a situation which has to be analyzed and understood, just as the teacher presented the pupil with a situation which had to be understood to be dealt with. With respect to crime and other social problems, we are like persons crossing a bridge which does not reach the other side of the stream. Our minds follow a gay white way as long as information holds out; then we plunge into the dark; but plunging into the dark is precarious. The logical aspect of our many social problems consists in getting all necessary information and then interpreting it, seeing what it means for us, and then weaving it together into something like a plan.

Then comes the *technical* side of the problem. After we are clear as to what is to be done, then we have to do it; we have to manipulate potential criminals and actual criminals in such a way as to eliminate crime from society. This is a matter of putting the plans conceived, on the basis of information, into operation. And, of course, this requires extraordinary skill. If the young adopt criminal tendencies, then how does it come to pass that they adopt them? Then, knowing where crime has its inception, what can be done about it? How can young people be manipulated so that they will not be criminals? How does it come about that some are poor? After we know this, we may be able to devise and carry out a plan to relieve or prevent poverty. And so on with other "problems."

We have to think and we have to manipulate, we have said. But why so? Why pay any attention to these problems? Why does the pupil have to pay any attention to the teacher? Well, we have already given some reasons. They are all summed up in the question of future welfare. The pupil who refused would not fare very well. This is an epitome of the whole matter. It is not healthy for us to neglect these so-called *problems*. We *have* to deal with them because we want to live and live better. If we say that the criminal will not "get" us, we are talking ignorantly; we do not know. As long as there is a criminal loose in society, no person's life or property is safe. This ought to be clear from our study of the interlinkings in society. As long as there is a disease germ loose in the world, no person's life is safe. Conditions that menace any one may menace all. If, therefore, we care at all for our welfare, even if we are utterly selfish, we have to deal with conditions which are a menace. From one point of view, the situation is no different from that presented to us by the presence of a deadly snake. What do we do? Stand there stupidly and allow it to bite us? Well, not if we can help it—if we are "all there." A social problem, then, is the recognition of a menace to human welfare and how to deal with it.

But we may have what is sometimes called an *idealistic* side. This manifests itself in a craving for unity and beauty in social arrangements. We may regard poverty, crime, disease, prostitution, insanity, and the rest as uglinesses in a world which might be harmonious and beautiful. Why should a farmer fix up a broken fence? First, because his cattle might stray away and be lost or other cattle might stray in and destroy his crops; he fixes it because a mended fence is conducive to his welfare. But if there are no such dangers, he might fix it because he likes to see everything in order about his place; he might fix it because a broken fence is an eyesore; he might fix it because of a standard of harmony and neatness to which he was trying to live up; he might fix it because of an æsthetic interest.

This desire for harmony in social relations leads not only to immediate rearrangement but also to ultimate rearrangement. Men close their eyes—after getting the facts, of course—and frame ideal worlds. Then they open them again and behold the frightening contrasts. The ideal and the real fight each other. What can people do?

They may puncture and abandon their ideals—and thus restore unity—and many people do this; finding it difficult and costly to make the real harmonize with the ideal, they pull down the ideal. Others work in the opposite way; they work the livelong day to rearrange the real so that it will correspond with the ideal, and thus they restore the unity. One is the way of destruction; the other is the way of construction. It is an old bit of folk wisdom that "where there is no vision the people perish." If, therefore, the end of the first way is extinction, there

is really only one way open—and that is the way of pulling things around so that they will correspond with the better world that may be conceived.

But we must be careful, here, to distinguish between those ideals which are but pretty speculative fancies and have no possibility of realization because of the nature of the materials with which we have to work and because the nature of these materials is not known *and* those ideals which are built up upon tested information. Because so many ideals are simply childish daydreams, we have sometimes been led to say that all ideals are bosh. Insane people do imagine wonderful things, and some have been inclined to turn this around and say that wonderful imaginings are usually insane.

How shall we determine, therefore, when ideals are sane and worthy to be carried out in action? A full answer to this question would take us to another question, the one with which we started, namely: How can we know when we know anything? But a sufficient answer for practical purposes might be this: Ideals are safe to follow, are valid and sane, when they are backed up by and grow out of careful investigation and logical thought, and when they seem to be favorable to human welfare. This is as far as we can go now. But it is far enough to allow full scope for all of our expanding powers. We can get the facts of situations more and more; we can interpret these facts and see better what they imply; we can learn to think more logically about them. And out of such processes come plans for human improvement.[1]

We all are blind until we see
That in the human plan
Nothing is worth the making if
It does not make the man.

—Edwin Markham.

Questions

1. Reviewing, what are some of the constituent elements or compositions of society? By the way, what is *society?*

2. Suppose that this course had not been called *sociology*, would you, after reading the book, have called it *sociology?*

3. Can you give examples of where social phenomena have been described in (1) mechanistic, (2) energistic, (3) vitalistic, (4) organic, and (5) psychological terms?

4. What statements in this book come under the above heads?

5. Have we kept faithfully to the scientific point of view outlined in, let us see, what chapter? Find places where you think that we have fallen into mere speculation.

6. Were you conscious of any exhibitions of prejudice as you read this book? Give examples.

7. What are the main differences between (1) sociology and the old history, (2) sociology and economics?

[1] See Case, "What Is a Social Problem?" *J. Applied Sociology*, Vol. VIII. Also Ellwood, "The Social Problem," *passim.*

8. What is the distinctive function of sociology? Don't miss this.
9. In what parts of this book did we trespass on political science?
10. Compare the methods of science with the methods of sociology.
11 What is needed before one can make a statistical statement of anything? Some facts? A unit of investigation?
12. What is the unit of investigation in sociology?
13. What would you say that you had gained from this course? Be specific.
14. What is a social problem? What methods of attacking problems have already been given? Where?
15. Can you find any contradictions between the positions taken in the first and the last chapters?
16. Take some problem that you have solved and trace out the steps.
17. What are the specific difficulties which all social scientists face? How may they be overcome?
18. Compare the natural and the social sciences as to their value for the human race.
19. What is philosophy? How does it differ from science?
20. Why is man the supreme value on earth? Are you of any value to anyone anywhere? How so?

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

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